VII

Ratification in States Generally Opposed to the Constitution

THE Constitution having been ratified by the requisite nine states, these states could now proceed to organize the government of the United States. The five weakest of them had ratified by large margins, as had been expected. The four stronger ones which the Federalists had believed could also, with sufficient effort, be brought to ratify had likewise fulfilled expectations. There now remained four strong states in which obviously there were large numbers of persons who were satisfied with the way their problems were being met under the Articles of Confederation.

These states were Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. In each of them it was expected that ratification, if it was achieved at all, would be attended by considerable difficulty. The Federalists had the upper hand now because they had a nine-state Union, but the possibility that one or even all of these remaining states might refuse to ratify was not at all remote. Their ratification was essential to the success of the Union, if only because their exclusion would divide the nation’s territory into three non-contiguous parts.

VIRGINIA

VIRGINIA’S ratification was almost as important to the Federalists as that of the first nine states. Without those nine states the Constitution could not be put into operation. Without Virginia, George Washington, the man whose unrivalled prestige made him the obvious choice for the office, could not be elected president. After a brilliant contest between powerful strategists Virginia ratified the Constitution on June 25, 1788. The victory of the Federalists was now all but complete.

Because of the refusal of George Mason and Edmund Randolph to sign the Constitution at the close of the Philadelphia Convention, even those who had little knowledge of the state’s internal affairs expected ratification in Virginia to be difficult. It was feared that a ratifying convention might not even be called. But this obstacle did not materialize. The Virginia legislature issued a call for a convention immediately after it convened in October, 1787, before the serious debate on the issue began. Despite the fact that of the members of the legislature who were later to serve as delegates to the convention, exactly half were to vote against ratification, the call for a convention was issued unanimously. There was some dispute over details. A bill originating in the House called for elections in March and the opening of the convention in May; the Senate proposed amendments providing that the election dates should coincide with the state’s traditional April elections, and that the meeting of the convention be advanced to June. These amendments the House accepted. The battle for ratification was now about to begin.¹

A full seven months was occupied in campaigning for the elections to the convention. The opponents of the Constitution clearly had an edge in the published propaganda. Mason’s lengthy and solemn statement of his objections, Randolph’s letter to the legislature explaining why he had refused to sign the document, and Richard Henry Lee’s masterful letter to the governor and the arguments he presented in newspapers and pamphlets were widely spread. Neither the barrage of newspaper propaganda from the northward, the anonymous writings on behalf of ratification in the newspapers of Norfolk, Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Alexandria, nor even the classic Federalist Papers, imported from New York and circulated in Virginia in quantity, could match the influence of these open declarations of Mason, Randolph, and Lee.²

The printed word reached only a limited audience in the vast spaces of Virginia, however, and forty-six of the delegates to the convention were to come from counties west of the Blue Ridge, where there was almost no circulation of printed matter.³ More important were oral discussions, the focusing of campaigns on particular areas, and the careful selection of candidates, and in these matters the friends of ratification were perhaps shrewder than their opponents. One technique which they used with signal success was to induce retired military heroes, whom they assumed would be under the great Federalist influence of George Washington, to become candidates for seats that would otherwise be likely to go to men who were regularly elected to the legislature and who it was assumed would be under the influence of the great anti-Federalist Patrick Henry.⁴

When the vigorous campaign was over and election returns were in, the Federalists had apparently won a clear victory. A careful Federalist survey made shortly after the elections showed that eighty-five candidates, exactly half of the total, had been elected as Federalists. Sixty-six had been elected as anti-Federalists and three were considered “doubtful.” With respect to sixteen delegates, twelve from Kentucky and four from the Trans-Alleghany area, it was not known what instructions they had received nor what their attitudes were. The task of the ratificationists appeared to be simply to hold their own and win one of the sixteen westerners. By the time the convention met, their position was stronger and victory seemed assured, for Edmund Randolph, who had been counted as an opponent, had changed his mind and announced his support of ratification.⁵

No one in the Federalist camp was overconfident, however, for it was impossible to ignore the almost magical power of Patrick Henry. With his prestige, his inspiring oratory, and his genius for creating and capitalizing on a dramatic moment, Henry was a formidable opponent. He was supported by William Grayson, a lawyer of prestige who had great personal influence with the half dozen men in the convention who had served in his regiment during the war. Colonels Benjamin Temple and Robert Lawson, both heroes of the war, and Theodorick Bland, vice-president of the Virginia Society of the Cincinnati, were expected to help Grayson break the military phalanx in the Federalist ranks. Finally, there was George Mason, renowned as the framer of the Virginia Bill of Rights, a man with enormous personal prestige. The strongest assets of the anti-ratificationists were age, prestige, and Patrick Henry.

The Federalist leaders devised their strategy with painstaking thoroughness. Realizing that no one man was a match for Henry, they worked as a team. As his equal in prestige they could offer Edmund Pendleton, his foe since the celebrated legislative battles of the 1760’s, and George Wythe, beloved mentor of a half dozen lawyers in the convention. To deal with Henry’s logic they employed Madison and Marshall. When Henry shifted his ground and talked of Virginia affairs, they countered with George Nicholas. For the dirty work, the infighting, they employed one of the few men who dared battle Henry in that area, Edmund Randolph.

Despite the careful plans, the keen strategy, and the persuasive oratory of the Federalists, Henry and the other anti-ratificationists managed to convert three of the elected Federalists and enlist ten of the twelve Kentucky delegates. The conversion of the three Federalists Henry apparently achieved with one brilliant speech portraying the destruction of liberties that would ensue from ratification, a portrayal so vivid that one witness “involuntarily felt his wrists to assure himself that the fetters were not already pressing his flesh.” The support of the Kentuckians was won by a dramatic introduction of the question of the proposed Jay-Gardoqui Treaty, providing for the surrender of navigation of the Mississippi to Spain. The Federalists managed to enlist the four Trans-Alleghany delegates, one of the three “undecided” delegates, and two of the Kentucky delegates. When the final vote was taken on June 25, the Constitution was ratified by a slim margin, the vote being 89 votes to 79.⁶

It is evident even from a reading of the debates in the convention that there is no simple explanation of the movement for ratification in Virginia. To explain the votes in full would be to write the history of Virginia from 1758 to 1788. Much light can be shed on the question, however, by an analysis of the origins and development of the principal issues upon which Virginia’s vote turned.

These must be considered in the light of Virginians’ attitude toward their state. Virginia has been called the Prussia of the American Confederation. To Virginians it was even more than that. So strongly imbued were they with state consciousness and pride that many of them applied the term “my country” only to Virginia, using various other terms to signify the United States.⁷ This state particularism, of long standing, had been augmented after the war when the state, now free from the commercial and political shackles that had bound it under the crown, enjoyed an unprecedented wave of prosperity; everyone except the planters on the depleted tobacco lands of the tidewater was inspired with a confidence Virginians had never known before.⁸

The task of the advocates of ratification was to overcome this state particularism. The problem of their opponents was to preserve and augment it.

Seven basic sets of factors may be profitably examined as possible determinants of the votes in the convention: the backgrounds of the delegates, the war experiences of various sections of the state, personal influences, military connections, the effects of the treaty of peace, Robert Morris, and the Mississippi River question.

Several of the delegates were not native Virginians. Four of them had been born and had grown up abroad, a fifth came from Pennsylvania, and a sixth had been taken to England by his loyalist parents as a young man and had returned after the peace. None of these men had the passionate provincial feelings of the other delegates, and all six were unwavering friends of ratification.

A second factor was the lesson the war had taught respecting military defense. Those places that had suffered damages from the war at first hand were acutely conscious of their military vulnerability, and their provincialism withered in the face of the realization that only a strong union could provide military security. The greatest wartime losses had been suffered by the counties of York, James City, Warwick, Elizabeth City, and Gloucester, which had been the battlegrounds preceding and during Yorktown, and the borough of Norfolk, which had been the victim of naval warfare. Almost every plantation in these counties had been burned to the ground. These areas sent eleven delegates to the convention, ten of whom voted for ratification.⁹

A third factor was the personal influence of some of the delegates. A complex network of lesser influences pervaded the convention: Randolph, Madison, Nicholas, Pendleton, and Wythe on one side and Grayson, Benjamin Harrison, and Mason on the other had personal followings of varying sizes. In the main, however, the contest was one between the rival influences of two giants, George Washington and Patrick Henry. Throughout the continent as a whole Washington enjoyed a prestige with which no other man’s could compare. In Virginia, however, Henry’s influence, except among the military, was probably greater than Washington’s. At least two dozen of the delegates were men who had, over the past six years or more, consistently followed Henry’s lead on virtually every issue in the legislature, and Henry’s prestige extended his influence far beyond his immediate political following. Except among the few men with whom he regularly corresponded, Washington’s influence outside the military is difficult to measure.

Military service also played a role in the contest over ratification. The Federalists, as has been said, had selected as many military men as possible as candidates for the convention. Forty-six of the eighty-nine Federalist delegates had been officers in the Revolutionary armies, and twenty-three more had been militia officers, about half of whom had seen combat. Henry Lee summarized Federalist logic in the choice of military candidates in a speech attacking Henry’s appeal to provincialism. One would think, Lee said, “that the love of an American was in some degree criminal, as being incompatible with a proper degree of affection for a Virginian. The people of America, sir, are one people. I love the people of the North, not because they have adopted the Constitution, but because I fought with them as countrymen, and because I consider them as such.” ¹⁰

Despite the fact that three-fourths of the delegates who favored ratification had seen military service, however, it is possible to overestimate this factor. The anti-ratificationists countered with the influence of Grayson and other distinguished veterans, and with Henry’s eloquent championing of the superiority of the civil authority over that of the military. The presence of so many military men in the Federalist ranks actually frightened some delegates and made them receptive to Henry’s vivid prognostication of armed hordes marching under the banner of the new government to subvert Virginia liberties. As a result of these counter-influences, thirty-five men who had served as officers in the Revolutionary armies voted against ratification.¹¹

The fifth set of factors, the issues relating to the treaty of peace, was the most complex of all. Two sections of the treaty, one providing for the evacuation of the British military outposts in the Northwest Territory and the other for the restoration of property to legitimate owners on both sides, were of immense significance to Virginia. These provisions affected Virginians for four reasons: 1) The Northwest posts were an obstacle to the westward migration of Virginians, and were therefore inimical to the interests of residents of the Valley and Trans-Alleghany regions, and to those of the land speculators who held titles to vast tracts in the Territory. 2) Virginia had lost some thirty thousand slaves, more than a tenth of the total number in the state, through confiscation by the British army. 3) Virginia had confiscated large quantities of British and loyalist property, principally the vast Fairfax estate in the Northern Neck, around Alexandria. 4) Virginia planters owed British merchants more than two million pounds sterling (nearly ten million dollars) for prewar purchases. The treaty affected Virginians favorably with respect to the first two matters, unfavorably with respect to the other two.¹²

During the 1780’s the treaty had been disregarded on all four matters. The British had refused to evacuate the posts and to restore or make restitution for the slaves, the Virginians had made no effort to restore the property they had confiscated and had passed legislation prohibiting the collection of the debts. During the war they had gone so far as to permit debtors to write off their obligations by paying nominally equivalent sums of depreciated paper money into the state treasury and twice, in 1784 and 1787, they had expressly refused to open their courts to suits by British creditors.

The Constitution promised an end to the treaty holiday. In theory, it made treaties the supreme law of the land; in practice, it established a government which could require the British to abide by the treaty and which would open its own courts to suits by British subjects seeking restoration of their property.¹³

One of these four issues, that concerning the Northwest posts, was a relatively simple one. Few of the delegates from the Valley and Trans-Alleghany regions were debtors to British merchants, and all of them resented the presence of the British across the Ohio River in the Northwest Territory. These areas sent twenty-eight delegates to the convention, twenty-seven of whom voted for ratification.¹⁴

The other issues arising from the treaty were extremely complex. The areas that had suffered most from British depredations were, in the main, the very same areas in which debts to British merchants were most heavily concentrated. The area that had the most to lose from a restoration of sequestered property, the Northern Neck, was the area where Washington lived and exerted his greatest influence. Attitudes with respect to the treaty varied with individual attitudes toward the British and the loyalists, which in turn were born of the amount of personal suffering endured at the hands of the British as well as a number of other factors.

In general, there were four shades of opinion regarding the treaty. One small group favored unconditional obedience to its terms on the part of the United States, either because they considered it a matter of national honor or, more often, because they were pro-British. A second group, which included a large number of the inhabitants of the western regions, favored making strong concessions to the British as a show of good faith, in the hope that the British would respond by abiding by the treaty themselves. A third and larger group would refuse to abide by the treaty until Britain made overtures indicating a clear intention to abide by all its terms. This group was subdivided into two factions: one wanted to work actively through Congress for British compliance and the other wanted merely to wait. The fourth group was unconditionally opposed to complying with the disputed parts of the treaty then or at any time in the future.¹⁵

While there existed these four shades of opinion and the lines separating them were not clearly drawn, in the ratifying convention the delegates could vote only one of two ways, yes or no. This being the case, it was obvious that the influence of the treaty in shaping attitudes toward ratification would depend largely upon the ability of partisan leaders to convince the delegates of the safety or insecurity of their interests. On the question of the property confiscated by Virginia, the Federalists, under the leadership of John Marshall—who was himself deeply interested financially in the sequestered Fairfax estate—obviously were the more convincing. All the delegates from the Northern Neck, with the lone exception of George Mason, voted for ratification.

The question of the British debts was not settled with such unanimity. Leaders on both sides had taken advantage of the wartime act to write off old debts by paying depreciated paper to the state. Federalists such as Pendleton, Lee, Fleming, Alexander White, Zachariah Johnston, Paul Carrington, Marshall, Thomas Walke, and Robert Breckenridge had made such payments, as had Harrison, Henry, and Joseph Jones of the opposition.¹⁶

During the 1780’s seven votes were taken in the House of Delegates on the various issues concerning the treaty. On only three of these was the issue clear-cut. On November 17, 1787, a proposal was made that all legal obstacles to the collection of the debts be removed, provided this could be done equitably and with some order. A comparison of the votes on this question with the vote on ratification seven months later is of considerable interest.¹⁷

The delegates who were later to vote for ratification opposed this proposal, twenty-two votes to six. The delegates who later voted against the Constitution voted, despite the opposition of both Henry and Mason, in favor of the resolution, sixteen votes to ten.

The counties east of the Blue Ridge which were to favor ratification cast fourteen votes in favor of the proposal and twenty-one against it. The counties east of the Blue Ridge which were to oppose the Constitution voted for the proposal, twenty-three to fourteen. From the four counties which were to be divided on ratification, three legislators later attended the convention, two of whom voted for the proposal. In the state as a whole, the counties that were to favor ratification opposed the proposal forty-four to twenty, and the counties that were to oppose ratification favored the proposal, twenty-eight to twenty-one.

On the same day, November 17, a vote was taken on a resolution that Virginia refuse to comply with the treaty until every other state passed a blanket law repealing all acts contrary to the treaty. This was virtually impossible of attainment, so in effect the proposal was to refuse to abide by the treaty at all, under any circumstances. The delegates who later voted for the Constitution supported this resolution, twenty-three to five, and the delegates who were to oppose ratification voted against the resolution, twenty to four. Later in the day the proto-Federalists voted, four to twenty-three, against a proposal that Virginia comply with the treaty if Britain indicated its intention of doing so. The anti-Federalist delegates-to-be supported this measure, twenty to six.

A great majority of the proto-Federalists, then, were opposed to the collection of the debts on any terms. On the other hand, sixteen of the twenty-six delegates who later opposed the Constitution favored collection of the debts without qualification, and four more favored collection if Britain could be induced to abide by the treaty.

It is clear, then, though it may be paradoxical, that if there was a debtors’ faction in Virginia politics, it was largely identical in personnel with the pro-ratificationist group.¹⁸

The sixth major element influencing the movement for ratification was the connection of the Virginia movement with Robert Morris of Philadelphia. That gentleman had been suspect in Virginia since his reign as superintendant of finance in 1781-1783, and Virginians were inclined to be hostile to any movement in which he had a part. Perhaps a more important cause of their antipathy was born of Morris’ contract with the corrupt French Farmers-General, giving him a monopoly of the French tobacco trade. Though shrewd Scotch-Virginian traders ultimately found ways to circumvent the monopoly and to trade on a large scale directly with France, Morris was temporarily able to force the price of tobacco in Virginia down from forty shillings to twenty-two shillings a hundredweight, and the experience won him the hostility of most Virginians. His signature on the Constitution did nothing to make the document more palatable to them.¹⁹

The seventh and final major element was the question of the navigation of the Mississippi, which has been previously mentioned and is discussed more fully on pages 366-367.²⁰

From the foregoing it would appear that only one economic consideration (navigation of the Mississippi) had a decisive influence on the final votes in the ratifying convention. The votes cut across all other economic issues in no meaningful pattern whatever; the decision did not turn on such questions. Furthermore, study of the occupations and property holdirigs of the members of the convention demonstrates that there was no line of division on the basis of individual property holdings. As the following tabulation shows, the property holdings of ratificationists and anti-ratificationists were virtually identical except that more small farmers from the interior supported ratification than opposed it.²¹

ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DELEGATES VOTING FOR RATIFICATION

One delegate voting for ratification, Levin Powell (Loudon), was a merchant. The amount of his stock in trade was not ascertained, but one sloop belonging to him appears regularly in the manuscript Naval Officer Returns—that is, the customs office records of Virginia—for the period. He also owned 1,836 acres of land in five parcels, valued at £464. His personalty consisted of 22 slaves above the age of twelve, 18 horses, 24 cattle, and a two-wheeled chair (1787). He held $321 in continental securities.²²

Seventeen were lawyers. Their property holdings were as follows.

John Blair (York), whose interests have previously been sketched in connection with his attendance at the Philadelphia Convention (page 74, above).

James Innes (Williamsburg), 200 acres valued at £92 10s. in York County (1786), no city property, 15 adult slaves (that is, slaves above the age of twelve) in Williamsburg, a cow, 3 horses, and a two-wheeled carriage (1786).

George Jackson (Harrison), amount of land unknown; 3 adult slaves, 8 horses. Jackson owned continental securities on which he received $59.40 interest payments in 1788.²³

James Johnson (Isle of Wight), 300 acres valued at £88 15s.; 5 adult slaves, 4 horses.²⁴

Gabriel Jones (Rockingham), 1,102 acres in Augusta County, 1,004 acres in Rockingham County, and 650 acres in Spotsylvania, having a total value of £996 17s. 10d.; 16 adult slaves, 6 horses, and a two-wheeled carriage. Jones owned $399.97 in continental securities.²⁵

James Madison, Jr. (Orange), whose interests are described on pages 72–73.

Humphrey Marshall (Fayette), 4 slaves, 10 horses. The land books for Fayette County (Kentucky) are missing; in all likelihood Marshall’s total landholding was the 4,000-acre bounty he had been granted for war service.²⁶

John Marshall (Henrico), no taxable personal property. The land books for his county are no longer extant, but Marshall owned 4,000 acres of Kentucky land that had been granted to him as a bounty for war service. He owned $6,205 in state securities.²⁷

Andrew Moore (Rockbridge), 610 acres valued at £154; 5 adult slaves.²⁸

George Nicholas (Albemarle), 3¼town lots with annual rentals totaling £90 and 1,122 acres valued at £282 3s.; 22 adult slaves, 15 horses.²⁹

George Parker (Accomac), 470 acres valued at £137 19 S .; no slaves or other personalty.³⁰

Edmund Pendleton (Caroline), 3,875 acres valued at £975 6s.; 44 adult slaves, 21 horses, one chariot; listed in 1787 as the owner of 105 head of cattle.

Edmund Randolph (Henrico), whose interests are listed on pages 74-75. Charles Simms (Fairfax), 11 acres valued at £ 11 11s.; no slaves, 2 horses. Simms owned $1,816 in state securities and was speculating in western lands, having acquired at least 16,000 acres in military bounties from various individuals.³¹

Archibald Stuart (Augusta), 440 acres valued at £82 5s.; one slave, 2 horses. Stuart owned continental securities on which he was paid $77.30 interest in 1788.³²

Alexander White (Frederick), 664 acres valued at £597 12s.;9 adult slaves, 9 horses, a four-wheeled phaeton. White owned $1,619 in state securities.³³

George Wythe (York), whose interests are sketched on pages 73-74.

Five were physicians:

William Fleming (Botetourt), 2,398 acres in Botetourt and 400 acres in Buckingham, with a total value of £386 19s.; 7 adult slaves, 11 horses.³⁴

Walter Jones (Northumberland), 636 acres valued at £182 17s.; 25 adult slaves, 8 horses, a four-wheeled phaeton; $485 in continental securities.³⁵

Miles King (Elizabeth City), half of a town lot with annual rent of £ 26 10s. and 604 acres in five parcels, having a total valuation of £356 18s .³⁶

David Stuart (Fairfax), 1,665 acres valued at £723 13s.; 14 adult slaves, 4 horses; $2,024 in continental securities.³⁷

James Taylor (Norfolk County), 165 acres valued at £120 6s.; 4 adult slaves, 3 horses; $1,443 in continental and state securities.³⁸

Two were ministers:

Robert Andrews (James City), who owned neither land nor slaves in James City County, but who owned two town lots in Williamsburg with a yearly rent of £16 10s. He also owned $13,030 in various forms of securities, most of them state securities.³⁹

Anthony Walke (Princess Anne), who owned 3,881½ acres in three parcels in Princess Anne and 50 acres in Norfolk County, having a total value of £1,689 15s ., and 12 town lots of unknown value; 48 adult slaves, 23 horses, a four-wheeled phaeton.⁴⁰

Sixty-four were planters and lesser farmers:

John Allen (Surry), 2,000 acres in James City County and 200 acres in Surry, having a total value of £2,004 3s.; owned no slaves in his own name. In 1787 Allen had owned continental securities on which he received $554.70 interest, but by 1791 the total face value of his securities was only $105.⁴¹

Burdet Ashton (King George), 350 acres valued at £110 16s.; 34 adult slaves, 13 horses.

Burwell Bassett (Newkent), 5,880 acres in four parcels, having a total value of £3,729 9s.; 81 adult slaves, 23 horses, a coach, a phaeton, and a chair.

Benjamin Blount (Southampton), 1,450 acres valued at £ 1,026 13s.; 19 adult slaves, 12 horses, and a two-wheeled chair.⁴²

Robert Breckenridge (Jefferson), whose landholdings consisted of the 3,110-acre bounty he had received for war service.⁴³

Humphrey Brooke (Fauquier), 400 acres valued at £257 18s.; no slaves or other personalty.

Rice Bullock (Jefferson), whose land consisted of his 2,666-acre military bounty.⁴⁴

Nathaniel Burwell (James City), 5,608 acres in Frederick County, 1,800 acres in York County, and 1,288 acres in James City County, having a total value of £7,886 3s ., and a 5400-acre tract in Kentucky received as a military bounty; 21 adult slaves and 19 horses on the Frederick County plantation and 34 slaves, 10 horses, a chariot, and a two-wheeled carriage on the James City County plantation; $307 in state securities.⁴⁵

William Overton Callis (Louisa), 660 acres valued at £343 15s ., and a 4,000-acre tract in Kentucky received as a military bounty; 10 adult slaves, 3 horses.⁴⁶

Paul Carrington (Charlotte), 1,815 acres valued at £1,817 17s.; 33 adult slaves, 21 horses, and a two-wheeled chariot; $891 in state securities.⁴⁷

William Clayton (Newkent), 1,808 acres valued at £1,055 8s.; 23 adult slaves, 16 horses, one chair.

George Clindinnen (Greenbriar), five parcels totaling 3,140 acres, valued at £628 17s . (1789); 2 adult slaves, 9 horses.

John Hartwell Cocke (Surry), 1,377 acres valued at £987 18S .; 22 adult slaves, 6 horses, a four-wheeled chaise; two continental certificates, one having a face value of $454 and the other of $298. On the latter Cocke received $54 for three years’ back interest in 1786.⁴⁸

Francis Corbin (Middlesex), 200 acres valued at £196 13s.; 14 adult slaves, 5 horses.

William Darke (Berkeley), 4 adult slaves, 15 horses. The records of land-holdings in his county are no longer extant, but it is known that Darke had received 8,660 acres in bounties for military service. He also owned $4,078 in state securities.⁴⁹

Cole Digges (Warwick), 3,013 acres in Warwick and 560 acres in James City County, total value £1,837 18S., and 2,666 acres of Kentucky land received as a bounty for military service; 34 adult slaves, 20 horses, a two-wheeled chair.⁵⁰

Littleton Eyre (Northampton), 1,504 acres valued at £752; 48 adult slaves, 23 horses.

Daniel Fisher (Greensville), 752 acres valued at £419 13s.; 43 adult slaves, 37 cattle, 14 horses, and a two-wheeled chair, all owned jointly with three other men; $442 in continental securities.⁵¹

William Fleet’ (King and Queen), 296¼ acres valued at £307 7s.; 7 adult slaves, 6 horses.

Thomas Gaskins (Northumberland), 700 acres valued at £575 8s . and 8,832 acres of Kentucky land received as a bounty for military service; 21 adult slaves, 9 horses, and a four-wheeled phaeton; $358 in continental securities, on which he received $60 for three years’ interest in 1787.⁵²

James Gordon (Lancaster), 686 acres valued at £359 14s.; 35 adult slaves, 10 horses, a four-wheeled post chaise, and a chair.

James Gordon (Orange), 36 adult slaves, 14 horses; no land is listed in Gordon’s name in the Orange County Land Books. One of the two James Gordons owned continental securities on which he received $162 interest in 1787.⁵³

Ralph Humphreys (Hampshire), landholdings unknown; no slaves, one stud valued at £1 5s . for a season’s coverage.

Zachariah Johnston (Augusta), 697 acres in Augusta valued at £211 15s. and 440 acres in Botetourt valued at £594; 3 adult slaves, 16 horses; continental securities on which he received $30 interest in 1787.⁵⁴

Samuel Kello (Southampton), 700 acres valued at £317 18S.; 13 adult slaves, 6 horses, and a post chaise.

Henry Lee (Westmoreland), 955 acres in Fairfax and 1,645 acres in Westmoreland having a combined value of £ 1,161 13s ., one town lot with £5 yearly rent, and 8,239 acres in military bounty lands; 50 adult slaves, 6 horses, 50 cattle, and a four-wheeled chariot (1787).⁵⁵

Thomas Lewis (Rockingham), 1,960 acres valued at £645; no slaves or other taxable personalty.

Warner Lewis (Gloucester), 3,024 acres valued at £3,729 (1787); 153 adult slaves, 45 horses, 224 cattle, one post chaise, and one chair; $4,672 in continental securities.⁵⁶

William McClerry (Monongalia), one slave, one horse; the land books for his county are no longer extant.⁵⁷

Martin McFerran (Botetourt), 319 acres valued at £526; no slaves or other taxable personalty; continental securities on which he was paid $41.50 interest in 1787.⁵⁸

William McKee (Rockbridge), 134 acres valued at £ 5; 4 slaves, 6 horses,

William Mason (Greensville), 828 acres valued at £ 565; no slaves, 2 horses. Thomas Matthews (Norfolk Borough). No tax returns for the borough as distinct from the county exist for these early years, and Matthews’ name does not appear on the county listings. He owned $524 in continental securities.⁵⁹

Wilson Cary Nicholas (Albemarle), no landholdings recorded; 41 adult slaves, 21 horses, and a phaeton.

David Patteson (Chesterfield), 810 acres valued at £435 7s . (1789), 28 town lots with a yearly rent of £ 58 14s.; 14 adult slaves (1789), 9 horses, a phaeton, and one stud horse; continental securities on which he received $20 interest in 1786. Patteson was opposed to ratification and he voted with the anti-Federalist minority for a proposal to ratify conditionally. This failing, he voted for ratification.⁶⁰

William Peachey (Richmond), 500 acres valued at £631 5s.; 39 adult slaves, 8 horses, 42 cattle (1786); $805 in continental securities.⁶¹

Martin Pickett (Fauquier), 1,063 acres valued at £403 8s. ; 17 adult slaves, 13 horses.

John Prunty (Harrison), size of landholdings unknown; no slaves, 5 horses.

Willis Riddick (Nansemond), 500 acres valued at £395 16s . and 4,000 acres of western land received as a bounty for war service.⁶²

Jacob Rinker (Shenandoah), 478 acres valued at £111 1OS.; no slaves, 34 cattle, 10 horses (1787).⁶³

William Ronald (Powhatan), 3,074 acres in Powhatan and 1,370 acres in Goochland, total value £2,218 17s.; 48 adult slaves, 28 horses, a phaeton in Powhatan, and 2 slaves in Goochland.

Abel Seymour (Hardy), landholdings unknown; 2 adult slaves, 9 horses. Solomon Shepherd (Nansemond), 529 acres valued at £698 14s.; taxable personalty unknown; $1,017 in continental securities.⁶⁴

Thomas Smith (Gloucester), 630 acres valued at £345; 31 adult slaves, 10 horses, and a phaeton; $268 in continental securities.⁶⁵

Adam Stephen (Berkeley), data on landholdings unavailable; 29 adult slaves, 40 horses; continental securities on which he was paid $614 interest in 1787.⁶⁶

John Stringer (Northampton), 400 acres valued at £200; 11 adult slaves, 5 horses; $704 in continental securities.⁶⁷

John Stuart (Greenbriar), 2,100 acres valued at £300; 6 adult slaves, 16 horses; $16 in continental securities.⁶⁸

James Taylor (Caroline), 2,070 acres valued at £2,105; 40 adult slaves, 12 horses, 48 cattle, and one phaeton (1787). An unidentified James Taylor funded $419 in continental securities. Whether it was this delegate, or Dr. James Taylor of Norfolk, or some other James Taylor cannot be ascertained.⁶⁹

William Thornton (King George), 400 acres valued at £426 14s.; 15 adult slaves, 13 horses; $1,224 in continental securities.⁷⁰

Walker Tomlin (Richmond), 274 acres valued at £124 8s •; 60 adult slaves, 7 horses, 80 cattle (1786); $499 in continental securities.⁷¹

Henry Towles (Lancaster), 485 acres in Lancaster and 1,230 acres in Culpeper, total value £396 7s.; 12 adult slaves, 5 horses, and a carriage.

Isaac Vanmeter (Hardy), landholdings unknown; 9 slaves and 10 horses co-owned with Jacob Vanmeter; $2,385 in continental securities.⁷²

Thomas Walke (Princess Anne), 1,000 acres valued at £425; 18 adult slaves, 15 horses, a two-wheeled carriage, and a stud horse worth £1 10s . for seasonal covering. Walke’s slaves had been confiscated by Lord Carleton during the war, and he had paid off prewar debts by payments into the state treasury.⁷³

Bushrod Washington (Westmoreland), land valued at £1,300; 19 adult slaves, 12 horses, a six-wheeled phaeton, a chair, and a stud horse worth 12 shillings for a season’s covering.

James Webb (Norfolk County), 878 acres valued at £256 1s. (1787); 21 adult slaves, 6 horses, and a two-wheeled carriage.

Worlich Westwood (Elizabeth City), 1¾ town lots with annual rental of £20 and 498 acres valued at £262 6s.; personal property unknown.

John Williams (Shenandoah), one town lot with a £5 yearly rental and 61 acres valued at £28 4s.; 5 adult slaves, 5 horses. Williams was the clerk of the Shenandoah County Court in 1788-1789.

Benjamin Wilson (Randolph), size of estate unknown.

John Wilson (Randolph), size of estate unknown.

John S. Woodcock (Frederick), 500 acres valued at £236 13s.; 7 adult slaves, 11 horses, and a four-wheeled stage coach.

Andrew Woodrow (Hampshire), landholdings unknown; 2 adult slaves, 4 horses; continental securities on which he received $416 interest in 1786.⁷⁴

Archibald Woods (Ohio), 400 acres valued at £33 6S.; personalty unknown; $519 in state securities.⁷⁵

ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DELEGATES VOTING AGAINST RATIFICATION

Four of the anti-Federalist delegates were merchants:

Isaac Coles (Halifax), brother-in-law of Elbridge Gerry, having, like Gerry, married one of the daughters of the New York City merchant James Tompson. Coles owned, in addition to his mercantile property, 1,640 acres of land valued at £702 13s ., 13 adult slaves, and 13 horses.⁷⁶

Stephen Pankey (Chesterfield), who owned, in Chesterfield, a store, a town lot with yearly rental of £ 160, 1,587 acres of land valued at £ 706 16s ., 6 adult slaves, and 3 horses, and in Powhatan 573 acres valued at £180 4s . Pankey also owned $111 in continental securities.⁷⁷

Parke Goodall (Hanover), who owned a retail store, an unknown amount of land, 16 adult slaves, 8 horses, and $186 in continental securities.⁷⁸

Henry Dickenson (Russell), who owned a country store, 150 acres valued at £ 26 17s ., one slave, and 7 horses.

Twelve were lawyers:

Cuthbert Bullitt (Prince William), 527 acres in Prince William and 2,200 acres in Botetourt, total value £398 9s.; 5 adult slaves, 5 horses, and a four-wheeled chair.⁷⁹

John Dawson (Spotsylvania), 588 acres valued at £271 19s.; 23 adult slaves, 6 horses, and 10 cattle (1787). Dawson and anti-Federalist James Monroe shared a house in Fredericksburg which they rented from anti-Federalist Joseph Jones.

William Grayson (Prince William), 2 town lots, 685 acres valued at £475 4s ., and 7,592 acres of western land received as bounties for military service.⁸⁰

Patrick Henry (Prince Edward), 8,534 acres in Henry County and 70 acres in Prince Edward County, total value £3,757 19s.; 40 adult slaves, 29 horses, and a two-wheeled coach.

Samuel Hopkins (Mecklenburg), 875 acres valued at £295 6s. and 7,833 acres of Kentucky land received as military bounties; 21 adult slaves, 16 horses, and a chair; $5,133 in continental securities.⁸¹

Joseph Jones (Dinwiddie), 2,503 acres valued at £2,189 14s.; 19 adult slaves, 19 horses, and a four-wheeled chariot; $32 in state securities.⁸²

Henry Lee (Bourbon), whose holdings of land and slaves are not ascertainable.⁸³

Stephens Thomson Mason (Loudon), 1,000 acres valued at £758 6s.; 71 slaves, 28 horses, 76 cattle, a four-wheeled chaise, and a stud valued at 18 shillings for a season’s covering (1787); continental securities on which he drew $32 interest in 1788.⁸⁴

James Monroe (Spotsylvania), no listing of either land or slaves in the county other than the house he rented with Dawson. He owned 5,333 acres of Kentucky land which had been granted to him for military service.⁸⁵

Abraham Trigg (Montgomery), 155 acres valued at £100; 5 adult slaves, 7 horses.⁸⁶

John Tyler (Charles City), 569 acres valued at £344 6s. ; slaveholdings not ascertainable.⁸⁷

Edmund Winston (Campbell), 500 acres valued at £220; 17 adult slaves, 15 horses.⁸⁸

One of the anti-ratificationist delegates, Theodorick Bland (Prince George), was a physician. Bland owned 1,339 acres valued at £880 14s . and 6,666 acres of Kentucky land received as a bounty for military service; 19 adult slaves, 10 horses, and a four-wheeled carriage; more than $5,000 in state and continental securities.⁸⁹

One of the anti-ratificationist delegates, Charles Clay (Bedford), was a minister.⁹⁰

Sixty of the delegates who voted against ratification were planters and farmers:

Robert Alexander (Campbell), 1,742 acres valued at £545 13s.; 10 adult slaves, 21 cattle, and a two-wheeled carriage (1787).

Thomas Allen (Mercer), the size of whose estate is not ascertainable.

Thomas Arthurs (Franklin), 717 acres valued at £337 18s.; 6 adult slaves, 8 horses.

David Bell (Buckingham), 426 acres in Buckingham valued at £111 16s. and 501 acres in Lunenburg valued at £204 14s.; slaveholdings unknown. Edmund Booker (Amelia), 568 acres valued at £305; 16 adult slaves, 5 horses.

John H. Briggs (Sussex), 3,025 acres valued at £995; 4 adult slaves, 5 horses.

Andrew Buchanan (Stafford), one town lot with £50 annual rental, 364 acres in Stafford and 600 acres in Washington, having a total value of £298 19s.; 9 adult slaves, 6 horses, and a four-wheeled carriage.

Samuel Jordan Cabell (Amherst), 1,444 acres in Amherst and 4,400 acres in Buckingham having a total value of £1,597 13s . and 7,833 acres of Kentucky land received as a military bounty; 21 adult slaves, 11 horses, and a four-wheeled phaeton; $4,529 in continental securities.⁹¹

William Cabell (Amherst), 17,837 acres valued at £6,596 11s.; 54 adult slaves, 22 horses, a four-wheeled carriage, and two chairs; $209 in continental securities.⁹²

George Carrington (Halifax), 1,974 acres valued at £1,077 6S.; 12 adult slaves, 7 horses; $2,837 in continental and $112 in state securities.⁹³

Thomas Carter (Russell), 400 acres valued at £38 6s.; one slave, 11 horses.

Richard Cary (Warwick), 350 acres valued at £ 186 135.; 24 adult slaves, 12 horses, a two-wheeled chair, and one stud valued at £ 1 for a season’s covering.

Green Clay (Bedford), 690 acres valued at £ 311 5s.; 6 adult slaves, 6 horses.⁹⁴

Thomas Cooper (Henry), 1,163 acres valued at £702 12s.; 7 adult slaves, 11 horses.

Walter Crockett (Montgomery), 478 acres valued at £140; 3 adult slaves, 9 horses.

Edmund Custis (Accomac), 534 acres valued at £255 18s.; 18 adult slaves, 11 horses; $1,837 in continental securities.⁹⁵

Thomas H. Drew (Cumberland), 90 acres valued at £ 46 10s. and 4,000 acres of Kentucky land received as a bounty for military service; no slaves; $466 in continental securities.⁹⁶

Joel Early (Culpeper), 881 acres valued at £474 1s. ; 31 adult slaves, 9 horses.

John Early (Franklin), 615 acres valued at £184 2s. ; 7 adult slaves, 3 horses; continental securities on which he received $45.80 interest in 1786.⁹⁷

Samuel Edmiston (Washington), 400 acres valued at £98 6s. (1786); 17 adult slaves, 16 horses, and 36 cattle (1785).

Thomas Edmunds (Sussex), 3,804 acres valued at £1,541 8s . and 4,000 acres received as a bounty for military service; 34 adult slaves, 14 horses, and a four-wheeled carriage; $9,190 in state and $50 in continental securities.⁹⁸

John Evans (Monongalia), landholdings unknown; 2 adult slaves, 6 horses; continental securities on which he received $371 interest in 1787.⁹⁹

John Fowler (Fayette), landholdings unknown; 10 adult slaves, 2 horses, and 8 cattle (1787); $1,679 in state and $102 in continental securities.¹⁰⁰

John Guerrant (Goochland), 636 acres valued at £334 2s. (1789); 15 adult slaves, 12 horses, and a two-wheeled carriage.

Joseph Haden (Fluvanna), 899 acres valued at £294 8s.; 7 adult slaves, 4 horses.

Benjamin Harrison (Charles City), size of estate not ascertained.

Binns Jones (Brunswick), 400 acres valued at £ 171 13s.; 27 adult slaves, 7 horses, and 22 cattle (1787).

John Jones (Brunswick), 901 acres valued at £412 9s.; 45 adult slaves, 18 horses, 44 cattle, a phaeton, and a chair (1787); $1,136 in continental securities.¹⁰¹

Richard Kennon (Mecklenburg), 1,094 acres valued at £1,120 7s . and 5416 acres received as a bounty for military service; 38 adult slaves, 20 horses, a four-wheeled phaeton, and one stud.¹⁰²

Robert Lawson (Prince Edward), 894 acres valued at £283 2s. and 10,000 acres received as a military bounty; 11 adult slaves, 9 horses, and a coach.¹⁰³

John Carter Littlepage (Hanover); landholdings not ascertained; 9 adult slaves, 13 horses; $10 in continental securities.¹⁰⁴

John Logan (Lincoln), size of estate not ascertained.

John Marr (Henry), 1,034 acres valued at £458; 7 adult slaves, 16 horses, and a four-wheeled carriage.

George Mason (Stafford), whose enormous estate is described on page 72, above.

Joseph Michaux (Cumberland), 995 acres valued at £555 10s.; 26 adult slaves, 8 horses, and 35 cattle (1787).

John Miller (Madison), size of estate not ascertained.

James Montgomery (Washington), 400 acres valued at £98 6s. (1786); 3 adult slaves, 10 horses, and 16 cattle (1785).

Charles Patteson (Buckingham), 1,984 acres valued at £528 2s.; 31 slaves (1790).

Jonathan Patteson (Lunenburg), 300 acres valued at £138 14s.; 5 adult slaves, 4 horses.

Henry Pawling (Lincoln), size of estate not ascertained.

John Pride (Amelia), 440 acres valued at £236 10s.; 23 adult slaves, 10 horses.

Thomas Read (Charlotte), 2,143 acres valued at £1,581 4s.; 29 adult slaves, 16 horses, and a four-wheeled phaeton; $554 in continental securities.¹⁰⁵

Samuel Richardson (Fluvanna), 963 acres in Fluvanna and 546½ acres in Goochland, total value £577; 13 adult slaves and 10 horses in Fluvanna and 9 adult slaves and 7 horses in Goochland; $2413 in continental and $435 in state securities.¹⁰⁶

Holt Richeson (King William), 1,615 acres valued at £759 7s. (1785 tax return plus additions recorded in returns for 1786 and 1787) and 6,000 acres received as a bounty for military service; 23 adult slaves, 7 horses.¹⁰⁷

Thomas Roane (King and Queen), 3,968½ acres in King and Queen and 516 acres in Middlesex, total value £3,676 4s.; 29 adult slaves, 13 horses, a six-wheeled phaeton and a chair.

Alexander Robertson (Mercer), size of estate not ascertained.

Christopher Robertson (Lunenburg), 600 acres valued at £487; 9 adult slaves, 3 horses, and a two-wheeled carriage.

Edmund Ruffin, Jr. (Prince George), 1,582 acres and 4 town lots, total value £1,541 17s.; 24 adult slaves, 14 horses.

William Sampson (Goochland), 375 acres valued at £137 12s.; 10 adult slaves, 6 horses.

Meriwether Smith (Essex), 2½ town lots with an annual rent of £18, 800 acres valued at £1,077 6s.; 61 adult slaves, 8 horses, 60 cattle, and a two-wheeled carriage (1786).

John Steel (Nelson), 3,055 acres awarded as a bounty for military service; $3,905 in continental securities.¹⁰⁸

French Strother (Culpeper), 1,110 acres valued at £877 19s . (1789); 23 adult slaves, 18 horses (1790); $191 in continental securities.¹⁰⁹

Benjamin Temple (King William), 2,285 acres valued at £1,434 (1785 tax return plus additions as recorded in 1787 tax returns) and 7,555 acres received as a bounty for military service; 36 adult slaves, 11 horses, a phaeton, and a chair.¹¹⁰

John Trigg (Bedford), 363 acres valued at £272; 8 adult slaves, 6 horses, and a two-wheeled carriage.

Thomas Turpin, Jr. (Powhatan), 866 acres valued at £342 15s.; 18 adult slaves, 15 horses, a four-wheeled chaise, and a chair; continental securities on which he received $429.30 interest payments in 1788.¹¹¹

James Upshaw (Essex), 220 acres in Essex and 2,119 acres in Caroline County, total value £570 1s.; 21 adult slaves, 5 horses, and 20 cattle (1786); $128 in continental securities.¹¹²

Matthew Walton (Nelson), the size of whose estate was not ascertained.

Walton owned continental securities on which he received $213 interest payments in 1786.¹¹³

William Watkins (Dinwiddie), 1,929 acres valued at £1,063 19s.; 24 adult slaves, 8 horses, and a two-wheeled chair; continental securities on which he received $7 interest in 1786.¹¹⁴

William White (Louisa), 795 acres valued at £289 18s.; 7 adult slaves, 7 horses; $1,828 in state and $1,695 in continental securities.¹¹⁵

Robert Williams (Pittsylvania), 3,866 acres valued at £1,240 6s.; 36 adult slaves, 17 horses; continental securities on which he received $7.56 interest payments in 1786.¹¹⁶

John Wilson (Pittsylvania), 4,891 acres valued at £2,237 11s.; 27 adult slaves, 14 horses, and a four-wheeled stage wagon.

To bring all these sketches to a focus, the following general observations may be made. First, the occupations and security holdings of the delegates may be summarized as follows:

It is clear that with respect to occupations there were no important differences between the delegates who voted for ratification and those who voted against it. The group that favored ratification included a larger number of security holders, it is true, but the margin of difference is not significant.

The foregoing sketches reveal that the forms of property most frequently held in significant quantities by delegates, irrespective of occupations or vote on ratification, were land and slaves. The figures for values of lands for tax purposes may or not represent their true value, but for comparative purposes they are valid, since they were arrived at by a uniform system. The values of the landholdings of the delegates voting for and against ratification may be summarized as follows:

It should be pointed out that the great majority of the delegates for whom data on property holdings are unavailable were from areas across the mountains, where land values were low. When this is taken into account, it appears that approximately the same proportions of delegates on the two sides held large and moderate amounts of land, but that the number of small landholders who supported ratification was considerably in excess of the number who opposed it.

The slaveholdings of the delegates may be summarized as follows:

Significantly, most of the Federalists whose slaveholdings are unknown are those from areas west of the mountains, where slaveholdings were generally small, whereas most of the anti-Federalists whose slaveholdings are unknown were from areas of large plantations.

From the foregoing tables it would appear that planters who had large or moderately large slaveholdings were divided almost equally on the question of ratification, but that the great majority of the small farmers who owned no slaves or very few slaves voted for the Constitution.

Professor Beard interpreted the contest in Virginia on the basis of the geographical distribution of the votes. Largely disregarding the fact that more than a fourth of the delegates were frontier farmers from areas west of the Blue Ridge, he focused his attention primarily on the eastern part of the state. There he found that a substantial majority of the tidewater counties voted for ratification and a sizeable majority of the piedmont counties against it. He ascribed to these areas economic characteristics which close examination would have revealed they did not have, and concluded that most of the support for the Constitution came from wealthy planters and security holders, and most of the opposition from small, slaveless farmers and debtors.

The precise opposite is nearer the truth. Public security holders were almost equally divided and the majority of the small farmers supported ratification. The wealthy planters were almost equally divided on the question of ratification, but planter-debtors, and particularly the planters who had brought about the passage of laws preventing the collection of British debts, favored ratification by a substantial margin.

NEW YORK

THE people of the state of New York were overwhelmingly opposed to the Constitution, and the delegates they elected to the state’s ratifying convention were anti-ratificationists by a majority of more than two to one. Only after the convention learned that New Hampshire and Virginia had ratified was their resistance broken. In the face of this news the anti-Federalist delegates decided, at a caucus held on the evening of July 25, 1788, that certain of their number should vote for the Constitution, and on July 26 the document was ratified by a vote of 30 to 27.

New York’s opposition, headed by Governor George Clinton, had begun long before the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 completed its labors. Its delegation to that body voted at the outset against the creation of a general government, and on July 7 they left the Convention. Before the end of July there was in wide circulation a report—originating with Clinton’s political enemy Hamilton but nonetheless valid—that Governor Clinton was busily organizing opposition to any product that might issue from the Convention. In September there began in the Clintonian press a series of attacks on some of the delegates, and repeated newspaper articles gratuitously defending Clinton’s right to oppose the Convention confirmed the talk of Clinton’s opposition.¹¹⁷

A series of articles in opposition to the Constitution was written by Clinton before it was in existence, and on September 27, concurrently with the publication of the document in New York, the first of them, published over the pseudonym “Cato,” made its appearance. A host of wordy arguments on both sides of the issue then began to appear in pamphlets and newspapers. The most celebrated were those appearing in the Independent Journal over the signature “Publius,” later republished as the Federalist Papers. Brilliant though they were, they were smothered by the deluge of anti-Federalist propaganda and were of virtually no influence in deciding votes except in the immediate vicinity of the City.¹¹⁸

New York anti-ratificationists organized powerful machinery not only to work against the Constitution in New York but also to unite anti-Federalists everywhere in a concentrated effort to prevent ratification. For the state campaign clubs named “Federal Republican” or sometimes simply “Republican” were organized in each county; committees of correspondence were appointed and regular meetings held. The central organization had headquarters at the customs house in New York City. It directed the state campaign, served as a clearinghouse for the writing of anti-ratificationist propaganda and for the selection and distribution of the best of it throughout the United States, and corresponded with such anti-Federalist leaders as Grayson, Mason, Richard Henry Lee, and Henry of Virginia, Atherton of New Hampshire, Samuel Chase of Maryland, Rawling Lowndes of South Carolina, Gerry of Massachusetts, Timothy Bloodworth of North Carolina, and others.¹¹⁹

Clinton ignored requests that he call a special session of the legislature in the fall of 1787, and by the time the New York legislature met and got around to calling a convention five states had already ratified. At the end of January, 1788, the House resolved to call a convention after defeating by two votes a proposal to attach to the resolution a preamble censuring the Philadelphia Convention for exceeding its powers. On the same day the Senate concurred in the resolution, also by a two-vote majority. The resolution provided that the convention be held in Poughkeepsie in June and the election of delegates in the third week of April. For these special elections all property qualifications were dropped, and all free adult male citizens were given the right to vote for delegates.¹²⁰

The elections resulted in a smashing defeat for the Federalists. Anti-ratificationist candidates received more than 14,000 of the known votes as against only 6,500 for the Federalists. Federalists carried only the City and County of New York and three other counties with a total of nineteen delegates; their opponents carried nine counties with a total of forty-six delegates. The popular mandate was clear. It remained to be seen what the politicians would do with it.¹²¹

When the convention met on June 17 there was not much, for the moment, that the politicians could do. The Federalists unleashed a brilliant array of debaters, led by Hamilton, Robert R. Livingston, and John Jay. The Clintonians occasionally answered through Melancton Smith, Lansing, and Clinton himself, but more often they followed their customary parliamentary practice of sitting quietly, confident of their voting strength.¹²² On the present occasion, however, they were uneasy. They were hesitant to reject the Constitution outright, perhaps because they were mindful of the vituperation that had been heaped upon them when they killed the proposed congressional impost early in 1787. They preferred to wait and let some other state be the first to do so.

Eight states had ratified when the New York convention met. The New Hampshire and Virginia conventions were in session at the time, and it appeared likely that one or both of those states might reject the Constitution. When the news of New Hampshire’s ratification reached Poughkeepsie on June 24, the Clintonians were depressed, and when news of Virgina’s ratification came on July 2, their spirit was broken. As late as July 15, however, only five of their number had joined the Federalists.¹²³

The convention approached a stalemate. The Clintonians were divided; one group wanted to reject the Constitution despite the approval of ten states, the other was ready to ratify conditionally, the condition being that New York would automatically retract its ratification unless a second federal convention, to revise the work of the first, were called within a stated period. Hamilton and his allies took advantage of this temporary indecision to employ perhaps the only device that could have succeeded. They solemnly declared that if the convention rejected the Constitution the City and County of New York would secede from the state and join the Union by itself. The announcement was not made on the convention floor, but in repeated private conversations with individual Clintonians. Whether the City would actually have carried out its threat is beside the point; what is important is that the Clintonians became convinced that it would do so. Rumors were printed in the City newspapers that the secession movement was already being organized, and Clintonian delegates were privately pressured at every opportunity.¹²⁴

The secession rumor having taken effect, the Federalists clearly had the upper hand. The Clintonians made a last vain effort to secure a conditional ratification, but when the Federalists assured them that the new government would not accept such a ratification, they gave up. On July 25 they held the caucus mentioned earlier and decided that some of their number should vote for ratification.¹²⁵ Apparently the plan was to make the decision rest on a one-vote margin, but one of the Clintonians failed to show up for the vote and Clinton himself, as president of the convention, abstained from voting, so that the final vote was 30 to 27.¹²⁶

The steps by which both the opposition to and the support for ratification had developed in New York stand out distinctly in the history of the state during and after the Revolution. Before these steps can be traced, however, two sets of facts about the state’s war experience must be understood as the factors that conditioned the atmosphere in New York during the period.

The first is that New York City was occupied by the British from 1776 to 1783. During this long occupation the Whigs in New York came to hate the British and Loyalists with an intensity perhaps unmatched in any other state. The second conditioning factor stemmed from the first. Loyalists in New York were numerous and many of them were wealthy, and the Revolutionary government ordered the confiscation and sale of their estates. The quantity of these sales was enormous, amounting in the Southern District alone (the City and environs) to more than a half million pounds, New York currency ($1,250,000). The opportunities to purchase large parts of these estates for later resale in small tracts set off a wave of speculation that lasted well into the 1790’s. The speculative mania was intensified by an act of 1780 which gave holders of soldiers’ depreciation certificates special purchase rights and made other securities as well as specie legal tender as payment for the confiscated property. Large-scale speculations and manipulations in these securities as well as in land resulted. An atmosphere charged with speculative frenzy conditioned all economic and political activity during the decade following the peace.¹²⁷

The first step in the development of attitudes toward the Constitution was the rise to power of George Clinton. The prewar struggle between the DeLancey family and allied clans and the Livingston family and its allies culminated with the Declaration of Independence and the framing of a state constitution by the triumphant Livingstonians in 1776-1777. By means of campaign maneuvers among the soldiers Clinton was elected first governor of the state in 1777 in a surprise victory over Philip Schuyler, a higher ranking member of the Whig faction of the colonial aristocracy. Clinton solidified his hold on the government, won the support of much of the aristocracy by his conservative administration, and was re-elected for a succession of three-year terms covering fifteen years. Until the Constitution was ratified Clinton held virtually unchallenged power in the politics of the state.¹²⁸

At the beginning, and as long as New York City was occupied, Clinton and his followers were strongly pro-Union. The next steps in the shaping of attitudes on the issue of 1788 were those that led New York to a break with its sister states. The first and most important was the termination of the war; when the pressing military need for co-operation ended, New York’s devotion to the Union declined considerably.

The next clear steps were a series of events that engendered distrust and even disgust with the Confederation Congress. The first was the handling of the Vermont question. The Vermont area was claimed by both New York and New Hampshire, and after much wrangling the Congress indicated in mid-1783 that it was disposed to recognize the grants New Hampshire had made in Vermont but that apart from this it was unwilling to take any decisive action on either state’s claims.¹²⁹

The second and third issues that bred hostility toward Congress were related to the treaty of peace. The Tory-hating, speculating New Yorkers considered that the treaty gave unnecessary benefits to Loyalists, and its ratification aroused in the minds of some New Yorkers the suspicion that Congress was soft on Tories. More important was the weakness shown by Congress in failing to force Britain to abide by the treaty with respect to garrisons inside the United States. Five of the frontier outposts which the British continued to occupy in violation of the treaty were inside the limits of New York. Not only was the maintenance of the posts an insult to New York, but it cut New Yorkers off from a share in the lucrative western fur trade.

In the face of this demonstration of the weakness of Congress, New Yorkers could do one of two things: they could seek a stronger union or they could decide to go it alone. A strong faction in the legislature, consisting almost exclusively of followers of Clinton, was ready by 1784 to pursue the latter course. The complaints with respect to the treaty came to a climax in March, 1784, when both houses resolved to lay an ultimatum before Congress. First declaring that New York was “disposed to preserve the Union” and that it had “an inviolable Respect for Congress,” the legislature gave Congress two months “after nine States shall be represented in Congress, subsequent to this State being represented there” in which to take decisive action regarding New York’s complaints. If Congress failed to respond, the resolution continued, “this State, with whatever deep Regret, will be compelled to consider herself as left to pursue her own Councils, destitute of the Protection of the United States.” ¹³⁰

Clinton himself was not yet ready to adopt such extreme measures. He acted as an apologist for Congress and sought to discourage the adoption of the resolution. Seven months later, after Congress had resolved in June to do what it could about the British posts, Clinton urged the legislature to accept that as compliance with New York’s ultimatum.¹³¹ But when two more elements had entered the picture, Clinton was ready to join his political allies in moving toward a complete break with the Union.

At some time toward the end of 1785 or the beginning of 1786 Clinton began to realize the enormous potential New York had in her natural advantages: a central location, excellent soil, a thrifty and energetic people, a superb system of inland waterways, and a great natural port serving three states, among others. Somewhere along the line, as the City recovered from the war with almost incredible speed, as the entire state underwent an economic boom and tremendous expansion, and as the state collected handsome sums in the form of duties on imports for the tri-state area, George Clinton came to visualize clearly a plan for fulfilling New York’s destiny as the Empire State.

One more step was necessary. Despite his re-election in 1780 and 1783, Clinton was not sure of his political strength. His previous victories had been scored during the war, and the lower counties and the City had not yet had an opportunity to vote in a gubernatorial election. When, in the elections of April, 1786, no candidate could be found to run against him and the legislative candidates he was backing were elected by great majorities, assuring complete control of both houses, this last reservation vanished. The Clintonians were now prepared to “secede” from the Union.¹³²

Two features of the Clintonian program, enacted in 1786-1788, were of primary importance in determining the state’s relations with the Union. One was the state’s rejection of the proposed amendment to the Articles of Confederation which would have given Congress power to levy import duties with which to fund its debts. New York approved the amendment only conditionally in 1786, after the other twelve states had ratified it; and when Congress declared that acceptance of this conditional ratification would invalidate the ratification of several other states, New York rejected the impost plan outright. This action has been described as the “death knell” of the Confederation Congress.¹³³

Of equal importance was the state’s financial program of 1786. Since 1784 there had been agitation in some quarters for an issue of paper money, complaints being rife that the drainage of gold and silver in payment for British manufactures during the last months of the occupation had produced a shortage of specie. The House of Assembly had passed a paper-money measure in 1784 and another in 1785, both of which had been rejected in the Senate. In 1786 the Clinton organization backed the paper issue and combined special features with it to produce an ingenious fiscal scheme.

The plan, all incorporated into a single act, was extremely complex. For present purposes, however, its features may be simplified. Paper money amounting to £200,000, New York currency ($500,000), was to be issued. Of this sum,£150,000 was to be lent to individual borrowers, against mortgages on otherwise debt-free real or personal property amounting to two or three times the amount of the loan. The remainder was to be reserved for funding purposes. The entire state debt was funded and two portions of the national debt were assumed: the continental loan office certificates and the so-called Barber’s notes, certificates issued by the United States for supplies furnished the continental army. Holders of these continental securities were given the right to exchange them, on loan, for state securities of equal par amounts, bearing interest at the same rate. The remaining £50,000 of the paper-money issue was appropriated for immediate interest payments equal to one-fifth of the back interest due from the United States on these securities.¹³⁴

Continental debts amounting to £557,000 (about $1,395,000) were assumed under this act. The state thus shouldered a heavy burden, but it was relieved of obligation to contribute to any further continental requisitions, for the annual interest now due the state government from Congress amounted to more than New York’s share of the interest on continental debts. The act also furthered the break with Congress in a more subtle way. The continental debt was considered by many in New York to be the strongest, if not indeed the sole remaining bond with the Union. The reason that loan office certificates and Barber’s notes had been chosen for assumption was not, as some charged, that the “honorable members” of the legislature owned only these kinds of debt, but that ownership of these securities was widely spread among at least five thousand holders, a large portion of the voting population. It was, indeed, as one critic charged, “a studied design to divide the interests of the public creditors,” to make their welfare contingent on the state’s welfare instead of the nation’s.¹³⁵

The program met with opposition only in the City, and it was opposed there not primarily by creditors who feared the money would depreciate—the Pennsylvania paper issue was circulating at or near par, and the South Carolina issue and that of New York were to do likewise—but rather by two special groups for two special reasons.¹³⁶ In the first place, its anti-Union implications ran counter to the hopes of the advocates of a stronger union, the great majority of whom were in the City. Secondly, the funding-assumption program affected adversely the interests of speculators in confiscated estates. Purchasers of such property had contracted to buy in the expectation that they would be able to pay their obligations in depreciated public securities. The sudden appreciation of security prices as a result of the funding scheme caught many “bears” in a “bull” market, forcing them to pay from thirty to fifty per cent more for their purchases than they had counted on paying. A little panic of 1786 ensued, causing commodity price gyrations and no small number of bankruptcies—an exact precursor of the larger panic of 1792.¹³⁷

Except for the side effects of the appreciation of securities, however, the program was a complete success. The state government was able to meet its obligations until the United States Loan of 1790 was enacted, and thereafter it literally had more money, in the form of income from the securities it owned, than it knew what to do with. As the state retired its own obligations with the receipts from the sale of confiscated property and public lands and from its impost, more and more of the continental securities “loaned” to the state in 1786 came into its outright ownership. In March, 1790, the state returned the continental securities still outstanding to the original owners, yet Gerard Bancker, as treasurer of the state, was able to fund continental securities amounting to $1,424,041.71 under the Loan of 1790.¹³⁸

The state was equally successful in other respects. Despite the setbacks caused by the panic of 1786, commercial recovery was rapid. By 1788 New York City, which at the end of the occupation in 1783 had been a broken port virtually without a vessel, was importing and exporting at least three times as much as it had in its best prewar years, and two-thirds of its trade was carried in New York bottoms. Despite the outbreak of Shays’ Rebellion in neighboring Massachusetts, no disorders occurred in New York. Despite the ravages of the Hessian fly, wheat production on New York farms was greater than it had ever been, and prices were at far higher levels than before the war. The Clintonian legislative and administrative program included something for virtually everyone; almost every economic interest and social group was the beneficiary of special legislation. In short, New York’s experiment in independence was eminently successful. The state had little reason to adopt any plan for a general government, for it was prosperous and contented with the government it had.¹³⁹

The opposition to Clinton consisted of three major groups and an assortment of minor ones, the combined totals of which embraced only a small fraction of the population. One of the major opposition groups was a faction of the aristocracy that had opposed Clinton from the outset. The principal chieftain of these malcontents was Philip Schuyler, whom Clinton had defeated for the governorship in 1777. Schuyler, an otherwise brilliant man, had an almost irrational hatred of Clinton thereafter, and until the day he died he never ceased plotting to subvert his enemy. A man of great influence in the aristocracy, he worked constantly to unify it against Clinton. He never quite succeeded; the powerful Livingston and Van Cortlandt families were split, some supporting and some opposing the governor, and many of the families lower in the aristocracy were Clintonians. But Schuyler was able to weld together a powerful, albeit numerically small, coalition against Clinton.¹⁴⁰

Immediately related to the group gathered around Schuyler for personal reasons was the second major group in the opposition. This was a nationalistic group headed by Schuyler’s son-in-law, Alexander Hamilton. By virtue of his marital connection, his persuasive manner, and his financial genius, Hamilton was able to ingratiate himself with various powerful New York merchants and bankers and to unify them in support of his nationalism. Employing his advantages artfully, he managed to split the mercantile clique which had headed the Sons of Liberty. He found ready support among the merchants who were hostile to the Clinton administration because of losses they had suffered as a result of the funding-paper act of 1786. Another group easily brought into the fold were the merchants who owed money to Loyalists, money they had hoped to avoid paying until the Clintonians decreed that such Loyalist credits were the property of the state and that Loyalist debts were obligations of the state. Many merchants and speculators, including John Lamb, Marinus Willett, Melancton Smith, Henry Wyckoff, and the Sands brothers, remained loyal to Clinton. More, however, like Isaac Roosevelt, the Beekmans, the Jays, the Alsops, and the Lows, either drifted into the nationalist camp or were persuaded to come into it by Schuyler or Hamilton.¹⁴¹

A third major element that opposed Clinton was the lesser citizenry of the City, parts of Long Island, and Westchester County. Many of these lesser folk had sided with the Tories during the war, from necessity as well as from inclination. As many more were Whigs who had been trapped behind the lines in 1777 and had no choice but to remain there during the occupation. Tories, Tory-sympathizers, and victims of circumstance were all treated alike in the wave of persecution of Loyalists which Clinton headed after the peace, and few of them were ever inclined to forget or to forgive him. Still another group among the lower ranks in and around the City were the former tenants of Loyalists. The former tenants of James De-Lancey, one of the richest of the Tory landlords, were in a particularly unfortunate situation. The leases of many of them had expired during the war, and in 1780 DeLancey had sold most of his holdings to them. After the war the state had refused to recognize these purchases and the hapless tenants had been forced either to purchase their property a second time or suffer ejection. Other tenants, scarcely more fortunate, were ejected or forced to pay high prices for the properties they occupied when speculators operating on a large scale purchased the confiscated property from the state.¹⁴²

Hamilton, Schuyler, and their aristocratic and mercantile allies exploited the hostility of these lower classes toward Clinton, and with their backing organized the only important opposition to Clinton’s powerful faction. Only in the City and in Westchester, Richmond (Staten Island), and Kings counties did the anti-Clinton coalition achieve any consistent success, though Albany, Schuyler’s home county, occasionally sent anti-Clintonians to the legislature. Every other county in the state supported Clinton, his measures, and his legislative candidates with majorities ranging from substantial to overwhelming.¹⁴³

The vote for delegates to the ratifying convention was cast along precisely the lines indicated above. That is, the City and the counties of Kings, Richmond, and Westchester sent Federalist delegates, and every other county anti-Federalist delegates. The majority asked, with Clinton, why should New York throw its great advantages into a common pot? The opposition to the Constitution was based almost entirely upon New Yorkers’ faith in Clinton and his concept of the Empire State.

There were, however, other elements in the City’s vote for ratification. Most, though not all, of the mechanics who had supported Clinton in the 1786 elections voted for ratification. One factor was the campaign appeals of the Federalists to this element. Another was the possibility that under the general government protective tariffs and other legislation designed to promote manufactures would be enacted which would expand the “protected” market for local manufactures from the existing three states to thirteen. This possibility had no appeal to the service industries and the manufacturers who needed no protection, but large numbers of those groups were already hostile to Clinton for the reasons mentioned earlier. Another factor in the vote was the fact that New York City was, for obvious reasons, sensitive about its military vulnerability. Still another was the City’s fear that it would be hazardous to remain outside the Union once a general government for the other states had been framed. The Federalists argued, with telling effect, that discriminatory legislation would be urged by New Jersey and Connecticut congressmen anxious to retaliate against New York for the duties which their states had been forced to pay into New York’s treasury during the 1780’s.

In the showdown over ratification neither party to the conflict had a monopoly on economic interests of any kind. Probably a majority of the five thousand small security holders who had benefitted from the funding-assumption plan of 1786 followed Clinton in opposing the Constitution. Probably a majority of the merchants in the City favored ratification and certainly the great majority of the lower classes in the City did so. The ranks of both parties, however, included approximately equal numbers of large and small landholders and speculators in various forms of property.

While information on the property holdings of individual delegates to the ratifying convention in New York is relatively scant, the available data would seem to confirm these generalizations. Because of the unusually large number of vote changes in the New York convention, the delegates have been divided, in the following summaries of their economic interests, into four groups: 1) those elected as Federalists; 2) those elected as anti-Federalists who voted for ratification; 3) those elected as anti-Federalists who abstained from voting; and 4) those elected as anti-Federalists who voted against ratification.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DELEGATES ELECTED AS FEDERALISTS

James Duane (New York) was a lawyer, landlord with a 40,000-acre estate, and mayor of the City. He was a Federalist despite the fact that he had received substantial benefits from the Clintonians. He was regularly appointed mayor and was enabled to collect a total of £ 1,615 7s. 1½d. ($4,033.38) from the state for debts owed him by former Loyalists because of the Clintonian policy of assuming the debts as well as the assets of the Loyalists. Duane held $288.67 in continental securities.¹⁴⁴

Alexander Hamilton (New York) was a lawyer. His interests are outlined on pages 48-49, above.

Richard Harrison (New York) was an ex-Tory lawyer. He owned one share in the Bank of New York (par $250) and was a substantial holder of state securities ($2,452) and the holder of a modest amount of continental securities ($91). He had suffered from the policy that had benefitted Duane, for he owed £1,300 in prewar debts due to Loyalists, and he was required to pay principal and accrued interest amounting to £2,486 55. 6d. ($6,215.65) to the state.¹⁴⁵

Richard Hatfield (Westchester) was clerk of Westchester County, a lawyer, and owner of a large confiscated farm which he had purchased for £1,050 ($2,625).¹⁴⁶

John Sloss Hobart (New York) was associate justice of the New York Supreme Court, though he never completed his legal training. He had purchased sixteen confiscated town lots for £672 ($1,680). Like Harrison, he Was a debtor to Loyalists and was required to make payments of £1,800 15s . 5d. ($4,502.91) for an old bond of £1,600 and accrued interest.¹⁴⁷

John Jay (New York) was a lawyer, diplomat, and member of a family of merchants. He owned $17,195.48 in state securities, though he engaged in none of the speculations of the decade. He was also a substantial private creditor and a large landowner.¹⁴⁸

Philip Livingston (Westchester), a landlord and speculator, owned $7,754 in state securities and had purchased forty-eight confiscated city lots and 268 acres of farmland for a total of £5,080 ($12,700). The operations of the confiscation laws required him to pay £268 8s. 3d. ($671) to the state for an old debt of £ 200 and interest.¹⁴⁹

Robert R. Livingston (New York), a landlord and lawyer, was “one of the rich men of the state.” While secretary for foreign affairs he was able to spend $3,000 a year beyond his salary. His estate was the Livingston Lower Manor, Clermont, and he also owned a town house and had commercial connections. His security holdings were nominal: $144 in continentals.¹⁵⁰

Nicholas Low (New York), a merchant, was a director of the Bank of New York and owner of eight shares of bank stock ($2,000 par). He was one of the most active speculators in the City. His purchases of confiscated property totaled $8,250 and after the convention he began acquiring vast quantities of securities. His first funding operation under the Loan of 1790 totaled $38,729, and several of his later fundings ran as high as $20,000.¹⁵¹

Lewis Morris (Westchester) was owner of the large estate Morrisania Manor, which had been razed—the land devastated and the house burned—during the war. Morris purchased two parcels of confiscated Loyalist property in Westchester County for a total of £1,524 ($3,810).¹⁵² He owned no public securities.

Isaac Roosevelt (New York), merchant, bank president, owner of a sugar refinery, and speculator, owned five bank shares (par $1,250) and $563 in continental securities of an issue not assumed by the act of 1786, and had purchased confiscated lots in New York City for £4,852 ($12,190). He was also a debtor to Loyalists, having been required to pay £1406 17s . 6d. ($3,517.18) to the state for an old debt of £900 and interest.¹⁵³

Gozen Ryerss (Richmond), a merchant, was a member of the firm of Ryerss & Riley, interstate traders. The firm owned a small sloop and 1½ bank shares (par $375).¹⁵⁴

Philip Van Cortlandt (Westchester), a civil engineer, was the son of anti-Federalist Lieutenant Governor Pierre Van Cortlandt. Young Van Cortlandt loaned considerable sums against mortgages to tenants on Philipse Manor, a “lucrative field” for surplus capital. He owned $1,729 in continental securities that were not assumed under the act of 1786, and he was required to pay the state for an old debt of £92 11s. 10d. ($231.45) due a Tory merchant.¹⁵⁵

Peter Vandervoort (Kings) was a merchant “of moderate means.”¹⁵⁶

Four delegates, Abraham Bancker (Richmond), Thaddeus Crane (Westchester), Peter Lefferts (Kings), and Lott W. Sarles (Westchester) apparently were all farmers and landowners. Lefferts was of a Loyalist family and was the holder of $512 in continental securities. Bancker was a member of the family of Gerard Bancker, the anti-Federalist state treasurer.¹⁵⁷

It is to be observed that at least eight of the Federalists had investments or obligations that were either damaged by Clintonian policy (confiscated estate speculations, debts due Loyalists) or by-passed in the assumption act of 1786 (certain forms of continental debt). This factor should not be overrated, however, for as was indicated earlier a number of Clintonians in the City also had just such property.¹⁵⁸

ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DELEGATES ELECTED AS ANTI-FEDERALISTS WHO VOTED FOR RATIFICATION

John DeWitt (Dutchess) was a farmer and landowner, proprietor of a grist mill, and owner of a small amount of securities.¹⁵⁹

Samuel Jones (Queens), an ex-Tory lawyer, was owner of a landed estate on Long Island and holder of $976 in continental and $1,978 in state securities.¹⁶⁰

Gilbert Livingston (Dutchess), lawyer and politician, was a brother-in-law of Clinton, having, like Clinton, married a Tappen.¹⁶¹

Zephaniah Piatt (Dutchess), a Poughkeepsie lawyer, was a speculator in confiscated estates and vacant lands. With others he purchased 11,250 acres and with the help of various other Clintonians built the city of Plattsburg. By 1788 the partners had built grist mills and sawmills and were later to erect forges and furnaces. Piatt owned $284 in continental securities.¹⁶²

Henry Scudder (Suffolk) was a farmer and “small landowner.”¹⁶³

John Smith (Suffolk), a farmer, was a member of “a prominent family that was well endowed with Suffolk lands.” He was one of the many speculators in the Clintonian ranks, having purchased £ 657 5s. ($1,518.12) worth of confiscated property in Westchester and possibly more upstate. He owned $1,461.67 in continental securities.¹⁶⁴

Melancton Smith (Dutchess), merchant and lawyer of New York City, was a speculator in confiscated property and western lands. His purchases of forfeited estates amounted to £1,470 in the City and to £1,200 in other places (total $6,675). With Clintonian Marinus Willett he acquired 6,000 acres on the Chenango River, and he bought 1,120 acres in the Plattsburg venture. He owned $1,537 in state securities and $969 in continentals.¹⁶⁵

Jesse Woodhull (Orange), landlord, speculator, and capitalist, creditor of a Loyalist, for which he received £529 5s . from the state, was owner of $4,887 in continental and $14,960 in state securities.¹⁶⁶

The occupations and interests of Stephen Carman (Queens), Jonathan N. Havens (Suffolk), Nathaniel Lawrence (Queens), and John Schenck (Queens) cannot be precisely defined. They were probably all farmers and substantial landowners. Carman and Schenck were ex-Tories. Havens had been educated at Yale and was a devout Presbyterian, perhaps even a minister.¹⁶⁷

ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DELEGATES ELECTED AS ANTI-FEDERALISTS WHO DID NOT VOTE

Governor George Clinton was a lawyer, capitalist, land speculator, and money-lender. Clinton’s favorite forms of investment were mortgages, direct loans, and land speculations. He had advanced about £5,000 from his own funds to help finance various needs of the armies, and upon being repaid these sums at the end of the war had re-invested them in lands. He owned rental property in the City and lands in almost every county. On a single occasion he purchased large quantities of land in twelve townships, and he made numerous purchases elsewhere. He helped his speculator friend Alexander Macomb acquire 3,600,000 acres of state-owned lands for only 8d. an acre. He owned grist mills and sawmills and investments in various businesses. With Washington he purchased 6,071 acres and to enable Washington to pay for that and purchases of Virginia lands he advanced Washington £4,500 (at 7 per cent), a sum which Washington was not able to repay until 1786. Clinton also made numerous loans to Westchester farmers. In 1788 his personalty, exclusive of lands held for speculation, amounted to about £20,000. His security holdings, though substantial, were modest as compared with his land ventures. He owned $1,288 in continental and $2431 in state securities.¹⁶⁸

Anthony Ten Eyck (Albany), a lawyer and merchant, owned $1,210 in continental and $1,815 in state securities.¹⁶⁹

Ezra Thompson (Dutchess), a capitalist, had invested in and developed a lead mine, purchased with another man a township of 25,000 acres, and probably was speculating in confiscated estates.¹⁷⁰

Peter Vrooman (Albany), a lawyer with mercantile connections, was the owner of a nominal amount of securities, $143 in continentals.¹⁷¹

Christopher P. Yates (Montgomery), lawyer and landlord, owned $261 in state securities.¹⁷²

The occupations and holdings of two delegates, David Hedges (Suffolk) and Dirck Swart (Albany), were not ascertained.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DELEGATES ELECTED AS ANTI-FEDERALISTS WHO VOTED against RATIFICATION

Matthew Adgate (Columbia), lawyer and speculator, owned $291 in state securities.¹⁷³

John Bay (Columbia), lawyer, owned $268 in continental securities.¹⁷⁴

James Clinton (Ulster), farmer and landlord, and speculator in lands with his brother the governor, purchased £3,112 in confiscated property and owned $6,895 in continental and state securities.¹⁷⁵

John Frey (Montgomery), lawyer, was a member of a wealthy landed family.¹⁷⁶

John Haring (Orange), lawyer, owed £427 12s . 3d . in prewar debts to a Tory and was required to pay £527 0s. 10d. to the state for principal and interest on this obligation.¹⁷⁷

Henry Oothoudt (Albany), a landholder and speculator in lands and a relative of a City merchant, owned $72 in continental securities.¹⁷⁸

Cornelius Schoonmaker (Ulster), surveyor, farmer, landowner, and speculator, owned $315 in continental securities.¹⁷⁹

Henry Staring (Montgomery), judge of Herkimer County Court, was owner of a mill and proprietor of “large landed estates.” Schuyler, in denouncing the appointment of Staring as a judge by the Clintonians, asserted that he could neither read nor write. However that may be, he was able to accumulate property.¹⁸⁰

Jacobus Swartwout (Dutchess), landowner and speculator, acquired at least three separate parcels of confiscated property in Dutchess and Orange counties, and probably more elsewhere. He owned 200 acres in the Plattsburg venture with Smith and Platt, and he bought up $7,372 in state securities and $283 in continentals.¹⁸¹

Thomas Tredwell (Suffolk), a “distinguished Suffolk lawyer,” was owner of 1,120 acres in the Plattsburg venture and probably of land elsewhere, and $209 in continental securities. He had owed an old debt to a Loyalist and was required to pay £260 18s . 3d . ($652.27) to the state for its retirement.¹⁸²

Peter Van Ness (Columbia), judge, lawyer, and landowner, was “a man of means.” In 1788 he purchased from the state three parcels of land totaling 86,500 acres, for which he paid £10,782. He also bought confiscated lots in New York City for £260 and probably confiscated estates elsewhere. He owned $2,010 in continental securities.¹⁸³

Volkert Veeder (Montgomery), a landowner who has been described as ”the possessor of comparatively little property,” owned $746 in continental securities.¹⁸⁴

John Williams (Washington and Clinton), physician and “lord of vast estates” with many tenants, is said to have been the largest landholder among the Clintonians, which would place his acreage well into six figures. Williams invested in many ventures and was one of the early promoters of a privately financed Erie Canal. His security holdings, $1,399 in state securities, were an insignificant part of his wealth.¹⁸⁵

Henry Wisner (Orange), capitalist and manufacturer, was owner of grist and powder mills near Goshen, in which he had manufactured powder for the Continental Army. He owned $3,169 in continental securities.¹⁸⁶

John Wood (Orange), lawyer and landowner, owned $77 in continental and $235 in state securities.¹⁸⁷

Dirck Wyncoop (Ulster), a landlord and “man of parts and property,” had invested in confiscated property (at least £120) and was the owner of $35 in continental securities.¹⁸⁸

Robert Yates (Albany) was a lawyer and judge; his interests are sketched on pages 49-50.

The occupations and investments of nine men were not ascertained: Jonathan Akins (Dutchess), Albert Baker (Washington and Clinton), Ebenezer Clark (Ulster), William Harper (Montgomery), David Hopkins (Washington and Clinton), Israel Thompson (Albany), John Cantine (Ulster), Ichabod Parker (Washington and Clinton), and John Winn (Montgomery). Most of them were probably country lawyers, farmers, and landowners. Three were holders of continental securities: Cantine ($32), Parker ($114), and Winn ($255).¹⁸⁹

It is regrettable that no more information is available about the property holdings of the delegates, particularly vacant lands and confiscated property purchased from the state.¹⁹⁰ The data presented here on purchasers of confiscated property include only purchases in the Southern District, and most of the Clintonian delegates came from other parts of the state. Even so, more of the anti-Federalists than of the Federalists elected—seven to six—had purchased such property around the City, though the amounts bought by the Federalist delegates were generally larger. Were data available on upstate purchases, perhaps considerably larger numbers of Clintonians would appear as purchasers.

Nonetheless a few general remarks may be made in summary. When the convention opened there were twenty-six delegates among the anti-Federalists who held securities and only nine among those who favored ratification. After various delegates changed sides, six of the security holders among the Clintonians voted for ratification, and three of them abstained from voting. But of those who voted against ratification on the final ballot, seventeen (63 per cent) owned securities, and of those who voted for ratification only fifteen (50 per cent) were security holders.¹⁹¹ The great landlords in the convention were divided about equally, but the supporters of ratification slightly exceeded the opponents. As indicated earlier, Philip Schuyler had never rested in his efforts to persuade the aristocracy to oppose Clinton, and his efforts carried weight; but the great Livingston and Van Cortlandt families were divided, and a number of the lesser members of the aristocracy, hardly poor men themselves, were unequivocal supporters of Clinton and opponents of the Constitution.

According to Professor Beard’s interpretive system the conflict in New York was a simple one between security holders (Federalists) and advocates of paper money (anti-Federalists). Such a proposition is self-contradictory, for in New York the term “paper-money advocates” was almost synonymous with the term “security holders.” The assertion that security holders were the dynamic element in the ratification in New York is clearly incompatible with the facts. In the absence of further data it would appear that the two parties to the conflict included approximately equal numbers of men of wealth in the form of personalty, that the Federalists were supported by most of the artisans, mechanics, and small farmers in and around the City, and that the Clintonians were supported by most of the smaller upstate farmers.

NORTH CAROLINA

NORTH CAROLINA was the first state to reject the Constitution. Eleven states had already ratified when North Carolina’s convention met late in July, 1788, but the state’s anti-Federalists were undaunted. They were in a clear majority and apparently they had more courage than their New York counterparts, for they voted against ratification by a thumping 184 to 84 margin. Not until more than a year later, when the general government under the Constitution had been in operation for eight months, did a new convention meet in the state. This time North Carolina ratified by a convention vote of 194 delegates to 77.¹⁹²

The legislature had been in session two days when, on November 21, 1787, two months after the Philadelphia Convention had adjourned, Governor Richard Caswell presented the Constitution to the lawmakers. Ignoring an attempted filibuster by Thomas Persons, Granville County planter and land speculator, the legislature set December 5 for a discussion of the document. Debates took place on that day, and the next day resolutions calling for a ratifying convention were adopted by both houses. Elections were set for the following March. Five delegates were to be elected from each of the fifty-eight counties and one from each of the six borough towns in the state; all taxpayers were declared eligible to vote. The convention was to assemble at Hillsboro on July 21, 1788.¹⁹³

A fierce campaign ensued. Pennsylvania sent pro-ratificationist propaganda to North Carolina, and the Clintonians in New York sent anti-ratificationist materials and exchanged information and advice with North Carolina anti-Federalists. The imported materials were too erudite for most North Carolinians, however; the most telling arguments were concocted inside the state. The campaign of the anti-Federalists was a peculiar one. Some of them tried to keep the arguments on a sane level, deploring the lack of a bill of rights, predicting exploitation of the South by shrewd Yankees, and warning debtors of British merchants that the federal courts would be opened to suits for debts. More common and more effective, however, were such fantasies as that of Baptist minister Burkitt in Hertford County. That divine told his illiterate flock that the clause in the Constitution providing for what was to become the District of Columbia was a provision for a walled city that would house thousands of soldiers who would be privileged to plunder the country. Anti-Federalist leaders based their appeal on ignorance, the Federalists based theirs on reason. The anti-Federalists won by a landslide.¹⁹⁴

Enemies of the Constitution in North Carolina recovered from the shock of the rapid succession of ratifications by New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York and were determined to vote against ratification when the convention met in July. Able debates by James Iredell, Archibald Maclaine, and other Federalists in the convention failed to alter this determination and the opposition, after proposing a long list of amendments, voted by a majority of one hundred against ratification. On August 4 the convention adjourned sine die. ¹⁹⁵

Refusing to despair, the friends of the Constitution immediately began a well co-ordinated campaign for a second convention. Iredell and William R. Davie financed the printing of the journal of the first convention for circulation in the back country; pamphlets and editions of The Federalist were sent to all parts of the state; and petitions for a new convention were circulated in every county. The tide began to turn, and when the legislature convened in November the Senate passed a resolution calling for a second convention. Shrewd anti-Federalists in the House of Commons, however, sensing that the House was inclined to concur with the Senate, introduced their own resolution, setting the elections for the new convention in August, 1789, almost a year away. Efforts of Federalist senators to obtain an earlier date failed, and the second convention was scheduled to be held in Fayetteville in November, 1789.¹⁹⁶

The nine-month campaign which followed was the most intensive educational campaign in the state’s history. In the meantime national elections were held, George Washington became president, and the government of the United States was organized. No federal armies marched to pillage the country. On the contrary, the First Congress passed twelve proposed amendments to the Constitution, ten of which were later ratified as the Bill of Rights. In the face of the educational campaign and the auspicious start made by the new government, most North Carolinians changed their minds. In the August elections the anti-Federalists were defeated as decisively as the Federalists had been in the earlier elections.¹⁹⁷

Of the delegates to the second convention, which met on November 16, 1789, 102 had been members of the Hillsboro convention. Thirty-nine of these had been and still were Federalists, twenty who had formerly been anti-Federalists had now changed sides, and forty-three who had been opponents had been re-elected as opponents. Of the 169 new delegates, 135 were Federalists. The convention lasted only five days, and on November 21, 1789, by a vote of 194 to 77, North Carolina became the twelfth state to ratify.

Beard’s interpretation of ratification has, in a negative sort of a way, some validity when applied to North Carolina. Certain forms of personalty, Beard maintains, were the dynamics in the movement for ratification. North Carolina seems, on the surface, to have lacked these forms of personalty. This, Beard concludes, “must have had a very deadening effect on the spirit of the movement for ratification.” ¹⁹⁸

Yet the matter is not quite so simple as that. The state had western lands, public securities, commerce, and manufacturing, some of them in abundance, but each was neutralized as a potential force in ratification by peculiar features of North Carolina life. Some understanding of the complexity of the economic factors in North Carolina’s ratification may be derived from brief consideration of each of these forms of personalty.

In the 1780’s North Carolina included within its borders all of the present state of Tennessee. Tennessee lands were disposed of by the state in a loose sort of way which for two decades made possible a wild orgy of land speculation. Furthermore, if the assertions of a recent scholar are well founded, business morality in North Carolina was almost unbelievably low; many local land speculators apparently put their economic interests above all philosophy of government, sometimes even above common integrity in government.¹⁹⁹

This band of avaricious speculators, if such they were, were singularly unskilled in their art, however, and uninformed about the political factors that affected the value of their lands. They followed the proceedings of the Virginia ratifying convention carefully, and they knew of Patrick Henry’s sensational expose of the proposed Jay-Gardoqui “give-away” of navigation of the Mississippi. Whether because they feared loss of the Mississippi, because of ignorance, or because they were not quite so avaricious as they have been depicted, speculators in Tennessee lands voted against ratification in the first convention by about five to one. In the second convention they completely reversed themselves and voted for ratification by a three to one majority.²⁰⁰

Even more interesting and paradoxical in view of the supposed speculative mania in North Carolina is the history of public security operations in the state from 1787 to 1790. Beard correctly points out that northern speculators bought up large quantities of the North Carolina state debt. For example, eleven outsiders, most of them from New York, executed 131 of the first 174 subscriptions of North Carolina securities to the Loan of 1790, and these eleven individuals funded $617,185, more than a third of the entire assumed debt of North Carolina. Yet at the time of the first ratifying convention the North Carolina war debt was more than $2,000,000, and almost all of it was owned in the state. Thus the potential “dynamic element in the ratification” existed in 1788, but North Carolinians were either ignorant of what was to their economic advantage or were disposed to put other things first. The chances are that some elements of both were involved.²⁰¹

In the field of manufacturing North Carolina was as productive as any other southern state, yet its manufactures were relatively stable and unaffected by politics. The principal manufactures were rum, which was largely consumed at home, lumber and lumber products, for which there was an insatiable market in the French West Indies as well as in the British West Indies, and naval stores, which were welcomed in markets all over Europe and America. Valuable though they were, almost no North Carolina manufactures were of the sort that could benefit in any appreciable measure from protective tariffs or other governmental measures.

North Carolina’s commerce was likewise unique as a potential element in the movement for ratification. It was larger than Beard assumes, for the vessels clearing the state in 1788 measured about 47,000 tons, more than two-thirds as much as cleared wealthy South Carolina.²⁰² But, as has been observed, except in Massachusetts and Connecticut the secondary effects of commercial intercourse were often more important than the economic effects as a catalyst promoting ratification. That is, 1) places reached by sailing vessels naturally had a broader outlook than isolated places because they participated in a regular exchange of news and ideas as well as goods, and 2) many ports had suffered from ravages of war and were acutely conscious of the need for a general government to provide for the common defense.

The secondary effects were minimized in North Carolina, however, by the odd topography of the state. The chain of narrow, ever-shifting barrier beaches extending from Cape Lookout north to the Virginia border fence off most of the North Carolina coast. Wilmingtoh, located south of the barrier beaches, was the only port in the state to be occupied by the British during the war, and while shippers in the other ports suffered occasional damages, most people in the protected parts of the coastal area emerged from the war with the feeling that they were invulnerable to invasion by sea.

More important than considerations of defense, however, was the lack of internal transportation facilities. Two rivers, the Neuse and the Tar-Pamlico, were navigable by small oceangoing craft for sixty to seventy miles into the interior, and the Roanoke was navigable by rafts and river boats for about the same distance. With these exceptions the state was without any internal transportation facilities other than its usually poor and unreliable roads. North Carolina was the only state except New Hampshire in which the great majority of the population lived at places removed from convenient avenues of transportation, communication, and trade.

The resemblance of North Carolina and New Hampshire with respect to elements affecting the decision on ratification was, indeed, marked. In many ways North Carolina in the 1780’s can be accurately described as an oversized version of New Hampshire, set in a warmer climate. It resembled the northern state in its rural isolation, difficulty of communication, and lack of information. The essential difference, and the reason why North Carolina rejected the Constitution completely whereas New Hampshire only came close to rejecting it, was that North Carolina was also a giant. It embraced an enormous territory, and it was populous and self-sufficient. All things considered, North Carolina could probably have come closer to surviving indefinitely as an independent republic than any other state, and except for Rhode Island it was perhaps most inclined to do so.

Granted the above conditions, it was a simple task for the energetic anti-Federalist leaders of North Carolina to exploit provincial feelings, lack of information, and state particularism, and direct them against the Constitution.

The minority favoring ratification in the state was elected almost exclusively from the counties and towns on the Neuse and Tar-Pamlico rivers. In view of the fact that the lower coastal area around Wilmington, a much richer part of the state,²⁰³ voted against ratification, it is interesting to compare the patterns of trade in the two areas. Vessels from the Wilmington area traded largely with ports in South Carolina, Georgia, East Florida, and the West Indies. Those from the upper area traded more with northern ports in the United States. It is significant that of the three hundred or so annual voyages from the area to those northern places, about half were to the nationalist center, Philadelphia. Thus, as in New Hampshire, it was not the mere fact of communication with the outside world, but the character of the places with which regular communication was established, that was an important factor in the development of national-mindedness.²⁰⁴

The factors that produced ratification in North Carolina’s second convention are not difficult to assess. The principal one was the success of the “educational” campaign, to which several external developments contributed. Beard cites three, the first two of which are sound: the election of Washington as president, the proposal of a Bill of Rights, and the threat of commercial pressures against the state by the general government.²⁰⁵ The latter would seem to have had virtually no influence, for the commercial parts of the state voted the same way in both conventions. One more element may be added: the discomfort of being outside the Union.

A thorough study of the economic interests of the delegates in the two North Carolina ratifying conventions has been made by William C. Pool.²⁰⁶ To that study two additions can be made: data on the public security holdings of the delegates, which Pool did not consider, and an analysis of the occupations and personalty holdings of the delegates, which information Pool furnishes but does not analyze. These data are given below, following which Pool’s own summaries are quoted.

In both conventions security holders were almost entirely unrepresented. In the first convention two delegates who voted against ratification held securities, John Brown of Wilkes County ($4,496) and John Campbell of New Hanover County ($595). Two delegates who voted for ratification also held securities, Nathaniel Allen of Chowan County ($905) and Josiah Collins of Tyrrell County ($17,711), who acquired securities as a purchaser for northern speculators. In the second convention Brown and Campbell again voted against ratification and a third anti-Federalist, Thomas Perkins of Orange County, also held securities ($26). Neither of the Federalists in the first convention was returned to the second convention, but four of the 194 Federalists in the second convention held securities: Hugh Williamson of Tyrrell County ($455 in Pennsylvania securities), Hardy Murfree of Hertford County ($15,370), Samuel Smith of Johnston County ($594), and Adlai Osborne of Iredell County ($158).²⁰⁷

In both conventions more than 90 per cent of the delegates were planters and farmers. In the first convention three of the Federalists were merchants, four were lawyers, and the remaining 77 were planters and farmers; one of the anti-Federalists was a merchant, two were taverners and tradesmen, one was a lawyer, three were physicians, one was a capitalist, and the remaining 176 were planters and farmers. In the second convention four of the delegates favoring ratification were merchants, two were lawyers, one was a physician, one was a capitalist, and 186 were planters and farmers. One of the delegates voting against ratification was a lawyer, two were physicians, and 74 were planters and farmers.

Substantial numbers of the delegates in the two conventions held personalty of various kinds besides slaves. In the first convention four delegates voting for ratification owned mercantile property, two held securities, four had investments in manufacturing, and eight owned western lands; a total of 19 different men (22.3 per cent) were engaged in nonagrarian occupations and/or owned personalty. Of the anti-Federalists in the first convention four owned mercantile property, two owned securities, five owned manufacturing property, and forty owned western lands; a total of 45 different men (24.5 per cent) were engaged in nonagrarian occupations and/or owned personalty besides slaves.

In the second convention six of the Federalist delegates owned mercantile property, four owned securities, three owned manufacturing property, and 37 held western lands; a total of 52 different men (26.8 per cent) were engaged in nonagrarian occupations and/or owned personalty other than slaves. Of the anti-Federalists in the second convention three owned securities, one owned manufacturing property, and twelve owned western lands; a total of 18 different men (23.4 per cent) were engaged in nonagrarian occupations and/or owned personalty other than slaves.

In both conventions, then, the distribution of personalty in the two parties was almost identical.

Pool’s summaries of the landholdings and slaveholdings of the delegates, presented below, likewise show that there was no division of the delegates along economic lines. The first tabulation summarizes, in terms of acreage, the landholdings of Federalist and anti-Federalist delegates in the first convention:

The distribution of the slaveholdings of the delegates in the first convention was as follows:

Below are shown the landholdings of the members of the first convention who were also members of the second convention, divided into three groups: the thirty-nine delegates who voted for the Constitution both times, the twenty delegates who voted against the Constitution in the first convention but voted for ratification in the second convention, and the forty-three delegates who voted against the Constitution in both conventions:

The slaveholdings of the delegates who sat in both conventions, divided as in the preceding tabulation, were as follows:

The next tabulation shows the landholdings of delegates in the second convention, divided into four groups: all 77 anti-Federalists, all 194 Federalists, the 34 anti-Federalists voting for the first time, and the 135 Federalists voting for the first time:

Finally, the slaveholdings of delegates in the second convention, divided as in the preceding tabulation, were as follows:

Dr. Pool summarizes these data as follows:²⁰⁸

The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that an analysis of the personal and real property holdings of those who supported and opposed the Constitution shows that there was no line of property division at all; that is, that men owning substantially the same amounts of the same kinds of property were equally divided on the matter of adoption or rejection. In this connection the debtor class was by no means confined to the small farmer group. The line of cleavage for and against the Constitution was not, as the original economic interpretation has implied, between the substantial property interests on one hand and the small farming and debtor class on the other.

RHODE ISLAND

RHODE ISLAND was the last state to ratify. Not until the United States government under the Constitution had been in operation for fifteen months, the state legislature had seven times defeated resolutions to call a ratifying convention, and the convention finally called had met on two separate occasions, did the little state at last adopt the Constitution. Even then, on May 28, 1790, the vote in the convention was only 34 to 32 in favor of ratification, the margin being the votes of a single town.

The Constitution was first considered by the Rhode Island legislature in its February, 1788, session. A motion to call a convention was rejected by a large majority and in its stead was adopted a resolution authorizing special town meetings at which citizens should vote directly on the question of ratification. The popular vote against ratification was 2,708 to 237. The only towns voting for ratification were Bristol and Little Compton, the former by a vote of 26 to 23 and the latter by a vote of 63 to 57. Providence and Newport protested against the referendum, with the result that only one man (who voted against ratification) voted in Providence and only eleven (ten of whom voted against ratification) in Newport.²⁰⁹

Immediately after this rejection of the Constitution by the voters, a second motion to call a convention was defeated in the March session of the legislature. During the next two years four such motions were defeated: in October, 1788, by a vote of 40 to 14; in December of that year by a vote of 44 to 12; in March, 1789, by about the same vote; and in June, 1789, by a slightly smaller majority. By September, however, the legislature showed signs of weakening. In that month it requested instructions from the towns on the issue, and in October it voted to print and distribute among the towns 150 copies of the twelve amendments to the Constitution recommended by Congress. But when it convened with new instructions two months later it again refused to call a convention, this time by a vote of 39 to 17.²¹⁰

In January, 1790, the Assembly finally voted in favor of a convention, 34 to 29, only to have the Senate reject the resolution, 5 to 4. The next day, however, when one member was absent, the Senate took another vote. The ensuing tie was broken by Governor John Collins, and a convention was set to be held in South Kingston on March 1, 1790.

When the convention met, opponents of the Constitution had a majority of about a dozen delegates. Unwilling to risk a vote on the Constitution with the proposed twelve amendments, the anti-Federalist leaders avoided the issue by a parliamentary stratagem and after five days of debate the delegates voted 41 to 28 to adjourn until May 24 and to reconvene in Newport.²¹¹

When it reconvened the convention faced an unexpected problem. The town of Providence had seceded from the state and presented an ultimatum: only if the convention ratified the Constitution unconditionally would it rejoin the state. In the face of this action and the threat of similar action by other towns, the opposition to ratification finally weakened. On the third day of the session the vote was taken, and the Constitution was approved by a majority of two votes.²¹²

It has generally been assumed that the contest over ratification in Rhode Island was intimately related to the state’s paper-money issue of 1786 and that the paper-money question was simply one of private debtor or paper-money forces opposed to ratification versus private creditor or hard-money forces in favor of ratification. It is sometimes implied and sometimes stated outright, as it was by contemporaries in other states, that “Rogue’s Island” was teeming with dishonest debtors, and that the demand for paper money and opposition to the Constitution were both manifestations of a movement by these debtors to defraud their creditors.²¹³

Whatever may be the justice of describing the Rhode Islanders as a band of pirates, it does great injustice to their imaginations and financial acumen to assume that their paper was no more than a simple scheme of debtors to defraud creditors. It is true that fiscal matters were at the center of Rhode Island political activity from 1781 to 1791, but the fiscal situation was an extremely complex one. Only through an understanding of the intricacies of the state’s financial history during the decade can the background of the contest over ratification be comprehended. The following account is a somewhat simplified summary of this financial history.²¹⁴

Rhode Island’s peculiar financial course began in 1782 with the state’s rejection of a proposed amendment to the Articles of Confederation that would have given Congress power to collect a five per cent duty on imports into all American.ports. All the other states signified their approval, but Rhode Island refused to yield, and when Virginia rescinded its ratification of the amendment the proposal was dead.

Two considerations were widely recognized as the reasons for Rhode Island’s rejection of the proposed impost. First, the state derived most of its income from trade, and it considered a free-trade policy, or a trade policy designed for and by Rhode Island, to be to its best interest. A second and perhaps more important consideration was that the holders of state securities and the taxpayers of the state saw that if the state surrendered import duties to Congress, a main source of the state’s revenues would be sacrificed. In that event state creditors would be left on a tenuous footing and, equally undesirable, the burden of direct taxation to support state debts would be substantially increased.²¹⁵

A third reason for Rhode Island’s rejection of the impost plan derived from the activities of speculators in Providence. A dozen or so merchants in Providence, including Nicholas and John Brown, Thomas Jenkins, the firm of Clark and Nightingale, Zachariah and Phillip Allen, Joseph and William Russel, and Jabez Bowen, had acquired among them nearly $250,000 in continental loan office certificates.²¹⁶ These speculators exploited the situation in various ways, the method employed by Nicholas Brown being the most common.

Brown owned nearly $100,000 worth of these continental securities. After the impost plan of 1781 had been ratified by the other twelve states, it was easy enough for Brown to convince his mercantile correspondents in other cities that Rhode Island, too, would soon give its approval. When this news was spread, the price of continental loan office certificates rose from about two and a half shillings to four shillings on the pound, and the prices of state securities dropped in almost every state. At the critical moment Brown quietly disposed of about thirty thousand dollars of his loan office certificates in exchange for state securities of Massachusetts, New York, and other states. These transactions completed, he then worked for rejection of the impost plan by Rhode Island and voted in the legislature against it. When the plan was defeated, the prices of state securities rose again and the prices of continental securities dropped. As a result of his manipulations Brown was about thirty thousand dollars richer.²¹⁷

As the war drew near an end Rhode Island, like most of the other states and like Congress, began to put its financial house in order by “scaling” its war debts to compensate for wartime inflation. That is, for example, if a horse worth ten pounds had been sold for a note of a thousand pounds face value, this note was called in and scaled down to ten pounds, the “real” price or value of the animal. When this process was completed and all accounts had been audited, the state of the various forms of certificates in Rhode Island was, in round figures, as follows: ²¹⁸

566 six per cent notes issued for money advanced to the state, held by about 250 individuals, amounting to … £ 50,000

2,416 four per cent notes of the same character, held by about 2,300 individuals, amounting to £ 46,000

Continental loan office certificates, two-thirds of which were owned in Providence and more than half by twelve men in that city, amounting to $524,000, or £157,200

Claims against Congress for war damages on the part of nineteen towns, most of whose inhabitants had few other securities, amounting to,£270,000

Claims of the state government for uncompensated expenditures on behalf of Congress £630,000

Claims of individuals against Congress for goods and supplies furnished; widely held in small amounts, totaling £278,000

It is to be observed that more than half the voters in the state owned four per cent notes. If it were possible, to identify all the individuals who owned one of the above forms of debt, it would probably appear that upwards of seventy-five per cent of the voters were security holders. Largely because of this wide distribution of security holdings, but also because the ideal of public integrity was still alive at the end of the war, Rhode Island entertained no thought of repudiating any of these debts. On the contrary, as Congress lagged ever further behind in its interest payments, the state took on more and more of the continental burden, until it was attempting to support the interest on all the continental securities owned in the state. Holders of continental loan office certificates were able to get preferential treatment in these interest payments by exerting their economic and political influence.

At first the state’s import duties alone were almost adequate to service the debt, but as the interest burden increased, direct taxes on real property rose rapidly. Five thousand pounds, then ten thousand, twenty thousand, and thirty thousand was levied annually in direct taxes on the freeholders. The towns complained, but most of them collected the levies. The financial situation, however, was fast approaching the absurd dilemma that faced Connecticut taxpayers, many of whom, it will be recalled, were losing their realty because of nonpayment of taxes levied on it for the purpose of supporting interest payments on their securities. The case of the town of South Kingston was typical. That town gradually slipped behind in its tax payments: it was £500 in arrears in 1783, £750 in 1784, more than £1,000 in 1785, and £2,000 by May, 1786. Most of these taxes had been levied to support interest payments on continental and state securities. The town tax collectors were being sent to jail for failure to collect these taxes, yet the town government of South Kingston owned nearly two thousand pounds in continental securities and a similar amount of state securities, and residents of the town owned upwards of twenty thousand pounds in various forms of debt.²¹⁹

In the meantime, toward the end of the war, an apparently irrelevant event occurred that was to alter the course of Rhode Island history. Elizabeth Thurston, the widow of a colonial official of Rhode Island, petitioned the Assembly respecting the official affairs of her late husband. Thurston, a Loyalist, had fled with the colony’s records to New York City, where he died during the war. A committee of the Assembly was appointed to investigate the petition, and the records were returned from New York.²²⁰

As it happened, Thurston’s office had been that of Keeper of the Grand Committee Office, the agency that supervised the colony’s last issue of paper money. When there had been a pressing need for a circulating medium in colonial days, Rhode Island had frequently resorted to issuing paper money on loan, secured by real estate mortgages and bearing interest payable to the colony. By the end of the war, however, there were few people in the state who could remember the last colonial issue of paper (1750). The only paper money that was clearly remembered in postwar Rhode Island was the issue of wartime bills of credit that had emanated from the Continental Congress, bills which had depreciated in two years to a thousand for one, and thereafter became worthless.

One of the members of the General Assembly at the time the Widow Thurston’s petition was presented was a keen, some-what demagogic politician named Jonathan J. Hazard. Hazard, who owned five different kinds of securities, was one of those persons who was in debt for taxes that had been levied to support the interest on his securities, and he thus felt at first hand the hopeless contradictions in the state’s fiscal policy. Mrs.Thurston’s claim was soon settled, but Hazard, together with friends and allies he began to acquire—Joseph Stanton, Job Comstock, Samuel Potter, Benjamin Arnold, and others—continued to study the late Keeper’s records for three years more.²²¹

In these records Hazard and his friends found, or thought they found, an answer to Rhode Island’s financial predicament. The records demonstrated that the colonial paper money had been successful, that in effect the paper had been a means of creating something out of nothing. Money had been needed, so paper was printed and called money. The paper circulated as money and was eventually retired through repayment of mortgages, foreclosures, and taxes, the tax burden being eased by the increased amount of money in circulation. The borrowers of the paper had repaid the colony almost in full and the colony had collected regular interest payments as well.

Conjecturing about the possibility of employing this same expedient in Rhode Island in the 1780’s, Hazard reasoned as follows. Paper money, of an amount approximately equal to the state debt, could be lent on good security and be made legal tender for all public obligations and taxes. Real estate would be the most desirable security, for the right to vote was contingent upon the ownership of land. Strict penalties could be enacted to prevent depreciation of the paper. If it did not depreciate, the interest to be collected on it would be equal to the interest owed by the state. If taxes were then continued at existing levels, they would be easier to pay and would be sufficient to retire the state debt at par in about seven years. The paper could then be retired through further taxes. If, on the other hand, the paper did begin to depreciate, it could be supported by increasing taxes fast enough to absorb the depreciation. In that event the state would retire its debts in very short order, perhaps in a year or two. Whether the paper depreciated or not, the state would be transformed from a debtor paying interest of about a hundred thousand pounds to a creditor collecting interest of about the same amount. Funding of the state debts would tie the interests of the multitude of state security holders to the fate of the paper and would thus be an additional force in maintaining its circulation at about par. The plan seemed foolproof.

As this scheme was being formulated by Hazard and his associates, developments were taking place which prepared the citizenry for acceptance of the plan. Most of the towns were beginning to resent having to support the continental loan office certificates. The people in the “country” towns on the western shore considered that this expense should be borne by Congress, to them virtually a foreign government. The inhabitants of the eastern shore and island towns, who owned almost no loan office certificates, regarded it as unjust that they should have to pay taxes to support these securities when they were receiving no money from either the state or Congress for their claims against Congress for war losses. Concurrently with the growth of this unwillingness to continue supporting the obligations of the United States, there was in Rhode Island, as in other states, a rapidly growing lack of respect for Congress. Increasing numbers began to feel that the Confederation was withering away, and Rhode Islanders witnessed the dissolution with little regret.²²²

Hazard and his allies took these developments into account and decided that the policy which would suit most people in the state would be a virtual dissolution of all connections with the Confederation. New York and Pennsylvania had already adopted financial systems that amounted almost to declarations of independence, and the Hazard group felt that the time was ripe for Rhode Island to do likewise. By the end of 1785 they had worked out the details of their financial scheme, and now they prepared to execute it.

In February, 1786, a “feeler” proposal for an issue of paper money was made in the lower house in response to petitions submitted by Newport and a half dozen other towns.²²³ The proposal was rejected, but the real purpose of it was accomplished when the Assembly agreed to request the towns to give their representatives instructions on the issue at the annual town meetings in April. During the next two months the friends of the Hazard scheme traveled throughout the state explaining the system to countless individuals. The decision of the towns was almost unanimous; only Providence, Newport, and Portsmouth instructed their delegates to vote against paper, and in none of these towns was the vote against paper an overwhelming one.²²⁴

A law passed in May, 1786, authorized the issuance of a hundred thousand pounds of paper money on the terms originally planned by Hazard and his associates. In most quarters it was accepted immediately, by all ranks of the population and all occupational groups. It was not issued to the “country” or to farmers alone. Nearly fifteen per cent of it was issued in Providence and Newport, in which towns about seventy per cent of the loans were made to merchants. In the state as a whole nearly sixty per cent of the total issue was borrowed by merchants and the wealthier landowners. In each town the minimum sum loaned was from £15 to £22; the total of 554 persons who borrowed this basic minimum unit took out a total of just over £ 10,000. At the other end of the scale, about 50 of the wealthier men in the state, those paying the heaviest taxes, borrowed about,£30,000 of the total £96,608 actually issued. The friends of the issue included not only the mass of the people but a large share of the wealthier men in the state as well.²²⁵

The law included a number of devices designed to maintain the par value of the paper, but most of them were too severe and defeated their purpose. Three of the more significant of these were the provision making the paper legal tender for all public and private debts, the disfranchisement of any person who refused to accept the paper at par, and the renowned lodge money or “know ye” clause. This last provided that if a private creditor refused to accept the paper for debts, the debtor could cancel his debt by depositing the paper money with certain courts, publishing a public notice of his action in the newspapers, and informing his creditor of the action. The creditor could then pick up the money or leave it, as he saw fit.

Much can be learned about the nature of the paper money and about its users and backers from these published announcements of deposits of lodge money.²²⁶ In the first place, most of the total of about,£17,000 so deposited was lodged and taken out of circulation within a year, so that the amount of paper in circulation after 1786 was never more than £79,000. Secondly, since the lodge money represented all private debts cancelled by the tender of paper contrary to the wishes of the creditor, and since hundreds of thousands of dollars of public debt were involved in the plan, it is clear that the cancellation of private debts was only a relatively insignificant by-product of the scheme, not its essential purpose. Finally, in view of the widely accepted notion that the debtor faction was the “country” party, made up of farmers, and that the creditors who suffered from the cancellation of debts in depreciated currency were largely merchants, the following tabulations of lodge-money deposits are of interest.

1.  As nearly as can be ascertained, 76 different farmers tendered paper money for debts and 62 different farmers received it; 57 non-farmers tendered paper money for payment of debts and 72 received it. Including those whose occupations are not ascertainable, a total of no more than 156 different persons tendered paper money and a total of no more than 158 received it. Making allowance for those who appear as both debtors and creditors, fewer than 300 different individuals, about two per cent of the adult male population, were involved in the lodge-money transactions in any capacity.

2.  Persons known to be farmers or identified as such cancelled debts totaling £6,218 13s. 4d. by depositing lodge money. On the other hand, debts totaling £6,525 2s. 9d. due to farmers were written off by lodge-money deposits. Farmers so cancelled a total of only £991 7s . 1d. in debts due to a total of only eight persons known to be or identified as merchants, traders, and shopkeepers. On the other hand, merchant-debtors so cancelled £524 1s. 3d. in debts that they owed to farmers.

3.  Thirteen different merchants and traders wrote off debts amounting to £2,824 16s. 3d . by depositing lodge money. The debts due to nineteen different merchants were cancelled by lodge-money deposits, the total sum being £3,332 1s. 11d. Of these write-offs of debts £757 2s. 7d. represented sums due from merchants to other merchants.

In short, there is no foundation in fact for the commonly accepted generalization that the paper-money movement in Rhode Island represented the actions of large bands of debtor-farmers who were using depreciated paper currency to pay obligations due to merchant-creditors.

When it was first issued the paper was acceptable in all quarters except one: among the holders and speculators in continental loan office certificates. Most of the citizens of Providence held some of these securities and, as was observed earlier, a dozen of the most powerful merchants in the town owned about half of the $524,000 in continental loan office certificates held in the state. It was obvious to these merchant-speculators—it was no secret—that the ultimate plan of the leaders in the paper-money movement was to pay off the state debts and to abandon all responsibility for continental obligations.

As it happened, the very individuals who had acquired the largest amounts of continental loan office certificates were being pressed in 1786 for nearly a hundred thousand pounds in debts they owed British merchants for postwar imports. Had these goods been sold in Rhode Island, the primary consideration of the merchants would have been to collect debts owed them by consumers in the state, and any legitimate plan designed for the improvement of the financial condition of such consumers would have worked to the ultimate benefit of the merchants. But most of the goods had been sold outside Rhode Island, and the profits had already been reinvested, much of them in public securities.²²⁷

The merchants thus had a great deal at stake as regards their speculations in securities. The question facing them in 1786 was whether to support the paper, collect on their state securities, and lose their investments in loan office certificates. The answer was simple arithmetic. For example, Zachariah Allen owned $600 in state six per cent securities, $15,000 in continental loan office certificates; Nicholas Brown owned $11,000 in state six per cents and $62,000 in continental loan office certificates; John Brown owned $3,920 in state four per cent notes and $68,000 in continental loan office certificates. This small group of merchants determined to destroy the entire plan of issuing paper money and retiring state debts.²²⁸

The favorite strategy of the opponents of the paper was to shout “cheat,” to denounce the advocates of paper money as a band of dishonest debtors attempting to defraud their creditors. As has been observed, the paper-money plan had little to do with private debts, but the merchants pretended otherwise, and since they exercised substantial control over the principal means of communication, including the local newspapers, the friends of paper money went largely unheard. A second major charge was that, since the paper would not be accepted outside the state, it would destroy Rhode Island’s commerce. This cry was as groundless as the first, for the state’s interstate and foreign commerce increased every year the paper-money plan was in operation.²²⁹

But the constant stream of propaganda against paper money and the private manipulations of the merchant-speculators in continental loan office certificates rapidly undermined popular faith in the currency, and it began to depreciate quickly. In thirty months it depreciated, at an approximately steady rate, to about twelve or fifteen for one—that is, until its market value was about eight cents on the dollar. It remained at this level for two years, after which it rose to six for one, at which rate it circulated until all but a fraction of it was fully retired in 1800.²³⁰

Undaunted by the depreciation of the currency, the leaders of the paper-money faction pressed forward with their plan to retire state debts. In March, 1787, they called for a referendum on the question of paying the debts, and the vote of the towns was overwhelmingly favorable to the plan. A bill for the purpose was drafted and in 1788 the debts were retired in four quarterly installments. By the end of the year the state was free from debt, and for the first time in more than a decade no expenditures were required for interest payments. By 1789 the state’s annual expenses were reduced to less than ten thousand pounds, forty per cent of which was collected in interest payments on the paper loaned and the remainder in the form of import duties. The direct tax load had been abolished.²³¹

When the program had run its course its advantages and disadvantages could be assessed. On the debit side there were two results. The worst effect of the paper was the great damage it had done to the reputation of Rhode Island among its sister states. The little state’s prestige had already been low, and now it had been reduced still further. A second bad effect was that private creditors suffered from the payment of debts in depreciated currency. As has been indicated, however, these losses were of considerably less importance than has generally been supposed.

On the credit side were many important achievements. Almost everybody involved made money. The state government obviously gained, as did the taxpayers. The holders of state securities gained, for the depreciated paper they received was worth more than the depreciated securities they had owned.²³² Speculators, even those who denounced and worked against the paper, doubtless profited from the gyrations of the currency, despite the fact that large numbers of small holders of the state debt were enabled to receive payment for their securities before they could be bought up and concentrated in the hands of a few speculators. The cash received by the multitudes of Rhode Islanders in payment for their securities was, it is true, depreciated paper, but the paper was acceptable for taxes, and it was funds for the payment of taxes that was the principal need of the small security holders.

The great majority of the citizens recognized these benefits and supported the paper-money leaders from start to finish. By the middle of 1788 all the opposition was coming from Providence, from three other towns that supported Providence by large majorities, and from three towns that wavered and tended to oppose the paper plan by small majorities. The principal reason for the opposition in Providence has been analyzed earlier. The towns that joined Providence in unqualified opposition were Newport, Middletown, and Portsmouth. These towns held audited and approved accounts against the United States for war damages amounting to £124,000,,£51,000, and £41,000, respectively. As it was clear almost from the outset that the paper-money program meant, in effect, a break with the United States, these towns quickly withdrew the support they had given earlier to the original plan for an issue of paper. The three wavering towns, Jamestown, Bristol, and Warren, also held large claims against the United States. They supported the paper, however, until it had depreciated considerably and the pressure from outside the state had become unbearable, and then they reversed their position by small majorities.²³³

The effect of these financial affairs upon the attitudes of Rhode Islanders toward the Constitution is clear. In general, the towns that constituted the bloc opposed to paper money or, more accurately, the particular individuals in those towns who had induced the towns to oppose paper, formed the hard core of the group that reacted favorably to the Constitution.

Virtually all the rest of the state opposed the Constitution from the moment it appeared. Steeped as they were in democratic traditions, Rhode Islanders could muster no enthusiasm for the republican conservatism of the Constitution, and many sincerely feared the political power vested in the proposed general government. Besides this philosophical consideration, there were three major, immediately practical reasons for the opposition. The first was that although the paper-money plan had just begun to operate in September, 1787, Rhode Island was already too deeply involved in the program to back out. The financial chaos that would have resulted from the abandonment of the plan before it had run its course would have made the existing financial situation seem peaceful and orderly by comparison.

This ground for opposition to the Constitution gave rise to another. The abuse heaped upon Rhode Island by other states caused most of its citizenry to band together more closely in bitter opposition to the United States. True, the abuse sometimes brought the opposite reaction; there were those who felt that Rhode Island should attempt to redeem itself in the public eye and that the only way it could do so was to join the Union. In the main, however, outsiders won very few friends in Rhode Island by hurling derisive epithets.

A third reason for the continued opposition was that, despite much talk of the economic losses that would ensue if the state remained outside the Union, the economic possibilities of independent status were enormous. The most important of such potentials was smuggling to circumvent payment of United States import duties. It hardly needs to be said that smuggling was a form of business activity developed to perfection by the Rhode Island merchants before the war.²³⁴

In view of the weight of the opposition, then, the critical question to be answered is why six towns in the state changed sides in 1790 and finally voted for ratification. The usual answers to this question are two: that the threat of economic coercion on the part of the government of the United States frightened many, and that the state’s merchants, creditors, and advocates of sound money united against farmers, debtors, and advocates of paper money to bring about the shift in votes.²³⁵

As to the former proposition, it is evident that the disadvantages that would have arisen from commercial legislation against Rhode Island by the United States were more than offset by the possibilities of profits from smuggling. The second proposition, that final victory for ratification was the result of the defeat of one economic class by another, requires careful consideration. The proposition cannot be tested with finality, though a superficial study of the interests of the individual voters in the towns indicates that there is little basis for a class interpretation. A reasonably accurate test, however, may be made by studying the immediate economic interests of the delegates to the ratifying convention. Such study reveals the following data.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DELEGATES TO the RATIFYING CONVENTION

MERCHANTS

Five of the delegates who voted for ratification were merchants and owners or part owners of vessels:²³⁶

Samuel Allen (Barrington), who owned the principal share of a 6o-ton sloop.

Sherjashub Bourne (Bristol), who had from a fourth to a half interest in sloops of 22, 25, 50, 60, and 61 tons and a third interest in brigs of 66, 104, and 147 tons.

John I. Clark (Providence), who owned, with his partner Joseph Nightingale, a fleet of about a dozen vessels.

George Champlin (Newport), who had a half interest in a 125-ton brig and a fifth interest in a 204-ton ship.

Peleg Clarke (Newport), who had a fourth interest in a 208-ton ship and was the sole owner of a 95-ton brig.

Six of the delegates who voted against ratification were merchants and owners or part owners of vessels:²³⁷

Benjamin Arnold (Coventry), who had a third interest in a 40-ton brig.

Elisha Brown (North Providence), who had a half interest in a 45-ton sloop.

Thomas Rice (Warwick), who had a third interest in a 40-ton brig, a half interest in a 147-ton brig, and a third interest in sloops of 24 and 44 tons.

Andrew Waterman (Smithfield), who had a third interest in a 60-ton sloop.

Gideon Arnold (Warwick), who had a half interest in a 35-ton sloop.

Job Wilcox (Exeter), who had a half interest in a 42-ton sloop.

This weight of merchants on the side of the opponents of ratification is somewhat balanced, however, by the fact that one of the Federalist delegates, Isaac Manchester (Tiverton), was a mariner and two Federalist delegates, George Hazard (Newport) and William Ladd (Little Compton) were merchants who did not own vessels.²³⁸

FARMERS

Every delegate in the convention owned farmland or other realty of a value of at least forty pounds, such ownership being the qualification for freemen. It is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize further about the occupations of the delegates, for almost all freemen in Rhode Island had a variety of interests—mercantile, manufacturing, and other personalty as well as farming. Only five delegates who voted for ratification were found to have been farmers who owned no mercantile or manufacturing property in addition to their realty: Benjamin Remington (Jamestown), Nicholas Carr (Jamestown), Joshua Barker (Middletown), Elisha Barker (Middletown), and Burrington Anthony (Portsmouth).²³⁹

The principal occupation of eight more Federalists was farming, and there were five lawyers, a physician, a hatter, the above-mentioned seven merchants and one mariner, one man who carried on a wagon trade with Boston, and five whose occupations were too varied to classify. The occupations of the opponents of ratification were approximately the same, except that only one anti-Federalist delegate, Joseph Reynolds (Exeter), was found to have been engaged in no economic activity other than farming. Neither party in the convention could reasonably be described as an “agrarian” party.²⁴⁰

DEBTORS

Private indebtedness is a nebulous condition, invariably difficult to ascertain. Except for the established fact that John I. Clark, George Champlin, and Peleg Clarke, all of whom favored ratification, were heavily indebted to British merchants,²⁴¹ the only information on indebtedness that is conveniently available is that revealed in the lodge-money announcements in the newspapers and in local property evaluations. Three Federalist delegates, Benjamin Remington, Nicholas Carr, and Elisha Barker, claimed exemptions for debts in their tax evaluations.²⁴² No anti-Federalists were found to have made such claims. Only two delegates who voted for ratification, Samuel Allen (Barrington) and William Ladd (Little Compton), wrote off debts in depreciated currency under the lodge-money provision. Only one delegate who voted against ratification, Joseph Reynolds, wrote off debts in this manner.²⁴³ The available facts would seem to indicate that neither side was a debtors’ faction, although approximately a fourth of the Federalists were debtors.

PUBLIC CREDITORS

Records for holdings of continental and state debts are complete, and they indicate the following distribution of security holdings in the convention.

Seventeen (50 per cent) of the delegates who voted for ratification were public creditors. The amounts of securities they held, exclusive of accrued interest, were as follows:

Six of them held both continental and state securities:²⁴⁴

Jabez Bowen (Providence), $15,948 continental, $391 state.

Henry Marchant (Newport), $619 continental, $747 state.

Benjamin Bosworth (Warren), $787 continental, $395 state.

Isaac Manchester (Tiverton), $95 continental, $446 state.

John I. Clark (Providence), $13,805 continental, $192 state.

John Brown (Hopkinton), $319 continental, $192 state.

Two held only continental securities:²⁴⁵

William Barton (Providence), $400.

Benjamin Arnold, Jr. (Warwick), $23.

Nine held only state securities:²⁴⁶

Sherjashub Bourne (Bristol), $505.

William Bradford (Bristol), $2,095.

Christopher Greene, Jr. (Warwick), $1,534.

Thomas Allen (Barrington), $50.

John S. Dexter (Cumberland), $623.

Benjamin Remington (Jamestown), $285.

Peleg Clarke (Newport), $13.

Benjamin Bourn (Providence), $452.

Fifteen (47 per cent) of the delegates who voted against ratification were public creditors, as follows:

Five held both continental and state securities:²⁴⁷

Elisha Brown (North Providence), $637 continental, $232 state.

Thomas Rice (Warwick), $569 continental, $720 state.

J. J. Hazard (South Kingston), $8 continental, $291 state.

Andrew Waterman (Smithfield), $240 continental, $2 state.

Joseph Stanton, Jr. (Charlestown), $271 continental, $22 state.

Three held only continental securities:²⁴⁸

James Aldrich (Scituate), $5.

Samuel Potter (South Kingston), $15.

Giles Slocum (Portsmouth), $28,253.

Seven held only state securities:²⁴⁹

Benjamin Arnold (Coventry), $1,435.

William B. King (Johnston), $9.

Joseph Reynolds (Exeter), $236.

Job Greene (Coventry), $72.

John Williams (Foster), $43.

James Sheldon (Richmond), $3.

John Sayles (Smithfield), $28.

The delegates voting for and the delegates voting against the Constitution, then, held approximately the same amounts of the same kinds of securities, and it would appear that there was no line of cleavage between public creditors and non-creditors. One fact of importance about security holdings, however, will be pointed out later.

PAPER MONEY

The pertinence of all the above data might be questionable if it developed that almost all the friends of paper money were against the Constitution. Such was not the fact, however. Twenty-one of the delegates who voted for ratification (62 per cent) had borrowed paper money in 1786:²⁵⁰

Samuel Allen (£60).

Thomas Allen (£54).

Burrington Anthony (£18).

Abraham Barker (£80 10s. 11½d.).

Levi Ballou (£28 145.).

Joshua Barker (£18 6s.).

William Barton (£12 2s.).

Benjamin Bosworth (£16 16s.).

Benjamin Bourn (£ 303 6s . 8d .).

Sherjashub Bourne (£461).

Jabez Bowen (,£30 9s .).

Nicholas Carr (£37 2s . 3d .).

John I. Clark (£2,62s ).

Christopher Greene (£21 5s .).

William Ladd (£100 4s .).

Isaac Manchester (£96 2s . 9d.).

Jesse Maxson (£208).

Samuel Pearce (£24 4s . 1½d.).

George Stillman (£ 21 19s . 5d.).

George Sears (£18).

William Tripp (£ 18).

A slightly smaller number on the other side were borrowers of paper. Twenty delegates who voted against ratification (63 per cent) borrowed paper:²⁵¹

Benjamin Arnold (£170).

Gideon Arnold (£113 15s.).

Elisha Brown (£25).

Bowen Card (£17 11s.).

Job Comstock (£78).

Eseck Esten (£15).

Job Greene (£140 9s.).

J. J. Hazard (£278 10s.).

William Matthewson (£22).

Noah Matthewson (£33 6s.).

William Nichols (£43 8s.).

Pardon Mawney (£14).

Samuel J. Potter (£228 4s. 8d.).

Joseph Reynolds (£42).

Thomas Rice (£21 5s.).

James Sheldon (£90).

Giles Slocum (£36).

Andrew Waterman (£300).

Job Wilcox (£180).

John Williams (£370 18s.).

These data may be summarized as follows:

It is clear, then, that there is no basis in fact for the traditional explanation of the vote in Rhode Island. To understand that vote it is necessary to turn back to the original alignment on ratification, as it appeared in 1787, an alignment that had grown out of the financial history of the state during the period. Towns having a total of twenty-two delegates were favorable to the Constitution at the outset. The number of delegates finally voting for ratification was thirty-four. This means that twelve delegates, representing six towns, changed sides.

There were two principal economic reasons for the shift.²⁵² The first was the secession of Providence and the threatened secession of other Federalist towns, including Newport. Most citizens of the state felt that Rhode Island could go it alone, but if the state was to be rent to pieces by secessions and partial ratifications, the advocates of state sovereignty would have a hopeless situation on their hands.

The second reason was the promise of greater profits on public securities. By the time the ratifying convention met for its second session in May, 1790, it had become clear that Congress planned to assume the debts of the states. Rhode Island had paid its debts, after a fashion, but it could enact a law setting up a scale of depreciation on its paper money, declare that because of the depreciation only a part of the debt had been paid, and return the certificates to the original holders.²⁵³

It will be recalled that the great majority of the backers of paper money had been creditors of the state. Many of them now desired to capitalize on this opportunity to receive payment for their securities a second time. It is further to be observed that six of the twelve delegates who shifted sides between the two sessions of the ratifying convention (Thomas Allen, Samuel Allen, Isaac Manchester, John Brown, Christopher Greene, and John S. Dexter) were holders of state securities.

Most of the anti-Federalists were adamant in their opposition, but enough of them joined with Federalists to secure passage of a bill in the legislature declaring that only a part of the debt had been paid, as outlined above.²⁵⁴ That arrangement completed, they were ready to vote for ratification.

The other states that had paid part of their war debts received no credit for their efforts under Hamilton’s assumption plan. Under that plan the debts, that had been retired were considered retired once and for all. Rhode Island alone, by this last of the series of intricate financial maneuvers it had executed during the decade, was able to pay off its creditors and make it possible for those creditors to receive a second payment, this time from the government of the United States. Thus, even in the act of ratifying the Constitution, Rhode Island paid its disrespects to the Union one last time.

NOTES

¹ Journal of the House of Delegates of the State of Virginia (Richmond, 1828), October 25, 1787. The bill formally became law on December 12, 1787. Exactly why the opponents of ratification offered no opposition to the calling of a convention is not clear. There were thirty-two delegates in the House who later voted against ratification and the same number who later voted for ratification. Patrick Henry, the leader of the opposition to the Constitution in Virginia, was probably caught off guard before he could organize his forces and estimate his strength in the House. Rather than risk defeat there, he doubtless felt that it was better to put the decision to a convention; furthermore, victory in the House would only be temporary, whereas victory in a convention would be more nearly final. And in a showdown right in a convention Henry, with his almost hypnotic oratory, excelled. Also, he thought he could count on Edmund Randolph’s support in a convention, and Randolph was not a member of the House.

² The printed campaign may be traced in the Richmond Virginia Independent Chronicle, the Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal, the Virginia Herald, and the Fredericksburg Advertiser, the Virginia Journal and Alexandria Advertiser, and other Virginia newspapers. Arguments for and against the Constitution appeared in virtually every issue of these newspapers from October, 1787, to June, 1788.

³ Hugh Blair Grigsby, The History of the Virginia Federal Convention of 1788, with Some Account of the Eminent Virginians of That Era Who Were Members of the Body, edited by R. A. Brock (2 vols., Richmond, 1890, 1891), 1:3in, records that Humphrey Marshall, a Kentucky delegate, had traveled far into the densely populated parts of Virginia, on his way to attend the con vention, before he saw his first number of the Federalist.

⁴ Ibid., 1:32. Data on the military backgrounds of the elected delegates are given below, pages 262–263.

⁵ David Henley to Samuel Henley, April 18, 1788, in Personal Miscellaneous File in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress. There has long been speculation as to the decision of the voters in Virginia, and it has often been assumed that the anti-Federalists had an elected majority. This contemporary document would seem to end the speculation. David Henley, a Federalist tobacco buyer in the employ of partners of Robert Morris, constructed and enclosed in this letter a table which gives all the above information. This remarkable document contains a few errors of detail—for example, Henley lists John Stringer of Northampton as John “Stratum,” but there are only two significant errors of fact. He lists two Federalists, George and Roger Thompson, as the elected delegates from Lincoln County, whereas these two men were actually defeated by anti-Federalists John Logan and Henry Pawling. It is significant that Henley lists James Monroe as a Federalist and Edmund Randolph as an anti-Federalist, indicating that immediately after the elections the Federalists were mistaken about the positions of these two important men.

⁶ Ibid. The analysis of the shifting of votes is based on a comparison of Henley’s pre-convention summary with the final vote, allowance being made for the four cases in which Henley was in error. The first volume of Grigsby’s Virginia Convention is an excellent description of the maneuverings in the convention, despite the fact that Grigsby wrote with a strong anti-Federalist bias.

⁷ It is a striking fact, not without significance in the contest, that except for a handful of men who had opposed Henry politically for two decades, the leadership and the ranks of the delegates elected as Federalists were composed largely of young men in their twenties and thirties. The leaders on the anti- Federalist side and many of their followers were men between the ages of forty-five and seventy. The younger men had come of age when talk of the “Union” and “hang together or hang separately” was in vogue; the older men were of a generation that talked more of “rignts” than of Union and thought of Virginia as a unique province under the British crown.

⁸ The port of Norfolk had been burned and deserted during the war, but it had since been rebuilt and by 1788 rivaled Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. The tonnage destined for foreign places clearing Virginia ports was greater than that of any other state, and though Virginia did not own a half dozen seaworthy vessels in 1782, by 1788 fully a third of its foreign trade was being carried in Virginia bottoms. Virginia vessels were favored by special legislation, and there was stiff competition among French, British, and other American vessels to get a share of the Virginia trade. Freight rates were only slightly above prewar levels, whereas the price of tobacco had nearly doubled. Data on shipping have been taken from Naval Officer Returns, in the Virginia State Library at Richmond, from which I have tabulated all pertinent information regarding ocean-borne commerce for the period 1782–1789. Prices and freight rates for the 1760’s and 1770’s are quoted in the Williamsburg Virginia Gazette, postwar prices and freight rates in the Alexandria Virginia Journal, the Richmond Independent Chronicle, the Richmond Weekly Advertiser, the Richmond American Advertiser, the Fredericksburg Advertiser, the Phila delphia Evening Herald, and the New York Daily Advertiser, 1783–1789.

⁹ The Richmond Virginia Gazette or the American Advertiser, January 26, 1782, describes the war losses by counties.

¹⁰ Tabularions from John H. Gwathmey, Historical Register of Virginia in the Revolution: Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, 1775–1783 (Richmond, 1938). Lee’s speech is quoted in Grigsby’s Virginia Convention, 1:160. Grigsby attributed the success of the Federalists almost exclusively to the influence of the ex-officers.

¹¹ It is significant that militiamen voted against ratification, 24 to 23, whereas soldiers of the continental line voted for ratification, 46 to 35. If the latter figures are a valid measure of influences, however, they would seem to indi cate that Washington’s influence even among the veterans was very little stronger than Henry’s.

¹² On the confiscation of slaves see Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860 (2 vols., Washington, 1933), 2:595–596. Estimates of the size of the debt vary. The £ 2,000,000 figure is Jefferson’s esti mate and the one most often quoted. On all matters regarding the treaty, and particularly on economic matters, see Isaac S. Harrell, Loyalism in Virginia. (Philadelphia, 1926).

¹³ The British watched the contest in Virginia with keen interest. A British factor who witnessed the convention wrote home two days after the conven tion adjourned that the “recovery of the British debts can no longer be post poned.” Francis N. Mason, ed., John Norton & Sons, Merchants of London and Virginia (Richmond, 1937), 460.

¹⁴ The counties in these areas were Augusta, Berkeley, Botetourt, Frederick, Greenbriar, Hampshire, Hardy, Harrison, Monongalia, Ohio, Randolph, Rock bridge, Rockingham, and Shenandoah. It should not be inferred that this was the only motive for ratification in these places, though it was one of the strongest. All the other conditions favorable to ratification were also present here to a lesser or greater degree. For example, ten of the fourteen delegates from the Valley were veterans of the continental line. Again, the great majority of the population in the two areas consisted of relatively recent immigrants from the north, mostly Scotch-Irish and Germans, none of whom had the deep-seated Virginia provincialism. Furthermore, the inhabitants from west of the mountains welcomed the prospect of an energetic general government which could pave the way for expansion into territory then occupied by Indians.

¹⁵ These various shades of opinion are derived from a study of Virginia newspapers and the journal of the House of Delegates. Particularly revealing are the voluminous debates and the instructions to delegates that were printed in the newspapers from October, 1783, to the summer of 1784.

¹⁶ Harrell, Loyalism in Virginia, 27–28, 81–84, 171; Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:96.

¹⁷ All the following votes are taken from the Journal of the House of Dele-gates, October Session, 1787, pp. 51–52. One of the other votes on the treaty during the period was taken on December 3, 1787, and the three others had been taken in 1784.

¹⁸ There were many debtors among the Federalists besides those indebted to British merchants. For example, virtually all the fourteen delegates from the Valley, who voted unanimously for ratification, were debtors, and most of them were in the courts being sued for debts at one time or another during the 1780’s. There were thousands of suits for the recovery of debts in the Valley during the decade. Freeman H. Hart, The Valley of Virginia in the American Revolution, 1763–1789 (Chapel Hill, 1942), 123, 124n, 132. Half the Federalists in the convention, at the very least, were heavily in debt. A number of their opponents were doubtless debtors too, but the Federalists were debtors who had enacted debtor legislation, and the anti-Federalists had opposed such laws.

¹⁹ See page 55 above.

²⁰ Two minor issues, paper money and religious freedom, may be dismissed as unimportant in the contest. There was not the remotest possibility of a paper issue in Virginia. A petition in favor of paper money had been rejected in 1786 by 85 votes to 17, and only two members of the House who later voted for ratification and four who voted against ratification voted for paper. Journal of the House of Delegates, October Session, 1786, November 1, 1786. The Virginia Baptist Association resolved unanimously in March, 1788, that the Constitution failed to provide adequate safeguards to religious liberty. The Baptists in Virginia were concentrated in the Southside (lower piedmont), which voted 28 to 2 against ratification. Large majorities of the delegates on both sides had been champions of religious liberty, however, and a survey of the religious affiliations of the delegates reveals no patterns of division along reli gious lines.

²¹ All property holdings cited, unless otherwise documented, are taken from the tax roll books in the Virginia State Library. These consist of two kinds of books, one listing land, the other personalty. The books are arranged chronologically by counties, and are unpaged. The mere listing of the property held by the delegates constitutes a citation to the proper books. All references and property holdings are for 1788 unless otherwise indicated. Thus the landholdings of Levin Powell, for example, are from the Loudon County Land Book, 1788, and his personalty, except securities, is from the Loudon County Per sonalty Book, 1787. The land values are expressed in Virginia currency: 6 shillings = $1; £1=$3.33 1/3.

²² Data on Virginia-owned securities cited in this chapter are from the Rec ords of the Loan of 1790, vols. 1112–1115 (Virginia Loan Office, Register of Assumed Debt); vol. 1116 (Register of Interest Payments, Liquidated Debt, 1786–87 [certificates of indebtedness issued]); vol. 1118 (Virginia Loan Office, Register of Public Debt); vols. 1078–1079 (Registers of Loan Office Certifi cates, 1785–1786); vol. 1081 (Register of Certificates of Interest, 1786–88), all in the National Archives. Powell’s securities are from vol. 1118, account dated April 30, 1791 (no page reference).

²³ Records of the Loan of 1700, vol. 1081, January 7, 1788; identified as an attorney in the 1927 edition of the Biographical Directory of Congress, 1142.

²⁴ Biographical Directory of Congress (1927 edition), 1153.

²⁵ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1118, July 21, 1791; Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:16–19.

²⁶ Biographical Directory of Congress, 1289; Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 501.

²⁷ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 502; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1113, folio 175.

²⁸ Biographical Directory of Congress, 1326–1327.

²⁹ Nicholas’ legal career is sketched in Grigsby’s Virginia Convention, 2:281 ff.

³⁰ Ibid., 2:376.

³¹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1113, folio 72; Charles Simms Papers, in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress.

³² Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1081, January 14, 1788; Grigsby, Vir ginia Convention, 2:0–15.

³³ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1113, folio 43; Biographical Directory of Congress, 1688.

³⁴ Grigsby, in his Virginia Convention, 2:40 ff., states that Fleming ceased to practice before the war; but he is listed as having been taxed as a “practicing physician” in 1787.

³⁵ Biographical Directory of Congress, 1164. Jones was also taxed as a practicing physician.

³⁶ 1 am not certain that King was a physician. Gwathmey’s Virginians in the Revolution states that King was a surgeon’s mate during the war. The Elizabeth City County personal property nooks are missing for the years 1782–1806, and it is thus impossible to ascertain whether King paid a physician’s tax.

³⁷ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1118, September 7, 1791; Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:373.

³⁸ Tavlor is called “Doctor” in his securities accounts, vol. 1113, folio 163, and vol. 1118, September 20, 1791, of the Records of the Loan of 1790, and in the Norfolk County Tax Records, but he paid no physician’s tax.

³⁹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1113, folios 35, 121; vol. 1115, folio 26; vol. u 18, May 9, September 10, 1791; Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:377.

⁴⁰ Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:129n, 381.

⁴¹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1081, March 22, 1787; vol. 1116, folio 76. Allen’s name is listed in the Surry County personalty books under that of his father, William Allen, the head of the family. William Allen owned 54 adult slaves, 18 horses, and a four-wheeled chariot.

⁴² Blount’s landholdings are taken from the 1784 land books, which contain additions recorded in 1785 and 1786, making the proper total for 1788.

⁴³ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 90.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 114.

⁴⁵ lbid., 115; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1113, folio 78.

⁴⁶ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 122.

⁴⁷ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1113, folio 72.

⁴⁸ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1078, January 18, 1786; vol. 1079, Oc tober 26, 1786; vol. 1081, October 26, 1786.

⁴⁹ Ibid., vol. 1114, March, 1793; Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 207.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 225.

⁵¹ Records of the Loan of 1700, vol. 1118, August 17, 1791.

⁵² Ibid., vol. 1078, April 9, 1785; vol. 1079, January 4, 1787; vol. 1116, folio 27; Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 299.

⁵³ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1081, January 4, 1787.

⁵⁴ lbid., vol. 1081, January 4, 1787.

⁵⁵ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 465.

⁵⁶ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1112, folio 103; vol. 1118, June 11, 1791.

⁵⁷ No search for records was made in West Virginia, where Monongalia County is now located. The current spelling is Monongahela.

⁵⁸ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1081, October 22, 1787.

⁵⁹ Ibid., vol. 1116, folio 51 and an unnumbered folio.

⁶⁰ Ibid., vol. 1081, June 6, 1786.

⁶¹ Ibid., vol. 1079, April 15, 1787.

⁶² Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 664.

⁶³ Jacob Rinker, Sr., and Jacob Rinker, Jr., are listed separately in the Shenandoah Records. I have assumed that the elder Rinker was the delegate. The property owned by the son included land valued at £131 and personalty consisting of 7 horses and 21 cattle. He owned no slaves.

⁶⁴ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1118, May 6, 1791.

⁶⁵ Ibid., vol. 1078, December 23, 1785. Thomas Smith, Jr., is also listed in the land books for’Gloucester County as the owner of 43 acres valued at £26, 10 shillings.

⁶⁶ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1116, folios 176–177.

⁶⁷ Ibid., vol. 1113, folio 77.

⁶⁸ Ibid.,vol. 1118, September 21, 1791.

⁶⁹ Ibid., vol. 1118, April 19, 1791.

⁷⁰ Ibid., vol. 1079, October 30, 1786.

⁷¹ Ibid.,vol. 1079, March 24, 1787.

⁷² Ibid., vol. 1118, December 7, 1790, October 8, 1792.

⁷³ Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:96.

⁷⁴ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1081, June 13, 1786.

⁷⁵ Ibid., vol. 1115, folio 25.

⁷⁶ Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:374–375.

⁷⁷ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1079, January 25, 1789; vol. 1081, May 31, 1786.

⁷⁸ Ibid.,vol. 1118, April 5, 1791.

⁷⁹ Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:380.

⁸⁰ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 323; Biographical Directory of Congress (1927 edition), 1030.

⁸¹ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 391; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1118, November 22, 1700.

⁸² Biographical Directory of Congress, 1163; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1115, folio 55.

⁸³ Lee’s career is sketched in Grigsby’s Virginia Convention, 2:368.

⁸⁴ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1081, January 7, 1788. Mason’s legal career is traced in Grigsby’s Virginia Convention, 2:225 ff., and in the 1927 edi tion of the Biographical Directory of Congress, 1297.

⁸⁵ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 557.

⁸⁶ Identified as a lawyer in the 1927 edition of the Biographical Directory of Congress, 1627.

⁸⁷ Sketched briefly in Grigsby’s Virginia Convention, 1:251.

⁸⁸ Identified as a lawyer, ibid., 2:369.

⁸⁹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vols. 1114, 1115, 1116; Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 69.

⁹⁰ Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 1:255.

⁹¹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1116, folios 3, 28, 187 (unnumbered, my count); Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 119.

⁹² Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1118, February 28, 1791.

⁹³ lbid., vol. 1078, April 9, 1785; vol. 1118, March 15, 1791.

⁹⁴ Grigsby, Virginia Convention, 2:378.

⁹⁵ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1079, October 24, 1786; vol. 1078, April 25, 28, 29, May 23, 26, October 17, 26, December 26, 1785, January 7, 1786.

⁹⁶ lbid., vol. 1116, folio 130; Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 236.

⁹⁷ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1081, November 13, 1786.

⁹⁸ Ibid.,vol. 1113, folios 2, 160; vol. 1118, December 23, 1790.

⁹⁹ Ibid., vol. 1116, folios 11, 121, 129 (121 and 129 are unnumbered).

¹⁰⁰ lbid., vol. 1113, folio 105; vol. 1078, April 9, 1785.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., vol. 1078, April 12, 1785.

¹⁰² Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution. 441.

¹⁰³ lbid., 462.

¹⁰⁴ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol 1116, folio 6,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., vol. 1118, December 3, 1790. Read is the only anti-Federalist mentioned by Beard (page 287) of whom he says specifically that he was not a security holder.

¹⁰⁶ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1115, folio 19; vol. 1118, March 14, 1791.

¹⁰⁷ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 662.

¹⁰⁸ lbid., 737; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1112, folio 133; vol. 1118, November 30, 1790, September 30, 1791.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., vol. 1118, October 22, 1790.

¹¹⁰ Gwathmey, Virginians in the Revolution, 763.

¹¹¹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1081, October 5, 1786, January 7, 1788.

¹¹² lbid., vol. 1078, April 29, October 21, November 23, 1785, January 1, 1786.

¹¹³ Ibid., vol. 1081, June 1, 1786.

¹¹⁴ lbid., vol. 1081, May 30, 1786.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., vol. 1113, folio 160; vol. 1118, March 2, September 20, 1791, June 8, August 2, 1792.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., vol. 1116, unnumbered page 171.

¹¹⁷ New York Daily Advertiser’, July 21, 1787; New York Journal and Weekly Register, September 6, 13, 20, 1787; Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (10 vols., New York, 1904), 8:180.

¹¹⁸ New York Journal, September 27, 1787. The Journal was the principal Clintonian newspaper. Additional propaganda may be seen in the New York Packet & American Advertiser, the New York Independent Journal, the New York Daily Advertiser, the Country Journal and Poughkeepsie Advertiser, and other newspapers from October, 1787, to July, 1788. There are numerous edi tions of the Federalist. It was common with Hamilton to make a brilliant argument that was of little effect in influencing votes. One of the most powerful and profound speeches he ever made was that which he delivered in the Assembly in February, 1787, on the question of granting the Congress power to levy imposts. The day-long speech excited the admiration of all who heard it and left Hamilton doubled up in pain from physical exertion, but the proposal he had advocated was rejected by a substantial vote. Daily Advertiser, February 27, 1787. After Hamilton had made a five-hour speech in the Philadelphia Convention William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut wrote that “the gentleman from New York … has been praised by everybody, he has been supported by none.” The most profound of Hamilton’s reports as secretary of the treasury, that on manufactures, was in large part not acted upon by Congress.

¹¹⁹ Ernest W. Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 1783–1789 (New York, 1932), 221. The influence of the propaganda emanating from this center I have traced in newspapers in every state. This machinery in New York was the national center of anti-Federalist organization, as the Robert Morris headquarters in Philadelphia was the center for Federalist activities.

¹²⁰ Votes and Proceedings of the Assembly of the State of New York, 11th Session, 1st Meeting (New York, 1788), January 31, 1788, pp. 47–48; Votes and Proceedings of the Senate of the State of New York, 11th Session, 1st Meeting (New York, 1788), January 31, 1788, pp. 20–21. No explanation for the special expansion of the franchise was given, and it seems impossible to determine which party was responsible for it. As there was no call for votes on the issue in either house, it may have passed unanimously.

¹²¹ A summary of election returns for five counties appears in the New York Journal of June 5, 1788; for Orange County see the Daily Advertiser, June 14, 1788; for Queens County (incorrectly called Suffolk therein), Ibid., June 7, 1788; for Dutchess County the Poughkeepsie Country Journal, June 3, 1788; and for Westchester County the Daily Advertiser, June 3, 1788. The two counties for which the votes are unknown (Washington and Suffolk) and which sent anti-Federalist delegates had 32,000 inhabitants in 1790, and in Washington County the majority for the winning candidates was reported to have been “two to one.” The two Federalist counties for which votes are unknown (Kings and Richmond) had only 8,300 inhabitants in 1790. Though these were four of the five least populous counties in the state, these facts would seem to indicate that the total vote gave the anti-Federalists an even greater majority of the popular vote, probably about 16,000 as against 7,000 for the Federalists. Beard (Economic Interpretation, 244–245) mistakenly places Queens as a Federalist county and errs in the addition of the total delegates. Spaulding’s New York in the Critical Period, 200–203, contains an analysis of the votes. Spaulding repeats Beard’s erroneous figure for the total number of delegates.

¹²² See “Leo” in the Daily Advertiser of February 27, 1787, for a complaint against this practice. This writer said that the Clintonians were willing to debate endlessly on petty matters, but that when vital issues were under consideration they became silent and voted as a bloc.

¹²³ Elliott’s Debates, vol. 2 (vote recorded on July 15); Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 257, 261. Clarence E. Miner’s Ratification of the Federal Constitution by the State of New York (New York, 1921) contains a narrative of the proceedings of the convention,

¹²⁴ Jay, in a letter to Washington, May 29, 1788, stated the Federalists’ intention to use this tactic. Henry P. Johnson, ed., Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (4 vols., New York, 1890), 2:334. Rumors of the City’s threatened secession were published in the New York Packet in May and several times in the Philadelphia Pennsylvania Gazette in June and July. Paul Leicester Ford, in the introduction to his edition of The Federalist (New York, 1898), page 38, declares that only the threat of secession forced New York to ratify. I agree with this view.

¹²⁵ The delegates who changed sides were, in my opinion, selected by de sign from the counties around the City. Beard (page 245) implies that the delegates who changed sides did so because they held securities; but, as will be shown, the changes of votes resulted in a higher percentage of security holders among the opponents of ratification than there had been before. The deliberate selection of delegates from southern counties to make the change would have had a reasonable basis. Several of the governor’s closest friends and ablest henchmen, such as Samuel Jones and Melancton Smith, were from these counties, and in the event of a rising tide of Federalism in their areas their political careers would be protected by votes for the Constitution.

¹²⁶ The story of the caucus is derived from William Dunlap’s History of the New Netherlands, Province of New York, and State of New York, to the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (2 vols., New York, 1840), 2:28m. Dun- lap reported that he had received the information from an eye-witness.

¹²⁷ For an excellent description of speculation in forfeited estates see Harry B. Yoshpe, The Disposition of Loyalist Estates in the Southern District of the State of New York (New York, 1939), 59–60, 63–78, 114–115, and elsewhere. This work is an invaluable contribution to the history of the period. It is to be regretted that the author never fulfilled his ambition to complete a study of the subject for the entire state. All the evidence would seem to indicate that the speculative mania pervaded the entire state. Many prominent upstate Clintonians were speculating in confiscated property and securities. For evidence of such speculation around Albany see the sketch of Robert Yates appended to the 1821 edition of Yates’s notes on the Philadelphia Convention. The speculative wave abated somewhat in 1786, for reasons which will be pointed out below.

¹²⁸ Carl L. Becker, History of the Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760 to 1776 (Madison, 1909); Ernest W. Spaulding, His Excellency George Clinton, Critic of the Constitution (New York, 1938); Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 95–100.

¹²⁹ In Edmund C. Burnett’s The Continental Congress (New York, 1941), pages 540–546, is a good brief summary of the Vermont dispute.

¹³⁰ Votes and Proceedings of the Senate, 7 th Session, 1st Meeting, March 2, 1784. The Assembly concurred on April 22.

¹³¹ Votes and Proceedings of the Assembly, 7th Session, 1st Meeting, March 2, 1784, 8th Session, 1st Meeting, October 18, 1784,

¹³² Election returns for 1786 are scanty. Some of the returns, with a general summary of the results, were published in the New York Packet of April 17, May 1, and June 5, 1786. The efforts to find someone willing to challenge Clinton at the polls may be traced in the correspondence between Jay and Philip Schuyler. See Johnston, ed., Correspondence of Jay, 3:151–187.

¹³³ The program is contained in the Laws of the State of New York Passed at the Sessions of the Legislature (3 vols., Albany, 1886–1888), vol. 2, covering the sessions from 1785 through 1788. A curious feature of these statutes is the number of basic” programs that were to mature or expire in 1800 (a “ 14-year Plan”), which suggests that the Clintonians set that year as a sort of target date. The struggle over approval of the impost may be traced in New York newspapers; the best accounts are those published in January and February, 1787,inthe Daily Advertiser, which printed accounts of the debates of the Assembly on the subject. A secondary account is Thomas Cochran’s New York in the Confederation: An Economic Study (Philadelphia, 1932).

¹³⁴ The act is Chapter 40 of the Acts of 1786, in Session Laws, 2:253 ff. The first two dozen sections of the act are identical, except for punctuation and such word changes as the substitution of “State” for “Colony,” to the act of 1771 by which the colonial aristocracy emitted paper. The act of 1771, in turn, was virtually identical to an act of 1738. The two colonial acts are in The Colonial Laws of New York, from the Year 1664 to the Revolution (5 vols., Albany, 1884), 2:1015 ff. and 5:149 ff. The funding and assumption features of the act of 1786 are in its Article 54.

¹³⁵ Reports of the operations of the act may be seen in the Report of the Committee on the Treasury to the House of Assembly, January 16, 1788, pub lished in the New York Journal of January 31, 1788. A brilliant analysis of the implications of the paper-funding-assumption act is the contribution of “Gus- tavus,” in the New York Packet of April 13, 1786. I have been unable to as certain who “Gustavus” was; judging from the style and the reasoning, I should guess either Hamilton or Schuyler.

¹³⁶ Attempts were made to defeat the measure through appeals to numerous motives, one of which was of course the creditor’s fear of depreciation. To charge that persons who advocate a particular piece of legislation are tainted with fraudulent motives is a technique as old as the an of politics. The most powerful piece against paper was Thomas Paine’s “Dissertation on Govern ment; the Affairs of the Bank; and Paper Money,” which was printed both as a newspaper article and as a pamphlet. Paine was employed by Robert Morris to write this article during the campaign to defeat Pennsylvania’s paper- funding-assumption act, and it was reprinted and circulated in great quantity wherever a proposed issue of paper threatened to dissolve the continental debt as a bond of union.

¹³⁷ The appreciation of securities, as indicated by quotations in the various New York newspapers, began about three months before the passage of the funding act, in anticipation of the effects of the act. Of the speculators whom Yoshpe lists in his appendixes as operating in confiscated property on an extensive scale, several, including Isaac Gouverneur, John Lawrence, Cornelius Ray, and others, filed bankruptcy petitions in 1786–1787. Their petitions are among those included in the Votes and Proceedings of the Assembly for 1786–87. Indications are that timely loans from the Bank of New York saved many more speculators—for example, Comfort and Joshua Sands. See Yoshpe, op. cit., 156. Many historians—for example, Spaulding in his New York in the Critical Period- have mistakenly assumed that the bankruptcies and the complaints of the scarcity of money in 1786 and 1787 were manifestations of a commercial depression. Instead, what commercial depression there was resulted from the bankruptcies. When merchants selling securities short for confiscated estates were obliged, because of the appreciation, to dump large quantities of imported goods on the market in order to raise cash quickly, bad effects were felt throughout the commercial community.

¹³⁸ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 548 (Subscription Register of the Funded Debt), folios 74 to 118, 124 to 126, 134 to 148, and vol. 549, folios 1 to 32, 32 to 78, 81, and 73(2). The state used this surplus in the 1790’s to issue another £200,000 on loan to its citizens on exactly the same terms as the paper issue of 1786; it exchanged interest-bearing six per cent stock to holders of deferred six per cent stock in the state; it subscribed to 190 shares of the newly formed Bank of the United States and to 100 shares of the Bank of New York; and it levied no direct taxes for a decade. Philip Schuyler, writing in the Albany Gazette, attempted to win support for ratification by pointing out to the voters that the state would profit handsomely from the funding and assumption of the debts by the United States; see a reprint of one of these pieces in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal of March 10, 1789. Similar articles appeared in newspapers of the City; for example, see the Daily Advertiser, February 2 and and 5, 1788. The thesis Cochran presents in his New York in the Confederation, that New Yorkers opposed ratification because the sur render of the impost to a new general government would subject landholders to a heavy burden of direct taxation by the state, would seem to wither in the face of these facts. Ratification of the Constitution did not mean an in crease of direct taxes, it meant their abolition.

¹³⁹ Documents on New York’s trade during the period are scarce. I have tabulated entrances and clearances of vessels from the incomplete returns in the New York Journal and the Daily Advertiser; these tabulations show a fairly uniform progress toward the great peak reached by 1788. The New-buryport Essex Journal and New Hampshire Packet of February 11, 1789, carries a list of the numbers of vessels of the various kinds of riggings which entered New York in 1788. If it is valid to estimate the tonnage of these vessels on the basis of average sizes of vessels of various riggings entering at Philadelphia, a total of about 75,000 tons entered the port during the year. Madison, quoted in Jensen’s The New Nation, page 215, estimated the total at 85,000 tons, 55,000 tons of which was owned in New York. The average for 1770–1772 was 26,000 tons. Ibid, Ship notices and announcements of cargoes in the London Daily Universal Register (microfilm file in the University of Pennsylvania Library) indicates that trade with England in 1785 and 1786, a period usually assumed to have been one of depression in New York City (for example, see Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 22), was at a uniformly high level.

¹⁴⁰ The description of Schuyler’s attitude and his activities is based on a study of the Philip Schuyler Papers, Box 38, in the New York Public Library, and of his correspondence in Johnston, ed., Correspondence of Jay, particularly volume 3. Some of Schuyler’s activities against Clinton are traced in the two works by Spaulding.

¹⁴¹ The occupations of the leading Clintonians and anti-Clintonians in the City have been studied principally through newspaper advertisements. Their operations in securities have been studied in the fiscal records in the National Archives, and their speculations in confiscated property in the appendix tables of Yoshpe’s Loyalist Estates.

¹⁴² On the problems of the Tories see Alexander C. Flick, Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution (New York, 1901). The plight of the ex-tenants is excellently treated in Yoshpe’s Loyalist Estates, 32–37, 56–58.

¹⁴³ Spaulding’s New York in the Critical Period, pages 121–130, contains an account of the manner in which Hamilton and his allies exploited the hatred of the persecuted groups for Clinton. Spaulding’s accounts of political align ments, however, are not always accurate. The most reliable way to trace alignments is to analyze votes cast in the legislature. I have tabulated all votes cast from 1776 to 1789 in both houses of the legislature on all issues, for the purpose of determining on what percentage of the issues each member voted with each other member. All generalizations made here with respect to fac tional alignments axe based largely on these tabulations.

¹⁴⁴ Sarah H. J. Simpson’s sketch of James Duane in the Dictionary of American Biography; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 244; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 166–176; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 2551, in the National Archives. Volumes of the Records of the Loan of 1790 consulted for New York security holdings include the following: vols. 22, 25, and 551 (Ledgers of Assumed 6% Stock, 1791–97); vol. 32 (Ledger, New York Assumed Debt); vols. 548 and 549 (Subscription Registers of Funded Debt); vol. 545 (Register of Certificates Issued for Debts due by the United States, 1784–87). When only six per cent volumes are referred to here, the total amount is to be found in three volumes and the amount stated here is derived from a calculation: six per cents were four-ninths of the total amount issued in original funding operations.

Beard (Econornic Interpretation, 270) mistakenly lists Duane as among the holders of six per cent stock, and he cites the six per cent ledgers. The reference is to vol. 551, folio 153, which entry records an acquisition of securities by Duane in 1791, three years after the ratifying convention.

¹⁴⁵ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 82; vol. 548, folio 63; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 246; Domett, Bank of New York, 133; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 179.

¹⁴⁶ Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 60, 87–88, 148.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 32, 126, 181; Charles E. Fitch, Encyclopedia of Biography of New York (2 vols., New York, 1916), 1:328.

¹⁴⁸ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 24; vol. 32, folio 158; Johnston, ed., Correspondence of fay, vol. 3.

¹⁴⁹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 22; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 58, 127, 143, 184.

¹⁵⁰ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 608; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 245.

¹⁵¹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 72; Domett, Bank of New York, 132; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 133.

¹⁵² Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 66; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 144.

¹⁵³ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 6717; Domett, Bank of New York, 132; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 129, 131, 179.

¹⁵⁴ Domett, Bank of New York, 134. Ryerss’ name appears occasionally in the Philadelphia Customs House Papers in the Historical Society of Penn sylvania as the owner of a small sloop. Beard {Economic Interpretation, 2 70) erroneously lists Ryerss as a security holder at the time of the convention. He cites “N.Y. 3%’s.” The reference could be either to vol. 28, folio 75, of the Records of the Loan of 1790, which records the acquisition of securities by Ryerss in 1793, or to vol. 31, folio 463, which records acquisitions in January, May, and June of 1793,

¹⁵⁵ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificates 6783–784; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 246–247; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 56, 182. Beard erroneously lists Van Cortlandt as owning funded six per cents. Eco nomic Interpretation, 270. Beard’s reference is to vol. 22, folio 299, which records Van Cortlandt’s acquisition of $176 in securities from his father in August, 1792. The delegate Van Cortlandt disposed of his securities before the Loan of 1790 went into operation, and he never funded any securities under that act.

¹⁵⁶ Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 247.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 247; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 7194; miscellaneous biographical data scattered through John T. Scharf’s History of Westchester County, New York (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1886).

¹⁵⁸ It is possible that the Clintonian speculators in the City had advance information as to which securities would be funded in 1786, and were thus able to avoid losses. Indeed, it is quite possible that several of them made substantial speculative profits.

¹⁵⁹ Frank Hasbrouck, The History of Dutchess County, New York (Pough- keepsie, 1909), 273. The exact amount of DeWitt’s security holdings cannot be ascertained. Three John DeWitts are listed in the Records of the Loan of 1790: “John A.” (vol. 545, certificate 863), for $15; “John L.” (vol. 545, cer tificate 1227), for $58; and “John” (vol. 545, certificates 4524–4525), for $220. All were from Dutchess County.

¹⁶⁰ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 216; vol. 548, folio 71; vol. 551, folio 313; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 73, 236.

¹⁶¹ Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 235.

¹⁶² Ibid., 236; Dwight H. Hurd, History of Clinton and Franklin Counties, New York (Philadelphia, 1880), 149 and note; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 5399.

¹⁶³ Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 240.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid,, 240; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 7004; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 145. Beard (Economic Interpretation, 270) erroneously lists Smith as the owner of six per cent stock, citing “N.Y. 6%’s” (vol. 22, folio 164). This account shows that Smith first acquired such stock in 1799. He did not fund any securities under the Loan of 1790.

¹⁶⁵ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 218; vol. 545, certificates 5559 and 5579; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 234–235; Hurd, Clinton and Franklin Counties, 1 49n; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 132, 137. Beard (Economic Interpretation, 270) erroneously states that Smith funded $10,000 in Connecticut securities. The Connecticut account, vol. 495, folio 125, shows that Smith acquired these securities in 1792.

¹⁶⁶ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificates 4852–4855; vol. 551, folio 125; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 169.

¹⁶⁷ Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 236, 240.

¹⁶⁸ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 12; vol. 545, certificates 6521 and 7112; vol. 549, folio 98(2); Spaulding, His Excellency George Clinton, 115–116, 220–236; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 56. Clinton may have held much more in securities, for his name appears often in the Card Index to Ledger Entries, in the Fiscal Section of the National Archives, with references to funding operations with the Treasury Department. These records are unreliable, however, for the first volumes in the series, covering original funding operations, are no longer extant.

¹⁶⁹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 548, folio 36; vol. 551, folio 197; Spauld- ing, New York in the Critical Period, 238.

¹⁷⁰ Hasbrouck, History of Dutchess County, 379; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 236.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 238; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificates 1926 and 2114.

¹⁷² Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 149; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 551, folio 133. Beard (Economic Interpretation, 149) describes Yates as a “large operator” in securities.

¹⁷³ History of Columbia County, New York (Philadelphia, 1878), 77, 321; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 224.

¹⁷⁴ History of Columbia County, 112; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 3210.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., vol. 22, folio 354; vol. 545, certificates 6114, 6115, 7278; vol. 549, folio 88; vol. 551, folio 215; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 233; Spaulding, George Clinton, 234; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 150n. That Clinton purchased confiscated property is not certain; Yoshpe says that he “located” on the property but that the bill of sale was made to another man. My own cursory examination of the records of the sales of confiscated estates (in the New York Historical Society) reveals that speculators often bought in the names of others property they occupied themselves.

¹⁷⁶ Washington Frothingham, ed., History of Montgomery County (Syra cuse, 1892), 156, 319.

¹⁷⁷ Biographical Directory of Congress (1927 edition), 1061; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 182.

¹⁷⁸ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 3314; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 238; New York Packet, August 21, 1786.

¹⁷⁹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificates 815, 1508, 6093; Spauld ing, New York in the Critical Period, 233; Biographical Directory of Congress, (1927 edition), 1499.

¹⁸⁰ Frank H. Willard and George A. Hardin, eds., History of Herkimer County, New York (Syracuse, 1893), 83, 351; Philip Schuyler Papers, Box 38, in the New York Public Library.

¹⁸¹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 121; vol. 545, certificates 4420–4421; vol. 551, folios 125, 131; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 235n; Hurd, Clinton and Franklin Counties, 149; Votes and Proceedings of the Assembly, nth Session, 1st Meeting, March 7, 1788, p. 118.

¹⁸² Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 6869; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 240; Hurd, Clinton and Franklin Counties, 139; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 182.

¹⁸³ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificate 3867; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 239; Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, 130.

¹⁸⁴ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificates 2597, 3014, 3916; Spauld ing, New York in the Critical Period, 241.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 73, 239; Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 13; vol. 25, folio 239; Biographical Directory of Congress (1927 edition), 1705.

¹⁸⁶ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificates 98–102, 472, 473, 492- 499, 503, 512, 514; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 234.

¹⁸⁷ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 22, folio 208; vol. 545, certificates 556,5358.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., vol. 545, certificate 855; Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 233n; Spaulding, George Clinton, 31.

¹⁸⁹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 545, certificates 275, 1339, 1510, 3169, 7087.

¹⁹⁰ It will be observed from the footnotes here that data on several of the delegates were derived from Spaulding’s New York in the Critical Period. Spaulding’s handling of data which I have been able to check reflects either careless work or a disposition conscious or unconscious, to depict a great split between the two groups along property lines. For example, he accepted Beard’s quotations of security holdings, errors included, without checking them, and he did not attempt to discover whether Clintonians were security holders. His use of such terms as “large” and “modest” to describe property holdings is quite misleading. For example, the terms “small” and “modest” are used to describe the purchases of confiscated property made by John Lamb and Marinus Willett, Clintonians in New York City, when in actual fact their purchases of £ 4,281 and £ 3,097, respectively, made them among the largest speculators in the City. See Yoshpe, Loyalist Estates, appendixes.

¹⁹¹ There were more large holders among the Clintonians as well as more small holders, but the Federalists Low and Jay held considerably more than any Clintonians. On this matter one may recall Beard (page 272n) on securities as the dynamic element in the ratification: “The point, it may be repeated, is not the amount but the practical information derived from holding even one certificate of the nominal value of $10.”

¹⁹² Ratification in North Carolina has been the subject of a great deal of historical writing, including Louise Irby Trenholme’s The Ratification of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina (New York, 1932); A. R. Newsome’s “North Carolina’s Ratification of the Federal Constitution,” in the North Carolina Historical Review, 17:287–301 (1940); William C. Pool’s “An Economic Interpretation of the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina,” in the North Carolina Historical Review, 27:119–141, 289–313, 437–461 (1950); and parts of numerous other works.

¹⁹³ Walter Clark, ed., State Records of North Carolina (26 vols., Winston and Goldsboro, 1886–1907), 20:128–129, 133, 196–197, 369–372.

¹⁹⁴ William K. Boyd, ed., “News, Letters, and Documents Concerning North Carolina and the Federal Constitution,” in Trinity College Historical Papers, vol. 14 (1922); Trenholme, Ratification in North Carolina, 107–132; Master-son, William Blount, 142–144. See Archibald Maclaine’s letter to Iredell, January 15, 1788, in Griffith J. McKee, Life and Correspondence of James Iredell (2 vols., New York, 1847), 2:216 ff., for a complaint by a North Carolina Federalist that although the authors of the Federalist were “Judicious and ingenious,” the essays were “not well calculated for the common people.”

¹⁹⁵ Elliott’s Debates, 4:1–252.

¹⁹⁶ Clark, ed., State Records, 20:477 ff. That the anti-Federalists outma-neuvered the Federalists is not surprising. It should not be assumed from this account that the anti-Federalist leaders were not intelligent men, for many of them were as well educated as the leaders of either party in any state. It was the rank and file who were uninformed.

¹⁹⁷ The campaign is traced in Newsome’s “North Carolina’s Ratification,” in the North Carolina Historical Review, 17:296–299, and in Trenholme’s Rati fication in North Carolina, 192 ff. The second volume of Iredell’s Correspond ence gives an intimate picture from the Federalists’ point of view.

¹⁹⁸ Beard, Economic Interpretation, 287.

¹⁹⁹ Masterson, William Blount, 348–352 and elsewhere.

²⁰⁰ See the analysis of the North Carolina conventions, pages 318–321 below. Masterson, in his William Blount, pages 135 ff., states that Blount, as a specu lator in Tennessee lands, favored ratification during the contests for the first convention. If this is so, it is curious that Stokely Donelson, Blount’s friend and associate and possessor of hundreds of thousands of acres of Tennessee lands in his own right, was an opponent of ratification in the first convention. On Donelson’s land speculations see Masterson, William Blount, passim, and Pool, “Economic Interpretation of the Ratification,” in the North Carolina Historical Review, 27:299, and for his vote against ratification see Elliott’s Debates, 4:251.

²⁰¹ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1243, folios 7–144, and vol. 1244, ac counts 79 and 86 (Subscription Registers, Assumed Debt), in the National Archives; Beard, Economic Interpretation, 287; Clark, ed., State Records, 21:1445. Only $37,059 in continental securities was funded in North Carolina. Summary Volume 174A. In all likelihood much more was bought in the state and funded elsewhere. Several New York anti-Federalists were among the larger raiders of North Carolina securities. For example, Richard Platt, Walter Livingston, and Robert Gilchrist acquired $324,865, face value, between them. Vol. 1243, folios 7–58, 79–101, 116–121, and vol. 1244, account 79.

²⁰² Christopher C. Crittenden, The Commerce of North Carolina, 1763–1789 (New Haven, 1936), chapter 10; Jensen, The New Nation, 216–217.

²⁰³ Francis G. Morris and Phyllis Mary Morris, “Economic Conditions in North Carolina about 1780,” in the North Carolina Historical Review, 16:120, 130 (1930), cited by Pool in his “Economic Interpretation of the Ratification,” in the North Carolina Historical Review, 27:124–125.

²⁰⁴ Sources for this analysis of the patterns of North Carolina’s coasting trade are the port records and newspaper tabulations cited above in connection with the discussions of ratification in Georgia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, Virginia, and New York.

²⁰⁵ Beard, Economic Interpretation, 236.

²⁰⁶ See note 192 above. Pool’s account, the result of tedious labors, contains a few minor errors that I have observed, but except for his failure to recognize that some land speculators, such as William Blount, acquired much of their land through agents and hence their names do not often appear in the records, it is basically a sound work. Pool also shows a certain reluctance to term pur chasers of Tennessee lands “speculators.” My assumption is that anyone buying such lands without any apparent intention of occupying them did so because he expected that they would appreciate in value and that they could be sold at a profit. That is speculation, no more, no less.

²⁰⁷ Records of the Loan of 1790, vol. 1243, folios 75, 150, 151, 155–157, 160, 175, 176; vol. 1244, accounts 114, 119, 156, 186, 196, 225, 226; vol. 1245 (Subscription Receipts, Public Debts), unpaged entry for Hardy Murfree; all in the National Archives.

²⁰⁸ Pool, “Economic Interpretation of the Ratification,” in the North Carolina Historical Review, 28:126. The tables are on pages 125, 438–439.

²⁰⁹ The votes by towns are recorded in Papers Relating to the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 17–36, and in Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly, 13:465; both manuscripts in the Rhode Island Archives. The New York Journal of April 24, 1788, reported that only 2,900 men had voted on the referendum, whereas 4,170 had voted in the gubernatorial elections in 1787, “by which it will appear, that upwards of 1200 freeholders in this state have not voted on the subject of the proposed national constitution.” This estimate is a reasonably accurate one. In the Providence Town Meeting Records (Office of the City Clerk, City Hall, Providence), an entry for April 18, 1787, records that there were 521 qualified freemen (voters) in Providence. The Newport Mercury reported that 306 votes were cast in that town in the election of a deputy governor in April, 1787. This would account for 800 abstainers; the remaining 400 were scattered throughout the other 28 towns in the state. Not all those who refrained from voting in the referendum were necessarily opposed to ratification, however. For example, 168 of the Providence freemen were under temporary disfranchisement because of their refusal to sign a state oath prescribed earlier by a state “Act to Prevent Bribery and Corruption.”

²¹⁰ The attempts to call a convention have been traced in Rhode Island Colonial Records, 10:271–358. For a good summary see the introduction of Rob ert C. Comer, ed., Theodore Foster’s Minutes of the Convention Held at South Kingston, Rhode Island, in March, 1790, Which Failed to Adopt the Constitu tion of the United States (Providence, 1929), 13–20.

²¹¹ Ibid., 33–90.

²¹² The resolutions adopted by the Providence town meeting were published in the United States Chronicle (Providence), May 27, 1790. The journal of the second session of the convention is in William R. Staples’ Rhode Island in the Continental Congress (Providence, 1870).

²¹³ Beard, Economic Interpretation, 28, 237; Frank G. Bates, Rhode Island and the Formation of the Union (New York, 1898). Newspapers all over the con tinent carried derisive accounts of affairs in Rhode Island. See in the New York Daily Advertiser of April 6, 1787, an account entitled “The Quintessance of Villainy; or, Proceedings of the Legislature of the State of Rhode-Island &c.” It was almost invariably assumed by outsiders that the Rhode Island doings were no more than the activities of dishonest debtors run amuck.

²¹⁴ The general data on the chronology of events which follows are derived from the following manuscripts in the Rhode Island Archives: Proceedings of the General Assembly; Papers Relating to the Adoption of the Federal Con stitution; Reports to the General Assembly, 1778–1788; and Petitions to the General Assembly, vol. 23. Supplementary information is derived from the printed Rhode Island Colonial Records, vol. 10. Specific data are documented separately.

²¹⁵ The struggle inside Rhode Island over the impost has been traced in the Providence Gazette from January, 1782, to February, 1783. These two princi pal motives were openly expressed in Rhode Island and they were recognized by contemporaries from other states. For example, see Rufus King’s speech in the Philadelphia Convention, recorded in Madison’s Journal under date of August 18, 1787.

²¹⁶ List of Notes Issued for Consolidating the Securities Issued from the General Treasurer’s Office, September, 1782, to June, 1784, in the Rhode Is land Archives. This document contains a list of all holders of continental loan office certificates in the state,

²¹⁷ Brown’s activities have been traced in the various records of the public debt housed in the Rhode Island Archives, and in the Old Loan Records in the National Archives, particularly the volumes for New York and Massachu setts. Much more information about Brown’s activities is contained in the Brown Family Papers in the John Carter Brown Library in Providence. I am indebted to Professor James B. Hedges of Brown University, who has for many years had the exclusive use of the Brown Papers, for information on Nicholas Brown. Professor Hedges and I worked out the above analysis of Brown’s speculations by pooling our information.

²¹⁸ Notes Issued for Consolidating Securities …, September, 1782-June, 1784; Ledger A, Accounts of Rhode Island against the United States, folios 200–203, pp. 500–501; Proceedings of the General Assembly, 13:689; all in the Rhode Island Archives.

²¹⁹ Proceedings of the General Assembly, 12:134–136, 137–139, 160–163, 475, 685–686, 13:109–110, 288, 360; Impost Accounts, passim; Reports to the General Assembly, 1778–1788, pp. 74, 90, 94; Papers Relating to the Adoption of the Constitution, 105; Ledger A, Accounts of Rhode Island against the United States, 500; Notes Issued for Consolidating Securities, 1782–1784, passim; all in the Rhode Island Archives.

²²⁰ Reports to the General Assembly, 1778–1788, pp. 16, 39, 100, 111, 117. These reports are the source of much of what follows.

²²¹ Ibid.; Proceedings of the General Assembly, passim. Later a writer in the Newport Herald of June 19, 1788, claimed that Hazard was only the nominal leader and that an unnamed Providence merchant and speculator was the “brains” of the paper faction. From all accounts, however, Hazard seems to have been perfectly capable of directing the entire affair.

²²² 1 have traced the development of attitudes regarding the support of loan office certificates from the Town Meeting Records in the individual town halls in the state. The distribution of ownership of the various kinds of public debt has been ascertained from the fiscal records in the Rhode Island Archives, cited in note 218 above. General attitudes toward the affairs of the Confederation have been traced in the Providence Gazette, the United States Chronicle (Providence), and the Newport Mercury, 1785–1786.

²²³ The first petition for paper had come from Newport early in 1785 and is mentioned in the Providence Gazette of February 26, 1785. It later appeared that a majority of the freemen of Newport opposed paper, however. The other towns petitioning were Gloucester, Smithfield, Tiverton, Foster, Middle- town, and Coventry. Papers Relating to the Adoption of the Constitution, 47, 50, 58, 59, 60, 63. See also Petitions to the General Assembly, vol. 25, part 1, p. 59.

²²⁴ The votes in most towns are recorded in their Town Meeting Records. Unfortunately the three towns opposed to paper neglected to record their votes on the issue. Judging by the votes there for governor in 1787, how ever, as recorded in the Town Meeting Records in Providence (City Hall) and Portsmouth (Town Hall) and the election returns published in the New port Mercury, the vote on paper was not extremely lopsided. Governor John Collins, an outspoken champion of the paper scheme, received from a third to 40 per cent of the vote in each of the three towns.

²²⁵ The foregoing analysis of the distribution of the loans is based on tabu lations made from Grand Committee Office, Account Books A and B, 1786- 1803, in the Rhode Island Archives.

²²⁶ All the generalizations about the lodge money which follow are derived from my tabulations of all such transactions as published in the Providence Gazette, beginning in August, 1786. Every such announcement published in this newspaper was cross-checked against the announcements in the Newport Mercury to insure a complete record. The Gazette of January 27, 1787, printed an accurate summary of all lodge money deposited up to that time. The notices include the date, the name and usually the occupation of the debtor and his residence, the name and usually the occupation of the creditor and his residence, the nature of the debt (e.g., mortgage, bond, note of hand), and the sum.

²²⁷ For a clear picture of the debts of the Providence merchants, and some notion of the relationship of these debts and security holdings to their opposition to the paper money, see Moses Brown to Champion and Dickson, June 26, 1785, Champion and Dickson to Moses Brown, August 19, 1785, and September 6, 1786, in the Moses Brown Papers, vol. 5; John Brown to Moses Brown, November 27, 1786, in the Peck Collection, vol. 8; and Nicholas Brown to David Howell, March 26, 1785, in the Rhode Island Historical Society Manuscripts, vol. .14; all in the Rhode Island Historical Society.

²²⁸ Security holdings are taken from the debt records in the Rhode Island Archives, cited in note 218. A few of the Providence merchants, even among those holding continental loan office certificates, were prepared at first to sup port the paper. The powerful mercantile firm of Clark and Nightingale, for example, which owned $13,000 in loan office certificates, borrowed £2,625 in paper money, apparently with a view to supporting it.

For a clear statement of the calculated efforts of this group to destroy the paper-money plan, see the message of Governor John Collins (who had himself been a merchant all his life) to the Assembly in August, 1786, in Petitions to the General Assembly, vol. 23, p. 58.

²²⁹ Commercial data tabulated from Maritime Papers, Outward and Inward Entries, 1776–1787; Bonds, Masters of Vessels, vols. 9 (part 2), 10, 11; Mani fests of Export Cargoes, vols. 1–4; Manifests of Import Cargoes, vols. 1–5; Book of Manifests, 1785–1789; “Miscellaneous, 1777–1786”; all in the Rhode Island Archives.

²³⁰ price fluctuations have been traced in a wide variety of sources, including official state and town records, merchants’ papers, and newspapers. A full ac count of the subsequent history of the paper is recorded in Grand Committee Office, Account Book A, pp. 61–110, and Account Book B, passim. By 1796, £ 69,252 of the money had been retired. When the accounts were closed in 1809, £ 2,580 in bonds was still outstanding, though the money itself had all been destroyed.

²³¹ The steps in the process of paying the debts have been traced in Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly, in the Rhode Island Archives, and in the Providence and Newport newspapers for 1787 and 1788. The statement of the state’s debts and the plan for their retirement which was submitted to the towns are in Reports to the General Assembly, 1778–1788, p. 116. The decisions of most of the towns on the referendum are recorded in Papers Relating to the Adoption of the Constitution, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51–56, 58, 61–63, 65. A record of the payment of the debt is the MS. Record of Notes on which the State has paid a part agreeably to An Act of Assembly passed at the June Session, A.D. 1791.

²³² for example, a person owning a four per cent state note of £ 10 face value prior to May, 1786, could have realized only about 18 shillings by selling it on the open market. In 1788 he was paid the full face value of the note plus accrued interest, a total of £ 11 45. The paper money in which he was paid was, at an average price of ten for one, worth £ 1 2s. 6d. His net gain was thus 4s ;. 6d., or about 25 per cent.

²³³ The development of attitudes on paper money has been traced partly from miscellaneous materials in Papers Relating to the Adoption of the Constitution and partly from the following town records: Middletown Town Meeting Book, 1743–1808, in the Town Hall, Middletown; Portsmouth Town Meeting Records, vols. 1 and 2, in the Town Hall, Portsmouth; Bristol Town Meeting Book, 1781–1811, in the Town Hall, Bristol; and Warren Town Meeting Book, no. 1, 1746–1811, in the Town Hall, Warren.

²³⁴ On the profits expected from smuggling in the event of Rhode Island’s continued refusal to ratify the Constitution, see “Charlestoniensis” in the Newport Herald of November 20, 1788. If Rhode Island retained its inde pendence, said the writer, “this State would not become an Algiers [i.e., a center for piracy], as some malevolent scribblers in Massachusetts have impu dently asserted, but a St. Eustatius.” St. Eustatius was the tiny Dutch Island in the West Indies that served as a base for smuggling into the British West Indies. That Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York were alarmed at the prospect of smuggling activity by Rhode Island is clearly seen in the remarks of the congressmen from those states and their efforts to induce the United States to use force to bring Rhode Island into the Union. See, for example, the remarks of Benson of New York and Ames of Massachusetts in the House of Representatives on June 5, 1789, in Annals of Congress, 1:420 ff.

²³⁵ Beard, Economic Interpretation, 237; Bates, Rhode Island and the Union, passim.

²³⁶ Ship Documents of Rhode Island (6 vols., mimeographed, Providence, 1938–1941): Providence, vol. 1 [part 1), pp. 7, 152; vol. 1, part 2, pp. 845, 858; Newporty vol. 1, pp. 45, 172, 184, 487, 507, 528, 568, 653. For vessels owned by John I. Clark see the indexes to the volumes for Providence and Newport.

²³⁷ Ibid., Providence, vol. 1 [part 1], pp. 152, 447; vol. 1, part 2, p. 946; New porty vol. 1, pp. 264, 393, 442, 503, 602.

²³⁸ Ibid., Providence, vol. 1 [part 1], p. 263; vol. 1, part 2, p. 860; Cotner, ed., Foster’s Minutes, 35n; Providence Gazette, January 27, 1787 (lodge money notices).

²³⁹ Jamestown Folder, Property Inventory, 1783; Middletown Folder, Rate able Property, 1783; Portsmouth Property Evaluations, 1783; all in the Rhode Island Archives.

²⁴⁰ Information on the occupations and property holdings of the delegates has been gleaned from a variety of sources, often more than a half dozen per delegate. The most valuable sources are the town records in the various towns, scattered property evaluations in the Rhode Island Archives, newspaper ad vertisements, sketches in the notes to Corner, ed., Foster’s Minutes, and the genealogical and town history collections in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Sketches of five of the delegates are contained in the 1927 edition of the Biographical Directory of Congress, and as many more are in the Die- tionary of American Biography. A list of the delegates, with their votes, ap pears in the Providence Gazette of June 5, 1790.

²⁴¹ See the sources cited in note 227 above.

²⁴² See the sources cited in note 239 above.

²⁴³ Lodge money notices in the Providence Gazette, January 27, 1787 (summary of notices), and May 26, 1787.

²⁴⁴ List of Notes Issued for Consolidating the Securities Issued from the General Treasurer’s Office, 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15; Ledger A, Accounts of Rhode Island against the United States, 497, 499, 500; Record of Notes on which the State Has Paid a Part, 75, 99. Some of the figures in the records are expressed in pounds, others in dollars. All figures are here converted into dollars, at the rate of 3 1/3 dollars per pound.

²⁴⁵ List of Notes Issued for Consolidating the Securities Issued from the General Treasurer’s Office, 2, 10.

²⁴⁶ lbid., 1, 3, 9, 11; Record of Notes on which the State Has Paid a Part, 5, 14, 15, 16, 19, 25, 32, 48, 98, 103.

²⁴⁷ List of Notes Issued for Consolidating the Securities Issued from the General Treasurer’s Office, 4, 7, 9, 12; Accounts of Rhode Island against the United States, 497, 499; Record of Notes on which the State Has Paid a Part, 9, 12, 21, 25, 82, 105, 124.

²⁴⁸ Accounts of Rhode Island against the United States, 497, 499; Portsmouth Town Meeting Records, vol. 1, entry immediately preceding page numbered 1.

²⁴⁹ List of Notes Issued for Consolidating the Securities Issued from the General Treasurer’s Office, 3, 5, 6; Record of Notes on which the State Has Paid a Part, 8, 19, 27, 51, 93, 134, 140, 149.

²⁵⁰ Grand Committee Office, Book A, pp. 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 23, 33, 44, 47, 49, 52, 54, in the Rhode Island Archives.

²⁵¹ lbid., pp. 3, 18, 28, 29, 31, 36, 38, 40, 41, 46, 53, 54, 56–59.

²⁵² Another issue that doubtless had some influence in shaping opposition to the Constitution was a strong hostility toward slavery, particularly among the Quakers. In December, 1783, Quakers presented a petition for the abolition of slavery (Petitions to the General Assembly, 29:102), which resulted in February, 1784, in “An Act for the gradual abolition of slavery” (Rhode Island Records, 12:578–579). In June, 1787, Quakers again petitioned the Assembly for abolition of the slave trade (Petitions to the General Assembly, 23:127), and in October of that year an act abolishing the slave trade was passed. The charter of the Rhode Island Abolition Society was granted in Jane, 1790 (Petitions to the General Assembly, 25:37)1 the petition which resulted in the passage of this act stated that the Society had existed for fifteen months. Eight of the 114 charter members of the Society were members of the ratifying convention: Daniel Owen, Joseph Stanton, Jr., James Sheldon, Job Comstock, John Saylcs, John Williams, John S. Dexrer, and Levi Ballou, only the last two of whom voted for ratification. The slavery question engendered more debate in the South Kingston convention than any other subject; Cotner, ed., Foster’s Minutes.

²⁵³ See William Ellery to Benjamin Huntington, June 15, 1789, and February 2, 1790, in the Ellery-Huntington Papers, in the Rhode Island Archives. In 1789 Ellery interviewed several anti-Federalist leaders in the state, who told him they planned to ratify later, but changed the subject when Ellery asked them why. In 1790 Ellery got his answer: they were holding out until it was clear that Congress planned to assume the state debts. Other evidence, in petitions preserved in the Rhode Island Archives, for example, suggests that a considerable number of persons were aware of these plans.

²⁵⁴ The details of the plan are in Records and Proceedings of the General Assembly, vol. 14. The volume entitled Record of Notes on which the State Has Paid a Part is a record of the second funding of the state debt. Under the plan security holders were debited for the supposed “specie value” of the payments they had received in paper money, and securities for the balance were reissued to them.