A Revaluation of the Beard Thesis of the Making of the Constitution
PROFESSOR Beard interpreted the making of the Constitution as a simple, clear-cut series of events. When all the groups that became Federalists are brought together and analyzed, he asserted, and all the anti-Federalists are brought together and analyzed, the events can be seen as mere manifestations of a fundamentally simple economic conflict. His analysis led him to formulate three basic propositions, one regarding the Philadelphia Convention and two regarding the contest over ratification. In the light of the data in the foregoing chapters, we may now focus our attention upon these three key propositions of Beard’s economic interpretation of the Constitution.
THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION
FROM his analysis of the Philadelphia Convention, Beard concluded that the Constitution was essentially “an economic document drawn with superb skill” by a “consolidated economic group … whose property interests were immediately at stake”; that these interests “knew no state boundaries but were truly national in their scope.”
From a thorough reconsideration of the Philadelphia Convention, however, the following facts emerge. Fully a fourth of the delegates in the convention had voted in their state legislatures for paper-money and/or debtor-relief laws. These were the very kinds of laws which, according to Beard’s thesis, the delegates had convened to prevent. Another fourth of the delegates had important economic interests that were adversely affected, directly and immediately, by the Constitution they helped write. The most common and by far the most important property holdings of the delegates were not, as Beard has asserted, mercantile, manufacturing, and public security investments, but agricultural property. Finally, it is abundantly evident that the delegates, once inside the Convention, behaved as anything but a consolidated economic group.
In the light of these and other facts presented in the foregoing chapters, it is impossible to justify Beard’s interpretation of the Constitution as “an economic document” drawn by a “consolidated economic group whose property interests were immediately at stake.”
THE CONTEST OVER RATIFICATION, FIRST PROPOSITION
BEARD asserted that the ultimate test of the validity of an economic interpretation of the Constitution would rest upon a comparative analysis of the economic interests of all the persons voting for and all the persons voting against ratification. He made an analysis of the economic interests of some of the leaders in the movement for ratification and concluded that “in the ratification, it became manifest that the line of cleavage for and against the Constitution was between substantial personalty interests on the one hand and the small farming and debtor interests on the other.”
For the purpose of analyzing this proposition it is necessary to employ Beard’s own definitions of interest groups. In the paragraphs that follow, as in the foregoing chapters, the term “men of personalty interests” is used to mean those groups which Beard himself had in mind when he used the term, namely money, public securities, manufacturing and shipping, and western lands held for speculation.
From a thorough reconsideration of the contests over ratification the following facts emerge.
1. In three states (Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia) the decisions of the ratifying conventions were unanimous, and it is therefore impossible to compare the interests of contending parties. The following analyses of the conventions in these three states may be made, however.
In Delaware almost 77 per cent of the delegates were farmers, more than two-thirds of them small farmers with incomes ranging from 75 cents to $5.00 a week. Slightly more than 23 per cent of the delegates were professional men—doctors, judges, and lawyers. None of the delegates was a merchant, manufacturer, banker, or speculator in western lands.
In New Jersey 64.1 per cent of the delegates were farmers, 23.1 per cent were professional men (physicians, lawyers, and college presidents), and only 12.8 per cent were men having personalty interests (one merchant, three iron manufacturers, and one capitalist with diversified investments).
In Georgia 50 per cent of the delegates were farmers (38.5 per cent slave-owning planters and 11.5 per cent small farmers), 11.5 per cent were frontiersmen whose economic interests were primarily agrarian, 19.2 per cent were professional men (lawyers, physicians, and professional officeholders), and only 11.5 per cent had personalty interests (all merchants). The interests of 7.7 per cent of the delegates were not ascertained.
Beard assumed that ratification in these states was pushed through by personalty interest groups before agrarian and paper-money groups could organize their forces. The opposite is true. In each of these three states agrarian interests dominated the conventions. In each state there were approximately equal numbers of delegates who had voted earlier for and against paper money.
2. In two states in which the decision was contested (Virginia and North Carolina) the great majority of the delegates on both sides of the question were farmers. In both states the delegates who voted for and the delegates who voted against ratification had substantially the same amounts of the same kinds of property, most commonly land and slaves. A large number of the delegates in the Virginia convention had voted on the question of repudiation of debts due British merchants, and the majority of the delegates who had favored such repudiation voted for ratification of the Constitution, Large numbers of delegates in both North Carolina conventions were speculating in western lands. In the first convention a great majority of these land speculators opposed the Constitution; in the second a substantial majority of them favored ratification.
Beard assumed that ratification in these states represented the victory of wealthy planters, especially those who were rich in personalty other than slaves, over the small slaveless farmers and debtors. The opposite is true. In both states the wealthy planters—those with personalty interests as well as those without personalty interests—were divided approximately equally on the issue of ratification. In North Carolina small farmers and debtors were likewise equally divided, and in Virginia the great mass of the small farmers and a large majority of the debtors favored ratification.
3. In four states (Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, and New Hampshire) agrarian interests were dominant, but large minorities of delegates had personalty interests.
In Connecticut 57.8 per cent of the delegates who favored ratification and 67.5 per cent of those who opposed ratification were farmers. Ratification was approved by 76.2 per cent of all the delegates, by 81.8 per cent of the delegates having personalty interests, and by 73.3 per cent of the farmers in the convention. Here, then, four delegates out of five having substantial personalty interests favored the Constitution. On the other hand, three of every four farmers also favored the Constitution.
In Maryland 85.8 per cent of the delegates who voted for ratification were farmers, almost all of them wealthy slave-owning planters; 27.3 per cent of the opponents of ratification were farmers, all of them substantial slave-owning planters. The opponents of ratification included from three to six times as large a proportion of merchants, lawyers, and investors in shipping, confiscated estates, and manufacturing as did the delegates who favored ratification. It is to be observed, however, that because the vote in the Maryland ratifying convention was almost unanimous (63 to 11), statistics on the attitudes of the various interest groups would show that every major interest group except manufacturers favored the Constitution. A majority the areas and of the delegates that had advocated paper money also favored the Constitution.
In South Carolina 59 per cent of the delegates who voted for ratification were large slave-owning planters and 10.7 per cent were lesser planters and farmers. Of the delegates who voted against ratification, 41.7 per cent were large slave-owning planters and 34.2 per cent were lesser planters and farmers. Merchants, factors, and mariners favored ratification, 70 per cent to 30 per cent, a margin almost identical to the vote of the entire convention—67 per cent for, 33 per cent against—and manufacturers, artisans, and mechanics were unanimous in support of the Constitution. On the other hand, 35.7 per cent of the delegates who favored ratification were debtors who were in a desperate plight or had borrowed paper money from the state. Only 15.1 per cent of those who voted against ratification were debtors or had borrowed paper money from the state. No fewer than 82 per cent of the debtors and borrowers of paper money in the convention voted for ratification.
As respects New Hampshire, comparisons are difficult because of the lack of adequate information concerning 28.2 per cent of the delegates. Of the delegates whose interests are known, 36.9 per cent of those favoring the Constitution and 25 per cent of those opposing it were farmers; of the known farmers in the convention 68.7 per cent favored ratification. If it is assumed, however, that all the delegates whose interests are not ascertainable were farmers (as in all likelihood most of them were), then 49.1 per cent of the delegates favoring ratification were farmers, 54.3 per cent of those opposing ratification were farmers, and 52.8 per cent of the farmers in the convention voted for ratification. Delegates whose interests were primarily in personalty (merchants, tradesmen, manufacturers, and shipbuilders) voted in favor of ratification, 60.9 per cent to 39.1 per cent. Delegates from the towns which had voted for and against paper money divided almost equally on the question of ratification: 42 per cent of the towns that had voted for paper money and 54 per cent of those that had voted against paper sent delegates who voted for the Constitution.
Beard assumed that in these states ratification was the outcome of class struggles between commercial and other personalty groups (Federalists) on the one hand and farmers and advocates of paper money (anti-Federalists) on the other. This generalization is groundless. In each of these states a majority of the men having personalty interests favored ratification, but in each of them a similar majority of the farmers also favored ratification. In one of these states there was no great demand for paper money, in another a large majority of the friends of paper money favored ratification, and in the other two the advocates of paper money were divided almost equally on the question of ratification.
4. In four states (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and Rhode Island) men having personalty interests were in a majority in the ratifying conventions.
In Massachusetts, in the popular vote (excluding that of Maine) men whose interests were primarily non-agrarian favored the Constitution by about three to two, and men whose interests were primarily agrarian opposed the Constitution by about 55 per cent to 45 per cent. In the ratifying convention 80 per cent of the merchants and shippers engaged in water-borne commerce, 77 per cent of the artisans and mechanics, and 64 per cent of the farmers favored ratification. About 83 per cent of the retail storekeepers, 85 per cent of the manufacturers, and 64 per cent of the miscellaneous capitalists opposed ratification. One-fourth of those favoring and one-sixth of those opposing the Constitution were farmers. Of the personalty groups combined, 57.5 per cent opposed and 42.5 per cent favored ratification. The realty groups combined, including artisans and mechanics, favored ratification by 67 per cent to 33 per cent.
In Pennsylvania only 34.8 per cent of the delegates favoring ratification were farmers, and only 26.1 per cent of the opponents were farmers. Almost three-fourths—72.7 per cent—of the farmers in the convention favored ratification. The great majority of the delegates on both sides, however, 84.7 per cent of those favoring and 91.3 per cent of those opposing the Constitution, had substantial investments in one or more of Professor Beards four forms of personalty.
New York delegates are difficult to classify as farmers because almost all farmers in the convention were also landlords with tenants. Delegates to the state’s convention may be classified as elected Federalists, converts from anti-Federalism, delegates who abstained from voting, and anti-Federalists. Of the delegates about whom there is sufficient data on which to generalize, fewer than 20 per cent of each group consisted of farmers who had no tenants and who owned none of Beard’s four forms of personalty.
Rhode Island delegates do not lend themselves to occupational classification because almost everyone in the state normally combined in his own economic activities several kinds of functions. Only 11.8 per cent of the delegates favoring ratification and only one of the delegates opposing ratification were found to have no interests except farming. The early opponents of paper money formed the original core of those favoring ratification, yet in the final vote 62 per cent of the delegates voting for ratification and 63 per cent of those opposing ratification were men who had borrowed paper money from the state.
Beard’s thesis—that the line of cleavage as regards the Constitution was between substantial personalty interests on the one hand and small farming and debtor interests on the other-is entirely incompatible with the facts.
THE CONTEST OVER RATIFICATION, SECOND PROPOSITION
BEARD was less certain of the foregoing point, however, than he was of this next one:
Inasmuch as so many leaders in the movement for ratification were large security holders, and inasmuch as securities constituted such a large proportion of personalty, this economic interest must have formed a very considerable dynamic element, if not the preponderating element, in bringing about the adoption of the new system…. Some holders of public securities are found among the opponents of the Constitution, but they are not numerous.
This proposition may be analyzed in the same manner that Beard’s more general personalty-agrarian conclusion was analyzed. To repeat, Beard asserted that public securities were the dynamic element within the dynamic element in the ratification. This assertion is incompatible with the facts. The facts are these:
1. In three states (Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia) there were no votes against the Constitution in the ratifying conventions, and hence no comparisons can be made. If public securities were the dynamic element in the ratification, however, it would be reasonable to expect that the great majority of the delegates in these states which supported the Constitution so unreservedly should have been security holders. But the fact is that in Delaware only one delegate in six owned securities, in New Jersey 34 per cent of the delegates, and in Georgia only one delegate.
2. In two states (New Hampshire and North Carolina) the numbers of security holders among the delegates were very small. In New Hampshire only 10.5 per cent of those who voted for and only 2.2 per cent of those who voted against ratification held securities. In the first North Carolina convention only 2.4 per cent of the friends and only 1.1 per cent of the opponents of ratification held securities. In the second convention only 2.0 per cent of those favoring and only 3.9 per cent of those opposing the Constitution were security holders. Superficially these facts tend to substantiate Beard’s thesis, for these virtually security-less states were slow to ratify the Constitution. It has been shown, however, that actually the reluctance of these states to adopt the Constitution and their vulnerability to raids on their securities by outsiders were both merely surface manifestations of the same underlying conditions—the isolation, the lack of information, and the lethargy of the majority of the inhabitants of North Carolina and New Hampshire.
3. In three states (Rhode Island, Maryland, and Virginia) where there were contests and considerable numbers of security holders, the advocates and the opponents of ratification included approximately the same percentages of security holders: in Rhode Island, 50 per cent of the advocates and 47 per cent of the opponents; in Virginia, 40.5 per cent of the advocates and 34.2 per cent of the opponents; and in Maryland, 17.4 per cent and 27.3 per cent respectively. The facts relative to these three states clearly contradict Beard’s thesis.
4. In two states (Massachusetts and Connecticut) the advocates of ratification included a considerably larger percentage of holders of securities than did the opponents. In Massachusetts 31 per cent of the ratificationists and only 10.1 per cent of the anti-ratificationists were security owners, and in Connecticut 36.7 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. The situations in these two states, and in these two states alone, tend strongly to support Beard’s thesis.
5. In three states (Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and New York) a considerably larger percentage of the delegates opposing ratification than of the Federalist delegates held public securities. In Pennsylvania 73.9 per cent of the opponents and 50 per cent of the supporters of ratification were security owners, in South Carolina 71 and 43 per cent respectively, and in New York 63 and 50 per cent respectively. The facts pertaining to these states not only fail to harmonize with Beard’s thesis but indicate that there the precise opposite of his thesis is true.
In the light of the foregoing facts it is abundantly evident that there are no more grounds for considering the holding of public securities the dynamic element in the ratification than for considering this economic interest the dynamic element in the opposition. There were, indeed, some holders of public securities among the opponents of the Constitution and, contrary to Beard’s assertion, they were as numerous as the security holders among the supporters of the Constitution.
On all counts, then, Beard’s thesis is entirely incompatible with the facts. Beard’s essential error was in attempting to formulate a single set of generalizations that would apply to all the states. Any such effort is necessarily futile, for the various interest groups operated under different conditions in the several states, and their attitudes toward the Constitution varied with the internal conditions in their states.