Economic Interpretation and the Constitution
AT THE outset four general questions were posed to be answered in the present work: 1) Is Beard’s economic interpretation an adequate explanation of the making of the Constitution? 2) If not, can any economic interpretation “explain” the event, partly or wholly? 3) What generalizations, if any, can be drawn from the present study about the usefulness of economic interpretation in historical analysis? 4) If no economic interpretation is adequate, what avenues of exploration seem to promise a better understanding of the making of the Constitution?
THE BEARD INTERPRETATION
CHAPTER eight above, and the earlier chapters of which it is a summary, demonstrated the inadequacy of Beard’s interpretation. The facts did not substantiate his assumptions; the details were found to be incompatible with the broad outlines he sketched. Beard asked the wrong questions, questions which, in the way they were phrased, were meaningless. The Philadelphia Convention, as a body, was acting neither as “a consolidated economic group” nor “merely under the guidance of abstract principles of political science.” The contest over ratification was neither an economic class struggle nor “the product of some abstract causes remote from the chief business of life—gaining a livelihood.” By asking invalid questions Beard arrived at an interpretation that obscures rather than illuminates the role of economic forces in the making of the Constitution.
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
How far, then, can one go in interpreting the making of the Constitution in economic terms? That is to say, to what extent did economic factors in fact condition or determine the outcome? They were obviously of some weight; the critical question is whether it is possible to reduce them to systematic interpretive generalizations. If the preceding chapters establish anything, it is that the interplay of conditioning or determining factors was extremely complex. It is clear that the making of the Constitution cannot be rendered intelligible in terms of any single system of interpretation; that it is only through simultaneous application of several systems that sense can be made of the multitude of pertinent factors. Hence the immediate question becomes, can an adequate pluralistic economic interpretation be devised?
At least four hypotheses in addition to that formulated by Beard, each of which has a measure of applicability, can be induced from the data presented.
FIRST HYPOTHESIS
ONE may begin by attempting to formulate a proposition as closely related to Beard’s as possible. It too should be cast in terms of motivations, specifically that men were motivated in the contest over the Constitution by their judgment of what direct and immediate effect it would have on them economically. For such a proposition Beard’s simple system of classifications of economic interests must be replaced by the analysis of the potential effects of the Constitution on economic interests which was made in the preceding chapter.
That analysis demonstrated that the interest groups could not have been aligned in such a way as to make the contest over ratification a direct economic conflict involving either a majority of the interest groups or a majority of the inhabitants of the country. The interests of too many of these groups were not directly affected; too many groups had so great a diversity of interests that they were affected both favorably and unfavorably; and there were conflicts of interests between groups, even among those who clearly stood to gain. A rigid system based on economic motivations, then, is not suitable.
A flexible system, however, can be devised and cast into a different and more plausible form. Suppose that this were the nature of the contest: that, at bottom, several or all of the interest groups which could be expected to benefit formed a dynamic inner core in the movement for the Constitution, and/or those affected in an unfavorable way formed a dynamic inner core of the opposition. Each can be thought of as an active minority seeking to win sufficient support from those who were unaffected, or who were affected both favorably and unfavorably, to bring about or to defeat the ratification. Such support could have been solicited through appeals to various noneconomic motivations: political philosophy, ideals, prejudices, fears of one sort and another.
The ideal requirements for testing this hypothesis seem to be four:1 1) It would need to be ascertained what interest groups existed, who comprised them, and how they were affected economically, or thought they would be, by the making of the Constitution. 2) It would need to be learned which of the groups directly affected acted according to the dictates of their economic interests. Those who acted thus, if any did so consistently, would form the hypothetical dynamic groups. 3) It would need to be ascertained what means were commonly used in political controversies to persuade voters to act in one way or another, and whether the hypothesized dynamic interest groups had access to and did in fact employ them. 4) It would need to be demonstrated what degree of correlation existed between the efforts to persuade voters and their actual votes on ratification.
SECOND HYPOTHESIS
SHOULD rigorous analysis of the first proposition demonstrate it to be unworkable, in whole or in part, it would still be possible to construct a different system whereby the issue might be seen as having turned primarily upon considerations of immediate economic self-interest. Suppose the first proposition is precisely reversed. Suppose the struggle over ratification to have been a struggle (or more properly, a number of struggles) for political power, with something other than economic interests as the primary driving force. It would seem axiomatic that any political faction or party seeking to acquire or to retain political power must, whatever its own inner dynamics, strive for the support of various economic groups that are of political weight. The contending political groups can thus be thought of as the dynamic elements in the contests, seeking support from the population at large through appeals to economic self-interest, real or imagined, indigenous or implanted, and actually determining the outcome in this way. The result of the contest would then be seen to have pivoted and turned largely upon the anticipated effects of the Constitution on economic interests.
The requirements for testing this proposition seem to be four: It would need to be determined 1) whether various contending political groups did exist prior to the contest over ratification; 2) whether such groups were primarily economic in character (this might reasonably be inferred from the outcome of the tests to which the first hypothesis was subjected); 3) whether such groups made a concerted effort to persuade voters to support or oppose the Constitution on the basis of their real or supposed economic interests; and 4) whether a very large proportion of the participants in the contest did vote according to the dictates of their economic interests, as these interests were pictured by the dynamic political groups.
THIRD HYPOTHESIS
THE movement for the making of the Constitution can be interpreted in economic terms in still another way. This is an approach that is quite different from the hypothesis that there was a direct connection between votes on ratification and the economic interests or selfish personal motivations of the participants. Suppose the economic and political situations in 1787 to have been intertwined in such a way that any action taken in one area must inevitably have affected the other to approximately the same extent. If, for example, some element in the relationship between government and private economy prevented either from operating effectively—that is, if the needs of the two were incompatible—it would follow that a major change in the governmental system would bring a fundamental change in the economy as well, and any proposed political change would necessarily hinge upon economic factors.
The requirements for testing this proposition can be stated only generally and tentatively. It would be necessary 1) to explore the whole range of the economy in each jurisdiction, to determine in what ways it operated; 2) to explore the whole range of polity in each jurisdiction, for the same purpose; 3) to induce from these data the requirements for the successful functioning of that economy and polity; and 4) to determine whether the needs of either were in any way incompatible with those of the other.
Because the contest over the Constitution was at once a contest and thirteen contests, it is conceivable that any or all of these first three hypotheses will serve to make the contests in one or more states intelligible and yet be entirely inapplicable in others. A fourth, somewhat broader hypothesis, to be stated in a moment, may possibly be meaningful only when the contest is viewed as a single contest rather than a number of contests. Accordingly it seems proper to pause here to consider whether any of the first three hypotheses will serve as an adequate interpretive framework for the data that have been presented.
Since the hypotheses were induced from the data, satisfaction of the stated requirements for testing them would be no more than repetition and rearrangement of those data. Certain general conclusions about the economic aspects of the contests in the several states were drawn in connection with the accounts of each. Here it is sufficient to re-view those conclusions in the light of the foregoing hypotheses.
For one state, New Hampshire, the first hypothesis—that the dynamic groups for and against the Constitution were selfishly motivated economic groups, appealing for voter support primarily on noneconomic grounds—has some measure of validity, if the hypothesis is qualified to indicate 1) that the dynamic pro-ratification groups, essentially economic groups, were also impelled by noneconomic considerations of varying potency; and 2) that the interests of the leaders of the opposition were so diverse as to suggest that no connection existed between their conduct and those interests.
For three states, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York, the second hypothesis—that the dynamic groups favoring and opposing the Constitution were essentially noneconomic groups struggling for political power, who sought and received support primarily through appeals to the economic self-interest of the voters—has a substantial measure of validity. The extent to which appeals were cast in economic terms varied, however. In Maryland and Pennsylvania the economic appeal was more intense and more widespread than in New York, where the appeals were much more diversified. In none of these states was the appeal for support from economic groups on economic grounds entirely successful.
For four states, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, the third hypothesis—that the needs of government and economy conflicted with each other in such a way that any political change was necessarily an economic event—has a very substantial measure of validity. In New Jersey the contradiction between the needs of the government and the economy accounts for a considerable measure of the state’s strong support of the Constitution. In Connecticut this contradiction was even more important in determining the course of the contest over ratification, inasmuch as it affected a greater segment of the citizenry and affected them more deeply. In addition, both of the first two hypotheses are applicable in large measure in Connecticut, the first among the supporters, the second among the opponents of ratification. In Rhode Island the contradiction, while as strong as in New Jersey and Connecticut, had a less direct and less immediate effect. Here it was not the contradictions per se, but the situation resulting from the state’s vigorous efforts to solve the problems they posed, that had an immediate influence in the contest over the Constitution. Furthermore, the political alignments born of Rhode Island’s efforts to solve local problems locally brought, in the ratification, a division along the lines suggested by the first hypothesis. In Massachusetts the conflict between the needs of economy and government formed a substantial base both for the political struggles of the decade of the 1780’s and for their climax, the contest over ratification. These struggles took several forms, partly along the lines suggested by the first hypothesis, partly along those of the second hypothesis.
For five states, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, none of the three hypotheses stated seems to have any considerable applicability. Indeed, the influence of economic forces of any kind seems to have been small.
One is struck by the fact that four of these states were geographically contiguous and that all five lay below the Mason and Dixon line. At the other end of the scale, the four states in which economic systems of interpretation seem to be most applicable were northern states (three of them geographically contiguous) which were relatively advanced economically—the criteria being complexity of the economy, the state or degree to which the division of labor had progressed, the variety of economic functions performed, and, in so far as it can be considered a product of these, density of population.
Three general propositions suggest themselves as a possible explanation of this distribution of states with respect to the applicability of economic interpretation.
1) Perhaps it is attributable to mere coincidence. The scholar is reluctant to accept coincidence as the explanation for any fact of history, but this possibility must be considered seriously. To establish coincidence as the explanation it must be proved that the conduct of each state was based on conditions peculiar to it and not fundamentally analogous to those in other states. It is obvious that the five states comprising the southern group and the four comprising the northern had certain fundamental similarities to one another and at the same time certain unique features. It seems clear that the unique elements in each of the five southern states were the determining factors in shaping attitudes toward the Constitution, and that the elements they had in common were not. But in the four northern states, while unique elements in each likewise determined the outcome of the contests, the elements that were analogous in them (primarily economic “advancement” as defined) channeled the course of the contests along parallel economic lines.
Since those elements that were analogous in the four northern states were absent in the five southern states, it follows that an additional characteristic shared by the five southern states was a negative one, the absence of the elements which the four northern states shared. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to infer that this may have been a vital element, the one which determined that the course and outcome of the contests should turn on unique noneconomic local factors in the five southern states and on unique economic local factors in the four northern states. Coincidence, therefore, hardly seems the explanation of the interesting distribution of states on this question of the applicability of economic interpretation. This element, the degree of economic “advancement” as defined, seems to be definitely, though not necessarily measurably, related to the applicability of economic interpretation.
2) Perhaps the making of the Constitution had a more direct effect on the economies, or on something in the economies, or on the economic interests prevailing in the North in general and in the four “advanced” states in particular. In myriad ways such was obviously the case.2
3) With due allowance for the fact that to generalize from inadequate particulars is inherently dangerous, one may tentatively postulate a much broader proposition. Perhaps the likelihood that some form of economic interpretation will render a given historical phenomenon intelligible, other things being equal, increases with the increasing complexity or “advancement” of an economy. Or perhaps this may be true within given limits, that is, in economies above some primitive level and/or below some highly advanced level. Verification of this proposition would depend upon studies of many other historical phenomena.
FOURTH HYPOTHESIS
A FOURTH possible economic interpretation of the making of the Constitution is that it was the expression of the prevailing popular ideology of the socially desirable or normal relationship between government and economy. This ideology did not necessarily coincide with the philosophical systems of theorists and other thinkers, but was rather a broad mosaic of folk values, assumptions, myths, and ideals, a vaguely defined mold which ordinary individuals unconsciously used as a frame of reference in judging whether any proposed political or economic action was acceptable.
Few will be disposed to deny the existence of such a general mold of popular opinion, but it may seem difficult or impossible to reduce it to concrete terms. For the period under study it is particularly difficult. In many historical situations there is a substantial clue to such patterns of opinion in the public utterances of persons seeking to justify or rationalize given political measures. The United States of the 1780’s, however, fails to offer such clues, for the reason that, as a long-range view of the period reveals, a fundamental transition was taking place both in the nature of the American economy and in these basic popular attitudes and assumptions. Nonetheless it is possible to devise methods of gaining an adequate working knowledge of prevailing opinion on the principles of political economy that were current.
The most obvious and probably the safest means of gaining such insight is to study the systems of polity devised by the various states. These systems may be viewed in two perspectives: as systems in operation in 1787 or 1788, and as systems growing and changing throughout the eighteenth century under the stimulus of changing conditions. A reasonably adequate criterion of the character of such systems is the legislative programs—including, wherever pertinent and ascertainable, legislation by local governmental units inside states—worked out by the several states from the time of the Declaration of Independence to the inauguration of the government under the Constitution.3
In either perspective—the short-range or the long-range view —one striking fact is to be observed: that there is a unifying thread running through the legislative programs of the several states, namely the theme of mercantilism. This is not to imply identity of policy. Mercantilism was geared to the economic needs of the community comprising the sovereign jurisdiction, and those needs were not the same in different communities at a given time, nor were the needs of a given community the same at different times. The mercantilist system devised for Virginia in the 1780’s, for example, differed from the one developed there forty years earlier, and from the French and British systems at that or any other time. In short, mercantilism had always engendered a wide range of regulatory and promotional measures. Furthermore, the American states had in practice departed a long way from two of the principal assumptions of classical mercantilism. The concept that gold constituted wealth was often challenged on a philosophical level, and in practice, as was indicated earlier (pages 385–393), the American states had developed a relatively sophisticated monetary system. That the success of a system was to be judged by the balance of trade, measured by accumulation of specie, was no longer universally subscribed to, at least in the carrying states. Even these two assumptions of mercantilism were not actually abandoned, however, but were merely modified to fit local conditions; and most of its other underlying assumptions were unreservedly, if often unconsciously, accepted. The forms that mercantilism took (for example, bounties, protective tariffs, inspection of products for quality, regulation of the flow of specie) were precisely the forms in which the American states cast their systems of polity. Most important, the fundamental concept underlying these state systems was that of mercantilism: the concept of governmental regulation of the economy with a view to the welfare of the sovereign community as a whole rather than that of its individual members.
If the Constitution, to the extent that it was an economic document, had to fit into this general mold to be acceptable, it would seem that it contemplated a governmental system with broad powers to regulate economic life. Yet study of the arguments and propaganda for and against the Constitution reveals that opponents attacked it most persistently on the ground that it did create just such a government, and defenders expended enormous efforts to prove that it did not. The frequency and vehemence of these exhortations would seem to attest to the widespread realization that the voting population at large distrusted and feared strong government. This fact is indeed self-evident and is accepted by virtually all students of American history.
What seems to be a paradox is, however, only an apparent, not a real one. Americans were accustomed to fairly extensive governmental interference in their economic lives, but only on the part of local governments. It was not governmental power as such that Americans feared, but the centralization of power, especially in a government far removed from local supervision and control. A division of power along both horizontal and vertical lines—a federal system with the principle of the separation of powers incorporated into each level of government—was broadly and deeply rooted in the complex of political, economic, and social traditions in Anglo-Saxon America. Such a division had existed prior to the Revolution and during the period between the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781; it had been continued under the Articles; and it was perpetuated in the political system established by the Constitution. It was not the sum total of governmental power being exercised that varied with these changes in organization, but the distribution of power, the equilibrium of the federal system.
Hence, while the general mold of opinion on matters of political economy was a mercantilistic one, it did not in America imply national mercantilism, but a group of local mercantilisms. The mold varied as to details in the several states, sometimes subtly, sometimes glaringly. Each state required and had in operation a system of its own to meet its own economic needs. In the face of these facts two inferences are inescapable, inferences which resolve the paradox: 1) That the Constitution was not “essentially an economic document,” if by this is meant that it created a new system of political economy. 2) That the states—that is, the people thereof, acting in their capacity as citizens of the states—assumed that they would retain control over these and all other matters not manifestly the concern of all the states.
METHODOLOGY
THE methodological implications of the foregoing explorations into economic analysis of the making of the Constitution are clear, and from them it is possible to pose some general propositions regarding the role of economic interpretation in historical analysis.
The events of American history are intrinsically pluralistic in that they take place simultaneously on personal, local, and state levels as well as the general level. The contest over ratification was on one level a single contest, on another thirteen separate contests, and on still another, that of the local units which elected delegates to the various conventions, a series of almost two thousand separate contests. In view of the three-part federal system of political organization in the United States (general, state, and local jurisdictions), and of the not dissimilar structure of the economic and social order, it seems likely, if not certain, that any historical phenomenon above the local level has this pluralistic character.
Research may take place on any of these levels. The findings and conclusions derived from an investigation made on one level can be valid only for that level, and it is always possible that even these findings and conclusions will be upset by new knowledge derived from research on another level. Since there is one level—the personal—on which investigation is inevitably limited to superficialities, and since on all levels it is limited to the study of inevitably fragmentary relics of the past, absolute certainty in historical study is unattainable. The closer the investigator comes to the primary constituents of a phenomenon, the higher the probability of accuracy, but it must be recognized that a historical phenomenon is more than the sum total of its manifestations on local levels, just as it is more than the phenomenon as it manifests itself on the general level. Ideally, all levels will be perceived, studied, and kept in mind simultaneously. The extent to which the historian accomplishes this is, by and large, the extent to which the results of his research can be reliable.
Inside the framework of this pluralistic concept any number of systems of interpretation—economic or otherwise—may prove useful. But it must be recognized that:
1) Whatever the interpretive system, a carefully drawn operational procedure must be consciously formulated at the time the system is formulated. If any approximation of the ideal of objectivity is to be achieved, the procedures of investigation, particularly the basis for selecting and arranging data, must be strictly defined, in terms of the requirements for verification of the hypothesis. The earlier in the process of gathering data that hypothesizing and selection begin, the greater the dangers of both subjectivity and error; the further along they begin—the more data are in hand before selection and interpretation begin—the greater the probability of accuracy. The more carefully the specifications are drawn, and the more rigorously they are adhered to, the closer the investigator comes to objectivity. This ideal of objectivity would be achieved if one observer could be replaced by another in the course of an investigation without altering the outcome of the observation. The extent to which this replaceability of the investigator is achieved is the measure of the degree of objectivity obtained.
2) No single system of interpretation can explain all historical phenomena; it is even unlikely that a single system can adequately explain all aspects of a single historical event. Obviously romantic as the quest for such single systems may seem, few readers will need to be reminded that it is just such quest that has occupied a very large part of the efforts of American historians. As one critic has phrased it, we have emulated the medieval alchemist, who sought to transmute base elements into gold before learning how to handle simpler things. In working with the simpler things it is useful to be aware that one system of interpretation may work—that is, render intelligible and compatible all the discoverable and verifiable facts—in one aspect of a multi-faceted phenomenon and not in another. That is to say, it should be recognized that a full explanation of one complex event may require several systems of interpretation, or even that several systems which are apparently contradictory may be required for a full explanation.
3) In interpreting a given facet of a given event, any system may prove useful, but the conditions and circumstances of a given situation will ordinarily make it better adapted to interpretation by one system than by another. To cite a simple and obvious analogy, the mathematician has several methods for describing various physical phenomena. For example, when he wants to describe physical vibrations in a rectangular space, he uses one method, the mode of description, or coordinates, best suited to that kind of space. When he wishes to describe vibrations in a cylindrical space he uses a different method or set of coordinates, and for a spherical space he uses still another set. Theoretically he can use any set for any kind of space if he does not mind making an unnecessarily large number of calculations and arriving at an obscure result; but there is an easy way, a natural system, for each kind of space.
The historian has at his disposal several interpretive systems comparable to these systems of coordinates, and he is limited in devising additional systems only by his own imagination. For any set of historical conditions, circumstances, situations, and phenomena there may be an interpretive system naturally adapted to it. If there is and one begins with an “unnatural” system—which would not necessarily preclude arriving at a satisfactory answer—one will have chosen the hard way. Before the system of interpretation can be made to work (assuming that the historian is proof against the distortion of facts and editing of data to make them conform to his thesis), much labor will be required and the interpretive system itself will require modification.
For this reason the whole idea (expounded by Beard and many others) of beginning research with a system of interpretation and basis of selection, or with a hypothesis, or even with a question, breaks down. However it might be evaluated in terms of philosophy and pure logic, the fact is that it was developed largely for practical reasons, and it is precisely from the practical standpoint that it is weakest. If one guesses wrong, if one investigates a phenomenon in terms of a system of interpretation and selection which proves to be unworkable, all one’s efforts may be wasted. An equal amount of effort, applied inductively, might have covered less ground, but it would at least have brought the investigator to a stage at which a more tenable system of interpretation could be induced from the body of particulars, and would at least have taught him to ask meaningful questions.
OUTLINES FOR PLURALISTIC STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION
ECONOMIC interpretation renders intelligible many of the forces at work in the making of the Constitution. It is far from adequate to explain it in its entirety, however; this would require that countless noneconomic factors be taken into consideration. The present study, focused as it is on economic factors, does not present sufficient data for a pluralistic interpretation adequate to explain the event, but it does permit of conclusions which suggest synthesizing and organizing principles that might be fruitful of meaningful results in further study of the making of the Constitution.
The Philadelphia Convention which framed the Constitution was made up of fifty-five men. These delegates were officially and primarily the representatives of the several states. They were also unofficial representatives of the geographical areas, political factions, and economic interest groups in those states.
Represented in the convention were twelve of the thirteen American states and virtually every geographic subdivision except the new areas west of the mountains, which had not yet produced significant leadership in any state. Almost all the important political factions in ten states were represented; the delegates from the other two states were drawn primarily from the factions that were momentarily dominant. The representation of economic groups was less complete. Most of the important economic groups were represented by at least one delegate, but a great majority of the delegates were drawn from the three groups that furnished most of the leadership in each state: lawyers, planters, and merchants.
Each individual delegate was also a unique human being with his own Weltanschauung as well as his own material interests. Inside the convention each delegate could vote and make proposals as he saw fit. Some delegates, a dozen at the outside, clearly acted according to the dictates of their personal economic interests, and about as many more according to their philosophical convictions, even when these conflicted with their economic interests. But the conduct of most of the delegates, while partly a reflection of one or both of these personal considerations, was to a much greater extent a reflection of the interests and outlooks of the states and local areas they represented.
The document framed by the Philadelphia Convention was thus the product of a number of conflicting elements. Except for a few minor innovations designed to adjust colonial custom and experience to the immediate political and economic milieu, the Constitution contained no provisions that were new to Americans. The one radical feature of the Constitution was that it created a general government to replace the Congress of the Confederation.
If the American people were to have a general government at all, they must accept it on the terms laid down in the Constitution. The states were called upon, through the medium of conventions elected expressly for the purpose, to accept or reject the Constitution in its entirety. Involved as the issue was, countless as were its ramifications, each state could answer in only one of two ways: yes or no.
Its answer to the question—to reject or to accept—depended upon what measure of satisfaction its citizens derived from the federal system of the existing Articles of Confederation, under which the separate states were, in practice, responsible for their separate fates. The extent of that satisfaction, in turn, depended largely upon two primary considerations: the endowments with which a state could expect to cope with its particular problems of sovereign existence, and the skill with which its people had met the problems that had faced them during the brief period of the experiments in independence. In short, those states that had done well on their own were inclined to desire to continue on their own, and those that found it difficult to survive independently were inclined to desire to cast their several lots with a general government.
As independent entities, five states (Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, and Maryland) had faced problems that had proved insurmountable to them. These states ratified quickly, the first three unanimously and the other two by majorities of 75 and 85 per cent, respectively.
Four states (Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and New Hampshire) were considerably better equipped for sovereign existence than the first five and were, by and large, faring well on their own. Each of them, however, was dissipating its energies in internal factional or areal disputes, ranging from legislation designed by one group for the destruction of another to organized physical violence. Over considerable opposition, after considerable debate, and/or through various political stratagems, each of these states ratified the Constitution. The majorities in their ratifying conventions ranged from barely over 50 per cent to 67 per cent.
Four states (Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island) were successful enough as sovereign entities to satisfy the greater part of their populations. Three of them were large, populous, and economically powerful states, and the fourth compensated for its deficiencies by the exercise of considerable ingenuity. The delegates elected to the ratifying convention in Virginia favored the Constitution by a slim majority, and the delegates from each of the three other states were opposed to ratification by majorities of about 70 per cent. Virginia ratified only after a vigorous campaign and much debate, maneuvering, and exercise of personal influence. New York ratified only after the City of New York threatened to secede from the state. North Carolina rejected the Constitution in one convention and ratified it in a second convention only after the government of the United States had been in operation for several months, and after twelve amendments had been proposed by Congress. Rhode Island refused seven times even to call a convention, refused to ratify when the convention did meet, and finally ratified only after the principal town in the state seceded and other towns threatened to follow suit.
The general outlines of the struggles for ratification are thus clear and relatively simple. The details which form and fill in the outlines constitute a large, intricate mosaic. The interplay of these details will become understandable only through extensive and intensive study on the state and local levels, areas hitherto largely neglected.
NOTES
1 Several conditions and limitations are implicit in these requirements. It is necessary to assume, for working purposes, that the individuals involved had a conscious image or knowledge and understanding of how their interests were affected, whenever this cannot be established factually. Moreover, it is necessary to assume that to idealize individuals as abstract economic men in this respect is a valid operational procedure. As to the means of persuasion, it must be recognized that except in a few instances where individualized persuasion can be traced through personal correspondence and similar records, one must depend for sources on the grossest of media used for communicating propaganda, ideas, and arguments, such as the press, the pulpit, and oratory and debate in the ratifying conventions. It is thus necessary to assume for working purposes that it is sufficient to examine these media.
2 This, of course, was suggested by Beard. As has been demonstrated, however, Beard’s analysis of the ways in which the Constitution affected economic interests and the ways various interest groups behaved bears little relation to the facts.
3 The following observations are derived from systematic analysis of all the public and private acts of each of the thirteen states, 1776–1789. The statutes of most of the states during the period have also been systematically analyzed by seminar students of Professor Fulmer Mood at the University of Texas, and I have examined these analyses.