Page numbers refer to the print edition but are hyperlinked to the appropriate location in the e-book.
The Accidental Mind (Linden), 176
adequate and inadequate causes and ideas, 37, 38, 44
affectio and affectus, translation of, 4–5
affects, xv–xviii; “affect” as positive term for a negative x, 209–10; as aftereffects of interactions of signifiers, 123, 135; and Agamben’s zoē-bios distinction, 193–94; as always affects of essence (Spinoza’s conception), 35–36, 43–44; anxiety as the sole or central affect (Lacan’s conception), 147–48, 151, 213; complex and enigmatic nature of, 134, 137–38, 146–47; and conatus, 37–41, 217; deceptive nature of, 206–9; defined, 4–5, 38, 41–42; detachment from (see affects, detachment from/absence of); displacement of, 124, 127, 137, 138, 155; distinction between affects and emotions/feelings (Lacan’s conception), 151; doubts raised about during analysis, 140–41, 147–48, 151–52; and the face, 46–48; and false connections, 103–4, 107, 122, 128, 145; and gap between the biological and the more-than-biological, 190; and homeostatic regulation, 31, 50–51, 217–18; and immediacy, 85–86, 134–35; impact of language on, 163, 189–90, 200; imprecise vocabulary for, 198–200, 207; as modifications, 5; modulation by intellectual, linguistic, and representational configurations, 163; as natural ontological phenomena, 36; origin of, 4, 6, 21; potential, 114–16; quota of (Affektbetrag), 109–10, 112–13, 214–16; and repression, 205; as signifiers, 205–10; and syncope, 23–24; three stages of processing (Damasio’s conception), 164–66; two-way modulation between affects and signifiers, 200; unconscious (see affects, unconscious); and warfare, 132; without subjects, 6–7. See also anxiety; emotions; feelings; Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis; Freudian metapsychology of affects; generosity; guilt; hatred; joy; Lacan-inspired metapsychology of affects; love; passions; sadness; shame; wonder; specific philosophers, psychoanalysts, and neuroscientists
affects, detachment from/absence of, 7–8; and brain damage, 58–60; Damasio and, 33–34, 58–60, 64; Elliot case, 11, 59–60; impaired capacity for wonder, 10–11; and lack of concern, 59–60, 71; “L” case, 60; Phineas Gage case, xii–xiv, 57–58; Sacks and, 71
affects, unconscious, xvii, xviii; Copjec’s denial of, 155; Damasio and, 163–65; distinguished from potential affects, 114–16; and false connections, 107, 122; Fink and, 122; and Freud’s Affekte/Gefühle/Emfindungen terminology, 112–13; Freud’s vacillations over, xvii, 75–80, 88–101, 105–13, 118, 119, 155, 212; Harari and, 122; Lacan’s denial of, 76, 84, 111, 119, 122, 129, 134, 149, 212–13; as misfelt feelings, 94–95; and neurobiology, 87; and pleasure and pain, 166–67; as potential-to-feel, 108–9; Pulver and, 113–17; and resistance to attempts to reconcile psychoanalytic theory with neuroscience, 81–82; and shame, 162. See also feelings, misfelt; guilt
Les affects lacaniens (Soler), 82
anosognosia, 33, 60, 71. See also brain damage
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Kant), 196
anxiety: and bodily movements, 13; Freud and, 89–90, 99–100, 110; and gap between cognitive and emotional abilities, 174; guilt felt as, 89–91, 99–101, 110, 212–13; Harari and, 134–35; and hysteria, 87; Lacan and, 82, 133, 139–40, 151–52; and obsessive disorders, 89–90; relationship to doubt, 151–52; and repression, 110; as a signal, not representing itself, 134–35; as sole or central affect, 147–48, 151, 213; Žižek and, 172, 174
autoaffection, xvi; autoaffection as temporality as the origin of all other affects (Heidegger’s concept), 6; cerebral autoaffection, 221–23; Damasio and, 31, 33–34, 51, 64; deconstruction of, 7; defined, 5–6, 21, 221; Deleuze and, 45, 48–49; Deleuze’s reading of Descartes and, 46; Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza and, 36, 45; Derrida and, 19–25, 63; and feeling of existence, 6, 20; Heidegger and, 5–6; and homeostasis, 31, 64; impaired mechanism for, 34 (see also brain damage); and imprecise vocabulary for affects, 199; and the “inner voice,” 20, 21; and mapping between affects and concepts, 42; as mutual mirroring of mind and body, 55; and neurobiology, 26; nonsubjective autoaffection, 55; and plane of immanence, 45–46; and self-touching, 19–21, 63; and spatiality, 46; term origin, 5–6; and types of knowledge, 45; and the unconscious, 221–23; and wonder, 9–11, 63–64
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud), 77–78
body-mind connection: and conatus, 38; Damasio and, 29–30, 164–66; Derrida and, 21–23; Descartes and, 12–15, 18, 21–22, 30; emotions and physiological processes, 164–67; and generosity, 18; Green and, 202–3; and inadequacy of brain events, 29–30; and linguistic mediation, 201; mind and body as expressions of the same substance, 36, 51; mind as the idea of the body, 51, 53, 166; and “organism” term, 55; and passions “in” the soul, 12–15; and pineal gland, 14–16, 21–23; and spatiality of the soul, 21–23; Spinoza and, 36, 38, 51, 53; substance of Descartes’ error, 30
brain: and autoexcitation, 216–19; and bodily movements, 13–14; cerebral autoaffection, 221–23; Changeux and, 195–98; computer model of, 27; Damasio and, 26–34, 163–70, 187, 217; Descartes and, 16, 30; and drives, 213–16; as “electrical center” (Breuer’s conception), 213–14; and evolution, 175–76, 180–83, 187–89, 201; Freud and, 60–62, 214–16, 255–56nn7,21; hardwired absences of hardwiring, 201–2; as hodgepodge of modules without overall coherent function, 175–77; interconnectedness of, 177, 194, 200; and language, 177, 195–201; and language acquisition, 195–96, 199–200; and learning, 195–98; LeDoux and, 175–79, 187–88; Linden and, 176; location of cerebral sites producing emotion, 218–19; mirror neurons, xi, 256n20; and mortality, 223–24; neural plasticity, xi, 26–28, 56–58, 190–91, 194, 202; Panksepp and, 176–77, 190–91; and perception, 27, 166–67; Pommier and, 197; self-mapping, 164–67; and subjectivity, 28; substance of Descartes’ error, 30; and symbolic activity, 213–14, 216, 219–23; trinity of cognition, emotion, and motivation, 163, 176, 177; and the unconscious, 71, 219–21
The Brain and the Inner World (Solms and Turnbull), 27–28, 57, 186
brain damage, xii–xiv, 56–62, 71; and damaged subjectivity, 28, 33–34; and detachment from one’s own affects, 7–8, 33, 58–60; and dreaming, 62; Elliot case, 11, 59–60; “L” case, 60; and loss of wonder, 11, 33, 60; and neuropsychoanalysis, 29; Phineas Gage case, xii–xiv, 57–58; and plasticity of the brain, 56–58; and role of emotions in reason, 8; and transformation of personality, xiii–xiv, 57–61
care for self and others: CARE emotional system, 186; relationship between feelings, emotions, and care for self and others, 51
La causalité psychique: Entre nature et culture (Green), 202–3
causes. See adequate and inadequate causes
cognition: differences between cognition and emotion, 194; entanglement of emotional and nonemotional dimensions, 177–78, 190–91, 194, 200; trinity of cognition, emotion, and motivation, 163, 176, 177. See also rationality; thought
conatus, 6, 217; affects and variability of conatus, 37–41, 54; defined, 38; and definition of emotions, 41–42; feelings, emotions, and self-attachment, 51; and joy and sorrow, 39–40; and origin of personal identity, 52; and self-preservation, 52; and wonder, 40–41
consciousness: as awareness of a disturbance caused by an external object, 30; and dupery, 208; LeDoux on, 188–89; link between consciousness and emotion, 30–31; as outgrowth of self-mapping dynamics, 164–67; as two-sided instance (speaker/listener etc.), 20. See also mind; psyche; self; soul; subjectivity; specific philosophers, psychoanalysts, and neuroscientists
conscious-preconscious-unconscious triad, 69–70, 78, 92
conversion, conversion symptoms, 103–4
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 83, 148
Critique of Judgment (Kant), 53
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), 5–6
Damasio, Antonio, xvi, xviii; and autoaffection, 31, 33–34, 51, 64; and brain damage, 33–34, 58–60, 71–72; and debate between naturalism and antinaturalism, 180–84; definition of emotion, 51; Descartes and (see Damasio’s reading of Descartes); distinction between pain and emotion caused by pain, 65–66; distinction between public emotions and private feelings, 163–64, 166, 179–80; and Elliot case, 11, 59–60; and evolution of the brain, 187; feelings-had and feelings-known, 165, 167–69; and Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, 165–66; and heteroaffection, 34, 65–66; importance of emotions and feelings for survival, 50–53; importance of emotions in neural regulation, 7, 217; and “L” case, 60; and loss of wonder, 11, 33, 64; and mental images/ideas, 54; and nonconscious affects, 163–65; and Phineas Gage case, xii–xiv, 57–58; Spinoza and (see Damasio’s reading of Spinoza); structure of the self, 31–33, 169–74, 217, 219–20, 222–23; three stages of processing in affective life, 164–66; and the unconscious, 163–68, 179–80; and wonder, 11, 32–33, 64; Žižek’s critique of, 162–63, 165, 169–74, 179–84, 190
Damasio’s reading of Descartes, 7; and body-mind connection, 29–30; Cartesian mind as a “disembodied” mind, 22; and inadequacy of brain events, 29–30; and link between consciousness and emotion, 30–31; and neural plasticity, 26–28; substance of Descartes’ error, 30
Damasio’s reading of Spinoza, 7, 50–55; and body-mind connection, 53; differing readings of Damasio and Deleuze, 36; emotions, feelings, and conatus, 50–53; and mapping, 51–55; and self-preservation, 52–53
deceptive nature of affects and signifiers, 206–9
defense mechanisms, xviii, 76, 87, 127, 155; Damasio and, 168–69; and doubt and anxiety, 152; Freud and, 103–10, 115, 131; and shame, 162. See also repression
In Defense of Lost Causes (Žižek), 172
Deleuze, Gilles, xvi; affect term definition, 4–5; and conceptual personae, 48; and delocalization of the natural body, 68–69; Descartes and (see Deleuze’s reading of Descartes); and different concepts of affects and autoaffection, 48–49; and heteroaffection, 65, 68–69; and nonmetaphysical concept of philosophy, 48–49; and perception, 67; and plane of immanence, 45–46, 48, 64, 67; privileged metaphor of the face, 64; Spinoza and (see Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza); and touch, 66–67; and wonder, 47–48, 64, 71
Deleuze’s reading of Descartes, 7, 45–48, 229n1; and facial expressions, 46–48; two possible readings of Descartes, 48–49; and wonder, 47–48
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza: and affects as affects of essence, 36, 43–44; and affect term definition, 4–5; and autoaffection, 45; differing readings of Damasio and Deleuze, 36; and God/Nature, 41–42; and heteroaffection, 65; and joyful and sorrowful affects, 39–40; and nonsubjective autoaffection, 36; and touch, 66–67; and types of knowledge/ideas, 44–45, 66–67; and variability of conatus and the power of acting, 41–42
Derrida, Jacques, xvi, xvii; and autoaffection, 19–25, 63; and delocalization of the natural body, 68–69; Descartes and, 19–25; and generosity, 24–25, 64; and heteroaffection, 7, 19, 20–21, 24, 25, 58, 64–65, 68–69; and pineal gland, 21–23; privileged metaphor of the graft, 64; and sense of touch, 21–24, 64, 69; and spatiality of the psyche, 69; tribute to Jean-Luc Nancy, 23; “two lovers” text, 64–65; and wonder, 11, 23–25, 64, 71
Descartes, René, xvi; and body-mind connection, 12–15, 18, 21–22, 30; definition of passions of the soul, 6, 13; Derrida’s interpretation of, 19–25; Descartes-Spinoza conflict, 7, 37–38; external signs of the passions (facial expressions etc.), 45–48; and functions of the soul, 15; and generosity, 13, 17–18, 25; and immediacy, 85; Irigaray and, 226n15; and nonmetaphysical concept of philosophy, 48–49; passions “in” the soul as consequences of bodily movements, 13–15; passions “of” the soul as related to the soul alone, 15–16; and perception, 14–15; and pineal gland, 14–16, 22; repudiation of Descartes’ equation of the mental with the conscious, 85; and wonder, 8–9, 16–18, 25. See also Damasio’s reading of Descartes; Deleuze’s reading of Descartes
desire: and agalma, 70–71; Lacan and, 124; as one of six primitive passions (Descartes’ conception), 9, 12; and power of acting, 40; SEEKING emotional system, 186, 201. See also conatus; drives
Le discours vivant (Green), 106–7
doubt: and deceptive nature of signifiers and affects, 210; doubts raised about affects during analysis, 140–41, 147–48, 151–52; relationship to anxiety, 151–52
drives: and the brain, 213–16; and confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32; Damasio and, 164, 165, 167; death drive, 172, 181–82; Descartes and, 226n15; Freud and, 105–6, 109, 127, 131, 213–16; Lacan and, 125–32; Leclaire and, 136; and SEEKING emotional system, 201; and sexuality, 214–15
ego: and “ego ideal,” 92, 95; and the protoself, 222; and spatiality of the psyche, 69; structural dynamics between ego and superego, 92–93, 99–101; and the unconscious, 92. See also id-ego-superego triad
Elliot (Damasio’s detached patient), 11, 59–60
The Emotional Brain (LeDoux), 175, 188
emotions, xvii–xviii; and Agamben’s zoē-bios distinction, 193–94; and decision making, 7, 30; distinction between affects and emotions/feelings (Lacan’s conception), 151; distinction between public emotions and private feelings (Damasio’s conception), 163–64, 166, 179–80; entanglement with nonemotional dimensions, 177–78, 190–91, 194, 200; and formation of images/ideas, 54; greater variety of negative emotions compared to positive emotions, 187; and homeostatic regulation, 31, 50–51; imprecise vocabulary for, 198–200, 207; link between consciousness and emotion, 30–31; Panksepp’s taxonomy of seven elementary emotions, 186–87, 192, 201; primary and secondary (“social”) emotions, 217; and rationality, 7–8, 30, 50; relationship amongst affects, emotions, and feelings (Freud’s conception), 110–14; relationship amongst emotion, feeling, and knowing (Damasio’s conception), 164–65; relationship amongst feelings, emotions, and care for self and others (Damasio’s conception), 51. See also affects; feelings; passions; specific philosophers, psychoanalysts, and neuroscientists
Empfindungen, 212; confusion caused by translation issues, 119; Damasio and, 165; and deception, 208; and feelings-had and feelings-known, 167–69; and honte (shame as a felt feeling), 157–58; relation to Affekte and Gefühle, 111–14
existence, 5, 6, 20, 32, 39–40. See also self-preservation
face and facial expressions, 46–48, 64
fear: and bodily movements, 13, 14; FEAR emotional system, 186, 189; and wonder, 9
feelings, xvii–xviii; and deception, 208; distinction between affects and emotions/feelings (Lacan’s conception), 151; distinction between public emotions and private feelings (Damasio’s conception), 163–64, 179–80; feelings-had and feelings-known, 165, 167–69; as feelings of feelings, xviii, 85; and Lacan’s distinction between honte and pudeur, 157–62; misfelt (see feelings, misfelt); and neural maps, 52, 165; relationship amongst affects, emotions, and feelings (Freud’s conception), 110–14, 164–65; relationship amongst feelings, emotions, and care for self and others (Damasio’s conception), 51. See also affects; emotions; Empfindungen; passions; specific philosophers, psychoanalysts, and neuroscientists
feelings, misfelt, xviii, 86, 212; Damasio and, 165; and doubts raised about feelings during analysis, 140–41; and enigmatic nature of affects, 146–47; and false connections, 107; Freud’s statements on, 106–7 (see also Freudian metapsychology of affects); Green and, 106–7; and guilt, 90–91, 99–101, 107, 162, 212–13; and hysteria, 87, 103; Lacan and, 106–7, 141, 146–47, 152–53, 162; and shame, 162; and three destinies of quotas of affect (felt, misfelt, unfelt), 109–10; unconscious affects as, 94–95; Žižek and, 141. See also defense mechanisms
Freud, Sigmund, x, xiii, 88–101; and affects (see Freudian metapsychology of affects); and anxiety, 89–90, 99–101; belief in lack of symbolic activity in the nervous system, 214–15; and the brain, 60–62, 214–16, 255–56nn7,21; city of Rome analogy for psyche, 60–61, 198; and conscience, 77–78, 91–92, 95; and “criminals from a sense of guilt,” 78, 92–93; dichotomy between energy and structure, 84, 102, 126; and drives, 105–6, 109, 127, 131, 213–16; on the ego, 222; focus on guilt, 78–79; Green and, 111; and hysteria, 86–87, 103–4; Kant and, 69; Lacan and, 84, 103, 119, 148–49 (see also Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis); and moral masochism, 93, 95–97; and negative therapeutic reaction, 94; and obsessive disorders, 88–89, 98–99, 103; and plasticity (capacity to preserve the past), 60–62; and pleasure principle, 95, 218; and primacy of the unconscious, 83–84; and principle of inertia, 218; and problem of unconscious guilt, 78–80, 88–101; and psychical energy, 215; recognition of possible to-be-discovered physiological mechanisms in affective life, 104–5; and remorse, 98–99; and revolutionary nature of discovery of the unconscious, 83–84, 148–49; and sleep, 61–62, 93; and spatiality of the psyche, 69–70; and structure of the self, 69–70, 78, 92 (see also id-ego-superego triad); vacillations over possibility of unconscious affects, xvii, 75–80, 88–101, 105–13, 118, 119, 155, 212; and warfare, 132. See also consciousness; ego; Freudian metapsychology of affects; id; id-ego-superego triad; preconscious; superego; unconscious
Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, xii, xvii; affects as aftereffects of interactions of signifiers, 123, 135; and anxiety, 133, 151–52; complexity and enigmatic nature of affects, 134, 137–38, 146–47; cross-resonating relations between multiple representations, 128–29; Damasio and, 165–66; and desire, 124; and drift/displacement of affects, 122, 124, 137, 138, 155; estrangement of the parlêtre from its affects, 137–38; inextricable entanglement of the affective and the intellectual, 120–22; Lacan’s assertion that there exists one central affect (anxiety), 139–40, 147–48, 151; Lacan’s denial of unconscious affects, 76, 84, 111, 119, 122, 129, 134, 149, 212–13; Lacan’s objections to affective life as primary focus of analysis, 120–21; neologism affectuation, 141, 146–47, 208; neologism jouis-sens, 143–46, 196–98; neologism lalangue, 141–46, 195–200; neologism senti-ment, 141, 146–47, 213; priority of signifier-ideas over affects, 122–24; representation and the confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32, 135–37; repression, 122, 125–34, 138; sexuality and death, 161; signifiers as sole entities capable of becoming unconscious through repression, 119
Freudian metapsychology of affects, 102–17; affective structures (Affektbildungen), 110–13, 116, 157–58, 212; confusion caused by translation issues, 119, 125–32; conversion, conversion symptoms, 103; defense mechanisms, 103–10, 115, 131; dichotomy between energy and structure, 102, 112, 144; distinction between “affect” (Affekt) and “idea” (Vorstellung), 102–3; and drives, 105–6, 109; false connections, 103–4; Lacan and, 114 (see also Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis); and misfelt feelings, 106–7; misunderstandings in Anglo-American tradition, 114–15, 119; primary and secondary processes, 143–45; primary repression and secondary repression/repression proper, 125–26; Pulver and, 113–17; quota of affect (Affektbetrag), 109–10, 112–13, 214–16; relationship amongst affects, emotions, and feelings, 110–14, 164–65; three destinies of quotas of affect (felt, misfelt, unfelt), 109–10; and unconscious vs. potential affects, 114–16
gaze, and psychoanalytic relationship, 70–71
guilt, xv, xvii, 88–101, 110–13; and anxiety, 89–91, 99–101, 110, 212–13; and civilization, 97–98; feeling of culpability without awareness of transgression, 78, 91, 110, 162, 212; Freud’s vacillations over unconscious sense of guilt, 78–80, 88–101, 113, 212–13; as fundamental philosophical affect in relation to ethics, 77; guilt-in-search-of-a-crime, 78, 92–93; and id-ego-superego triad, 78–80, 88, 91–93, 99–101; and moral masochism, 93, 95–97; and need for punishment, 96–97, 99, 101; and negative therapeutic reaction, 94; and obsessive disorders, 88–89, 98–99; as penalty imposed by conscience, 95; as potentially misfelt feeling, 107 (see also anxiety); reasons for focus on, 77; and three destinies of quotas of affect (felt, misfelt, unfelt), 110; two modes of unconscious guilt (Žižek’s conception), 162; unconscious guilt as instance of Gefühl, not Empfindung, 113; unresolved questions about, 78. See also conscience
heteroaffection, xvi, 7; auto-heteroaffection, 55; and biological basis of subjectivity, 55; and conatus, 42; Damasio and, 34, 65–66; defined, 20–21, 63; Deleuze and, 49, 65, 68–69; Derrida and, 19, 20–21, 24, 25, 58, 64–65, 68–69; and generosity, 25; and Nancy’s nonmetaphysical sense of touch, 23–24; and neural maps, 55; and pain, 65–66; and “self-touching you,” 24; and source of affects, 21; and spatiality of the psyche, 69; Spinoza and, 42; and wonder, 9, 11, 63–64
homeostasis: and autoaffection, 31, 64; and the cerebral unconscious, 220–21; consciousness as awareness of a disturbance to an organism’s homeostasis caused by an external object, 30; Damasio and, 30–33, 50–51, 64, 168–69; role of emotions in homeostatic regulation, 31, 50–51, 217–18; and structure of the self, 33, 220–23; and symbolic activity in the brain, 219–23
hystericization of the analysand, 140–41, 153
id: as intercessor between the brain and the psyche, 203; and SEEKING emotional system, 201; and spatiality of the psyche, 69. See also id-ego-superego triad
ideas: affects without ideas as blind/ideas without affects as empty, 121; ideas as only entities ever repressed, 155 (see also Lacan, Jacques: denial of unconscious affects); inextricable entanglement of the affective and the intellectual, 120–22, 163; unconscious ideas, 110, 164
ideational representations, 84; affects as aftereffects of interactions of signifiers, 123; cross-resonating relations between multiple representations, 128–29; and defense mechanisms, 103, 107–10, 125–26, 155; distinction between “affect” (Affekt) and “idea” (Vorstellung), 102–3; and drives, 105–6; and false connections, 107; Green and, 205; and instincts, 214–15; Lacan and (see signifiers); and misfelt feelings, 107; and obsessive disorders, 90; priority of signifier-ideas over affects, 122–24; representation and the confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32. See also signifiers; Vorstellungen
id-ego-superego triad, 101; and moral masochism, 95–97; and possibility of unconscious guilt, 78–80, 88, 91–93; relation to conscious-preconscious-unconscious triad, 78, 92; structural dynamics between ego and superego, 92–93, 99–101; superego distinguished from conscience, 92. See also ego; id; superego
identity: conatus and origins of personal identity, 52; personality transformation due to brain damage, xiii–xiv, 57–61; and the protoself, 219–20; self-model and a new conception of materialism, 72; and the unconscious, 92, 221
International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, 28
joy: neural maps associated with, 54; as one of six primitive passions (Descartes’ conception), 9, 12; and power of acting, 39–40, 53; Spinoza’s definition, 39, 54; and states of equilibrium, 54; and variability of conatus, 39–40; and wonder, 40–41
Kant, Immanuel: and autoaffection, 5–6; Freud and, 69; and intuition, 69; Panksepp and, 190–91; and “plastic force,” 53; relationship between affects and ideas, 121; and socialization, 196; and subjectivity, 170
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Heidegger), 5–6
knowledge: intuition, 44–45, 69; knowledge from random experience, 44; knowledge from signs, 44–45; Spinoza’s conception of three kinds of knowledge/ideas, 44–45, 66–67
Lacan, Jacques, x, 117–49, 195–200; agalma and the gaze, 70–71; and alienation, 129–30; and anxiety, 82, 133, 151–52, 213; and beauty, 160–61; contrast to Pulver, 114; Copjec and, 154–58; and deceptive nature of signifiers and affects, 206–9; denial of unconscious affects, 76, 84, 111, 119, 122, 129, 134, 149, 212–13; dichotomy between the signifier and jouissance, 155; distinction between “dupery” and “deception,” 207–8; and events of May ‘68, 154–55; formations of the unconscious, 108, 111; and free association, 166; Freud and, 84, 103, 119, 148–49 (see also Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis); and the intersection of the biological and the social, 202–3; lack of references to Freud’s German terminology for affects, emotions, and feelings, 119, 134, 151, 156; and language and translation issues, 155–56; and misfelt feelings, 152–53; and the nature of reality, 139; opposition between conscious affects and unconscious signifiers, 84; and resistance to attempts to reconcile psychoanalytic theory with neuroscience, 81; responses to criticisms of neglect of affects, 81–82, 123–24, 133–36, 150; seminars (see Lacan, seminars of); and shame, 153–62; signifiers (see signifiers); theory of the four discourses (analyst, master, university, hysteric), 139–41, 147; and thinking without thinking that one thinks/knowing without knowing that one knows, 84, 87, 149; and the unconscious, 82–83, 155, 179–80, 208; and wonder, 70–71; Žižek and, 162. See also Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis; Lacan-inspired metapsychology of affects; signifiers
Lacan, seminars of, 212–13; 5th seminar, 158–59; 6th seminar (Desire and Its Interpretation), 122–23, 128; 7th seminar (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis), 123, 132, 160–61, 213; 9th seminar (Identification), 123; 10th seminar (Anxiety), 119–20, 133, 134, 150, 151–52, 213; 11th seminar (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis), 129, 132, 153; 17th seminar (The Other Side of Psychoanalysis), 119–20, 133, 137–38, 153–54, 156; 18th seminar, 146; 19th seminar, 141–42; 21st seminar, 206; 23rd seminar (Le sinthome), 124; 25th seminar, 143
Lacan-inspired metapsychology of affects: and Agamben’s zoē-bios distinction, 193–94; Damasio and, 167–68; distinction between affect and emotion/feeling, 151; relationship between anxiety and doubt, 151–52; and shame, 153–62
language: and body-mind connection, 201; confusion caused by translation issues, 119, 125–32, 135–37, 155–56; and desynchronization in the brain, 177; and free association, 142–43; impact on experience of feelings, 189–90; imprecise vocabulary for affects, 198–200, 207; and inextricable entanglement of the affective and the intellectual, 120–22; lalangue neologism, 141–46, 167, 195–200; language acquisition, 195–96, 199–200; and neuroscience, 195–201; and structure of the self, 171
Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness (Husserl), 20
life: Agamben’s zoē-bios distinction, 192–93; and autoaffection, 20; and conatus, 38; and debate between naturalism and antinaturalism, 172–74; survival promoted by emotions and feelings, 50–53; Žižek’s life 2.0, life 1.0, 172–73, 192–94, 197–98
Looking for Spinoza (Damasio), 4, 50, 53, 166
LUST emotional system, 186
The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (Sacks), 71
maps, mapping, 64; and Damasio’s reading of Spinoza, 51–55; and Deleuze’s reading of Descartes, 45; and Deleuzian conception of autoaffection, 45; and feelings as perceptions, 166–67; interruption of mapping process (see affects, detachment from/absence of; brain damage); maps between affects and concepts, 42; self-mapping in the brain, 164–67, 220; and structure of the self, 171, 219–20; and symbolic activity in the brain, 219–23
materialism, new conception of, ix, 72, 204
mental illness. See brain damage; hysteria; obsessive disorders; psychopathologies; psychosis
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 66–67
Miller, Jacques-Alain, 129, 153
mind. See body-mind connection; consciousness; psyche; self; soul; subjectivity
misfelt feelings. See feelings, misfelt
The Movement Image (Deleuze), 43
Nature: and debate between naturalism and antinaturalism, 172–74, 180–84, 187–88, 190, 204; and self-preservation, 53; Spinoza and, 36, 53; Žižek’s life 2.0, life 1.0, 172–73, 192–94, 197–98
neurobiology, x, 166; and autoaffection, 26; conflict with metaphysics, 7; and Damasio’s structure of the self, 31–32; and detachment from one’s own affects, 7 (see also brain damage); distinction between psychoanalytic unconscious and term as used in neuroscience, 177–78; evolution of field, 27; importance of emotions in neural regulation, 7, 217–18; and language, 195–201; neural maps, 51–55 (see also maps, mapping); neural plasticity, xi, 26–28, 56–58, 60–62, 190–91, 194, 199, 202; neurological difficulties analyzed in terms of functional systems, 27; reality of affective unconscious, 87; resistance to attempts to reconcile psychoanalytic theory and philosophy with neuroscience, x, 81. See also body-mind connection; brain; brain damage; homeostasis; specific philosophers and neuroscientists
neuroscience-psychoanalysis relationship, xi–xii, 28–29; connection/overlap of neuroscience and psychoanalysis, 194–95, 200–202, 204–5, 213–14; and language, 194–95; neuropsychoanalysis, Anglo-American, xi–xii, 28–29, 80–81, 165, 183, 200 (see also Solms, Mark); neuro-psychoanalysis, new conception of, xv, 188, 198, 204; and problem of unconscious affects, 80–81; and resistance to attempts to reconcile psychoanalytic theory with neuroscience, 81
neurosis. See guilt; hysteria; obsessive disorders
New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Freud), 101
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 48, 192
object: consciousness as awareness of a disturbance caused by an external object, 30; and joyful and sorrowful affects, 39–40; space of encounter between thought and its object, 45; and wonder, 16–17, 40–41
Of Grammatology (Derrida), 21
ontological phenomena: and Damasio’s and Deleuze’s differing readings of Spinoza, 36; ontological generosity, 24–25, 64; and self-preservation, 54–55
organism, 217; body maps and capacity for feeling, 167; and consciousness, 188–89; and debate between naturalism and antinaturalism, 182; joy and sorrow as states of equilibrium/disequilibrium, 54; and mortality, 223–24; as term encompassing both mind and body, 55. See also body-mind connection; homeostasis
PANIC emotional system, 186, 189
Panksepp, Jaak, xviii, 182, 190–94; denial of compartmentalized anatomical brain loci, 176–77; differences between cognition and emotion, 194; and imprecise vocabulary for affects, 199; Kant and, 190–91; and the protoself, 222; taxonomy of seven primary emotions, 186–87, 201
passions: Descartes and, 12–18, 45–46; external signs of, 45–48; generous people as masters of their passions, 18; passions “in” the soul as consequences of bodily movements, 13–15; passions “of” the soul as related to the soul alone, 15–16; passions “of” the soul defined, 6; and pineal gland, 14–16; primitive and derived passions, 12; Spinoza’s critique of Descartes, 35, 37–38; wonder as first of six primitive passions (Descartes’ concept), 9. See also generosity; wonder
passivity. See activity and passivity
perceptions: adequate and inadequate perceptions, 44; and body-mind connection, 53, 166–67; and the brain, 27; Deleuze and, 67; Descartes and, 14–15; generosity as a perception directed at the self, 18; McDowell and, 86; Spinoza and, 53; as type of passion “in” the soul, 14–15
Phantoms in the Brain (Ramachandran), 27
philosophy, Continental. See Deleuze, Gilles; Derrida, Jacques; Descartes, René; Spinoza, Baruch
philosophy, theoretical vs. practical, xv, 77
PLAY emotional system, 186
power of existing, 6. See also force of existing
primordial affect, 24, 31
principle of inertia, 218
Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud), 102
psyche, x, 11, 28; and autoaffection, 31, 70; and brain damage, 57, 61–62, 71–72; Descartes and, 45; Freud’s city of Rome analogy for psyche, 60–61; interacting layers of, 198; spatiality of, 64, 69–70. See also body-mind connection; brain; consciousness; Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis; Freudian metapsychology of affects; id-ego-superego triad; Lacan-inspired metapsychology of affects; self; soul; subjectivity
psychic events (Freud’s conception), 28–29, 71
psychoanalysis, clinical practice of, xii, xiv–xv, 76; and brain damage, xiv; and deception, 207–8; doubts raised about affects during analysis, 140–41, 147–48, 151–52; and free association, 142–43; Lacan’s insistence upon cognitive structures as central object of analysis, 124; and Lacan’s lalangue neologism, 141–45; Lacan’s objections to affective life as primary focus of analysis, 120–21; Lacan’s theory of the four discourses (analyst, master, university, hysteric), 139–41, 147; and psychopathologies/psychosis, xiv–xv
psychoanalysis-neuroscience relationship. See neuroscience-psychoanalysis relationship
psychoanalytic theory of affects, 4; resistance to attempts to reconcile psychoanalytic theory with neuroscience, 81. See also affects, unconscious; defense mechanisms; feelings, misfelt; Freud, Sigmund; Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis; Freudian metapsychology of affects; guilt; id-ego-superego triad; Lacan, Jacques; Lacan-inspired metapsychology of affects; unconscious
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Freud), xiii
RAGE emotional system, 186
reality: and deceptive nature of signifiers, 206–7; Lacan and, 139
representation: and confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32; symbolic activity in the brain, 213–14, 216, 219–23. See also ideas; ideational representations; language; signifiers
repression: and confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32; Copjec and, 155; Damasio and, 168–69; displacement of affect as result of, 155, 212; and drives, 215; Freud and, 105–10, 125–26; Green and, 205; Lacan and, 122, 125–34, 138, 155; and memory, 168; primary repression and secondary repression/repression proper, 125–26, 138
sadness. See sorrow
SEEKING emotional system, 186, 201
self: and Deleuzian conception of autoaffection, 45; feelings and concern for self-attachment, 51, 59–60; and homeostatic regulation, 217–22; impaired sense of, 33, 58–60 (see also brain damage); self-mapping in the brain, 164–67; self-model and a new conception of materialism, 72; sense of self as state of the organism, 223; and storytelling, 223; structure of (Damasio’s conception), 31–33, 169–72, 217, 219–20, 222–23; structure of (Freud’s conception of consciousness, preconscious, unconscious), 69–70, 78; structure of (Freud’s conception of id, ego, and superego), 69–70, 78; Žižek’s critique of Damasio’s conception, 169–74. See also brain damage; consciousness; identity; personality; psyche; soul; subjectivity
self-preservation, 51–54. See also conatus; homeostasis
self-touching, 221; and definition of autoaffection, 19–21, 63; Deleuze and, 45; Derrida and, 21–24, 64, 69; and Nancy’s nonmetaphysical sense of touch, 23–24; self-touching you, 20, 23–24, 64; and spatiality of the psyche, 69. See also autoaffection
signifiers: affects as, 205–10; affects as aftereffects of interactions of signifiers, 123, 135; cross-resonating relations between multiple representations, 128–29; deceptive nature of, 206–9; dichotomy between the signifier and jouissance, 155; and diplomat metaphor, 130–31; existence in sets of two or more, 128–29, 208–9; Green and, 205; and inextricable entanglement of the affective and the intellectual, 121–22; priority of signifier-ideas over affects, 122–24; and repression, 119, 122, 128–30, 155; Saussure and, 208–9; two-way modulation between affects and signifiers, 200; and the unconscious, 84, 122, 208, 212; Vorstellungen as, 119, 122, 129; and Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, 127–28
somatic markers, theory of, 7
sorrow: as one of six primitive passions (Descartes’ idea), 9, 12; Spinoza’s definition, 39, 54; and states of functional disequilibrium, 54; and variability of conatus, 39–40
soul: activity and passivity of, 15, 22–23; functions of, 15; and generosity, 18; Green and, 203; passions “in” vs. passions “of,” 12–18; passions “of” the soul as related to the soul alone, 15–16; and perception, 15; and pineal gland, 14–16, 21–23; and spatiality, 21–23; as two-sided instance (speaker/listener etc.), 20; and wonder, 9–11, 18. See also autoaffection; body-mind connection; consciousness; existence; mind; psyche; self; subjectivity; specific philosophers
spatiality, 21–23, 46, 64. See also maps, mapping; plane of immanence
Spinoza, Baruch, xvi; and active affect/autoaffection, 45; activity and passivity, 37–41; adequate and inadequate causes, 37; affects and variability of conatus, 37–41; affects as always affects of essence, 35–36, 43–44; affects as natural ontological phenomena, 36; critique of Descartes’ theory of passions, 35; definition of affects as modifications of the power of existing, 6; definition of affects related to the body’s power of activity, 37, 41–42; definition of joy and sorrow, 39, 54; Descartes-Spinoza conflict, 7, 37–38; lack of knowledge of neurobiology, 54; mind and body as expressions of the same substance, 36, 37, 51; mind as the idea of the body, 51, 53; and Nature/God/Being, 36, 53; and power of acting, 38–41, 53; as protobiologist, 50, 52; Solms and, 200–201; three kinds of knowledge/ideas, 44–45, 66–67; translation of affectio and affectus, 4–5; and wonder, 8–10, 40–41. See also Damasio’s reading of Spinoza; Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza
Studies on Hysteria (Freud and Breuer), 213–14
subject, xvi; and absence of emotions and feeling, 8, 11 (see also affects, detachment from/absence of); and conceptual personae, 48; and definition of autoaffection, 5–6; and heteroaffection, xvi, 7; and icons, 49; Kant on, 5–6. See also autoaffection
subjectivity, xvi–xvii; biological basis of, 55; and brain damage, xiii–xiv, 28, 33–34, 58; and cerebral autoaffection, 223; and denaturalization, 172–74, 178, 180–84, 187–88, 202; disembodiment of, 29–30; Kant and, 170; Lacan’s barred subject ($), 151, 169–74, 187, 200; and language, 200 (see also language); and misfelt feelings, 86 (see also feelings, misfelt); neural subjectivity as a plastic structure, 26–28; and new conception of materialism, 72; and “self-touching you,” 64; and time, 6; wonder and the structure of the self, 32–33; and Žižek’s critique of Damasio’s conception of the self, 169–72. See also consciousness; mind; psyche; self; soul; specific philosophers, psychoanalysts, and neuroscientists
superego: and civilization, 97–98; distinguished from conscience, 92; Freud’s introduction of concept, 78; and moral masochism, 95–97; sadism of, 95–96, 98; and spatiality of the psyche, 69; structural dynamics between ego and superego, 92–93, 99–101; and unconscious guilt, 88, 91, 99–101, 212–13
thought: and Deleuzian conception of autoaffection and “maps,” 45; and free association, 142–43, 166; Freud’s primary and secondary processes, 143–45; Lacan and, 138–39, 142–43; and perceptions, 166–67. See also cognition; ideational representations
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche), 48
time, and autoaffection, 6, 20
touch, 66–67; and activity and passivity of the soul, 22–23; Deleuze and, 66–67; Derrida and, 21–24; Nancy’s nonmetaphysical sense of touch, 23–24; “touching-touched” relationship between me and myself (Merleau-Ponty’s schema), 66, 67. See also self-touching
unconscious: and the brain, 71, 219–21; and conscience, 78–79, 91–92; Damasio and, 163–68, 179–80; and death, 223; and defense mechanisms, 104–10, 124 (see also repression); discovery as revolutionary breakthrough, 83–84, 148–49; distinction between psychoanalytic unconscious and term as used in neuroscience, 177–78; Freud and (see Freud, Sigmund; Freudian metapsychology of affects); and id-ego-superego triad, 78–80, 92–93, 99–101; Lacan and, 82–83, 108, 119, 124–44, 155, 179–80, 208; and lalangue neologism, 143–45; LeDoux and, 188; as negative term for a positive x, 209; Panksepp and, 188; and personal identity, 92; and potential-to-feel, 108–9; repression and the confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32; slips of the tongue, jokes, etc., 143, 196; and spatiality of the psyche, 69–70; unconscious sense of guilt (see guilt); and Vorstellungen as signifiers, 122. See also affects, unconscious
“unpleasure principle,” 187
Vorstellungen: confusion caused by translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, Vorstellung, and Repräsentanz, 125–32, 136–37; Green and, 205; and inextricable entanglement of the affective and the intellectual, 121–22; as Lacan’s signifiers, 119, 122, 129; and lalangue neologism, 143; and obsessive disorders, 90; and the unconscious, 122. See also ideational representations
What Is Philosophy? (Deleuze), 43, 48, 67
wonder, xv–xvi, 225n10; and alterity, 10; as ambivalent affect, 64; and autoaffection, 9–11, 63–64; and brain damage, 11, 33, 60; Damasio and, 11, 32–33, 64; deconstruction of, 10–11; defined, 8–9, 16; Deleuze and, 64, 71; Deleuze’s reading of Descartes and, 47–48; Derrida and, 11, 23–25, 64, 71; Descartes and, 8–9, 12, 16–18, 25; and facial expressions, 47–48; and fear, 9; function of, 17; and generosity, 17–18, 24–25; and heteroaffection, 9, 11, 63–64; impaired capacity for, 10–11, 17, 33, 60, 64; as intermediary between passion and thought, 47; Lacan and, 70–71; nonjudgmental nature of, 17, 18; as source driving philosophizing, 77; Spinoza and, 8–10, 40–41; and the structure of the self, 32–33; and virtue, 41
Žižek, Slavoj: critique of Damasio, 169–74, 179–84, 190; and debate between naturalism and antinaturalism, 180–84, 190; LeDoux and, 174–79, 190; life 2.0, life 1.0, 172–73, 192–94, 197–98; and misfelt feelings, 141
Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Johnston), 170