The Empires of the Near East and India: Source Studies of the Safavid, Ottoman, and Mughal Literate Communities

THE STRENGTH OF AKHBARISM IN SAFAVID IRAN

MARYAM MOAZZEN

The writings of Muhammad b. Murtaza b. Mahmud Kashani, better known as Muhsin Fayz (d. 1680), offer a vivid picture of the religious atmosphere of Safavid Iran. Born into a scholarly family, Fayz was destined to become a keen observer of intellectual and religious conditions in the second half of the seventeenth century. He received a comprehensive education in his hometown of Kashan, and then he mastered both the rational and traditional sciences during his studies in Isfahan, Shiraz, Hijaz, and Qum. In his autobiography, Risala-yi Sharh-i Sadr, he describes his formative years as follows:

I started my education in my hometown of Kashan, learning formal and exoteric religious sciences including Qurʾanic exegesis, Islamic jurisprudence, the principles of the religion, and auxiliary sciences in the teaching circle of my uncle…. At age twenty I left Kashan for Isfahan and took part in the teaching circles of a number of scholars, but because I was in search of esoteric knowledge (‘ilm-i batini), nobody in Isfahan could teach me such knowledge. While in Isfahan I learned some mathematics and the like. Finally, I left for Shiraz in search of Prophetic traditions and there became a student of the mujtahid (jurist-consult) of the age, that is, Sayyid Majid b. Hashim Sadiqi Bahrani, an expert in exoteric sciences who taught me the knowledge of what is permitted and what is forbidden and other legal issues.

Finally, Bahrani issued me an ijaza (license to transmit hadith). Then, I went back to Isfahan and joined the teaching circle of Shaykh Baha’ al-Din Muhammad ‘Amili, who also issued me an ijaza to transmit hadith. Afterward, I left for Hijaz; during the pilgrimage I met Shaykh Muhammad b. Hasan b. Zayn al-Din al-’Amili who also issued me an ijaza to transmit hadith. On the way back home bandits killed my brother…. In spite of this event, I continued to visit various places in search of knowledge and perfection (kamal), seeking out the teaching circle of every scholar who had any spiritual knowledge. Finally, I went to Qum and became a student of Mulla Sadra,1 the foremost Sufi of the age and the moon in the sky of certitude. Sadr al-Din (i.e., Mulla Sadra) was the leading scholar in spiritual sciences. In the course of the eight years I was his student, I was busy with disciplining and training my soul, which resulted in my attaining insight into spiritual sciences.”²

When Mulla Sadra (d. 1640) left Qum for Shiraz, Fayz accompanied his teacher and attended his teaching circle for two more years. Finally, he returned to his hometown of Kashan, where he occupied himself exclusively with studying and teaching. The only interruptions to his work were the occasions when he was summoned to Isfahan by Shah Safi (d. 1642) and later by Shah ‘Abbas II (d. 1666) to lead the Friday prayer.³

In his books and short treatises, Fayz examined a wide range of topics from Islamic theology and jurisprudence to theosophy. Yet his main contribution is to the field of prophetic and imami hadith (sayings and deeds of the Prophet and the imams). His al-Wafi is a ratification of the four Shiʿi books of hadith (al-Kafi, Man la Yahdur al-Faqih, Tahzib, and Istibsar). In several of his treatises, including Sharh-i Sadr (written in 1655), Haqq al-Mubin, Raf ‘ al-fitna, Zad al-Salik, Rah-i Savab, al-I’tidhar (written in 1666), and al-Insaf (1672), Fayz criticized both the mutakallims (speculative theologians) and mujtahids (jurisconsults) alike. However, he reserved his harshest criticism for the mujtahids who favor speculation (zann) over the definitive knowledge (qat’) offered by the Qurʾan and the prophetic and imami traditions. This criticism is rooted in Fayz’s epistemological principle that there is absolute certitude (yaqin) in the traditions of the Prophet and the Shiʿi imams. He maintained that canonical hadith literature should be viewed primarily as soteriology. Moreover, he blamed the mujtahids for causing widespread ikhtilaf (differences of opinion) amongst themselves and sowing division in the Shiʿi community.

Although the divergent opinions of jurists can be seen as representing intellectual creativity, legal disputes were undeniably divisive. The plurality of opinion among mujtahids did not resonate well with the perceived ecumenical nature of the religious discourse advocated by Fayz. In addition to critiquing the mujtahids’ differences of opinion, Fayz criticized their scholarly methods. He was well aware of the impossibility of achieving consensus among the mujtahids, who develop religious rulings based on probable evidence, in particular their personal opinions (ra’y), and use of qiyas (analogy), which he regarded as inferential. Fayz insisted that epistemic certainty, which is crucial for securing the Shiʿi faith and for maintaining unity in the community, cannot be attained by means of scholarly tools other than the Qurʾan and the traditions of the Prophet and the imams.4 For this reason, he praised such hadith transmitters as al-Kulayni,⁵ Ibn Babuya (Shaykh Saduq),⁶ and Razi al-Din ‘Ali b. Tawus al-Hilli,⁷ who, according to Fayz, made religious rulings only based on the Qurʾan and the traditions of the imams. He claimed that their works are reliable and their words will never die “because their discourse is the word of God and His messenger which will not change until the day of the resurrection. These hadith scholars did not write about theology and usul al-fiqh (sources of jurisprudence) unless they wanted to refute the opinions of the mutakallims and mujtahids.”⁸ Conversely, mujtahids generally argued that a qualified scholar could apply his individual reasoning to usul al-fiqh and develop religious rulings to address the increasingly diverse aspects of social life that were not clearly addressed in the Qurʾan or hadiths.

In addition, Fayz followed the path of his mentor and father-in-law, Mulla Sadra, who harmonized scripture, theosophy, and philosophy in his unique reinterpretation of the Islamic scriptures. Mulla Sadra proposed a type of transcendent philosophy different from other intellectual and spiritual currents and gave hikmat (Islamic theosophy)—which he identified with the traditions of the Prophet and the imams—a lofty status. In his scholarship, Fayz emphasized that the hikmat he advocated is the inheritance of the prophets and not what was taught in his time. He argued that, similar to Islamic jurisprudence, the so-called theologians and philosophers have contaminated Islamic theology and philosophy.

The ancient hakims were virtuous people who curbed their desires and had expert knowledge of the truth and of gnosis. Although their words are mysterious and one cannot fathom their meanings from the words (alfaz) alone through exoteric reading, their discourses free people from the traps of ignorance and deception. The wisdom of ancient scholars is the legacy of the prophets, which is different from the conventional hikmat current among recent scholars, for it has strayed.⁹

Fayz identified the hikmat taught by the followers of the prophets, especially by the family of the Prophet, with mysticism because “the science of Sufism is indeed an expression of the new and subtle points of hikmat and secrets of noble sciences that were uttered by the Prophet Muhammad.”¹⁰ He added that in every age there are a few real Sufis who possess this kind of wisdom, and that their rare spiritual genius usually makes them the subject of exoteric scholars’ blame and criticism.¹¹

FAYZ’S CRITICS

A number of Fayz’s contemporaries and later scholars rejected his ideas on the grounds of inconsistency and heresy. For example, according to Mirza ‘Ali Tajalli,

Mulla Muhsin Kashi’s scholarship is flawed and shallow. He changes his mind constantly. For a while he follows Ibn ‘Arabi’s mysticism, but he changes his stance and adopts Muhammad Ghazali’s approach. For a short period of time he associates himself with Peripatetic philosophers, but soon thereafter changes his position and adopts the path of the Illuminationists (Ishraqis). He does not pay attention to the opposition of his fellow scholars and he carelessly records in his books whatever comes to his mind.¹²

Mulla Fazlullah Kashani (d. 1700), a relative of Fayz’s, also took issue with his works. He wrote a gloss (hashiya) on Fayz’s Haqq al-Mubin in which he criticized mystical notions as well as Fayz’s ideas. In his al-Nafahat al-Malakutiyya, Yusuf Ahmad Bahrani (d. 1772) refuted and rejected Sufi ideas as well as the opinions of Mulla Sadra and Fayz alongside those of the mujtahids. In his Lu’lu’at al-Bahrayn, Bahrani argued that “some of Fayz’s ideas border on disbelief.”13 Shaykh ‘Ali b. Muhammad ‘Amili, (d. 1692), who wrote polemics against Sufis and philosophers, rebuked both Fayz and Muhammad Baqir Sabzavari for their mystical and philosophical inclinations.¹⁴ In one of his tracts, Shaykh ‘Ali b. Muhammad attributed “some improper discourses” to Fayz, accusing him of believing in the Unity of Existence (wahdat-i wujud), of holding that infidels will not be punished eternally in Hell, and that even mujtahids of high rank are not guaranteed salvation, and so forth.¹⁵ Although Mulla Muhammad Tahir Qumi condemned Fayz’s ideas harshly as well, animosity between the two was brief. In a symbolic act of penitence and in order to seek Fayz’s forgiveness, Muhammad Tahir went from Qum to Kashan on foot to meet him.¹⁶

The “Right Path” According to Fayz

The following translation is excerpted from Fayz’s Rah-i Sawab (The Right Path), in which he provides answers to twelve hypothetical questions concerning “the right path” for the believer.¹⁷ Indeed, this relatively short treatise summarizes his opinions on a number of key doctrinal points discussed in most of his other works. An abridgment of the treatise exists under the title of Sharayit al-Iman (The Stipulations of Faith).

TRANSLATION

Question 1: Given that the Muslim community believes in one God, and [follows] one prophet, and one Book [that is, the Qurʾan], then why do they differ so vastly on religious issues?

Answer: If the God, the prophet, and the book of everybody were one, then there would be no disagreement. God’s worshipers are the ones who are God-fearing and on the right path. They are the ashab-i-yamn (companions of the right hand), whose prophet is Muhammad and whose book is the perspicuous Qurʾan. This verse of the Qurʾan refers to them: “Those are upon [right] guidance from their Lord” (2:5). They are the firqah-yi najiya (the sect that has been promised salvation) whereas others are vain (hava parast) and intoxicated from the wine of aberration (zalalat). They have gone astray and are the proof (misdaq) of this verse: “Have you seen he who has taken as his god his [own] desire, and God has sent him astray due to knowledge and has set a seal upon his hearing and his heart and put over his vision a veil? So who will guide him after God? Then will you not be reminded?” (45:23). These are the people who have divided into many sects and are the slaves of their own desires. They would go to Hell and their messengers (rusul) are the devils of both humans and jinns, as mentioned in the Qurʾan: “And thus We have made for every prophet an enemy—devils from mankind and jinn, inspiring in one another decorative speech in delusion. But if your Lord had willed, they would not have done it, so leave them and that which they invent” (6:112). And, “…indeed, they are saying an objectionable statement and a falsehood” (58:2).

Question 2: What was the first disobedience that the strayed people exhibited toward God and the Prophet?

Answer: The first [act of] disobedience came about when Muhammad in his death bed ordered [his companions] to bring him a sheet and a pen and ink “to protect you and resolve the issue by writing you a letter so that you follow and there won’t be any disagreement after my death.” They said: “the man is delirious and talks nonsense.” They said: “the Qurʾan suffices us!” His Excellency [Prophet Muhammad] also repeatedly said: “O people! Verily, I am leaving behind two precious things (thaqalayn) among you—if you follow them you will never go astray. These two are: the Book of God and my family members (ahl al-bayt).” He also said: “My ahl al-bayt is like the ark of Noah; whoever boards this ship remains safe and whoever refuses [boarding] it will get drowned.”18 Afterward, those people left the prophet’s family and preferred others to them and abandoned the Book of God and fabricated heresies based on their whims and desires.

Question 3: Why are there so many differences in opinion among those who follow the Qurʾan and the family of the Prophet, who have acknowledged the leadership of the imams and disavowed their enemies? To the extent that Shaykh Qutb al-Din Rawandi composed a book about the disputations between Shaykh Mufid¹⁹ and Shaykh Murtaza,²⁰ May God have mercy on them—they who were the leading figures among the Shiʿa and the greatest scholars of their time. In his book, Rawandi mentions ninety-five issues related to the principles (usul) of religion, concerning which the aforesaid scholars had different points of view. He says: “if I wanted to include all their disagreements, the book would have become very lengthy. Here I have included their differences of opinions on the principles of religion; now imagine how they differ in the branches (furu’) of religion!”

Answer: The reason for this difference is that when the misguided people (that is, Sunnis) refused to follow the Book and the family of the Prophet, they developed the science of kalam (Islamic theology) and the art of disputation (jadal), which were used to refute the heretical groups and to convince the enemies of the religion. They augmented its [the science of kalam’s] problems to meet their own whims and wishes, assuming that they were correcting their own religious beliefs. They also devised the science of jurisprudence, which is a kind of disputation based on weak speculations (zunun-i wahiyya) and in which it is hardly possible to reach an agreement. They invented this science to deduce religious rulings at a time when the Shiʿa were in a state of precautionary dissimulation (taqiya) and did not feel safe. They were associating with misguided people and were hearing their false statements presented as truth. As some scholars have stated, they were studying their [Sunni scholars’] books when they were young, and thus became accustomed to them. This is because at that time those books were taught in madrasas, mosques, and other learning centers, and because rulers were Sunnis and people follow the religion of their leaders. As it is commonly said: “people follow the religion of their kings.” This situation continued for a while, as a result of which there came about a total misunderstanding concerning Sunni and Shiʿi belief. Principles and knowledge got mixed with ignorance. Scholars started discussing and arguing issues that neither God nor the Prophet had addressed and [in fact] had remained silent about them, as a result of which so many differences of opinion came about. They abandoned the approach of the early scholars who were satisfied merely to listen to the infallible imams on everything related to the principles (usul) and branches (furu’). Instead, the scholars favored the approach of the stray [Sunni scholars], following their own personal opinions and whims, despite the fact that in several verses of the Qurʾan, God assertively dismisses following personal opinion and surmise.21 Several hadiths also speak against personal opinion (ra’y), independent scholarly reasoning (ijtihad), and rulings (fatwa) on a matter of Islamic law given by a recognized authority except when they are based on sayings and deeds of the infallibles (that is, the Prophet and the Shiʿi imams) that has been prescribed by the Qurʾan as well.²² When personal opinion, and surmise as well as rationalization [in principles and branches of religion] have become the norm, as a result there are so many differences of opinion among children of Adam. Beware! Beware! The best approach is for all the community to take their religious beliefs, including the principles (usul) and branches (furu’), from the Prophet and his appointed successors, who are infallible and do not rely on their deficient intellect.²³

Question 4: On the surface, there are so many discrepancies within the Qurʾan and hadith literature. There are also countless contradictory sayings both on the usul and furu’ of religion by the imams. If we cast aside kalam (theology) and sources of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), how can we bring compatibility and harmony among them?

Answer: There is no difference of opinion about the clear and fixed verses of the Qurʾan (muhkamat), and the imams who are the most knowledgeable (rasikhan) and infallible have explained the hidden meanings of most of the vague verses (mutishabihat). This [approach] follows the order of Prophet Muhammad, who said: “Write down our hadith and record them and leave them for your progeny because there will come a time that they would need them.” Shiʿi scholars sifted through the prophetic and imami traditions painstakingly and distinguished weak hadiths from the authentic ones for us. Hence they [the Prophet and the imams] are the authors of these hadith and khabar, as the book of any author belongs to him and the way to reach harmony among their various sayings has been mentioned in the authentic hadiths that are not disputed, such as the saying quoted by ‘Umar b. Hanzala. Whoever follows the sayings of the Prophet and the imams, he will not have a different opinion. Because the above hadith has several beneficial points, I quote it here: It has been quoted from ‘Umar b. Hanzala who had asked Abu ‘Abdullah (that is, Ja’far al-Sadiq, the sixth Shiʿi Imam) whether it was permissible for two of the Shiʿis who had a disagreement concerning a debt or a legacy to seek the verdict of the ruler or judge. He replied: “Whoever who has recourse to the ruler or a judge, whether his case be just or unjust, has in reality recourse to taghut (that is, the illegitimate ruling power). Whatever he obtains as a result of his verdict, he will have obtained by forbidden means, even if he has a proven right to it, for he will have obtained it through the judgment of the taghut, that power that God Almighty has commanded him to disbelieve in.” God said, “Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you [O Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to seek justice from taghut, while they were commanded to reject it; and Satan wishes to lead them far astray” (4:60).

Then, I asked: “So how are they to act?” He said: “They look to someone from you, who narrates our traditions, and is well-versed in our permitted (halal) and our forbidden (haram), and is well-acquainted with our ordinances. So, they are to accept him as judge and arbiter, for verily I have made him a ruler (hakim) over you. Thus, if he rules by our ruling and it is not accepted from him, then only the ruling of God has been belittled and we have been rejected. And the rejecter of us is the rejecter of God, and such person is close to [committing the sin of] associating [a partner] with God (shirk).”

Then, I asked: “[what happens] if each of the men [litigants] agreed on two arbiters from our community and they both would agree to look into their case but they would differ in their judgment and would differ over [the transmission or interpretation] of your tradition?” The imam said: “the ruling of the one who is more righteous (‘adil), more learned, more truthful in relating our tradition, and more pious shall prevail. And no attention shall be paid to the decision of the other.” I asked: “[what] if both are equally righteous and equally accepted by our associates and neither of the two is regarded more excellent?” The imam replied: “[In that case] the tradition related on our authority should be investigated. That which is agreed upon by your associates should be accepted as our ruling and that which is rare and unknown among your associates should be abandoned, for that which is agreed upon is not subject to doubt. The matters of faith are of three types.”24

Question 5: There are so many religious matters that have not been discussed either in the Qurʾan or the hadith literature. If we dismiss theology and jurisprudence, how can we come up with answers for these issues?

Answer: The Qurʾan covers all necessary matters related to creed, deeds, and ethical issues, as God in the Qurʾan says: “And no grain is there within the darknesses of the earth and no moist or dry [thing] but that it is [written] in a clear record” (6:59); “And We have sent down to you the Book as clarification for all things and as guidance and mercy and good tidings for the Muslims” (16:89); and, “We have not neglected in the Register a thing” (6:38). The Qurʾan even explains one topic in several ways. For one group of people, it explains [the topic] in a logical way and for another group it uses preaching, and for others it explains through a disputation technique. Generally, the Qurʾan explains issues in accordance with people’s level of understanding and ranks. As the Qurʾan says: “Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best. Indeed, your Lord is most knowing of who has strayed from His way, and He is most knowing of who is [rightly] guided” (1:125).

The sayings of the imams provide necessary comments and interpretation for the verses of the Qurʾan that need elucidation. If some of those hadiths have not reached us or we don’t understand some of their sayings, we can make analogical reasoning based on the hadith and principles that we have at our disposal…. In summation, the Qurʾan and the family of the Prophet suffice the Muslim community, and other than these two there is no need for anything else. That is why, in the final days of his life when he was receiving the last messages of God, the Prophet chose Ali to succeed him; in the Sura al-Ma’ida, which is the last chapter of the Qurʾan, God Says: “This day I have perfected for you and your religion and completed My favor upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion. But whoever is forced by severe hunger with no inclination to sin—then indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful” (5:3).

But since the misled people (that is, Sunni Muslims) chose not to follow the family of the Prophet and did not have any other resource, out of desperation they invented a number of approaches as analogy: istihsan (juristic preference, referring to the principle that permits exceptions to strict and/or literal legal reasoning in favor of the public interest), ijma’ (consensus), interpretation of the unclear verses of the Qurʾan in accordance with their own personal views, and other baseless approaches in which there is no possibility of agreement. Everyday a new opinion comes about…. They have confused the ignorant in principles and branches of religion by emphasizing that not only knowing [the aforesaid principles and methods] is necessary but also knowledge of them is the most important religious task, but there is no need to know them because they haven’t been discussed or mentioned either in the Qurʾan or the hadith literature. A group of contemporary scholars have become fond of the [abovementioned] approaches and nonsenses, and have started making use of them and putting forward similar ideas.

Question 6: When the opinions of the jurists (fuqaha) cannot be trusted and their disagreement is against God’s will, and when deducing religious verdict based on personal opinions (ra’y) is not permitted in [our] religion, hence what is the point of preserving the sayings and writings of the jurisconsults (mujtahids)?

Answer: There are two types of mujtahids: there is a group of mujtahids such as Abu Ja’far Muhammad b. Ya’qub al-Kulayni, Abb Ja’far Muhammad b. ‘Ali Babawayh Qumi, Sayyid Razi al-Din ‘Ali b. Tawus al-Hilli, and a few among the recent scholars who rely only on the Qurʾan and the sayings of the Prophet and the imams on all religious matters in both principles and branches, insofar as in their books they don’t go beyond what is said in the thaqalayn [that is, the Qurʾan and the imams)—May God have mercy on all of them. One can have full confidence on their work, and their opinions are always valid and relevant, because they only transmit the ever-unchanging and fixed words of God and His messenger, as it has been confirmed in a prophetic hadith: “What is permitted by Muhammad will remain permitted till the Day of Resurrection and what is forbidden by him would remain so until the Day of Resurrection.” And for this reason the aforementioned scholars never authored any books on Islamic theology [‘ilm al-kalam] and the resources of jurisprudence [usul al-fiqh] except to refute scholars who like to dispute and reason [in religious matters]. This is also because they always refer to the Qurʾan and hadith and khabar literature. They have never believed that the sayings of a dead scholar are invalid and emulating a living non-mujtahid is not permitted and similar invalid views that issued forth from the misled people [the Sunni and their Shiʿi imitators].

There is another group of them [mujtahids] who, at times, come up with some religious rulings (fatwas) based on the Qurʾan and hadith. Sometimes their rulings are based on their own personal opinion, which they build upon several principles established by scholars of their ilk. They are overly reliant on their own intellect regarding religious verdicts. They change their views [regarding religious matters] constantly and easily and even say or write things contrary to what they said earlier. In their books, they sometimes contradict what they have said earlier or quote a different consensus about an issue, yet again in the same book or in another claim consensus about the same subject. Shaykh Zayn al-Din wrote a book about subjects on which Shaykh Abu Ja’far al-Tusi25 had claimed consensus and then contradicted himself or mentioned consensuses against the same topic. Zayn al-Din listed about 400 topics discussed in al-Tusi’s book, not even including the disagreements of other mujtahids. Therefore, one cannot rely and depend on the sayings and writings of this group of jurisconsults; preserving their work has little value, and that is why they claim that the sayings of a dead [scholar] are like a corpse: so long as a mujtahid is alive, one cannot rely on his [ever-changing] opinion and is not permitted to emulate him, since mujtahids don’t even trust their own opinions.

Question 7: What is consensus (ijma’) and what is an agreed upon issue (mas’alayi ijma’iya)?

Answer: Consensus is of two kinds: the valid consensus and invalid consensus. The valid consensus is what all Muslims and all Shiʿi sects have agreed upon with regard to a single subject, usually due to the fact that the topic is discussed in the Qurʾan and hadith literature and if anybody disagrees with that subject, he or she has left the religion. For example, every Muslim agrees that consuming intoxicating beverages is forbidden in Islam, and all Shiʿi sects have agreed upon the necessity of wiping their feet (mash) while performing ablution.26 Hence, if any Muslim maintains that drinking is permitted in Islam, then he has left the religion. Likewise, if a Shiʿi believes in washing feet while performing ablution, he has indeed declared himself a non- Shiʿi. This kind of consensus is also called “the necessities of religion (or faith)” and it has been proved repeatedly that this kind of consensus cannot be made against what is mentioned in the Qurʾan and hadith. Indeed, these consensuses are based on the Qurʾanic verses and prophetic hadith. This is because an umma cannot devise an issue (a consensus) unless it is mentioned in the Qurʾan, let alone fabricate something against the teachings of the Qurʾan [and agree upon it].

Their Excellencies, the imams, said: “Whenever you come across a saying ascribed to us, check it against the Qurʾan and the prophetic hadith; if it is in accordance with them, then accept that khabar [as authentic], otherwise reject it.” Therefore, considering that even the sayings of the imams must be rejected if they are against the Qurʾan and prophetic tradition, consensuses of scholars [if they are against the teachings of the Qurʾan and hadith] most definitely must be rejected.

The invalid consensus occurs when one person or more people from the Muslim community or the Shiʿi sect choose a school of thought (madhhab) and then seek the agreement of people through deception or falsehood, or based on surmise or approximation, and if somebody were to carry out an investigation he would find a contradiction against [that school of thought] either in Islam or Shiʿism. For example, the consensus that the Sunni claimed over Abu Bakr’s caliphate was based on deception and falsehood, and there was no proof for it in either the Qurʾan or the tradition of the Prophet. Rather, it was against the Qurʾan and the sunna of the Prophet, and the best of the companions such as his (the Prophet’s) family members as well as Salman-i Farsi, Miqdad b. Aswad, Abu Darr Ghifari, ‘Ammar b. Yasir, Hudhayfah b. Yaman, and so forth, expressed their disagreement [with this consensus] clearly and unequivocally.

Likewise, the consensus of the Twelver-Shiʿa on the obligatory observance of the Friday prayer on the condition of the presence of an infallible imam has been discussed by some of the contemporary scholars. Their rationalization is based on surmise and guessing, despite the fact it is against what is being said in the Qurʾan and the sunna and the clear wordings of the imams, as well as many Shiʿi scholars, especially the best of them, who have argued against it. Many of these scholars were living closer to the time of the imam and therefore their knowledge of the religious matters is more accurate. In addition, this consensus is not a mutawatir (a tradition or consensus that has been reported by numerous transmitters in each degree of its transmission to such an extent that it would be absurd to suppose that all these transmitters concurred to narrate a falsehood) and is instead a kind of consensus that is only based on one single khabar and is therefore not a consensus.

Question 8: If a consensus is substantiated based on the Qurʾan or hadith and that reference is a proof [hujjat], then what is the point of a consensus and what is the use for it? And if it doesn’t have any proof, then why is it a hujjat? Who devised this [system] and why did he do that?

Answer: A valid consensus has a proof [that can be found in the Qurʾan or hadith], as we explained earlier. The benefit of it is as follows: if there are two hadith discussing the same issue and one confirms the consensus and the other one contradicts the consensus, and the narrator of each hadith possesses the same characteristics of justice, scholarly care, and knowledge, then he [the scholar] prefers the confirming hadith over the contradicting one. The invalid consensus is invalid on principle: if it does have a proof, then that proof is a hujjat, and if it doesn’t [have a proof], then it cannot be a hujjat.

The first group of people who came up with this kind of consensus were the people who assembled in the Bani Sa‘ida pavilion due to corrupt objectives and desires to agree upon Abu Bakr’s caliphate. They called that assembly of the hypocrite “consensus” and made it their hujjat based on falsehood. That consensus became the foundation and the paradigm of all other falsehoods among them (the Sunni). Whoever afterward wanted to make a falsehood prevalent among people with a goal in mind, and could not find a hujjat in the Qurʾan or hadith, would rely on consensus.

Question 9: How can one recognize the guided virtuous people and what is the sign of the strayed? Is there any criterion based on which one can distinguish between the sect promising salvation and the sect that is doomed?

Answer: Yes. For each of the sects there are signs and characteristics that distinguish them from each other. As for the guided virtuous people, their sign is that their scholars’ words and deeds are one most of the time. They also pay close attention to strengthening their certitude and guarding their hearts, as well as going after the esoteric sciences, knowing the path to the hereafter and how to get there, and discussing corrupt actions and what disturbs the heart. They are not after good meals, fine clothes, and extravagant houses and furniture. They prefer a plain life over a luxurious lifestyle. They are always subdued, humble, and pleasant. They disregard the world and are also wary of rulers. They are not keen in giving fatwas except on rare occasions; even then, they would do their best to give that ruling based on the Qurʾan and hadith. If there are issues not discussed in either the Qurʾan or hadith, they take every step and give a ruling with utmost caution, while replying from their purified hearts and not [replicating] what earlier scholars have said. They are always against innovations, even though everybody seems to be in agreement with them. In summation, their behavior resembles the tradition of the Prophet and the imams…the sign of the average guided people is that they follow their scholars in both their deeds and morals, fashion themselves after [the example of] their scholars, learn about their religious issues from them, show affection toward them, and serve them. They will be resurrected together in the Day of Judgment, as it has been said in the hadith: “A man will resurrect with whom he likes the most.”

And the sign of the strayed is the opposite of the above: their scholars say something but act differently, and they spend most of their time attaining the kind of sciences that are useful in this world. This [behavior] leads to amassing wealth and proximity to the kings. They are always after improving their lives by wanting delicious food, fine clothing, houses, and furniture. They are in love with debate and disputation, and are conceited and arrogant.

Question 10: Only a small group of people have the sign of the guided virtuous people; therefore, are there only a very few of these people?

Answer: Yes, that is the case. Don’t you see that God says: “…And few of My servants are grateful” (43:13). In other verses God says: “…and few are they…” (38:24), “…but most of them do not understand” (29:63). In addition, in the following verses God articulates the same idea: 31:25; 48:10; 12:103; 6:116; and 12:106. He also says: “And We have certainly created for Hell many of the jinn and mankind. They have hearts with which they do not understand, they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears with which they do not hear. Those are like livestock; rather, they are more astray. It is they who are the heedless” (7:179). Imam Muhammad Baqir has said three times that the majority of people are like animals, but a few of the faithful [are true human beings]. And he said three times: the faithful are truly a rare breed. Hamran b. A’yan reports: “I asked his Excellency, what we should do? If all of us get together, we [are so few in number that we] cannot even finish eating a whole lamb.” His Excellency inquired: “Can I say something even more surprising than this?” Then he said: “All of the helpers (ansar) and the immigrants (muhajirun) went astray except for three people who remained on the right path! And then did I say what happened to ‘Ammar after that? He said ‘Ammar made allegiance (bay’at), then he got martyred…. And the three people that he was referring to are: Salman, Abu Darr, and Miqdad.”

Question 11: If only this small group can be considered as faithful, then can we describe other people as infidels?

Answer: This small group of people has the most complete faith, and there are degrees in faith. In contrast to any level of faith, there is a level of disbelief. Therefore, whoever is aware of all the degrees of faithfulness and disbelief, and has a deep knowledge of all these levels, can then describe a person according to his level of disbelief…the fact is that nobody can be described as an absolute infidel unless he doesn’t have any degree of faithfulness. Likewise, only one can be described as a person of absolute faith who does not have a degree of disbelief in him. He can also be described as tested faithful, pious and a Shiʿa par excellence. The general population of the Shiʿa are the ones who can be described as the untested faithful.

Question 12: What is the definition of perfect faith, and what are the levels of faith and disbelief?

Answer: Faith is the full acceptance of, and submission to, God, both in heart and in speech without any meddling of temperament and impulsiveness. It should be based on knowledge and insight regarding all that is permitted and forbidden. Therefore, full faith has five stipulations; each condition leads to a degree in faith, and the lack of each condition leads to one kind of disbelief.

The Stipulations of Faith and Disbelief

1. Accepting and submitting to [the Will of] God Most High is the first degree in faith. Its opposite in terms of disbelief is described as denial and refusal (juhud), which means not submitting to the will of God either out of pride or arrogance. According to the Qurʾan, when Satan was asked to prostrate before Adam, he “refused and was arrogant and became of the disbelievers” (2:34). Because they emulated the forefathers and predecessors like most of the infidels, when they were asked to follow the prophet that was sent down to them by God, they said “we follow the path of our forefathers as it is mentioned in the Qurʾan”: and “when it is said to them, ‘Follow what God has revealed,’ they say, ‘Rather, we will follow that which we found our fathers doing.’ Even though their fathers understood nothing, nor were they guided” (2:170). The Qurʾan is replete with verses on this topic. So whoever denies a truth out of self-adulation and arrogance, he possesses a degree of and a kind of disbelief.

2. [The second condition] is that the acceptance and submission must be only for God’s sake and not to safeguard life, wealth, health, and fear of blame. This means one should convert wholeheartedly and not just by word or by deed. This is the second degree of faith, and its opposite degree in terms of disbelief is hypocrisy: when one submits only by tongue and organs due to one of the aforesaid objectives and not out of true belief. The Arabs said “we have converted to Islam,” and then God told them to confess that they had submitted, but God knew that there was no faith in their hearts: “The Bedouins say, ‘We have believed.’ Say, ‘You have not [yet] believed’; but say [instead], ‘We have submitted,’ for faith has not yet entered your hearts. And if you obey God and His Messenger, He will not deprive you from your deeds of anything. Indeed, God is Forgiving and Merciful” (49:14). This verse means that although one performs prayer and fasts, it is not because he believes in God but rather because he has other goals in mind. Whoever performs a pious act to gain something in this world has a degree of hypocrisy. Many of the companions of the Prophet displayed this kind of disbelief. As God Says: “And of the people are some who say, ‘We believe in Allah and the Last Day,’ but they are not believers.” and “ Indeed, God is over all things competent” (2:8, 2:20).

3. [The third condition] occurs when temperament and worldly desire cannot prevent one from accepting and submitting [to the Will of God] in speech, nor prevent one from confessing openly his conversion and submission. This means that after one has accepted God and His will in his heart, he also confesses [his belief] aloud. This is the third degree of faith. The degree of disbelief corresponding to this level of faith involves denial, refusal out of jealously, pride, conformism, and arrogance. So whatever is in accordance with his wish and his will, or whatever is in agreement with what he has learned from his teachers and masters, he believes and submits, whereas whatever is against his wish and learning he would not accept. This is the description of the Jews, who said: our belief is what we have heard from our teachers and masters, as God says: “Indeed, those who disbelieve in God and His messengers and wish to discriminate between God and His messengers and say, ‘We believe in some and disbelieve in others,’ and wish to adopt a way in between—Those are the disbelievers, truly. And We have prepared for the disbelievers a humiliating punishment” (4:150–51). Elsewhere God also says: “So do you believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part? Then what is the recompense for those who do that among you except disgrace in worldly life; and on the Day of Resurrection they will be sent back to the severest of punishment” (2:85).

4. The fourth condition: This is conversion and submission based on knowledge and insight, and not misunderstanding. This is the fourth level in faith and its corresponding level in terms of disbelief is going astray: that is, studying the word of God and the traditions of the Prophet, misunderstanding their meanings, keeping this misunderstanding, and spreading this ignorance amongst people. If a knowledgeable and insightful person who has learned the meaning of the Qurʾan from the Qurʾan, and the meaning of the hadith from the hadith, expresses the correct meaning of the Qurʾan and hadith, then that misunderstanding prevents the person from learning the right meaning and veils the correct meaning. Most Muslims suffer from this kind of disbelief. And God most high does not grant everybody the right understanding, and one cannot acquire this correct understanding by means of frequent studying and repetition. As God says: “He gives wisdom to whom He wills, and whoever has been given wisdom has certainly been given much good. And none will remember except those of understanding” (2:269).

5. The fifth condition: This occurs after submitting to the will of God, according to the aforesaid stipulations, performing all those that are permitted and avoiding the forbidden ones. It is the fifth condition of faith; and its opposite level in disbelief is described as transgression and disobedience. Disbelief in this condition is only figurative. As God says: “And [due] to God from the people is a pilgrimage to the House—for whoever is able to find thereto a way. But whoever disbelieves—then indeed, God is free from need of the worlds” (3:97). Because it does not affect the truth and principle of faith and, rather, is related to perfection of faith, therefore, if somebody is bereft of this condition, he won’t be condemned to the eternal punishment of Hell. He would only enter Hell because of his disobedience. Being faithful and then disobeying God does not lead to redemption of punishment, as if nothing has happened. That is why it is said in the hadith: “The fornicator is considered a believer while he is not actually in the act and the same is the case for a drinker and burglar.” And there is another kind of disbelief, termed “disbelief out of ignorance,” and that is the case for a society that has not heard of any prophetic mission and has no knowledge of religion and prophetic mission….

A valid consensus has a proof [that can be found in the Qurʾan or hadith] as we explained earlier and the benefit of it is as follows: if there are two hadith discussing the same issue and one confirms the consensus and the other one contradicts the consensus and the narrator of both hadith posses the same characteristics of justice, scholarly care, and knowledge and then he prefers the confirming hadith over the contradicting one. And the invalid consensus is invalid on principle because if it does have a proof, a proof is a hujjat, and if it doesn’t, so it cannot be a hujjat.

The first group of people who came up with this kind of consensus were the people who assembled in the Bani Sa’ida pavilion due to corrupt objectives and desires to agree upon Abu Bakr’s caliphate and then they called that assembly of the hypocrite consensus and made it their hujjat based on the falsehood and that consensus became the foundation and the paradigm of all other falsehoods among them [the Sunni] and whoever afterward wanted to make a falsehood prevalent among people with a goal in mind and could not find a hujjat in the Qurʾan or hadith, would rely on consensus.

NOTES

1. For Mulla Sadra’s philosophical outlook, see Sajjad Rizvi’s essay in chapter 7 of this volume.

2. Muhsin Fayz Kashani, Risala-yi sharh-i sadr, in Dah risala-yi muhaqqiq-i buzurg Fayz Kashani, ed. Rasul Ja‘ariyan (Isfahan: Markaz-i Tahqiqat-i ‘Ilmi wa Dini-i Imam Amir al-Muʾminin ʻAli, 1992), 58–64.

3. For more information on Fayz’s life, see Yusuf Bahrani, Luʾluʾat al-Bahrayn fi al-ijazat wa tarajim rijal al-hadith (Beirut, 1986), 121–31; Khansari, Rawḍat al-jannat, 126–30; Muhammad ʿAli Mudarris Tabrizi, Rayhanat al-adab (Tabriz, n. d.), 4: 368–79; Muhammad b. Sulayman Tunakabuni, Qisas al-ʿulamaʾ (Tehran, 1886), 126–30; William C. Chittick, “Muhsin-i Fayz-i Kashani,” in Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. 2, Anamaka Through Atar al-Wozara (New York: Mazda, 1987); Hamid Algar, “Fayz-E Kasani, Molla Mohsen-Mohammad,” in Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. 2, Anamaka Through Atar al-Wozara (New York: Mazda, 1987).

4. Muhsin Fayz Kashani, Risala-i su’al wa jawab, in Rasul Ja‘fariyan, Dah Risala az Fayz Kashani, 117–18.

5. Muhammad b. Yaʿqub b. Ishaq al-Kulayni Al-Razi (d. 941) is one of the most prominent Shiʿi compilers of hadith, whose work, al-Kafi (Sufficient) is one of the Four Books (al-kutub al-arba’a) that constitute the main body of hadith for Twelver-Shiʿism.

6. Muhammad ibn ʿAli ibn Al-Husayn ibn Musa al-Qumi (d. after 991), commonly known as al-Shaykh al-Saduq or Ibn Babawayh/ Ibn Babuya, was one of the greatest Shiʿa hadith compilers whose Man la yahḍuruh al-faqih (Every Man His Own Lawyer), is one of the Four Books of the Shiʿa.

7. Sayyid Radi al-Din, ʿAli b. Musa b. Jaʿfar b. Tawus, known as Sayyid b. Tawus (d. 1265), is a prominent Shiʿi scholar who authored more than fifty books, most of which are about supplication and pilgrimages. He had a rich library with approximately 1,500 books.

8. Fayz Kashani, Risala-i su’al wa jawab, 125.

9. Rasul Ja‘fariyan, Din wa siyasat dar dawra-yi safawi (Qum: Ansariyan, 1991), 283; Fayz Kashani, Risala-yi sharh-i sadr, 48–49.

10. Fayz Kashani, Risala-yi sharh-i sadr, 53.

11. Fayz Kashani, Risala-yi sharh-i sadr, 52–54.

12. Cited in Ja‘fariyan, Din wa siyasat, 273.

13. Bahrani, Lu’lu’at al-Bahrayn, 121.

14. Tunkabuni, Qisas al-ʿulamaʾ, 300.

15. Muhammad Baqir Khvansari, Rawdat al-jannat fi ahwal al-ʿulamaʾ wa sadat (Tehran: 1886), vol. 7: 10–31.

16. For more on his life and works see, Wali Quli Shamlu, Qisas al-khaqani, ed. Sayyid Hasan Sadat Nasiri (Tehran: Sazman-i Chap wa Intisharat-i Wizarat-i Farhang wa Irshad-i Islami, 1992), 2: 58; Muhammad Tahir Qazwini, ʿAbbas-nama: Ya sharh-i zindigani-i 22 sala-yi Shah ʿAbbas Thani, 1052–1073, ed. Ibrahim Dihqan (Arak: Intisharat Dawudi, 1950), 305–6; ʿAbd al-Husayn Khatunabadi, Waqayi’ al-sinin wa al-a’wam, ed. M. Bihbudi (Tehran: Kitabfurushi-i Islamiyya, 1973), 525–35; Isfahani Afandi, Riyaḍ al-ʿulamaʾwa hiyad al-fudala, ed. Ahmad al-Husayni (Qum: Matba‘at al-Khayyam, 1981), vol. 5: 80–82. Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa’i also criticized Muhsin Fayz and his mentor Mulla Sadra for their mystical and philosophical tendencies. See Todd Lawson, “Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in Twelver Shiʿism: Ahmad al-Ahsa’i on FayzKashani (the Risalat al-’Ilmiyya),” in Religion and Society in Qajar Iran, ed. Robert Gleave (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005). 134.

17. There is a manuscript of this treatise at the library of the University of Tehran, no. 3149. Here I have used Qasimi’s edition of this treatise, which is based on manuscript number 22460 held at the Astan-i Quds Library in Mashhad, Iran.

18. In his Risala-yi insaf, Muhsin Fayz expressed wonder and disappointment that “an umma blessed with having the best Prophet to guide them, who had left them a Book and a family (the thaqalayn) and who possessed the most comprehensive knowledge of the revelation, were still looking for knowledge in books written by scholars of the bygone nations (umam al-salafa).” Muhsin Fayz Kashani, Risala-yi al-insaf, in Rasul Jaf‘ariyan, Dah risala-yi muhaqqiq-i buzurg Fayz Kashani (Isfahan: Markaz-i Tahqiqat-i ʻIlmi wa Dini-i Imam Amir al-Muʾminin ʻAli, 1992), 186–87.

19. Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Nuʿman al-ʿUkbari al-Baghdadi, known as al-Shaykh al-Mufid (d.1032), wrote a large number of books including al-Amali, al-Irshad, and Ahkam al-nisa’, and was a renowned teacher. Some of the most imminent Shiʿi scholars including Shaykh Radi, Sharif Murtada, Shaykh al-Tusi, and al-Najashi were trained by him.

20. Abu al-Qasim ʿAli ibn al-Husayn al-Sharif al-Murtaḍa (d. 1044) was one of the greatest Twelver Shiʿi jurists and theologians of his time. He was one of the students of Shaykh al-Mufid and the elder brother of al-Sharif al-Raḍi, the compiler of Nahj al-Balagha.

21. Perhaps he means verses of the Qurʾan such as these: “And most of them follow not except assumption. Indeed, assumption avails not against the truth at all. Indeed, Allah is Knowing of what they do” (10:36); “And they have thereof no knowledge. They follow not except assumption, and indeed, assumption avails not against the truth at all” (53:28).

22. The bulk of his tracts (Sharh-i sadr, Haqq al-mubin, Raf‘ al-fitna, Zad al-salik, Rah-i savab, I’tidhar, and al-Insaf) are reactive and polemical objections to the mujtahids and other intellectuals. Fayz categorically rejected the pedagogical views of the mujtahids, mutakallims, and conventional philosophers, claiming that they had deviated from the right path of the Prophet and the imams and relied on intellectual tools that did not yield what he called epistemic certitude (yaqin). He believed that seeking “sure knowledge” (qat’) is a religious obligation for every Muslim who must first purify his soul and then acquire this knowledge from infallible sources, namely, the Qurʾan, hadiths, and akhbars (sayings and deeds) of the Prophet and the imams.

23. In his Safinat al-najat, Fayz reiterated the same notion. He writes: “When the epoch of the infallible imams came to an end…the Shiʿa mixed with the Sunnis and became familiar with their books as youths, since these were the books that commonly taught in the madrasas, mosques, and elsewhere—for the kings and governments officials were Sunnis, and subjects always follow the lead of their kings. The Shiʿa studied the religious sciences together with the Sunnis and read books on Islamic legal theories written by the Sunni scholars…they (that is, the Shiʿa) approved some of what the Sunnis had written and disapproved some.” Muhsin Fayz Kashani, Safinat al-najat, ed. Muhammad Rida al-Naqusani (Tehran, 1960), 9–10.

24. Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina has translated the hadith fully in his The Just Ruler (al-sultan al-’adil) in Shiʿite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 139–42.

25. Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. ʿAli b. al-Hasan (d.1066), better known as Shaykh al-Ta’ifah (the chief the Shiʿa) al-Tusi, was one of the greatest Shiʿi jurists and compilers of hadith. al-Tusi wrote in nearly all fields of Islamic sciences. His Istibasar fi ma ikhtelar min al-akhbar and Tahdhib al-ahkam are two of the four canonical Shiʿi hadith books.

26. The Shiʿa believe one should only wipe one’s feet during ablution (wudu’) instead of washing them, following this verse of the Qurʾan: “O you who believe! When you intend your prayers, wash your faces and your hands from the elbows and wipe (by passing wet hands over) your head and your feet up to the ankles” (5:6). Sunni Muslims who practice the washing of their feet during wudu’ argue that “your feet” in the Qurʾan is linked to washing the face, whereas the Shiʿa argue that “your feet” is linked to rubbing the head and, therefore, they should be wiped but not washed.