The Empires of the Near East and India: Source Studies of the Safavid, Ottoman, and Mughal Literate Communities

JALAL AL-DIN DAVANI ON ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF THE NECESSARY BEING

AHAB BDAIWI

THE CASE FOR DAVANI

Admittedly, the philosophical writings of the Iranian polymath Jalal al-Din Davani (d. 1502)¹ are not the most salient choice for selected readings on Ottoman philosophy. Davani, however, had a powerful impact on Ottoman intellectual life² and was a widely read author particularly popular in Ottoman lands.³ Manuscript evidence attests to the centrality of Davani in Ottoman scholarly culture. The catalog of the Suleymaniye Library in Istanbul lists 891 copies of works by, or related to, Davani.⁴

Little surprise, then, that in the realms of philosophy, philosophical theology, logic, and occultism,⁵ Davani exerted a profound influence on later Ottoman and Mughal learning.⁶ Indeed, few modern scholars would contest Davani’s status as one of the most influential philosophers and theologians active after the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century and before the rise of the Safavids in the sixteenth.

Emblematic of Davani’s reputation for erudition and popularity beyond Iran—whence he hailed—is the fact that in the last decades of the fifteenth century the Ottoman sultan Bayezid (r. 1481–1512) encouraged his personal friend Muʾayyadzade ʿAbd al-Rahman Efendi (d. 1516), the renowned Ottoman thinker,7 to travel to Iran to study under the tutelage of Davani.⁸ In fact, Efendi played an instrumental role in promoting and circulating the ideas of Davani in Ottoman realms during the latter’s lifetime, leading modern scholars to describe Efendi as “a vector in Ottoman lands for the dissemination of the knowledge that he had acquired in Shiraz.”⁹ Nor does the Davani-Ottoman link stop here. We know of at least three philosophical writings of Davani that were dedicated to Sultan Bayezid: Risalat Ithbat al-wajib al-qadima; al-Hashiya al-jadida, the second set of glosses on ʿAli Qushchi’s (d. 1474) famous commentary on Nasir al-Din Tusi’s (d. 1274) Tajrid al-iʿtiqad; and Sharh al-rubaʿiyyat, a commentary on his own quatrains.¹⁰

To grasp the popularity and apparent centrality of Davani in the Ottoman philosophical tradition in the early modern period, a brief note on the decline of Sunni philosophical theology in Iran in its Ashʿari permutation is in order. In the late Timurid period,¹¹ Ashʿarism was the dominant philosophical current and arguably the intellectual tradition par excellence particularly in western Iran.¹² However, shortly after the rise of the Shiʿi Safavids in 1501, the influence and prevalence of the Ashʿari tradition waned, at least in western Iran; soon thereafter, Ashʿarism played second fiddle to the philosophical tradition advanced by the circle of Dashtaki philosophers and their students.¹³

The establishment of a new Shiʿi polity and the death of Davani in 1501 or 1502 did not, however, bring philosophical Ashʿarism to a complete halt, at least not in Iran. Whatever Ashʿari presence there was in Iran, it was manifested in the writings of Davani’s students, most of whom, if not all, preferred exegetical writing; they penned expository glosses on their teacher’s major philosophical works.¹⁴ Most of Davani’s students and their students, who had previously studied in Shiraz, moved to various geographical locations that fell outside the sociopolitical orbit of the new Shiʿi polity; some moved to Ottoman territories and others migrated to India.¹⁵

DAVANI AND OTTOMAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

That the “triumph of fanaticism” in the seventeenth century set in motion the rapid decline of the Ottoman philosophical traditions and brought an end to the study of philosophy is a view no longer tenable in modern scholarship. A recent study on Ottoman intellectual history has conclusively shown that the philosophical disciplines were studied assiduously in the Ottoman Empire throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹⁶ Contrary to the hackneyed assumptions that the fanatical Qadizadelis suppressed the rational traditions, Ottoman scholarly circles of the seventeenth century turned to works on philosophy, logic, dialectics, philosophical theology, semantics, rhetoric, and grammar by Persian thinkers of the fifteenth and sixteenth century.¹⁷ Standing at the head of the line of those Persian philosophers and theologians was Davani. The writings of Davani, particularly on philosophy and philosophical theology, were studied, taught, and commented upon by Azeri and Kurdish thinkers who “made an impression on local scholars with their mastery” of the “books of the Persians.”¹⁸

From the seventeenth century onward, most of the major Ottoman philosophers were trained in the works of Davani.19 Similarly, many Ottoman intellectual elite traced their philosophical lineage back to Davani. For instance, Hoca ʿAbd ul-Rahim (d. 1656),²⁰ Ibrahim Kurani (d. 1690),²¹ Tefsiri Mehmed b. Hamza Debbagi (d. 1699),²² Haydar b. Ahmad Husaynabadi (d. 1717),²³ Ebu Saʿid b. Mustafa Hadimi (d. 1762),²⁴ Ismaʿil Gelenbevi (d. 1791),²⁵ and Ismaʿil Konevi (d. 1781),²⁶ all renowned teachers of philosophy in central and eastern Ottoman lands, claimed intellectual descent from Davani.

Three works of Davani received considerable attention in Ottoman intellectual circles: his commentary on Tahdhib al-mantiq by Saʿd al-Din Taftazani (d. 1390); his commentary on al-ʿAqaʾid al-ʿAdudiyya by ʿAdud al-Din Iji (d. 1355); and the Risalat Ithbat al-wajib. The last work of Davani is written independently in two recensions: the Risalat Ithbat al-wajib al-qadima (The Old Treatise on Establishing the [Existence] of the Necessary [Being]) and the Risalat Ithbat al-wajib al-jadida (The New Treatise on Establishing the [Existence] of the Necessary [Being]).

In the prologue of the New Treatise, Davani tells us that he wrote the Old Treatise in the heyday of his youth (ʿunfuwan shababi), without specifying exactly when. But according to the colophon of the MS Ragıp 1457,²⁷ the Old Treatise is dedicated to the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II in 1489, which seems rather late, especially as Davani was born sixty-three years earlier. More plausible, though, is that the date of 1489 refers to the time when Bayezid II sent a letter of gratitude to Davani thanking him for using subtle philosophical language and insightful precision in diction when composing the Old Treatise.²⁸ It is probable, then, that the copyist transcribed the date of 1489 on the colophon of the manuscript, confusing it with the date the letter was issued and when presumably the copyist had read or heard of it.

As for the New Treatise, we learn from the Safavid-era historian and philosopher Qadi Nur Allah Shushtari (d. 1610) that Davani composed this work during his sojourn in Lar, shortly before his death sometime in 1501 or 1502.²⁹ However, the narrative is compounded further when the same source of evidence, namely, Shushtari, and echoing him Ahmad Tuysirkani, renowned modern editor of the works of Davani, claim without clear proof that the New Treatise was completed ten or so years after the Old Treatise.³⁰ If we accept this last claim, then the date of composition of the New Treatise would have to be long before t 1501 or 1502. This leaves us with two plausible scenarios regarding the date of composition for the New Treatise. The work was either written (1) in Davani’s youthful years, long before 1501 or 1502; or (2) during Davani’s more mature life or shortly before his death in 1501 or 1502. Both possibilities have merit, but the second is more plausible, that is, the Old Treatise was written in Davani’s later, more mature years.

When Davani completed the Old Treatise, it is possible that he was taken aback by and became uncomfortable with the criticisms of his contemporary and fierce rival Sadr al-Din Dashtaki (d. 1498). Responding to Davani and his supposed flimsy grasp of philosophical topics, Dashtaki penned Risala fi Ithbat al-bari wa-sifatihi in 1497 primarily to undermine the scholarly credentials of Davani. To refute the criticisms of Dashtaki, Davani probably started writing the New Treatise shortly after 1497. Davini must have completed the work after Dashtaki’s death in 1498 because he refrains from specifically naming Dashtaki, which he typically did in previous works when Dashtaki was alive. It is possible then that Davani deliberately invented a chronological chasm between the Old Treatise and the New Treatise to allay the criticisms of his disputant,31 for surely ambitious youth can be forgiven for their vacuous grasp of philosophy.

The excerpt that follows are partial translations of the main sections of the New Treatise by Davani,³² which would have been read, studied, and taught in Ottoman scholarly circles as early as the late sixteenth century. This work had a profound impact on Ottoman philosophy, so much so that one may characterize the work as reflective of Ottoman philosophical concerns in the early modern period.

The New Treatise is divided into a brief prologue, fourteenth sections, and a conclusion. Broadly, the work is intended to demonstrate through philosophical arguments the existence of a being whose existence is necessary. In religious parlance, God is the term used to denote this necessary being. More specifically, in this treatise Davani bears the unmistakable imprint of an Avicennan philosopher with a pronounced penchant for the syllogistic method rather than dialectics and scriptural attestation. In the Safavid period, the New Treatise was the subject of at least six known commentaries,³³ and in the Ottoman era it received no fewer than twelve commentaries and glosses.³⁴

TRANSLATION

A Treatise on Establishing the Existence of God

I. ON ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF THE NECESSARY BEING

Rest assured that the [human] intellect, in the first instance, divides the existing being into (A) that whose existence is posited as necessary due to the nature of its essence; and (B) that whose existence and nonexistence is posited as possible due to its essence. As for A it is Necessary-due-to-Its-Essence, whereas B is possible, or contingent.

That whose existence and nonexistence are [equally] possible is self-evident and needs not mediating and explanatory qualification, for we bear witness to the coming-into-being of existents after they were nonexistent. As for the Necessary, however, it needs mediating and explanatory qualification. The mediating and explanatory qualification is as follows:

A concomitant conclusion that comes after insightful contemplation upon the concept of the existing being is that it cannot come into being and subsist without the Necessary, for had the existing being remained in the mode of possibility, no existing being would ever come into being and subsist. An explanation of the concomitance is in order:

Based on this supposition, the possible came into being either through its own ontological state without [an efficient] cause; however, this is self-evidently impossible. Another plausible scenario is that the possible came into being through that which is other than it; accordingly, this other than it is also possible; it follows, then, that either (i) the sequential unitary existent beings will regress ad infinitum; or (ii) fall into circularity. Both presumptions yield a situation whereby an individual contingent is self-sustaining in need not of a cause to preponderate its existence over its nonexistence (sabab yurajjih wujudihi ʿala ʿadamihi); however, this [is known to be] impossible (muhal). This is because the contingent cannot come into being unless there is a cause that makes its coming-into-being necessary (that is, al-mumkin ma lam yujab lam yujad) and this necessity [which causes it to come into being] cannot materialize until all dimensions of nonexistence are impeded; and without the necessary cause there cannot be an impediment to the all dimensions of nonexistence. This is a subtle proof that is easy to grasp and does not require an invalidation of circularity and infinite regress.

This last approach, then, shows that some existents are necessary due to the essence; moreover, this approach shows that existence [of a necessary being due to its essence] can be demonstrated without recourse to the existence of contingent existents, which, as is famously known, the method preferred by the theologians.

If you say [in objection]:

Do you not presuppose in the proof you bring forth that the existence of the contingent is established and indubitable especially when you say, “the existence of the contingent is self-evident, for we do not observe its opposite in concreto.”

If you say [as a follow-up]:

The proof rests on the supposition that there is some kind of existent being whose existence is in need not of demonstrating the existence of a contingent existent.

To this we respond as follows:

There is no doubt that there is some kind of existing being whose existence is either necessary or contingent. If the former, then the aim of our proof is met; and if the latter, then that contingent must be in need of the necessary, as already stated. Alternatively, we could also say there is no doubt that an existent being of some kind exists; and its existence cannot subsist independently of the existence of the necessary without entailing an impossibility. This is because if the existence of any being is confined to something contingent, then based on the previous statement, no existing being will subsist, ever.

The proof is distinct from the one taken up by the theologians; and he (that is, Avicenna) has described it in the Isharat as the Proof of the Veracious.

II. THAT HIS EXISTENCE IS NOT ADDITIONAL TO HIM BUT IS IDENTICAL TO HIS SPECIAL EXISTENCE

The proof is that had His [that is, God, or the Necessary Being] existence been additional to Him [that is, His essence], so that that additional existence, A, for example, exists to the extent its essence allows, and without taking into account its [that is, A] accidents, A is then neither existing nor nonexisting…whatever thing is in such ontological state is a contingent existing being; this is because its characterization as “existing” is either (i) due to its essence, which is impossible because that which is not brought into being cannot bring another into being. It follows then that its existence is prior to its essence; but this is the opposite of what is intended. Or, (ii) due to something other than it; in which case it becomes caused and hence not necessary.

It cannot be said [that]: The necessary in our view is an expression denoting the necessity of the essence requiring existence, and if its essence required its existence then it follows that it is necessary through its essence and in need not of a cause, for the need (al-haja) is a component of contingency; it, however, is necessary, not contingent; it does not follow then that something is prior to itself.

To this we respond:

There is no difference between the cause and necessity except in denotation. If the necessary is necessitated by its existence then it is a cause for itself; in which case the conclusion that must be avoided follows.

You say:

The nonexistence of contingency is either (i) through the essence or (ii) other than the essence. In the case of (i) the essence becomes a cause, for a cause cannot take meaning except as that which when taken into consideration nonexistence cannot be; in the case of (ii) it follows that it becomes in need of something other than it; in which case it cannot be necessary, which is the opposite of what is intended.

It cannot be said [that]:

It is necessary by the relation of concomitance that the necessary is a cause for itself based on the reckoning that it is identical to existence (ʿayn al-wujud), necessarily entailed by the impossibility of its nonexistence for its essence.

This is because we say [as a response to the above]:

The reckoning that it is identical to existence is not merely a characterization. And the meaning of the impossibility of its nonexistence for its essence is that it is the indubitable and affirmed existence.

It has been firmly established, then, that the Necessary, exalted is He, is pure existence that subsists through its essence; and it, the Necessary, is of an essence that is free of relations and considerations (al-nisab wa l-iʿtibarat).

III. THAT HIS ATTRIBUTES ARE IDENTICAL WITH HIS ESSENCE

[His attributes are identical with His essence], for if an attribute inheres in Him but subsists as other than His essence in the same way one of us [humans] becomes knowledgeable when such attributes as knowledge inheres in him, and when one becomes powerful when such attributes as power (qudra) inheres in him, and when ones becomes willful when such attributes as will inheres in him, and similarly with other attributes; in such eventuality the necessary, exalted is He, becomes the agent and recipient of these attributes (faʿil^an li-tilka al-sifat wa-qabil^an laha). This in mind we will strive to demonstrate that the Simple Real (al-basit al-haqiqi) cannot be the agent and recipient of the same thing simultaneously; on the contrary, the necessary, exalted is He, insofar as He is free of matter and its concomitants, is the loftiest aims of immateriality; He is knowledge (fa-huwa ʿilm); and, insofar as He is subsisting due to His essence not through other than His essence, He is knowledge due to His essence; He is at once knowledge, knowledgeable, and the known (ʿilm^an wa-alim^an wa-maʿlum^an); this is not the sole preserve of the necessary, but all other immaterial things partake in this; even the rational soul (al-nafs al-natiqa), insofar as it is free of quiddity and subsisting due to its essence, is at once knowledge, knowledgeable, and known (ʿilm wa-ʿalim wa-ʿmaʿlum).

IV. ON GOD’S POWER

Power denotes the thing being such when it is justifiable [to say] action can and cannot come forth (sudur) from it with intention (bi l-qasd). And because His [that is, God] grasping knowledge of the totality of the cosmos is the cause of the coming forth of the contingents, and if the contingents relate to Him insofar as they come forth from Him, it follows, according to this definition, that His knowledge is power. And if the contingents relate to Him insofar as He is sufficient (kaf) in their coming forth from Him, it follows, according to this definition, that [His knowledge] is [classified as] will (irada). The disparity (or the difference) between power and will is similar to the disparity between them and knowledge, as well as between knowledge and the essence, is mentally posited (iʿtibari). He is powerful insofar as something can come forth from Him; and He is willful insofar as specific action comes forth from Him. The well-known definition among the philosophers is that [His] power describes the following: If He so wills, actions will come forth; if He does not will, action will not come forth. They [that is, the philosophers] describe the first conditional [of the statement] as necessary and subsisting in reality whereas the premise of the second conditional is impossible and does not subsist in reality. Philosophers of the later tradition have singled out this definition as the point of contentious between them and the theologians, who describe as possible the coming forth of the cosmos and its coming to an end after it comes into existence (sudur al-ʿalam wa-ifnaʾihi baʿd wujudihi); the philosophers hold this to be an impossibility […]

The theologians aver that with regard to animals, power is a quality of the soul (kayfiyya nafsaniyya); power is the [correct] requirement for action and the nonexistence of action; it has equal relation to both of the possible outcomes. Theologians disagreed among themselves as to whether power is ontologically prior to (or precedes) action. In my view [however,] the debate is essentially about the essence of power. Those who aver that power is ontologically prior to action bring forth two points: First, if power did not precede action, then obligating (taklif) belief upon a disbeliever becomes [an instance of] obligating the incapable (taklif al-ʿajiz)—and although God is capable of imposing such an obligation, according to the [doctrines of] the Ashʿaris—this kind of obligation does not occur in reality, as stated by God, exalted is He: “God charges no soul beyond its capacity” [Q. 2:286].

Second, power is necessarily required for an action to be temporally originated (ihdath); this necessary requirement [for a cause] is discarded when the action ensues.

As for the first point, I respond as follows: the argument is problematic, namely, that when obligation is placed upon the disbeliever this will be followed by the acquisition of faith for that individual and is a demonstration that power is ontologically prior to will; for if the individual persists in disbelief, he will never acquire the power that takes him out of the fold of disbelief; this is based on the assumption that power and will occur at the same time, and hence the individual will not enter the state of obligation. The second [point] is invalid based on [scholarly] consensus.

V. ON GOD’S WILL

According to the explications of the theologians [the will of God] is specified for one of two possible actions. Some [theologians] state that in the case of animals the will is assured desire (shawq) certain of achieving the desired (al-murad). It has [also] been stated that [the will] is different from desire; for will is [defined as] determination to uphold the intent. [In some instances] man may crave that for which he does not will—delicious foods, for example. A rational man, however, will refrain for he knows the determinants of delicious [and unhealthy] food. That rational man may will for that which he does not crave—bitter-tasting but health-benefiting medicine, for example. The theologians draw distinctions: for them, the will is [defined as] a voluntary inclination (or impetus) (mayl ikhtiyari); whereas desire is a natural inclination.

It is said:

It is for this reason that an obligated agent (mukallaf) is punished for willful sins but not for holding a desire to commit sins. And those [that is, theologians] hold that the starting origins (mabadiʾ) of voluntary actions in animals are five: conceptualization (tasawwur); belief in benefit and dispelling of harm (iʿtiqad al-nafʿ wa-dafʿ al-dar); desire; will; agent faculty (al-quwwa al-muharrika). The early [theologians, however] discard the will in order to make it identical with assured desire (al-shawq al-mutaʾakkid).

To this, I respond:

As for the view that intent (qasd) and will are part of the voluntary actions, had this been true then [intent] would require another [prior] intent ad infinitum. The argument that some of it is voluntary, while part of it is not, is arbitrary (tahakkum) with no basis in reality; what is evident, though, is that when desire vanquishes, the [effect of the] will transpires necessarily. The starting origins of voluntary actions end up at the compulsory matters that proceed from the animal per necessitatem (bi l-ijab). [It follows then that] belief in the benefit and the longing [of actions] occurs involuntarily followed by assured desire after which the agent faculty provides it with a necessary impetus. These matters are ordered according to necessity. As for animals, actions motivated by free choice are an expression of knowledge and desire, which is dependent on it [that is, knowledge] (tabiʿ lahu); knowledge is cause of actions. Power [of animals] is an expression of it [that is, knowledge and its dependent, namely, desire].

As for those who make desire different from the will, and who draw distinction between them as noted earlier, the relation of concomitance demands from those [people that] they hold the consumption of repulsive but health-benefiting foods, by the one who knows the benefit [of the foods] but consumes them grudgingly, to be something that proceeds without desire (min ghayr shawq); and [similarly, the relation of concomitance demands that] the consumption of delicious but health-harming, by the one who knows the harms [of the foods], to be something that proceeds from the consumer [of food] without will; [in the former scenario] the inclination of [bodily] appetite is repudiated, previously termed natural inclination in the first [scenario] and the repudiation of the will in the second [scenario]…. It follows then that the starting origins of voluntary actions are not five [in number].

If you say [in objection]:

How, then, will recompensation and punishment (al-thawab wa-l-ʿiqab) be ascertained (yatahaqqaq)? This is akin to the [scenario] whereby a person compels another person to act, then some persons will be punished, while others receive recompense.

I say [in response]:

It has been decisively determined (taqarrara) among the ranks of the Folk of Truth [and Verification] that recompense and punishment is not due to some prior desert (istihqaq); and not one among the bondsmen (ʿibad) [of God] has a right of desert over God, exalted is He, such that [they will say] the impediment of it [that is, recompense and punishment] makes it [an act of] oppression. Indeed God is much too exalted than that. As for what the Muʿtazilis disseminate through discussion that the bondsman voluntarily performs [acts of] obedience and disobedience, and deserves recompense and punishment, and on account of this the bondsman deserves recompense and punishment; however, this [view] does not receive the support of the Folk of Truth and Verification (ahl al-haqq wa-l-tahqiq). As for the established [doctrine of] acquisition (kasb) of al-Ashʿari it is an expression of the association (or bond) (taʿalluq) of the power of the bondsman with [the performed] action without it [that is, power] having any influence [over the action]; for in his view [that is, al-Ashʿari] there is no influencer (muʾaththir) save God, exalted is He. This is the distinction between his method of composition (madhhab) and that of the Muʿtazilis. For them [that is, the Muʿtazilis] the power of the bondsman is capable of influencing, and by establishing another incapable of influencing power their [method of composition] is differentiated from that of the al-Jabarriya. The obligating the incapable (taklif al-ʿajiz) is not something actual (waqiʿ), whereas the obligating of the powerful is, even though his power is incapable of influencing. This is not at all connected to divine compulsion (jabr).

As for the will of God in the view of the philosophers, it [describes] His most complete and perfect (al-atamm al-akmal) knowledge of the order of all things (niẓam al-kull). As has been repeatedly stated and firmly established, this knowledge is power (qudra), insofar as contingents can come forth from Him; and [this knowledge] is will (irada), insofar as it [that is, knowledge] is sufficient to bring about their [that is, contingents] existence—as well as being a preponderant of one of the limits [or alternatives] (taraf) of their existence over [the other limit of] their nonexistence.

And they [that is, the philosophers] have mentioned that in our case [that is, humans] knowledge becomes a cause for external existence. For instance, take the one who walks along the narrow edge of an elevated wall. If the person imagines [the idea of] falling [through the internal power of estimation (wahm)], the [false] imagination (tawahhum) will become a cause for his falling.

NOTES

I am thankful to my friend and colleague Matthew Melvin-Koushki for his assiduous reading of an earlier draft of this essay.

1. Briefly, Jalal al-Din Muhammad b. Saʿd Kaziruni, popularly known as Muhaqqiq-i Davani, or simply Davani, was born in Davan near Kazirun near the city of Shiraz in 1426. His philosophical and theological training took place in Shiraz too. He became renowned as a masterful exponent of both the rational and transmitted sciences and occupied the office of qadi of the province of Fars during the reign of the Aq-Qoyunlu dynasty. He died soon after the Safavids took power in 1501 or 1502 and was buried in Davan. In the biographical and historiographical sources, Davani is often identified as a savant and one of the principal revivers of Avicennan philosophy in the late medieval period. Indeed the breadth and depth of Davani’s writings reveal him to be a doyen who mastered an array of philosophical disciplines, including Peripatetic philosophy, illuminationist philosophy, Ashʿari theology, lettrism, Qurʾanic hermeneutics, legal methodology (usul al-fiqh), and logic. On Davani’s life, works, and general outlines of his thought, see Qadi Nur Allah Shushtari, Majalis al-muʾminin (Tehran, 1998), 2:221–30; Qutb al-Din Muhammad ʿAli Ishkavari Lahiji, Mahbub al-qulub, ed. Hamid al-Dibaji (Tehran, 2003), 2:463–67; ʿAli Davani, Sharh-i zindigi-yi Jalal al-Din Davani (Qum, 1975); Bakhtiyar Husain Siddiqi, “Jalal al-Din Dawwani,” in A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. Mian Mohammad Sharif (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 1963–1966), 2:883–88; Harun Anay, Celaleddin Devvani Hayati (PhD diss., Istanbul University, 1994), 42–52; Harun Anay, “Devvani,” in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1994), 9:257–62; Mahdi Dihbashi, “Tahlili az andishaha-yi falsafi va kalami-yi Jalal al-Din Muhaqqiq-i Davani,” Khiradnama-yi Sadra 1, no. 3 (1996), 41–51; Reza Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 87f, 88–93, 100, 102, 104f; Ghulam Husayn Ibrahimi Dinani, Jalal al-Din Davani filsuf-i zawq al-taʾalluh (1390; Tehran, 2012). On Davani’s political theology, see Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 210–23; Murtada Yusuffirad, Andisha-yi siyasi Jalal al-Din Davani (1378: Qum, 2008). For an annotated bibliography of Davani’s writings, see Reza Pourjavady, “Kitab-shinasi-I athar-i Jalal al-Din Davani,” Maʿarif 15 (1998), 81–138; Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran, 4–14. See also Mirza Muhammad ʿAli Mudarris, Rayhanat al-adab: Dar tarajim-i ahval-i maʿrufin bi-kunya aw-laqab ya kunan va-alqab (Tehran, 1967), 2:232–36; Andrew Newman, “Davani,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica (New York: Mazda, 1979–). More recently, see Ahab Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna: An Intellectual History of the Dashtaki Philosophers of Shiraz (PhD diss., University of Exeter, 2014), 44–48. For a detailed account of the philosophy and philosophical theology of Davani, see Ahab Bdaiwi, Jalal al-Din Davani: An Avicennan Philosopher and Ashʿari Theologian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

2. Very rarely has modern scholarship explored the reception of Davani in Ottoman intellectual circles. On the influence of Davani in the Ottoman world, see Sherif Mardin, “The Mind of the Turkish Reformer, 1700–1900,” Western Humanities Review 14 (1960), 418ff. For a more recent treatment with some useful notes on the reception of Davani’s philosophical writings in Ottoman lands, see Khaled el-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 38ff.

3. Judith Pfeiffer, “Teaching the Learned: Jalal al-Din al-Davani’s Ijaza to Muʾayyadzada ʿAbd al-Rahman Efendi and the Ottoman Empire at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century,” in The Heritage of Arabo-Islamic Learning: Studies Presented to Wadad Kadi, ed. M. Pomerantz and A. Shahin (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 284–332, at 296f.

4. Pfeiffer, “Teaching the Learned,” 297.

5. Matthew Melvin-Koushki is leading the charge in dissecting, translating, and contextualizing Davani’s occultist writings and ideas; see his The Occult Science of Empire in Aqquyunlu-Safavid Iran: Two Shirazi Lettrists (Leiden: forthcoming).

6. On the reception of Davani and other Iranian philosophers and theologians in India, see Asad Ahmed and Reza Pourjavady, “Theology in the Indian Subcontinent,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 606–24.

7. On Muʾayyadzade Efendi, see Ahmad b. Mustafa Taskopruzade, al-Shaqaʾiq al-nuʿmaniyya fi ʿulamaʾ al-dawla al-ʿuthmaniyya (Beirut, 1975), 280f; Hasan Aksoy, “Mueyyedzade Abdurrahman Efendi,” Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 2006), 31:485–86, at 485; Pfeiffer, “Teaching the Learned,” 286–93.

8. Muslih al-Din Lari, “Mirʾat al-adwar wa-mirqat al-akhbar: fasl-i dar sharh hal-i buzurgan-i Khorasan va Mawaraʾ al-nahr va Fars,” ed. ʿArif Nawshahi, Maʿarif 13, no. 2 (1997): 91–113, at 104; Anay, “Devvani,” 9:261. Davani issued an ijaza (extant) to Muʾayyadzade on 11 Jumada I 888/June 17, 1483. See Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran, 12.

9. Pfeiffer, “Teaching the Learned,” 292.

10. Ahmad Tuysirkani, Sabʿ rasaʾil (1381; Tehran, 2003), 35, 41f; Muhammad Barakat, Kitab-shinasi-yi falsafi-yi maktab-i Shiraz (Shiraz, 2004), 33, 59, 104. On Davani’s poetry, see Husayn ʿAli Mahfuz, Shiʿr-i farsi-yi Jalal al-Din Davani (Baghdad, 1973).

11. Broadly, I understand the Timurid period as beginning c. 1370, that is, when Timur (r. 1370–1405) conquered large parts of Central Asia, primarily Transoxiana and Khorasan, where he was recognized as ruler over them, as well as his sacking of western Anatolia and the Levant, until the rise and consolidation of the Safavids in the early decades of the 1500s.

12. On later Ashʿarism in Iran, and its gradual decline, see Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna, 37–48. For brief introductions on the main exponents of later Ashʿari theology in Iran in the Timurid period, including English translation of key excerpts of major works, see S. H. Nasr and M. Aminrazavi, eds., An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, vol. 3, Philosophical Theology in the Middle Ages and Beyond from Muʿtazili to Ashʿari to Shiʿi Texts (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 249–366.

13. For a brief survey of other intellectual and philosophical trends in Iran in the late medieval period, see Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna, 13–26. Modern studies have yet to sufficiently investigate the fate of the later Ashʿari tradition in Iran in the late medieval period. That later Ashʿarism faded out some time after the rise of the Safavids is, indeed, the prevailing and standard account. A detailed analysis, however, is as of yet lacking. At this stage of our knowledge, we can only offer, for the most part, impressionistic remarks (which can carry value if they succeed in directing attention to unconsciously neglected areas of research) partly based on the limited number of recent studies and partly on the preliminary findings of forthcoming studies:

First, evidence indicate that Davani was the last major representative of the later Ashʿari tradition in Iran; subsequent philosophizing Ashʿari thinkers, such as Muslih al-Din Lari and Habib Allah Baghnawi, were much influenced by Davani’s philosophical thinking and were indeed self-proclaimed intellectual disciples of Davani. Both Lari and Baghnawi left Iran to settle elsewhere as the sociopolitical milieu in Iran could no longer accommodate the presence of Sunni thinkers. Compare Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran; Dinani, Jalal al-Din Davani filsuf-i zawq al-taʾalluh; Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna.

Second, later Safavid historians, such as Muhammad Amin Astarabadi (d. 1626), portray Davani and his intellectual disciples as the last major Ashʿari current in Iran after the arrival of the Safavids. See Muhammad Amin Astarabadi, al-Fawaʾid al-madaniya, ed. Rahmat Allah al-Araki (Qum, 2003), 500.

Third, another indication that Ashʿari activity in its later form was on the decline at the turn of the fifteenth century is found in a statement of Fakhr al-Din Sammaki (d. 1576), who described his teacher, Sadr al-Din Dashtaki, as the “one who defeated the Ashʿari theologians [in Iran]” (Fakhr al-Din Sammaki, “Tafsir ayat al-kursi,” ed. ʿAli Rida Bahardust, Afaq-i Nur 9 [2009]: 395–448, at 439, 444).

Fourth, the later intellectual disciples of Dashtaki, Shams al-Din Khafri (d. 1535), Najm al-Din Nayrizi (d. 1541), and Sammaki, known for their opposition to Ashʿari philosophizing and promotion of philosophical Shiʿism, singled Davani out as the last major Ashʿari figure in Iran, rarely if ever acknowledging the existence of any worthwhile post-Davani Ashʿari thinking. On Khafri, see Shushtari, Majalis al-muʾminin, 2:233ff; George Saliba, “A Sixteenth-Century Arabic Critique of Ptolemaic Astronomy: The Work of Shams al-Din al-Khafri,” Journal for the History of Astronomy 25 (1994): 15–38; Firouzeh Saatchian, Gottes Wesen-Gottes Wirken: Ontologie und Kosmologie im Denken von Sams al-Din Muhammad al-Ḫafri (Berlin, 2011); Ahab Bdaiwi, “Some Remarks on the Confessional Identity of the Philosophers of Shiraz: Sadr al-Din Dashtaki (d. 1498) and His Students Mulla Shams al-Din Khafri (d. 1535) and Najm al-Din Mahmud Nayrizi (d. 1541),” Ishraq: Islamic Philosophy Yearbook 5 (2014): 61–85, at 75–83; Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna, 106–17. On Nayrizi, see Muhammad Baqir Khwansari, Rawdat al-jannat fi ahwal al-ʿulamaʾ wa l-sadat, 7 vols. (Beirut, 1991), 186f; Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran; Bdaiwi, “Some Remarks on the Confessional Identity of the Philosophers of Shiraz,” 83–85; Bdaiwi, Shiʿi Defenders of Avicenna, 117–20.

Fifth, a recent study has shown that Davani, insofar as he is a philosophizing Ashʿari thinker, was one of the last major luminaries of this tradition in Iran; philosophizing Ashʿaris in post-Davani Iran were, as argued by Dinani, few and far in between (Dinani, Jalal al-Din Davani, 431ff).

Sixth, when compared with the first generation of Safavid philosophers, second and third generation philosophers in the Safavid period, such as the late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-centuries thinkers Mir Damad (d. 1631) and Mulla Sadra (d. 1635), devote little attention to Ashʿari kalam and even less effort to critically engage with its theological commitments. This, perhaps, is an indication of the inconspicuousness of the Ashʿari tradition in the later Safavid period, and something to which the manuscript evidence attests. For example, the paucity of manuscripts on Ashʿari kalam or by Ashʿari theologians listed in the Safavid catalogs paint a very dim picture and seem to lend credence to the argument that after the sixteenth century there was little interest in the Ashʿari tradition in Safavid scholarly circles.

14. I was very cautious of the declinist thesis popular in modern scholarship until recently. Nowadays modern scholarship is making considerable headway digging up intellectual gems and bringing to light intellectual trends, traditions, and ideas from the postclassical period. Be that as it may, one can still argue with some justification that Mongol and post-Mongol intellectual history in the central and eastern lands of Islam, with few notable exceptions, has gone largely unnoticed in modern scholarship. This neglect is particularly true of its development during the period between the later decades of the thirteenth century and the emergence of the so-called School of Isfahan in Iran. A major reason for this neglect is that many works and intellectual outputs of this period were written in the style of commentaries, supercommentaries, glosses, superglosses, and abridgments. As such, they are considered unoriginal compositions that are unworthy of the modern scholar’s attention. On this tendency in Islamic intellectual history, see Dimitri Gutas, “The Heritage of Avicenna: the Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000-ca. 1350,” in Avicenna and His Heritage, ed. J. Janssens and D. de Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press 1999), 81–97; Asad Q. Ahmed, “Post-Classical Philosophical Commentaries/Glosses: Innovations in the Margins,” Oriens 41 (2013): 317–48; Asad Q. Ahmed and Margaret Larkin, “The Hashiya and Islamic Intellectual History,” Oriens 41 (2013): 213–16; Robert Wisnovsky, “Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the Isharat,” Oriens 41 (2013): 349–78.

15. Later philosophizing Ashʿari thinkers, such as Muslih al-Din Lari and Habib Allah Baghnawi, were much influenced by Davani philosophical thinking and were self-proclaimed intellectual disciples of Davani. Both Lari and Baghnawi left Iran to settle elsewhere as the sociopolitical milieu in Iran could no longer accommodate the presence of Sunni thinkers. Lari entered the service of the Mughal court, where he was warmly received, then moved to Constantinople in 1560, during the reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566). Once in Constantinople Lari took up the mantle of teaching at the madrasa of Khusraw Pasha and, while there, authored a number of works. Baghnawi became persona non grata after the death of Shah Ismaʿil II (r. 1576–1578), forcing him to move to India. On Lari, see Hanna Sohrweide, ʿal-Lari’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. Hamilton Rosskeen Gibb et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1954–2004); Reza Pourjavady, “Muslih al-Din al-Lari and His Sample of the Sciences,” Oriens 42 (2014): 292–322. On Baghnawi, see Reza Pourjavady, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd ed., ed. Marc Gaborieau, Roger Allen, and Gudrun Kraämer (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

16. El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah.” For studies on Ottoman intellectual history, see Mehmed Serafeddin Yaltkaya, “Turk Kelamcıları,” Darulfünun Ilahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuası 23 (1931): 1–19, a useful although dated study on Turkish theologians; Bursalı Mehmet Tahir, Osmanli muellifleri: Osmanlarin zuhurundan zamanimiza kadar gelen ve mesleklerinde eser yazan Turk mesayih, ulema, suera ve udeba, muverrihin, etibba, riyaziyun ve cografiyunun muhtasar tercumei halleriyle eserlerine dair malumati kafi havidir (Istanbul, 1914) is an immensely useful bio-bibliography that includes many entries on philosophers and theologians and relevant philosophical works from the Ottoman period; Katib Chelebi, The Balance of Truth, trans. Geoffrey L. Lewis (London, 1957); Ismail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, Osmanlı devletinin ilmiye teskilatı (Ankara, 1965); Madeline Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600–1800) (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988); Huseyin Atay, Osmanlılarda Yusek Din Egitimi (Istanbul, 1983); F. Jamil Ragep, “Freeing Astronomy from Philosophy: An Aspect of Islamic Influence on Science,” Osiris 16 (2001): 49–71; Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, “Institutionalisation of Science in the Medreses of Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Turkey,” in Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, ed. G. Irzık and G. Guzeldere (Dordrecht, 2005), 265–84; Ayman Shihadeh, “Khojazada on al-Ghazali’s Criticism of the Philosophers’ Proof of the Existence of God,” in International Symposium on Khojazada (22–24 October 2010 Bursa): Proceedings, ed. T. Yucedogru et al. (Bursa, 2011), 141–61; M. Sait Ozervarlı, “Theology in the Ottoman Lands,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. S. Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 567–86; Sait Ozervarlı, “Arbitrating Between al-Ghazzali and the Philosophers: The Tahafut Commentaries in the Ottoman Intellectual Context,” in Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazzali. Papers Collected on His 900th Anniversary, ed. G. Tamer, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 375–97.

17. El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah.”

18. El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” 38. In fact there is some evidence that the philosophical writings of Davani were circulated in Ottoman lands in the early decades of the sixteenth century. As noted previously, the Suleymaniye Library in Istanbul contains no fewer than 891 copies of works by, or related to, Davani. In the catalogs of Iranian libraries I have counted approximately 424 manuscript copies of works by Davani.

19. El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” 38.

20. His full name is ʿAbd al-Rahim b. Muhammad, known in the bio-bibliographical literature as Osmanlı seyhulislamı (or, mufti al-dawla al-ʿUthmaniyya). See Muhammad Amin al-Muhibbi, Khulasat al-athar fi aʿyan al-qarn al-hadi ʿashar (Cairo, 1867), 2:411f; Mehmet Ipsirli, “Abdurrahim Efendi, Hoca,” in Turkiye Diaynet Vakfi Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1994), vol. 1, 289; El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” 42.

21. His full name is Ibrahim b. Hasan b. Shihab al-Din al-Kurani, sometimes known as Burham al-Din, al-Shahruzi, al-Kurdi, and al-Madani. The sources describe him as imam al-aʾimma wa-hibr al-milla, abu l-ʿirfan, al-muhaqqiq al-sufi, and faqih al-sufiyya wa-sufi al-fuqahaʾ (the Sufi jurist par excellence). We learn much about Kurani and his intellectual learning and pedagogical lineages in his al-amam li-iqaz al-himam (lithographed in Hyderabad in 1910). To date (and to the best of my knowledge) thirty-two works of Kurani survive in manuscript form. In recent times, Kurani was the subject of a detailed study by ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz b. ʿAbd Allah al-Ghizzi. The famous maghrebi jurist-traveler Abu Salim al-ʿAyyashi (d. 1679) who met Kurani in Medina records one of the earliest external contemporaneous bio-bibliographical and intellectual accounts of Kurani in his famous travelogue in the years 1661 to 1663. See ʿAbd Allah b. Muhammad al-ʿAyyashi, al-Rihla al-ʿAyyashiyya, ed. S. al-Fadli and S. al-Qarashi (Abu Zabi, 2006), vol. 1, 478–87. See also Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Baqi al-Hanbali al-Baʿli al-Dimashqi (d. 1714), Mashyakhat Abi l-Mawahib al-Hanbali, ed. M. M. al-Hafiz (Beirut, 1990), 102–104; ʿUmar Rida Kahhala, Muʿjam al-muʾallifin (Beirut, 1957), 1:46; Recep Cici, “Ebu’l-Irfan (Ebu Ishak) Burhanuddin Ibrahim b. Hasen b. Sihabiddin el-Kurani es-Sehrezuri,” in Turkiye Diaynet Vakfi Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1994), 26:426f; El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” 51.

22. Details of Tefsiri Mehmed can be found in the useful but little-used Ottoman-era bio-bibliographical work, Waqaʾiʿ al-fudalaʾ, by Muhammad Shaykhi Afandi (d. 1731). Shaykhi Afandi includes hundreds of entries on Ottoman scholars. The Waqaʾiʿ was the subject of a detailed monographic study by Ali Ugur, The Ottoman ʻulema in the Mid-17th Century: An Analysis of the Vakaʾiʿ ul-fuzala of Mehmed Seyhi (Berlin, 1986). On Tefsiri Mehmed, see Seyhi Mehmed Efendi, Vekayiuʾl-fudala, Sakaik-ı nuʿmaniye ve zeyilleri 3–4, vol. 2, ed. Abdulkadir Ozcan (Istanbul, 1989); El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” 47f.

23. On him and the Husaynabadi family of philosophers and theologians, as well as the centrality of Davani in their philosophical thinking, see Florian Schwarz, “Writing in the margins of empires—the Husaynabadi family of scholiasts in the Ottoman-Safawid borderlands,” in Buchkultur im Nahen Osten des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts, ed. Tobias Heinzelmann and Henning Sievert (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010); El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” 49f.

24. El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” 53. The biographical literature in Turkish recognize Ḫadimi (Khadimi) primarily as a Sufi and jurist (fakih ve mutasavvıf), secondarily as philosopher. See Mustafa Yayla, “Hadimi, Ebu Said,” in Turkiye Diaynet Vakfi Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1994), 15:24–26.

25. Ismaʿil b. Mustafa b. Mahmud, also known as Gelenbevi, or Kalanbawi, was a celebrated Ottoman logician, theologian, philosopher, astronomer, mathematician, and commentator. He was recognized officially as a muderris (professor) in 1763 and held classes in the presence of the Ottoman sultan in the month of Ramadan, known commonly as huzur dersleri. His major contributions in philosophy include detailed discussions on existence and contingency, as well as thorough commentaries on the writings of Athir al-Din Abhari (d. 1265) and Muslih al-Din Lari. His most famous work on logic is al-Burhan fi fann al-mantiq wa-ʿilm al-mizan. See M. Sait Ozervarlı, “Gelenbevi, Ismail,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd ed., ed. K. Fleet, G. Kramer, D. Matringe, J. Nawas, and E. Rowson (Leiden: Brill, 2007). On Gelenbevi logical and philosophical ideas, see Abdulkuddus Bingol, Gelenbevi’nin mantık anlayısı (Istanbul, 1992); Ahmet Akguc, Ismail Gelenbevi’de varlık dusuncesi (PhD diss., Ankara University, 2006); Rıfat Okudan, Gelenbevi ve Vahdet-i vucud (Isparta, 2006).

26. ʿIsam al-Din Ismaʿil b. Muhammad al-Qunawi, or Ḳonevi, renowned as an exegete and author of the famous hashiya on the Qurʾanic commentary of al-Baydawi (d. probably 1286), published as Ismaʿil al-Qunawi, Hashiyat al-Qunawi ʿala tafsir al-imam al-Baydawi (Beirut, 2001). See also Kahhala, Muʿjam al-muʾallifin, 2:294; ʿAta Allah Saʿid al-Nasasira, al-Janib al-ilahi fi hashiyat al-Qunawi ʿala tafsir al-Baydawi li l-imam ʿIsam al-Din Ismaʿil b. Muhammad al-Hanafi al-Qunawi al-mutawaffa sanat 1196 AH (master’s thesis, University of Jordan, 2008).

27. Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran, 11n65.

28. Asnad va mukatabat-i tarikhi-yi Iran az Timur ta Shah Ismaʻil, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Navaʼi (Tehran, 1963), 254–58.

29. Shushtari, Majalis al-muʾminin, vol. 2, 225.

30. Shushtari, Majalis al-muʾminin; Tuysirkani, Sabʿ rasaʾil, 47.

31. That in the view of Dashtaki and his students the Old Treatise did not contain philosophically probative force is further affirmed by Nayrizi in his commentary, completed in 1515, on the work. See Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran, 129–31.

32. Based on the edition in Tuysirkani, Sabʿ rasaʾil, 115–70.

33. Tuysirkani, Sabʿ rasaʾil, 47f.

34. El-Rouayheb, “Baghnawi, Habiballah,” 40f.