… as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.
—U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
This is clearly tortured language, and the meaning of the sentence is obscured by that. There’s no reason for the repetitive use of the same word, and the secretary might have been clearer if he had said instead, “There are things we know, things we are aware that we do not know, and some things we aren’t even aware that we don’t know.” There’s a fourth possibility, of course—things we know that we aren’t aware we know. You’ve probably experienced this—someone asks you a question and you answer it, and then say to yourself, “I’m not even sure how I knew that.”
Either way, the fundamental point is sound, you know? What will really hurt you, and cause untold amounts of damage and inconvenience, are the things you think you know but don’t (per Mark Twain’s/Josh Billings’s epigraph at the beginning of this book), and the things that you weren’t even aware of that are supremely relevant to the decision you have ahead (the unknown unknowns). Formulating a proper scientific question requires taking an account of what we know and what we don’t know. A properly formulated scientific hypothesis is falsifiable—there are steps we can take, at least in theory, to test the true state of the world, to determine if our hypothesis is true or not. In practice, this means considering alternative explanations ahead of time, before conducting the experiment, and designing the experiment so that the alternatives are ruled out.
If you’re trying out a new medicine on two groups of people, the experimental conditions have to be the same in order to conclude that medicine A is better than medicine B. If all the people in group A get to take their medicine in a windowed room with a nice view, and the people in group B have to take it in a smelly basement lab, you’ve got a confounding factor that doesn’t allow you to conclude the difference (if you find one) was due solely to the medication. The smelly basement problem is a known known. Whether medicine A works better than medicine B is a known unknown (it’s why we’re conducting the experiment). The unknown unknown here would be some other potentially confounding factor. Maybe people with high blood pressure respond better to medicine A in every case, and people with low blood pressure respond better to medicine B. Maybe family history matters. Maybe the time of day the medication is taken makes a difference. Once you identify a potential confounding factor, it very neatly moves from the category of unknown unknown to known unknown. Then we can modify the experiment, or do additional research that will help us to find out.
The trick to designing good experiments—or evaluating ones that have already been conducted—comes down to being able to generate alternative explanations. Uncovering unknown unknowns might be said to be the principal job of scientists. When experiments yield surprising results, we rejoice because this is a chance to learn something we didn’t know. The B-movie characterization of the scientist who clings to his pet theory to his last breath doesn’t apply to any scientist I know; real scientists know that they only learn when things don’t turn out the way they thought they would.
In a nutshell:
We can clarify Secretary Rumsfeld’s four possibilities with a fourfold table:
What we know that we know: GOOD—PUT IT IN THE BANK |
What we know that we don’t know: NOT BAD, WE CAN LEARN IT |
What we don’t know that we know: A BONUS |
What we don’t know that we don’t know: DANGER—HIDDEN SHOALS |
The unknown unknowns are the most dangerous. Some of the biggest human-caused disasters can be traced to these. When bridges collapse, countries lose wars, or home purchasers face foreclosure, it’s often because someone didn’t allow for the possibility that they don’t know everything, and they proceeded along blindly thinking that every contingency had been accounted for. One of the main purposes of training someone for a PhD, a law or medical degree, an MBA, or military leadership is to teach them to identify and think systematically about what they don’t know, to turn unknown unknowns into known unknowns.
A final class that Secretary Rumsfeld didn’t talk about either are incorrect knowns—things that we think are so, but aren’t. Believing false claims falls into this category. One of the biggest causes of bad, even fatal, outcomes is belief in things that are untrue.