After Queen got his .30-caliber light machine gun set up and firing, his crew eliminated the Germans on the right side entranceway to the Manoir and gained a direct field of fire from behind the stone wall at and into the Manoir property. We in A Company now had control of the north side and rear backyard of the Manoir, as well as the little bridge running over the causeway westerly to the hamlet of Cauquigny, across the enormous flood plain. This eliminated the Germans outside the Manoir buildings and surrounding grounds. There were probably Germans still trapped inside the Manoir, but we didn’t know that. It was at this point that the 508 squad, now coming into the south side backyard, took the Manoir with all assisting, within about 15 or 20 minutes, as recounted further below.

At approximately 0900 hours, while A Company was making their costly approach, working down both sides of the line towards the Manoir along the east side of the river, the 1/505 commander, Maj. Frederick C.A. Kellam, had just been approached by Slim Jim Gavin. The young, 38-year-old general was leading a group of 300 men, mainly from the 507, who had been totally misdropped and had assembled about mile away to the north and west on the other side of the marsh and flooded Merderet River.

General Gavin had located the railroad line on the east side of the river, and his pickup group knew where they were located: he could hear the noise of the 505 A Company firefight as he moved down the railroad toward the sound of the guns with a band of soaking-wet paratroopers who had just crossed over the north side of the marsh to the shore. Kellam told Gavin that he had everything under control and there should be no problem taking the Manoir building after a cautious approach. No enemy had tried to come over the bridge from the west, so Gavin was satisfied with Kellam’s report and assurances. As the former colonel and original 505 commander, Gavin had absolute faith and confidence in his 505 officers and paratroopers. They had proven themselves competent and aggressive soldiers in Sicily and Italy, and he knew they would prove themselves again at the bridge.

With satisfaction that Major Kellam had his 1st Battalion mission solidly under control, Gavin took off for the Chef-du-Pont bridge along with Lt. Col. Arthur A. Maloney of the 507, and Lt. Col. Edwin J. Ostberg, also of the 507. Both Maloney and Ostberg were battalion commanders without their battalions. (5) Gavin took them and their men to seize and defend the Chef-du-Pont bridge and causeway; he also possibly wanted them to occupy or at least scout Hill 30, which was part of the 508’s original mission, and defend the surrounding area. It did not take Gavin, who was a brilliant combat general, long to determine that the 508 had also been scattered and was not at regimental strength. The battle at Chef-du-Pont that ensued later in the afternoon with Lieutenant Colonel Ostberg and his pick-up group of about 150 paratroopers, and the battle that afternoon with Capt. Roy Creek of E/507 from Lawrence, Kansas, will be reported in detail in a separate chapter.

By the time Lieutenant Dolan was ready to make his final attack, Colonel Lindquist was in a field near the bend in the road, 300 yards above and behind the Manoir. He sent word to Dolan that his (Lindquist’s) men would attack from the left/south side, while A Company attacked from the right side. Dolan never received Lindquist’s message; moreover, he had neither seen nor heard from Lindquist or any other 508 trooper all morning.

At about 0900 hours, after General Gavin had talked to Major Kellam, he told Colonel Lindquist to set up a reserve force by the railroad crossing, about 800 yards behind the Manoir, then to take what he had of the men from B/508 and move forward to the south and rear side as a supporting force for A/505. Presnell, Cpl. Oscar Queen, and the 1st and 2d Platoons of A Company cleared the rear area, and the Manoir roadside yard and entrance on the north side in front of the bridge of all outside enemy.

By 1015 hours, a group of 508 paratroopers had come from around the last Manoir farm building to the rear on the southeast side, entering along the pathway between the barn and the fort-like Manoir homestead. This 508 group included 1st Sgt. Ralph Thomas, Pfc. Jim Blue, Lieutenant Hagar, and a small group of other enlisted men who were about to add the finishing touch to the fight to capture the Germans who were left inside the Manoir.

Approximately seven hours earlier, 1st Sergeant Thomas of E/508 had landed off course near the 505 DZ, and met Colonel Lindquist later that morning. They assembled at the nearby east railroad crossing, as did 600 other 507 and 508 misdropped troopers. By the time the A/505 attack was well in progress, approaching or at the Manoir, Sergeant Thomas took off with his E/508 mixed group on Lindquist’s order.

Another group under the command of A/508 Lieutenant Hagar, along with James Blue and Robert J. Broderick, F/508, were in on this Manoir clean-up crew. They heard the shooting from the rear and the northeast end of the farmhouse before they began entering the Manoir backyard. As they cautiously moved ahead, Sergeant Thomas observed dead Germans in the yard. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Dolan and Colonel Ekman, the 505 commander, were casually standing in the driveway talking over the situation while waiting for the German-speaking Charles Burghduff to arrive and convince any enemy soldiers that might still be inside the Manoir to surrender, because at that point no one was doing any shooting.