A member of Robert E. Lee’s personal staff since 1861, Major Walter H. Taylor served as his adjutant during the Gettysburg campaign. He wrote to his brother from the Shenandoah Valley about the recent battle in Pennsylvania and its consequences. (Walter H. Taylor was not related to the Confederate general Richard Taylor.)
Camp near Winchester
17 July 1863
Presuming that Mary Lou may have left Richmond before this I will address myself to you and get you to forward this letter after reading it to our people wherever they may be.
I have written twice and telegraphed once since the late battle in Pennsyla giving assurance of the safety of Rob and myself and, as far as I know, of all our immediate friends. I hope these advices have been received & that all anxiety on our account has been allayed.
I was rejoiced to hear that John was unhurt up to the 24th of last month and trust that ere this you have received later tidings from him and that he is well. But for the loss of prisoners & the morale effect I would not much regret the fall of Vicksburg. Our people make a sad mistake when they attempt to hold such isolated points & attach so much importance to their being held successfully. After the enemy had obtained possession of the reach between Vicksburg & Pt. Hudson and held the same with their gunboats, I regarded the two points as of no more importance than any other two points on the Miss river. We could have prevented the free navigation of the stream by means of light and moveable batteries, and by concentrating our forces been enabled perhaps to have successfully resisted Grant’s advance into the interior. Even now it seems to me affairs are terribly deranged out west. If Genl Johnston feels too weak to attack Grant, or rather felt too weak to attempt to relieve Pemberton, why so weaken Bragg to such an extent to make him powerless to resist Rosecrans? Division and not concentration seems to be the order of the day out there. But it is not proper to criticise yet, nor do I blame anyone particularly; only it looks to me as if there was some lack of judgment or some mismanagement.
As regards our own affairs, I wish I could write you an account in full of all that has transpired since we left the Rappahannock but I cannot now do this. Indeed you are already aware of all that happened up to our arrival at Gettysburg and engagements at that place. On the first day we were eminently successful. We fought two corps of their army with two divisions & a fraction of ours and drove them handsomely, capturing a number of prisoners & reducing the two corps to less than half their strength. The Northern papers admit a loss in one corps of 66 per cent.
On the second day we were also successful & drove them from a very strong position, capturing some cannons & many prisoners. But now we came to a position that was a sort of Gibraltar. Their two flanks were protected by two insurmountable, impracticable rocky mountains. It was out of the question to turn them. We reached the very base of the stronghold only to find almost perpendicular walls of rock. Besides the natural advantages of the place the enemy had strengthened themselves very much by artificial works. There was no opportunity whatever for a successful flank movement and on the third day two divisions assaulted a position a little to the left of their centre. Pickett’s division of Virginians here immortalized itself. Its charge was the handsomest of the war as far as my experience goes and though it carried the works and captured a number of guns, it was not well supported by the division on its left, which failed to carry the works in its front & retired without any sufficient cause, thereby exposing Pickett’s flank. The enemy then moved on Pickett’s left & forced him to retire. The loss I suppose in killed, wounded & missing was about half of his command, which however was very small, consisting of only 3 reduced brigades.
Tho not much affected by this repulse, it was deemed inexpedient to make any more attempts to carry this place by assault. It was beyond our strength, simply this. If we had have had say 10,000 more men, we would have forced them back. As it was they did not resist Pickett but fled before him & had the supporting or second division performed its part as well, the result would have been different. On the next day we waited patiently for the enemy to attack us. This they did not do nor have they at any time since either attacked or manifested any desire to attack us. They retired from Gettysburg before we did and only claimed a victory after they had discovered our departure.
They only followed us with a little cavalry & horse artillery & their attempts to annoy our rear were ridiculous and insignificant. We took our time to Hagerstown, though to tell the truth we could not have moved rapidly had we desired it, for it rained in torrents incessantly, as indeed it did the whole month we were north of the Potomac. We arrived at Hagerstown & did not even hear of the enemy in our vicinity. Why he did not attempt to intercept us must appear remarkable to those who believe his lies about his grand victory. After four or five days he made his appearance. This time we had selected the ground and were most anxious for an attack. Our ordnance wagons had been replenished, we had enough to eat & the high waters of the Potomac gave no concern, if the enemy would only attack us.
We could not wait there for weeks & do nothing, nor could we afford to attack him in position, but if he would attack us, we would rejoice exceedingly. This the rascals dared not do, and their army, as they say, anxious to meet us again & flushed (as they say) with victory, did meet us & what next? They went to work fortifying as hard as they could and as I have discovered from their papers since, anticipated an attack from us. As they manifested no intention of fighting us, it was necessary or at least proper for us to leave our position and go where we could subsist. We threw a bridge over the Potomac & in face of this tremendous Yankee army flushed with victory (?) came into Virginia without the slightest annoyance from the enemy, but the elements were certainly against us. I never saw it rain so hard and our poor fellows had a hard time of it, I can tell you. The Yankees must organize a new army before they can again enjoy an “On to Richmond.” We crippled them severely & they cannot now make any formidable aggressive movement. We are again restive & ready for work. I will not hide one truth—that our men are better satisfied on this side of the Potomac. They are not accustomed to operating in a country where the people are inimical to them & certainly every one of them is today worth twice as much as he was three days ago. I am persuaded that we cannot without heavy acquisitions to our strength invade successfully for any length of time. Indeed had we been eminently successful at Gettysburg, in all probability we would have been obliged to make the same movements we have. Posterity will be astonished when the facts of this war are made known to see against what odds this little army contended. Even you would be surprised if I were to give you the figures of the Yankee army and our own.
I have just received Sister’s letter of the 13th and am grieved to see that she has not received my letter. I wrote immediately after the fight & hoped she certainly would have rec’d it as soon as the Dept did the Genl’s dispatches, which it accompanied. I did not know before that Mother had returned to Norfolk, tho I had received a letter stating she was detained in Annapolis. I try to be resigned & imagine that tho it now seems hard to us, some good will result from their cruel treatment of our household. God ordains all things well & I am assured we have only to wait patiently to see the good in this instance. We must get her some money if possible, or else she must borrow from the banks on some of her stocks or her real estate. I will send a draft to you by first safe opportunity for her half year’s interest on her Virginia stock.
I expect Mrs Parks will write to Norfolk & advise of the safety of all of us.
Unlike most people I think Peace is near at hand & more probable now than when we entered Pennsylvania, that is, provided Genls Grant & Rosecrans are not allowed to overrun the whole west & do as they please. If they are confined to the fall of Vicksburg & that of Pt Hudson all will be well, but if allowed to go where & when they please without any genuine show of resistance, why then we can’t say what the result will be. What the North is to be taught in order to secure peace is that a few military successes do not at all affect the ultimate result. Let them know that a success here and one there only prolongs the war without rendering our conquest by any means probable & they will not be able to resist the propositions of the Peace party in the North. Europe too may now think that we are weak in the knees & about to collapse and as sure as they do for fear of a reunion they will certainly recognize the independence of the South. The last thing they desire is to see us restored to the Union & if they see any apparent probability of it, they will move Heaven & Earth to prevent it.
Give my love to all at home when you write to Sally or Marcia and to all in Richmond. Aff yr bro
Walter