CHINA’S SUBMARINE FLEET IS EXPANDING RAPIDLY, with the development of second-generation nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines (the 093 and 094 respectively), as well as the US$ 1.6 billion purchase of eight Russian Kilo-class conventional submarines.1 With an increasingly complex submarine fleet, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will need to develop a system to control its forces. While command, control, and communications (C3) have challenged military leaders for centuries, submarines present a unique set of obstacles because of the nature of submarine warfare. A submarine’s key tactical advantage is its ability to act undetected beneath the ocean surface. However, communications are limited by the fact that seawater rapidly attenuates the signal strength of all but the longest radio wavelengths. A submarine wishing to send and receive information beyond basic time and navigation data must rise to shallower depths for transmission, trading stealth for connectivity. Submarine communications therefore come with a trade-off: a submarine can either stay hidden but act alone, or it can act in concert with the rest of the navy but with limited stealth.
This chapter will analyze China’s submarine C3 system, paying particular attention to the level of centralization and trends in the development of communication technologies. We will begin by discussing the relative merits of centralized and decentralized C3 systems. After that, we will examine the PLAN and its approach to submarine C3. While the PLAN may recognize the effectiveness of decentralized C3 for certain types of submarine missions, it appears to be seeking to create a more tightly centralized submarine C3 system by developing command automation, network-centric warfare strategies, and advanced communications technologies.
Before embarking on a discussion of Chinese submarine C3, it is first necessary to compare what is meant by centralized versus decentralized C3. In a decentralized C3 system, tactical decisions are made at the lowest level possible, relying heavily on well-trained officers at the tactical level who are able to act without guidance from the central commander. Such a system requires established rules of engagement and frequent training exercises in preparation for battle, including battle simulations and real-time exercises designed to prepare individual soldiers to act in unexpected circumstances. Decentralized C3 systems still take advantage of high communications connectivity, but individual tactical nodes are entrusted with greater autonomy in the event of a collapse in the communications infrastructure.
By contrast, in a centralized C3 system, decisions are made at the top of the command chain. Centralized C3 systems seek to empower a central commander to collect and process enormous amounts of information, and issue orders to guide the actions of subordinate command units. Centralized C3 requires a reliable communications system so that the central commander can remain in constant contact with his subordinates. The system requires training, consisting of rote drills and scripted exercises designed to get officers at the tactical level to follow orders, rather than to react independently and/or solve problems as they arise.
In Command in War, Martin van Creveld analyzed the historical development of C3 in land warfare,2 and found that decentralized C3 systems have generally proven to be more adaptable and effective than centralized C3 systems. Michael Palmer came to similar conclusions with regard to naval C3 in his recent book Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century.3 Their conclusions were based on an assessment that, despite advances in surveillance and communications technologies, the wartime battlefield environment remains significantly uncertain. Real-world commanders act under pressures of limited time, imperfect knowledge, and haphazard communications. Decentralized C3 systems are generally better suited to overcoming these challenges. This is reflected in the U.S. Navy’s endorsement of decentralized control in “Naval Doctrine Publication 6: Naval Command and Control.”4 The Second World War provides two historical examples of centralized and decentralized C3 for submarines.
The German submarine campaign in the Atlantic made use of a relatively centralized C3 approach. The German approach involved sending submarines to different points in the Atlantic. When allied ships were located, the submarines would send the coordinates to headquarters. Headquarters would then order several submarines to converge on a select point where they would attack as a “wolf pack.” By most accounts this strategy was effective in that Germany was able to sink a respectable quantity of allied shipping.5 However, as the war continued, Germany suffered progressively greater losses to its submarine force. By the end of the war, according to the analysis of Karl Lautenschlaeger, Germany had lost 67 percent of its submarine forces while sinking approximately 17.4 percent of Great Britain’s merchant shipping.6
We see a very different approach to submarine C3 in the U.S. submarine campaign against Japan. The U.S. approach involved sending several submarines into Japanese shipping channels. Rather than communicating with headquarters, these submarines were expected to attack alone, and to take targets of opportunity as they presented themselves.7 The U.S. campaign devastated Japanese shipping, sinking approximately 48.5 percent of Japan’s merchant fleet as measured in tonnage, with losses to U.S submarine forces of approximately 15.4 percent.8
While decentralized C3 appears to be the superior approach, this endorsement is not without caveats. Decentralized C3 demands a well-trained officer corps. In the absence of such well-trained officers, delegation of authority can be far worse than micromanagement. While a well-functioning decentralized C3 system may be the ideal, it may not be practical if tactical commanders are not up to the challenge. It is therefore possible that centralized C3 could be preferable under certain circumstances.
It should also be noted that certain types of missions demand centralized C3 by their very nature, the most important example being the deployment of nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). In this case, the goal is not so much victory on a naval battlefield or the destruction of enemy shipping, but rather deterrence from engaging in nuclear warfare. Under these circumstances, centralized C3 is preferable, and during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union maintained constant centralized control over their submarine forces.9
The most important political-military challenge and the most likely flashpoint for Sino-US conflict is Taiwan. Should the situation deteriorate into direct military conflict, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 1992 has been hard at work bolstering the hedging options of the leadership, developing advanced campaign doctrines, testing the concepts in increasingly complex training and exercises, and integrating new indigenous and imported weapons systems. At the strategic level, the writings of Chinese military authors suggest that there are two main centers of gravity in a Taiwan scenario, both of which directly involve China’s increasingly formidable submarine force. The first of these is the will of the Taiwanese people, which they hope to undermine through exercises, submarine blockades, missile attacks, Special Operations Force (SOF) operations, and other operations that have a psychological warfare focus. Based on intelligence from the 1995–96 exercises, as well as public opinion polling in Taiwan, China appears to have concluded that the Taiwanese people do not have the stomach for conflict and will therefore sue for peace after suffering only a small amount of pain. The second center of gravity is the will and capability of the United States to intervene decisively in a cross-strait conflict. In a strategic sense, China may believe that its ICBM inventory, which is capable of striking the continental United States, will serve as a deterrent to U.S. intervention, or at least a brake on escalation. In the future, deployment of the next-generation SSBN will enhance the stability of China’s second-strike deterrent. Closer to Taiwan, the PLA has been engaged in an active program of equipment modernization, purchasing and indigenously developing niche anti-access, area-denial capabilities such as long-range cruise missiles and quiet diesel-electric and nuclear-powered attack submarines to shape the operational calculus of the American carrier battle group commander on station.
At the same time, China’s emerging submarine force, much like its road-mobile conventional and nuclear missile force, pose significant C3 challenges to the Chinese military and national command authority, as they will be the primary units operating at the dynamic edges of a system accustomed to maintaining strong, active control via internal lines of communication. Traditionally, the Chinese C3 system has delegated little authority to lower levels, requiring central-level approval for the movement of even company-size ground force units.10 The traditional command culture has also emphasized caution and discouraged initiative without explicit instructions from above, suggesting that units cut off from their chain of command would remain passive rather than acting without clear guidance. These traditional concepts and operational codes are perceived by the PLA leadership as an impediment to full exploitation of the PLA’s emerging advanced C3 system, characterized by multiple, redundant, secure channels of communication.11 Moreover, the combination of this traditional command culture and advanced information technology could result in the perverse outcome of greater centralization of control rather than decentralization and flexibility at lower levels, as senior military leaders use their greater battlespace awareness to exercise closer control at tactical levels.
In the context of these contradictions between central desire for control and the liberating effect of information technology, submarine command and control poses a particularly thorny challenge. A few examples illustrate the dilemma. For the diesel-electric and nuclear-powered attack boats expected to operate east of Taiwan and hunt for carrier strike groups (CSGs), it is unreasonable to expect them to surface and transmit a request for guidance from Beijing after finding the CSG, especially in such a hostile ASW environment. Instead, it is more reasonable to deduce that the submarines (and mobile missile units) would be given rules of engagement to be used when they cannot communicate with Beijing, either because it would be too dangerous or their C3 support infrastructure had been destroyed. However, this scenario places tremendous responsibility in the hands of a submarine commander, particularly given the possible strategic consequences of sinking a U.S. ship.
Indeed, one must assume that a similar dynamic is at work with the imminent deployment of China’s next-generation SSBN. Decades of lessons from the Cold War about operating a successful nuclear deterrent suggest that a stable, survivable C3 system is critical so that headquarters could reliably authorize a second strike in the event of any first strike. At present, China’s communications infrastructure is vulnerable to a first strike. As a result the SSBN commander would require explicit and restrictive rules of engagement and even targeting data, lest crisis communications with Beijing reveal its position to hostile attack submarines, or if the submarine is cut off from Beijing after a decapitating first strike. Both of these illustrative cases highlight C3 challenges that will likely stress both the Chinese C3 and decision-making systems.
The PLAN is part of the greater PLA, which is divided according to services—the PLAN, People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and the 2nd Missile Brigade—and seven military regions (MR).12 The PLAN itself is subdivided into three fleets: the North Fleet, headquartered in Qingdao (Shandong Province, Jinan MR); the East Fleet, headquartered in Ningbo (Jiangsu Province, Nanjing MR); and the Southern Fleet, headquartered in Zhanjiang (Guangdong Province, Guangzhou MR). The PLAN can also be divided into five categories of units: naval surface vessel units, naval submarine units, naval aviation units, naval coastal defense units, and marines.13
In peacetime, PLAN fleet commanders are subject to multiple lines of authority from the PLAN headquarters,14 the leaders of their respective MRs, as well as the relevant offices of the four General Departments (Staff, Political, Logistics, and Armament), especially the naval bureaus under the operational and planning departments of the General Staff Department (GSD). PLAN headquarters is organized along the same lines as PLA headquarters with its own general staff, political, logistic, and armament departments. This pattern is repeated at the level of PLAN regional fleets as well. Under this system, each commander is directly subordinate to numerous superiors. Many articles written by PLA members have described this system as being inadequate to the needs of modern war, because subordinate commanders simply cannot respond to multiple, often-conflicting orders.15
Because of this weakness, the PLA supreme command (tongshuai bu) is supposed to establish a streamlined joint wartime command structure during times of war. The process begins with the designation of a war zone16 (zhanqu) and the establishment of a Joint Campaign Command (lianhe zhanyi zhihui jigou). The joint campaign command then takes over control of campaign execution, including planning, logistics, battlefield control, and coordination among the PLA services.17 The desired effect of this transition is removing redundant lines of authority from the service headquarters and GSD departments. It is important to note that these reforms are not an effort to delegate tactical decision making down to the tactical level. Rather, the Chinese reforms appear to be focused on achieving unity of command.
This push for greater central control is reinforced through a move toward greater reliance on technology in submarine command automation. Naval Operational Command Theory, an internal publication of the PLAN, deals with principles of naval operational command. It lists several things that are necessary for an effective command system, including strengthening “jointness (lianhe)” and “synthesis (hecheng)” in the command system, and adopting modern technological methods of command. One striking suggestion concerns improving the quality of commanders: “currently the most important thing is to strengthen the commander’s knowledge of science and technology at all levels. . . . Science and technology has materialized within intelligence, communication, command and control systems, and if commanders do not master high-technology knowledge, they will not be able to use automated command tools, and will not be able to truly implement operational command automation.” In other words, a quality commander is one who can properly use command automation equipment, not one who can take initiative.
Naval Operation Command Theory18 does acknowledge the potential usefulness of decentralized C3, even going so far as to remark on its potential application for submarines: “delegation-style [weituoshi—explained as decentralized C3] command methods are especially useful for opening naval sabotage/guerilla warfare (poxi youji zhan), as it is good for fully realizing the initiative, flexibility, rapidity, quick decision, and fluidity of naval sabotage/ guerilla warfare. It is more advantageous for submarines, air power, and small scale surface ships, when executing activities in small aircraft units, flotillas, or even as single boats or aircraft” (emphasis added).19 Based on this statement, it appears that submarines could operate with substantial autonomy down to the level of single vessels. In short, this passage would support the assertion that delegation-style command is very possible in the context of the PLA’s very centralized C3 system. However, closer review of Chinese writings on submarine command automation (zhihui zidonghua), network centric warfare (wangluo zhongxin zhan), and efforts to develop joint capabilities within PLA/PLAN provide some evidence that the PLAN may be seeking to develop tighter central control over its submarine forces.
Several articles extolling the benefits of submarine command automation have appeared in Chinese academic journals. An article in Ship Engineering presents a model for submarine decision making based on fuzzy neural networking theory. The author argues that submarine commanders would be able to enter a series of incomplete inputs into a program, which would then provide advice on the most expeditious course of action.20 Other examples include an article in Fire Control and Command and Control, discussing the applicability of analytic hierarchy processing and fuzzy mathematics,21 and a third article, which appeared in Ship Electronic Engineering, pointing to quality function deployment (QFD) as a way of improving command automation in submarines.22 These discussions emphasize data entry and execution of computer-generated decisions. While submarines would operate independent of central command, tactical decision making in this construct would still be outside the hands of the submarine commander. While this information is by no means doctrinal information, it does indicate that there are people doing work on technologies that would do at least some of the work of a submarine officer, and does not indicate a high level of trust in individual submarine commanders.
Besides command automation, the PLA/PLAN is seeking to develop network-centric warfare (NCW) capability. Given China’s penchant for centralized command, the enhanced connectivity inherent to NCW would probably lead to even greater interference in submarine tactical decision making. Several journal articles hint that centralization is the intended outcome of Chinese NCW development. One article in Sensor & Control Technology explicitly states that the goal of network-centric warfare is to “implement centralized long distance control over military forces.”23 The same article also noted the importance of combining NCW with command automation technology. Another article that appeared in Information Command Control System & Simulation Technology also made the point that NCW should be used in conjunction with greater command automation to better integrate submarine, surface, air, and land forces.24 Based on these articles it appears that China’s efforts to bring submarines into NCW will probably lead to less decision-making responsibility among subordinate officers.
While the PLAN may want to exercise tighter control over its submarine fleet, its current communications technology presents a significant obstacle. Until the PLAN is able to develop more advanced means of communication, it will probably be forced to exercise a more decentralized form of C3 with its submarine force. China’s research and development in communications technology will be an important factor in determining how China will execute C3 with its submarine force.
At the national level, the communications aspects of C3 in the PLA are very likely led by the General Staff Department Communications Department (Zong canmoubu/tongxin bu). This unit (hereafter referred to as GSD/ Comms) is the PLA’s signal corps, responsible for building, operating, and protecting the military’s communications infrastructure. The navy communications system is connected to the national military communications system in both vertical and horizontal ways, paralleling the multiple lines of command and control in peacetime. The PLAN Headquarters in Beijing, for example, has its own communications department, which supervises subordinate communications departments in the three regional fleets. The fleet communications departments, in turn, exercise guidance over communications units in all lower echelons, culminating in the communications personnel on individual naval ships.
An early article from Xinhua describes the PLA’s communications system as comprising underground networks of fiber optic cables, communications satellites, microwave links, shortwave radio stations, and automated command and control networks.25 A series of articles in Liberation Army Daily between 1995 and 1997 is more specific, describing the C3 system as being composed of at least four major networks: a military telephone network, a confidential telephone network (alternatively described as “encrypted”),26 an all-army data communications network (also known as the “all-army data exchange network” or “all-army public exchange network”),27 and a “comprehensive communication system for field operations.”28 A third account merges the two accounts, arguing that the PLA’s underground networks of optical fiber cables, communications satellites in the sky, and microwave and short-wave communications facilities in between form the infrastructure for a military telephone network, a secure telephone network, an all-army data communications network, and the integrated field communications network.29
In terms of submarine communications, China currently has long-range high frequency (HF)—also known as shortwave—and very low frequency (VLF) communication capability.30 China’s first submarine communications technology was long-range HF radios from the Russians. In 1958, Russia agreed to construct a high-power VLF site. In addition, the South Fleet made use of a low frequency (LF) station located in Zhanjiang. The first high-power LF station was built in Hainan in 1965. By 1980, China had VLF transmitters in both Zhanjiang and Yulin.31 Reportedly, China has twelve VLF stations with twenty-two operating frequencies, of which only two appear to be in active use.32
Each technology has advantages and disadvantages, and each is useful for different purposes. VLF allows shore commanders to contact submarines submerged to depths between ten and forty meters, or greater if the submarine deploys a buoyant cable antenna. VLF transmitters operate continuously to provide submarines with basic navigation and time data while maintaining an open channel for sending other alerts. These advantages are balanced by several limitations. First, VLF communications are one-way—the transmitters are too large to house on a submarine. Second, VLF signals are less useful for sending large amounts of data because they operate with limited bandwidth compared to HF transmissions—VLF communications are typically transmitted at fifty to two hundred baud, compared with up to twelve hundred baud for high frequency (HF) transmissions. Third, besides functional issues, VLF transmitters are vulnerable to enemy attack because of their immense size.
The advantages of HF transmissions are that they allow the submarine to engage in two-way communications, and they are capable of supporting higher data-rate transmissions. HF transmissions allow for communications over great distances without using relays. However, in order to communicate, the submarine must rise to periscope depth, exposing the submarine to detection and the adversary’s ASW forces. HF transmissions can also expose the submarine’s location by allowing ASW forces to track the submarine’s signals—a problem that China has addressed using instantaneous HF transmission technology based on the Soviet Akyha 900 communication system.33 Another problem with HF communication is its reliability. HF transmissions rely on the ionosphere to reflect HF waves over distances and are therefore susceptible to disruption by solar wind and other atmospheric disruptions, including high-altitude nuclear detonations.
Several articles in Chinese academic journals have addressed trends in the development of submarine communication technology. An article in Ship Electronic Engineering discusses the vulnerability of China’s shore-based VLF transmitters, suggesting that China should develop a system of airborne VLF transmitters, similar to the U.S. Navy’s Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) system.34 Another article addresses ways of preventing enemy detection of submarine-to-shore transmissions, specifically suggesting developing satellite technology, frequency hopping, and spread spectrum transmissions.35 Research on spread spectrum technology is clearly in progress as indicated by a recent article reporting experimental findings in this area.36 Research is also being conducted on improving China’s HF instantaneous communications technology.37 Beyond this, several articles also address the development of extremely low frequency (ELF) and blue-green laser technology.38 However, China does not appear to be ready to develop either an ELF system or a laser communications system.39
The Chinese military and defense-industrial base possesses numerous subordinate research institutes that focus on topics related to C3 systems. Among the General Staff Department institutes, the 54th Research Institute is a long-established center for research on communications and monitoring technologies, including microwave relay communications, wireless communications, scatter communications, satellite communications, satellite broadcast access, remote sensing, telemetry, surveys, communications countermeasures, intelligence, and reconnaissance. The institute produced China’s first fully digital satellite, communications ground station, first large shipborne satellite, communications ground station, first area air defense communications network, and first man-made satellite monitoring equipment.40 The 56th Research Institute develops computer systems. The 61st Research Institute reportedly develops command automation systems, as well as C3 systems, and hosted the 1997 Defense Information Modernization Symposium.41 The 62nd Research Institute performs research and development on communications equipment, computers, and command automation. The former 63rd Research Institute (now merged into the PLA Science and Engineering University) in Nanjing reportedly conducted research into microwaves and possibly encryption. One of these institutes was likely the subject of a 1999 article describing “a certain communications technology research institute under the General Staff Department” that had developed a phased-array antenna for satellite communications, thereby achieving “the goal of mobile communications and improving the rapid-reaction capability of its troops.”42
A narrower strata of the military and defense-industrial R&D base is principally concerned with naval communications. The China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), a state-owned conglomerate that designs, manufactures, and sells both military and civilian ships, is a major source of submarine C3-enabling research and development. One of CSIC’s principle research facilities for naval communications systems and network technology is CSIC No. 722 Research Institute, also known as the Wuhan Maritime Communications Research Institute. The institute was responsible for developing China’s high-power VLF43 and instantaneous HF communication technology.44 The institute has also done research to determine the minimum shift key (MSK) for ELF communication, as well as buoyant antenna technology,45 and a wide range of hard communications hardware including antennae.46
The CSIC 716 Research Institute, also known as the Jiangsu Automation Research Institute, investigates command automation, target processing, and C3 networking. Notably, the 716 research institute is particularly vigilant in monitoring foreign trends in naval C3-I, publishing numerous studies on the state of technology in other advanced nations.47
Among academic institutions, the Dalian Naval Academy and the Naval Submarine Academy at Qingdao stand out as key loci of submarine C3 research. While many of China’s foremost technical universities are engaged in research on topics with tangential implications for submarine C3, these two academies are particularly notable because their programs of study include both technical and naval officer training. The variety of research published by these schools reflects this dual mission. Researchers at the Dalian Naval Academy have published numerous studies on communications technology topics applicable to submarine communications. The Academy’s C3I Department, Automation Department, and Information Engineering Department all engage in naval communications research. Most recently, the academy appears to be particularly active in the fields of high-frequency communication, and frequency hopping and management techniques.48 Also, as Dalian Naval Academy’s primary mission is to train the PLAN officer force (80 percent of PLAN officers graduate from the Dalian Naval Academy),49 the academy also publishes on topics relating to officer training reform and some naval C3 theory.
Submarine C3 research at the Naval Submarine Academy in Qingdao has recently focused on command automation systems and computer control models for submarine-commander decision making.50 Other C3-related topics covered in recent publications include submarine-specific VLF communication,51 and theoretical laser communications. The Submarine Academy has also published broader C3 literature considering the role of submarines in network-centric warfare and indexing worldwide trends in submarine C3 development.
Due to the limitations of submarine communications technology, the PLAN currently can only exercise relatively limited tactical control over its submarines. This makes China’s submarine force an anomaly in the PLA, which has a tradition of highly centralized decision making. Although some Chinese military publications support the idea that submarines might be effective as relatively autonomous guerilla sabotage units, this concept is at odds with the PLA’s wartime joint command structure, which is designed to move the locus of tactical decision making closer to central command. It seems likely that submarine autonomy is a second-best solution driven more by questions of what is possible than by what is most desirous.
There have been many articles published in Chinese journals that indicate an interest in developing improved command automation technologies and greater network-centric warfare capability. Both developments hinge on the ability of the submarine force to share information and coordinate action with other PLAN vessels. The greatest obstacle to this interactive role is communications technology. Chinese research organizations and universities are currently working to develop better satellite and high-frequency communication systems, and a survivable VLF system. Advances in these technologies will facilitate greater connectivity between submarines and the rest of the PLAN fleet, providing military leaders with the option to exercise greater control over tactical decision making.
It remains to be seen how these technical developments will change the degree of centralization in China’s submarine force C3. While it is highly likely that the PLA will seek to strengthen centralized control over its fleet of nuclear ballistic-missile submarines, it is less obvious what will happen to the command structure of its attack submarines. Lessons drawn from historical comparison of United States and German submarine fleet effectiveness clearly favor decentralized C3, but this would be a highly unusual mode of operation within the greater PLA so accustomed to centralized decision-making. As improved communications technology makes centralized C3 a real option, it is difficult to say whether or not submarine forces will be able to resist the prevailing tendency toward greater centralization.
1. See Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 165–66.
2. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 261–75.
3. Michael Palmer, Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 319–22.
4. “Naval Doctrine Publication 6: Naval Command and Control,” accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ndp6.pdf.
5. Michael Palmer provided comparative descriptions of the German and U.S. approaches to to submarine C3 during World War II: Michael Palmer, Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century, 275–79.
6. Karl Lautenschlager, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901–2001,” International Security 11, no. 3 (Winter, 1986–87): 122.
7. Michael Palmer, Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century, 275–79.
8. Karl Lautenschlager, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901–2001,” 122.
9. Michael Palmer, Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century, 300–303. For further discussion on nuclear command and control see Stephen Polk, “China’s Nuclear Command and Control,” in Lyle J. Goldstein and Andrew S. Erickson, eds., China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, U.S. Naval War College, Newport Paper No. 22, 2005.
10. Michael Swaine, The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992), R-4254-AF.
11. James Mulvenon, “Chinese C4I Modernization: An Experiment in Open-Source Analysis,” in James Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, A Poverty of Riches: New Challenges and Opportunities in PLA Research (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), CF-189-NSRD.
12. The seven military regions are Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Shenyang, Chengdu, and Jinan.
13. Bernard C. Cole, “The Organization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), CF182-NSRD, 482–83.
14. The previous commander of the PLAN was Admiral Zhang Dingfa, himself a former submariner. See Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 161–96.
15. See Zhang Peigao, ed., Joint Campaign Command Teaching Materials (Beijing: Beijing Military Science Press, 2001), 49. See also Li Wei, ed., An Introduction to War Zone Joint Campaign Command (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000), 69.
16. A war zone is described as a relatively independent battle field, encompassing a wide battle space possibly encompassing land, sea, and air elements. See Kevin Pollpeter, Michael Lostumbo, Eric Valko, and Michael Chase, Joint Campaign Command, Control and Coordination in the Chinese Military (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, April 2004), 27–28.
17. It is important to note that service coordination in the Chinese sense is very different from joint operations in the U.S. sense, in that there is little actual integration of forces across services. For example, navy air forces would not fall under a coordinated command with air force, or army air units. Rather, each service would maintain control over their land, sea, and air units, but under the guidance of the joint campaign command. See Pollpeter et al., Joint Campaign Command, Control and Coordination in the Chinese Military, 49–53.
18. Yang Genyuan, ed., Naval Operational Command Theory (Haijun Zuozhan Zhihui Gailun) (Beijing: National Defense University Publishing House, 2002).
19. Ibid., 158–59.
20. Lu Minghua and Zhao Lin, “Submarine Command Decision Control Model and Simulation Research,” Ship Engineering (Chuanbo Gongcheng) 27, no. 3 (2005).
21. Cai Guangyou and Song Yunong, “AHP and Its Application in the Field of Submarine Command,” Fire Control & Command and Control 28 (5 October 2003).
22. Yang Jian and Song Yunong, “Operations Analysis about Submarine Command Automation System Based on QFD,” Ship Electronic Engineering (Chuanbo Dianzi Gongcheng) 25, no. 4 (April 2005).
23. Qiu Xiaohui and Qiu Xiaohong, “Study on Network Centric Warfare and Its Command and Control System,” Sensor and Control Technology 23, no. 4 (2004): 67.
24. Meng Zhaoxiang, “Submarines Engaged in NCW Require More Advanced C4ISR,” Information Command Control System & Simulation Technology (Qingbao Zhihui Kongzhi Xitong Yu Fangzhen Jishu) 27, no. 1 (February 2005).
25. Li Xuanqing (Jiefangjun bao) and Ma Xiaochun (Xinhua), “Armed Forces Communications Become Multidimensional,” Xinhua (16 July 1997).
26. Liu Dongsheng, “Telecommunications: Greater Sensitivity Achieved—Second of Series of Reports on Accomplishments of Economic Construction and Defense Modernization,” Jiefangjun bao (8 September 1997): 5, in FBIS, 14 October 1997.
27. See Tang Shuhai, “All-Army Public Data Exchange Network Takes Initial Shape,” Jiefangjun bao (18 September 1995) (FBIS).
28. Cheng Gang and Li Xuanqing, “Military Telecommunications Building Advances Toward Modernization with Giant Strides,” Jiefangjun bao (17 July 1997) (FBIS).
29. Chen Jun, Hong Jie, and Tian Hong, “Regarding War Preparation, Emergency Communications, Research on Tax Exemption Questions,” Electronics Window (Dianzi zhi Chuang), 08-2005, 51–54; Situ Mengtian “A Superficial View on the Construction of Our Army’s Emergency Communication System,” Journal of Military Communications Technology (Junshi Tongxin Jishu) (September 2001): 31–33.
30. Zheng Ruixun, “Navy Ship Communication Technology and Development Trends,” Ship Electronics Engineering (Chuanbo Dianzi Gongcheng), no. 5 (August 1997).
31. James C. Bussert, “Chinese Submarines Pose a Double-Edged Challenge,” SIGNAL Magazine, December 2003, accessed at: http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=93&z=22.
32. http://www.vlf.it/trond2/25-30khz.html, viewed January 15, 2006.
33. Zheng Ruixun, “Navy Ship Communication Technology and Development Trends.”
34. Qu Xiaohui, “A Brief Look at the Direction of Domestic Submarine Technology Development,” Ship Electronic Engineering (Chuanbo Dianzi Gongcheng) (May 2000): 43.
35. Mi Chen and Lai Jungao, “Submarine Communications Reconnaissance and Deception,” Information Command and Control System & Simulation Technology (Qingbao Zhihui Kongzhi Xitong Yu Fangzhen Jishu) 26, no. 4 (August 2004): 63.
36. Fan Youwen, “Analysis of Multiple-Access Interference for Spread Spectrum Communications in Modern Submarines,” Ship Science and Technology 26 (Supplement, 2004): 62–65, 74.
37. Zheng Ruixun, “Navy Ship Communication Technology and Development Trends,” 34.
38. See Dan Xianyu, “Exploration and Partial Experiments on the Principles of Underwater Laser Communications Technology,” Physical Experiment of College (Daxue Wuli Shiyan) 15, no. 4 (December 2002). See also Qu Xiaohui, “A Brief Look at the Direction of Domestic Submarine Technology Development,” Ship Electronic Engineering (May 2000): 43.
39. ELF communications systems have only been built by the United States and Russia, as the systems are very large and difficult to keep in operation. Because of the expense involved, it appears unlikely that China will develop an ELF communications system.
For its part, blue-green laser communications technology, if successfully developed, would theoretically allow for high-speed transmission of information to submarines at exceptional ocean depths. However, there are several technological challenges that prevent the technology from working. Examples include atmospheric and aquatic scatter, as well as interference from sunlight. To date there is no known blue-green laser communication system.
40. China Electronic News (Zhonguo Dianzi Xinwen) (22 September 2000).
41. Liang Zhenxing, “New Military Revolution: Information Warfare,” Zhongguo dianzi bao (24 October 1997): 8, in FBIS, 12 January 1998.
42. “PLA Develops Mobile Satellite Communications Antenna,” Xinhua (14 December 1999) (FBIS).
43. Stephen Pollack, “China’s Nuclear Command and Control,” from Lyle Goldstein and Andrew Erickson, eds., China’s Nuclear Force Modernization (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005).
44. Zheng Ruixun, “Navy Ship Communication Technology and Development Trends,” 34.
45. Ibid., 37.
46. Ibid., 35.
47. See examples: Dong Zhirong, “Teams and Academic Contribution on Submarine Concealed Attack Research,” Information Command Control System & Simulation Technology (Qingbao Zhihui Kongzhi Xitong Yu Fangzhen Jishu) 26, no. 1 (February 2004); Zhang Yisheng, “Development of New Russian Shipboard C-3I,” Intelligence Command Control and Simulation Techniques (Qingbao Zhihui Kongzhi Xitong Yu Fangzhen Jishu) (June 2004); Wang Ya, “EMC Design of the Maneuverable C4-I System,” Fire Control and Command Control (Huoli yu Zhihui Kiongzhi) (March 2005).
48. Examples include: Zhao Wenxiang, “Shortwave Communications Challenges for a Naval Island Blockade,” Ship Electronic Engineering (Chuanbo Dianzi Gongcheng (February 2003); Wang Yu, “Reconnaissance Probability of Shipboard Frequency Hopping Radio,” Ship Science and Technology (Chuanbo Dianzi Gongcheng) 27, no. 2 (April 2005); Li Guojian, “Software Radio and Its Applications in the Networking of Frequency Hopping Radio,” Ship Science and Technology (Chuanbo Kexue Jishu) 26, no. 6 (December 2004).
49. Statistic provided by Dalian Naval Academy website: http://www.dljy.edu.cn/.
50. For example: Cai Guangyou, “Analytic Hierarchy Processing and Its Application in the Field of Submarine Command,” Fire Control & Command Control (Huoli yu Zhihui Kongzhi 28, no. 5 (October 2003); Yang Jian, “Operations Requirement Analysis about Submarine Commands Automation System Based on QFD,” Ship Electronic Engineering (Chuanbo Dianzi Gongcheng), no. 148 (April 2005).
51. Yan Haijiao, “INS Output Revising Based on Differential VLF Position,” Ship Electronic Engineering (Chuanbo Dianzi Gongcheng) 25, no. 3 (March 2005).