AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II, only diesel submarines existed in the world. There were no nuclear submarines or submarines armed with ballistic missiles. In the 1950s, both the United States and the Soviet Union conducted very intensive development of ballistic-missile submarines. This was a completely new weapons system. There was no experience in its use. Progression from diesel to nuclear power, from surface launch to submerged launch of missiles, navigation and missile-guidance improvements, and increasing missile ranges facilitated improvements in operational use. Examining how the fleet ballistic-missile submarines and their weapons were developed during the Cold War leads to reflections on the changes in their operations. In considering the historical development of this weapon system and comparing the various employment doctrines of the superpowers, this chapter will seek to provide possible insight into how China is developing and may use its new force of SSBNs.
In 1955, the USS Nautilus proved that nuclear power would greatly expand the capabilities of submarines and make them free from the earth’s atmosphere for long periods of time. In 1960, the 5,900-ton nuclear-propelled USS George Washington, carrying sixteen Polaris A-1 missiles, put to sea. This accomplishment required phenomenal technical developments in a short period of time. By 1967 the United States had forty-one ballistic-missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs), called “Forty-One for Freedom,” available for operations. Later, more advanced ships and missiles were developed, and Trident-class submarines with their twenty-four missiles still conduct patrols today.
The U.S. goal was to keep each SSBN at sea for as many patrols as possible, considering refit requirements and overhaul intervals. At sea, “continuously ready,” was the watchword for SSBNs patrolling the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as the Mediterranean Sea. From 1960 to 1991, 2,427 Polaris and Poseidon patrols were conducted.
Operating an SSBN is not an easy task. To suppose that one simply hides and waits for orders to launch their weapons is too simplistic. These are nuclear-powered submarines submerged in a hostile environment twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, for patrols of seventy days or longer. The author made three patrols in the Pacific and one in the Atlantic in USS Daniel Boone (SSBN 629), a Polaris submarine, and five patrols in the Mediterranean as commanding officer of USS George Bancroft (SSBN 629), a Poseidon-armed submarine.
SSBNs are required
•to remain undetected by anyone, friend or potential foe, essentially in a wartime posture;
•to remain able to receive radio messages continuously;
•to maintain navigation accuracy beyond anything one could have conceived just a few short years before the Cold War; and
•to take the crew through missile launch sequences, with no previous notice on orders received any time day or night, either for an exercise or for a tactical launch. The requirement was to have all preparations completed and ready to launch in less than fifteen minutes.
The Soviet Union also started developing submarine-launched ballistic-missile systems in the 1950s. They developed diesel-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBs), and later, nuclear-powered SSBNs. They deployed their first sixteen-missile SSBN, the Yankee-class, in 1967.
In the early years, with so many different classes of submarines, and different missile ranges, the Kremlin operated its SSBN fleet more on an individual deployment basis. Soviet SSBNs sailed out of the Northern Fleet and the Pacific, and conducted patrols off of the coast of the United States for periods of some weeks. Later, when longer-range missiles were available, they stayed closer to home, in so-called “bastions,” and conducted more continuous patrols.
The price of the intense submarine operations during the Cold War was not cheap, in human lives or in submarines. The United States lost two nuclear attack submarines, USS Thresher (SSN 593) and USS Scorpion (SSN 589). The Soviet Union lost several submarines in the earlier years, including a November-class SSN in 1970. In the 1970s and 1980s, they lost several more submarines including a Yankee-class SSBN.
In 1981, China launched its very first ballistic-missile submarine, Type 092, NATO Code Xia-class. China tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 1988 and the submarine is still deployed with the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) North Sea Fleet. A new class of SSBN, the Type 094, was launched in July 2004. It is reported that it will carry twelve ballistic missiles.
China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now, or will shortly have, the capability to deploy an SSBN for individual patrols in open ocean areas within range of targets in the United States or other countries. If Beijing desires to have a continuous SSBN on station in a strategic deterrent posture, that will require more assets. To have one SSBN on patrol requires at least three and probably four SSBNs in the fleet. If the current estimates are correct, China could have that capability by 2010 to 2015, with five or six Type 094 submarines. If the new Jl-2 missile with an estimated range of 8,000 kilometers (4,900 NM) is available, China’s SSBNs can remain reasonably close, in the open ocean off China’s coast, for patrols. The PLAN will have to develop longer range missiles to conduct patrols in bastions in the South China or East China Sea, however, and still be able to cover targets in the continental United States.
The PLAN may indeed opt to deploy SSBNs in bastions similar to the doctrine of the Soviet navy in the later stages of the Cold War. It is an advantage to be protected by friendly air and surface forces. But being in a bastion is not particularly useful if both the SSBN and its protector, possibly an SSN, are both under an acoustic disadvantage to an enemy who will come in to the bastion and be ready to attack.
China has now genuinely become the fifth member of the ballistic-missile submarine club after the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia. It is an elite group possessing a very sophisticated weapons system. SSBNs and their weapons systems are expensive to build and expensive to maintain. They require a high level of technology, and above all, exquisite and regular crew training to exceedingly high standards. Continuous demonstration of the ability for the entire weapon system to work is required for them to form a credible strategic deterrent.
China has the resources, the access to technology and, seemingly, the will to create a viable SSBN force. But it will take time, serious training, extensive support facilities and a lot of experience at sea to be truly successful in this endeavor.
In the 1950s, the idea of launching ballistic missiles from nuclear submarines was conceived. Many, particularly submariners, viewed this initiative with great skepticism. The United States had cruise-missile submarines which were tested and deployed, although they had to surface to fire their missiles and these weapons were of short range. In 1955, the Navy’s ballistic-missile program commenced as part of the Army-Navy Jupiter Program. In 1956, the Navy under Adm. Arleigh Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), received approval to initiate its own Polaris fleet ballistic-missile (FBM) program and terminate its involvement in the joint liquid-fuel Jupiter missile program.1 Due to the surprise and anxiety in Washington concerning Moscow’s success with space launches, the so-called missile gap was perceived by U.S. leaders to exist and we found ourselves in a missile race with the Soviet Union. The goal for the U.S. Navy to develop a ballistic-missile system was set for four years.
Only four years later, in 1960, the fifty-nine-hundred-ton nuclear-powered USS George Washington, carrying sixteen Polaris A-1 missiles, put to sea. The technical challenges to accomplish this were monumental. The primary challenges were in six areas: the ship, the missile, ship navigation, missile guidance, the fire control system, and missile launchers.
The challenge was to design, build, and test a submarine of revolutionary design in an extremely short amount of time. It was decided to use a modified Skipjack (SSN) hull. A submarine in construction, the Scorpion, was actually cut in half, a one-hundred-thirty-foot-long missile compartment containing sixteen vertical launch tubes was added, and this became the fleet ballistic-missile submarine, USS George Washington.
With respect to the nuclear-armed missile, Jupiter had been a liquid-fueled missile. The Navy felt that a liquid-fueled missile was too large and inherently more cumbersome and dangerous than a missile with solid propellant. At the time, however, solid propellant was not a mature technology.2 In spite of inevitable missile failures from the test pads—and some were spectacular—the solid fuel motors were developed successfully.
The existing missile guidance systems were too large for the Polaris missile so a new system had to be developed. MIT and General Electric worked together to miniaturize inertial components to be integrated into the guidance system. To guide a ballistic missile more than one thousand miles, greater navigational accuracy than available by traditional means was needed. One must know the ship’s position at all times between navigational fixes and the azimuth to target with the required accuracy. Fixing techniques using radio navigation, bottom contour navigation and, later, satellite navigation were developed. Also, a dead reckoning system, called the ship’s inertial navigation system (SINS), which provided the between-the-fix accuracy, was developed. Finally, to provide the very accurate heading information needed, a periscope sextant, the Type XI, was developed. In the mid-1960s improved SINS systems made it so that dependence on the periscope sextant was no longer required. Finally, a digital fire control system was developed (MK 80) that solved the ballistic missile fire control problem.3
With respect to the process of launch, propelling the missile through the water while keeping it dry was no small feat. A method of ejecting the missile through a frangible diaphragm using compressed air was developed. The diaphragm kept the missile dry when the hatch was opened for a launch. Once launched, the missile actually surfaces in an envelope of air and does not ignite until it is above the surface. Later, a gas generator using the exhaust and steam from the combustion was used. While already going at slow speed and quickly launching a missile weighing thousands of pounds, the SSBN becomes instantly very light. Depth control becomes a serious problem. A method of hovering the submarine in place and quickly compensating for the loss of weight on missile launch was developed.
These were impressive technical developments in a short period of time. By 1967 the United States had forty-one SSBNs available for operations. But all was not rosy. There were many stumbling blocks, such as early missile test failures. Also, in the early years there was a very steep learning curve in building proficiency in operating these submarines. A very careful way to test the entire system was developed: communications, transmitting and receiving a launch order, verification of the order, placing the submarine at depth and speed to launch, energizing the missile fire control systems, verifying the fire control inputs to be correct, and finally simulated launch. This system is tested, practiced, and proven continuously. It has to be so for the credibility of the weapons system to be believed, especially by potential adversaries.
In the 1970s a new submarine, the Ohio-class, was designed and built. Carrying twenty-four Trident D-5 missiles with a range of 5,000 miles, 560 feet long, and displacing 16,747 tons, the first Ohio-class deployed on patrol in October 1982.
Operating an SSBN for a patrol is not a simple task. These are nuclear-powered submarines. They are submerged in a hostile environment twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, for patrols of seventy days or longer. They experience damage to equipment that must be repaired by the crew.
They are required
• To remain undetected by anyone, friend or potential foe. All sonar contacts were continuously tracked, and avoided. If it was necessary to come to periscope depth for some reason, although seldom, it could be a challenge to find a vacant piece of ocean. This was especially true in the crowded Mediterranean where the author made five SSBN patrols.
• To remain able to receive radio messages continuously. One of several types of antennas had to be close to the surface in the Cold War days. Casualties to the somewhat fragile antennae were common and had to be dealt with by deploying spares or alternate types.
• To maintain navigation accuracy beyond anything one could have conceived just a few short years before the SSBNS were built. Until the mid-1960s, the Type XI periscope sextant had to be used to provide the very accurate heading information needed. This meant going to periscope depth to shoot stars. Again, it could be a challenge to accomplish that and return to patrol depth undetected. Present-day systems are extremely accurate due to the introduction of GPS and improvements in the SINS systems, so excursions to periscope depth are required much less often.
• With no previous notice, on orders received any time day or night, take the crew through a missile launch sequence either for an exercise or for a tactical launch. Once the launch message was received, the ship would be brought to launch depth and prepared to slow and almost hover in place. The missile systems would be spun up and the launcher systems prepared. The requirement was to have all preparations completed and ready to launch in fifteen minutes. Exercise messages would be sent often by higher authority. Invariably, it seemed, this occurred in the middle of the night. The ship and crew went through the whole simulated missile launch sequence exercise every time.
In order to keep the submarines at sea for the maximum time, the two-crew concept was initiated. This allowed the submarine to be refitted and to return to sea immediately with the counterpart crew on board. It was a unique concept, a complete break with Navy tradition. The turn-over period between crews was only four days and the crew having just completed a patrol flew back to their home port in the United States for rest and recreation, followed by intensive training, only to return to the refit site three and a half months later.
The Soviet Union’s program developed differently from ours. They used diesel ballistic-missile submarines (SSBs) for a time even after they had developed nuclear power for submarines. They commissioned many different classes, making incremental improvements rather than great technological breakthroughs.
The Soviet Union created the world’s first ballistic-missile submarine with its project 611 (NATO code name Zulu). One was equipped with a single Scud missile. Five more were converted to carry two of the Scud missiles in tubes in the enlarged sail. The submarine B-67 launched a missile on September 16, 1955. The missile was the R-11FM missile designed by Sergei Korolev, using kerosene and nitric acid for fuel. The Scud missile was derived directly from German V-2 technology, and continued to haunt the world as it migrated down the power chain to rogue nations of the Middle East.4
The Zulu was a diesel-powered submarine and had to surface to launch missiles. They had their problems. The author was a young lieutenant stationed at the U.S. Navy’s Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center in Washington in 1963 and 1964, assigned as the submarine and submarine-launched missile analyst. A picture, taken by a third country source, came across my desk which showed a Zulu-class submarine returning to port, a missile at the top of the sail and blackened charred areas all around the openings at the bottom of the sail. Evidently, it was a failed launch in which the missile motor ignited but did not leave the top of the sail. We analysts all felt the ship was fortunate to make it home.
The first Soviet submarine, designed from the outset as a ballistic-missile submarine, was the Golf-class (1958). The Golf-class was diesel-powered and carried three SS-N-4 ballistic missiles in an extended sail structure. The SS-N-4 could only be fired from the surface, and required a time-consuming prelaunch setup period.
The Soviets had a very ambitious nuclear submarine program which led to the production of three classes of nuclear submarines between 1958 and 1960, with no fewer than twenty-six of all types being built by 1963. These were the November-class, an SSN; the Echo-class, an SSGN; and the Hotel-class, an SSBN. The Hotel-class was the world’s first nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine; with the first hull completed in 1959, slightly ahead of the United States’ first, USS George Washington. The Hotel versions I and II carried three missiles. The Hotel III carried six. The later Hotel classes (1962) could launch their missiles from the submarine while submerged.5
Through the early 1960s, the U.S. intelligence community was continuously asked: Are the Soviets developing a more advanced capability than the Hotel-class? The answer was: “Not that we can determine.” On a Saturday morning in 1963, the author, still stationed at the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center, received a call from a fellow analyst at the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center. He said, “You need to get over here—now.” After arriving, we gazed at a picture of a submarine in a building yard that looked very similar to our George Washington-class SSBN. But it was a Soviet building yard. It was Project 667 (a NATO-designated Yankee-class submarine). This was the first Soviet submarine to approach any thing like our Polaris submarines. It had a streamlined hull, and so was faster than previous Soviet SSBNs. It had sixteen launch tubes, and could launch while the submarine was submerged. The first Yankee class was commissioned in 1967. Thirty-four hulls of this class were built.
The Soviets continued to build larger and improved SSBNs. Between 1972 and 1992, they built forty-three of the Delta-I though Delta-IV submarines. This class is one of the most successful of all SSBNs. It had increasingly improved missiles and went from twelve missiles in the Delta-I to sixteen in the Delta-II, -III and -IV. With the forty-eight-hundred-nautical-mile-range SS-N-8 missile, the Soviets were truly able to threaten the United States from bastions in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea, close to their own shores.6
In 1983 the Soviets came out with the Typhoon-class, the largest SSBN in the world, 566 feet long and displacing 33,800 tons submerged. The Typhoon carries twenty 4,470-nautical-mile solid-fuel missiles. A total of six Typhoons were built.
In the early Golf- and Hotel-class submarines, Soviet missiles were in the one thousand- to thirteen hundred-mile range, which required them to patrol off the east and west coasts of the United States in order to cover targets. These presented a significant threat to major U.S. military targets, as they were within just minutes of flight time for the missiles. However, the submarines were noisy and easily tracked by American SSNs and the SOSUS (sound surveillance system).7
The eight years between the first Hotel-class and the first Yankee-class allowed for some major changes in Soviet strategy. The Hotel-class was stopped after only eight units were built, a reflection of the ascendance of the Strategic Rocket Forces that Nikita Khrushchev had established in December 1959. This new service, as dramatic in its debut as the United States Air Force had been in September 1947, took over the first land-based ICBMs as well as the medium-range missile units that formerly had been under the control of Long Range Aviation or reported directly to the Supreme High Command.8 The George Washington-class had to be matched, however, and the Central Design Bureau No. 18 responded with Project 667A, which became the Yankee class.9
With a streamlined hull, added speed, and sixteen vertical launchers, the strategic effect of the Yankee-class was dramatic. The Soviets now had a fast nuclear submarine, armed with sixteen ballistic missiles with a range of fifteen hundred nautical miles, which could launch submerged. It was a serious threat to the United States. However, once again, they were relatively noisy and could be tracked by U.S. SSNs and the SOSUS system.10
Over the next years the very serious business between the United States and the Soviet Union of trying to track each other and trying to establish a method of neutralizing each other’s SSBNs was conducted. In the colorful prose of Gary Weir and Walter Boyne: “Cold War oceans were filled with the tumult of submarine versus submarine encounters, any of which could have resulted in disaster and some of which did result in collisions. To the United States and the Soviet Union, the threat of a ballistic-missile submarine was so great that each one had to be identified, shadowed, and marked for instant destruction in the event of war. It was a demanding task, and required extraordinary equipment and crews in both navies.”11
As their missile ranges improved, the Soviets elected to patrol closer to home in their bastions, where they felt their SSBNs could be protected by their forces. This could only be successful if their submarines, both SSBNs and SSNs, were quiet enough to have an advantage over an adversary in contact with their SSBN.
The price of intense submarine operations during the Cold War was not cheap, either in human lives or in submarines. Submarines were lost during the Cold War, not to hostile action, but to failures of equipment, fires, collisions, and other casualties.
The United States lost two nuclear attack submarines, USS Thresher (SSN 593) and USS Scorpion (SSN 589). USS Thresher was lost during post-overhaul sea trials in 1963. The investigation indicated that the vessel probably suffered a flooding casualty, which resulted in short-circuiting some electrical equipment, causing the reactor to shut down. Although the crew blew the main ballast tanks, the blow stopped, possibly due to ice forming in strainers in the blow valves.12 Many changes in submarine piping systems design and fabrication, as well as to operational procedures, directly resulted from the loss of Thresher.
USS Scorpion was lost returning from a deployment to the Mediterranean in the mid-Atlantic in 1968. In the investigation report, the Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet postulated that Scorpion was lost “as a result of a flooding type casualty, which originated at a depth of XXX feet or less; that for undetermined reasons the flooding caused the ship to sink near or beyond the hull designed collapse depth.”13
The book Blind Man’s Bluff documents the findings and investigation by Dr. John Craven, who directed the search for Scorpion. Craven felt that a likely cause of its loss was a faulty torpedo battery overheating. The Mk46 battery used in the Mark 37 torpedo had had a thin foil barrier separating two types of volatile chemicals. When mixed slowly and in a controlled fashion, the chemicals generated heat and/or electricity, powering the torpedo motor. But vibrations normally experienced on a nuclear submarine had been found to cause the thin foil barrier to break down, allowing the chemicals to interact intensely. In one case, vibration tests in a torpedo test lab had caused a fire in the lab that was strong enough to have caused a low order detonation of a warhead (a dummy warhead was installed for lab tests) had the fire not been extinguished quickly. Such a detonation may have occurred in Scorpion, opening the torpedo loading hatch and causing Scorpion to flood and sink. Indeed, the Court of Inquiry looking into the disaster, when their detailed findings were finally released in 1993, showed that the court had concluded that the top three probable causes of Scorpion’s loss all involved torpedo accidents.14
The Soviet Union lost several submarines in the earlier years, including a November-class SSN in 1970.15 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets lost several more submarines including a Yankee-I class SSBN northeast of Bermuda. In that submarine, K-219, a missile hatch leaked, allowing in seawater that reacted with liquid missile fuel that had leaked in to the missile tube. The resulting explosion and fires killed four crew members. All others aboard were rescued. After extensive efforts to save the ship and to tow her, the ship sank due to the extensive damage and resulting flooding.16
Perhaps the most well-known Soviet submarine accident, until the tragic loss of the Kursk17 and its crew in 2000, was that of the Hotel-1-class K-19 in July of 1961. Coolant piping for one of the reactor plants failed. The submarine surfaced and tried to radio for help at that time, but the long-range radio antenna was flooded and useless. Volunteers were requested and a team of eight courageous crewmen entered the reactor compartment to make repairs, which they knew would mean their death from radiation exposure. The ship’s freshwater system was rigged to provide cooling, which prevented a catastrophic accident. The crew was eventually evacuated to a Russian submarine. Nevertheless, the whole ship was highly contaminated and many of the crew later died. K-19 was towed to port, decontaminated, new reactors installed, and put back in to service. Crew members who served in the submarine in later years called it “Hiroshima.”18
The Type 092 Xia-class was China’s first SSBN. The first ship, Changzheng 6 (406), was launched in 1981, and became operational in 1983, though the JL-1 SLBM did not conduct a successful test launch until 1988 due to problems with its fire-control system. The Xia-class submarine is outfitted with twelve submarine-launched ballistic missiles with two-stage solid-fuel rocket motors and a maximum range of approximately two thousand kilometers (eleven hundred nautical miles).
The first test launch of the JL-1 SLBM took place on 30 April 1981 from a submerged pontoon near Huludao. A second missile was launched on 12 October 1982 from a Golf-class diesel trial submarine. The first launch from Type 092 in 1985 was unsuccessful, delaying the final acceptance into service of this submarine. It was not until 27 September 1988 that a satisfactory launch took place. Currently the 406 is deployed in the PLAN North Sea Fleet based at Qingdao. It started a major set of upgrades in late 1995 at Huludao Shipyard. This modernization was completed in 2001. The upgrades reportedly include replacing the original JL-1 SLBM with the improved JL-1A, which has an extended range of 3,000–4,000 kilometers (1,640–2,187 NM).20
With only one single Type 092 SSBN, it is not possible for the PLAN to establish an effective underwater nuclear strike capability, which can guarantee that at least one SSBN is ready to launch at any time. However, the boat has served as a stepping stone in the development of a more comprehensive Chinese SSBN force in the future.
Operations of the Type 092 SSBN have been limited and the boat has never sailed beyond Chinese regional waters. Despite a potential for operations in the Pacific Ocean, capabilities would be very limited against modern ASW capabilities.
The first of a new class SSBN, the Type 094, was launched in July 2004.21 It is estimated that four or five of the Type 094 will be built by 2010. Type 094 will have twelve of the new Jl-2 missiles with an estimated range of seventy-five hundred kilometers (forty-seven hundred nautical miles).22 Estimates from various sources show the JL-2 missile with ranges quoted from seventy-five hundred kilometers to eighty-six hundred kilometers. Eight thousand kilometers is used for subsequent analysis of Chinese SSBN capabilities in this chapter.
Recently, the Chinese and Russians conducted eight days of joint “maneuvers” centered on the Shandong Peninsula, across the Yellow Sea from the Korean Peninsula. The drills were conducted with ten thousand military personnel on land, at sea, and in the air; about eighty-five hundred of them Chinese.23
In an interview in August 2005 concerning the exercises, Adm. Gary Roughhead, the new commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, suggested that he was more interested in the Chinese than the Russian navy, much of which has been sidelined by a lack of funds. “Clearly, the Chinese are developing a very capable modern military, especially the navy. The question is: What do they see as the intended use of that navy? If it is to ensure the free flow of commerce, that would not be surprising,” he said, nodding toward the sea lanes in the South China and East China Seas through which pass the oil and raw materials that feed China’s burgeoning economy, not to mention its soaring imports. The Admiral added, however: “What if the intent is not purely to defend the sea lanes?”24
At the Naval War College, it is taught that a nation’s national objectives lead to policy, which leads to strategy. Strategy leads to the procurement and allocation of resources and their operational use. How does that relate to Chinese naval strategy, and specifically, development and deployment of ballistic-missile submarines?
An insight into this initiative might be gleaned from an interview of Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, Cheng Siwei, in June of 2005.25 Although the subject was the Chinese economy and this discussion specifically concerned U.S. pressure on China to revaluate their currency, which they partially did later, the statements by Cheng reveal the Chinese sensitivity to treatment as an equal world power: “If you take us as a friend, you will have a friend. If you take us as an enemy, you will have an enemy. So we don’t want to fight with you. So please don’t put pressure to us. . . . We would like to solve these problems through dialogue and consultation rather than confrontation. But, you know, we have our own dignity.”
China is the fourth largest country in the world and has a population of over 1.2 billion people, about one-fifth of the world’s population. It has a rapidly expanding industrial base and economy. China certainly must be taken seriously and is, because of a painful historical legacy, quite obsessed with defense against external threats. That China is developing an expanding navy with increasing and varied weapons systems and capabilities is not surprising. Ballistic-missile submarines are part of the mix.
Capt. Brad Kaplan, the naval attaché to China at the time, seemed to capture the essence of the Chinese strategy for the PLA Navy when he wrote in December 1999:
In recent years, the PLAN’s maritime mission has evolved from a role of static coastal defense to one of “active offshore defense.” In this capacity, the PLAN can be used both as a tactical force and to support strategic national defense. The objectives of this new strategy are to assert China’s role as a regional maritime power, to protect coastal economic regions and maritime interests, and to optimize the Navy’s operations for national defense. The PLAN’s responsibilities now include capture and defense of islands, and protection and blockade of sea-lanes of communication. Moreover, the PLAN is increasingly viewed by senior PLA leadership as integral to resolution of the Taiwan issue—should force be required—and for safeguarding China’s “Xisha” [Paracels] as well as claims to the “Nansha” [Spratly] islands in the South China Sea. Finally, the PLAN is likely to be increasingly used as an instrument of overseas diplomacy through participation in goodwill cruises and port visits.
It seems that as far as national policy and overall strategy are concerned, the Chinese are intent on increasing their ability to be a serious player on a larger and larger part of the Pacific Ocean stage.
The Chinese Navy has now or will shortly have the capability to deploy an SSBN for individual patrols to open ocean areas. If it desires to continuously have an SSBN on station in a strategic deterrent posture, it will require more SSBNs. To have one SSBN on patrol would require at least three, probably four, SSBNs in the fleet. If current estimates are correct, China could have that capability by 2010 to 2015. If the new Jl-2 missile with an estimated range of eight thousand kilometers (forty-nine hundred nautical miles) were available, Chinese SSBNs could range in the open ocean distant from their targets, using the vast reaches of the Pacific for their operations.
If one assumes that the Chinese desire to have a credible SSBN weapons system with capability for a continuous strategic deterrent posture, they must not only have a sufficient number of SSBNs but also pursue rigorous training and practical demonstrations of the system on a regular basis. Once the decision is made to launch, that must be transmitted to the submarines by a robust and survivable communications system. A system of authenticating that order on the ship must be totally dependable. The ship itself has to rigorously practice the preparations for launch, gaining proper depth and speed rapidly and, finally, the missile and guidance systems must be able to be exercised and verified right up to a simulated launch. All of this training must be done routinely and often. Some sort of test program with a periodic launch from an operational submarine of a missile with dummy warheads is also essential. This is necessary to prove the reliability and accuracy of the system.
If a two-crew concept is used, the crew that is ashore cannot allow their skills to be neglected, so training must resume during their off-crew period, after suitable leave. This requires sophisticated facilities ashore.
If the Chinese were to desire to patrol in bastions, similar to Moscow’s strategy in the later stages of the Cold War, the mode of operations would secure the protection of Chinese air and surface assets. With the JL-2 missile range of only eight thousand kilometers, the new 094 probably cannot stay close in the South China or East China Sea. If they want to cover targets in the United States, for instance, they must patrol in more distant areas, for example about twenty-four hundred kilometers (fifteen hundred nautical miles) in the open ocean due east of Taiwan. The ranges to some U.S. West coast cities and Washington, D.C., are shown in Table 1.
If China develops longer-range missiles, so that its SSBNs can stay in bastions closer to their homeland, Chinese SSBNs would enjoy additional protection. Also, those areas are saturated with merchant and fishing boat noise. Such noise can facilitate the hiding of an SSBN, but it can also make the sonar picture for the SSBN very complex. Having literally tens or hundreds of sonar contacts in such an area is not uncommon. Sorting through them and monitoring the contacts of interest can be a challenge. Also, with respect to being protected from an adversary SSN by one’s own friendly SSN, this is a matter of acoustic advantage. Being in a bastion is not particularly useful if both the SSBN and its protector SSN suffer an acoustic disadvantage to the enemy who will come in to the bastion and be ready to attack. As a submariner friend of the author recently said, “If he operates his submarine correctly, he who is quieter will win.”
Table 1. Missile Ranges From a Point at 20°N 150°E in the Open Ocean, about 2,400 Kilometers (1,500 nautical miles) East of Taiwan
There are lessons learned during the Cold War development of SSBN forces that can provide insight into what the Chinese face in creating an SSBN weapons system of strategic deterrent capability. China is modernizing its navy at an accelerated pace as it certainly desires to become a major power to be reckoned with in the world strategic picture. SSBNs are part of that modernization. The Chinese navy has demonstrated that it can build an SSBN and operate it at sea. It has built a second-generation SSBN with significant improvements and increased missile range. All indications are that this program will continue, but exactly how it fits into the Chinese policy and strategy remains to be seen. Beijing has the resources, the access to technology, and seemingly, the will to continue to create a viable SSBN force of some number of ships. But it will take time, serious training of personnel at very high standards, creation of significant support and training facilities ashore, and considerable experience at sea to make that force a legitimate SSBN weapons system to support a deterrent strategy.
1. Richard T. Wright, “Submarines in Strategic Deterrence,” in United States Submarines (Waterford, Conn.: Sonalysts Inc.; and Annandale, Va.: Naval Submarine League, Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, 2002), 208. This article provides an excellent overview of the development and history of the United States strategic deterrent submarine force by one who was directly involved for the whole time.
2. Ibid., 214.
3. Ibid., 217
4. Gary Weir and Walter J. Boyne, Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines That Fought the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 288.
5. Ibid., Appendix 2, 280.
6. David Miller, Submarines of the World (St. Paul, Minn.: MBI Books, 2002), 427.
7. NOAA VENTS program, articles approved by the Navy for publication in open literature. Claude E. Nishimura and Dennis M. Colon, “IUSS Dual Use: Monitoring Whales and Earthquakes Using SOSUS,” Marine Technology Society Journal 27, no. 4 (1994): 13–21. “The U.S. Navy developed and operates the SOund SUrveillance System, or SOSUS. It is a fixed component of the U.S. Navy’s Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems (IUSS) network used for deep ocean surveillance during the Cold War. Installation of SOSUS was begun in the mid-1950s by the U.S. Navy for use in antisubmarine warfare. SOSUS consists of bottom-mounted hydrophone arrays connected by undersea communication cables to facilities on shore. The individual arrays are installed primarily on continental slopes and seamounts at locations optimized for undistorted long range acoustic propagation. The combination of location within the oceanic sound channel and the sensitivity of large-aperture arrays allows the system to detect radiated acoustic power of less than a watt at ranges of several hundred kilometers.”
8. Gary Weir and Walter J. Boyne, Rising Tide, 293.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 294.
11. Ibid., 188.
12. Francis Duncan, Rickover, the Struggle for Excellence (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 194–96.
13. Navy press release of Court of Inquiry findings, 26 October 1993, obtained by the USS Scorpion Veterans, http://www.txoilgas.com/589-court.html.
14. Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (New York: Perseus Books Group, 1998), 88–107. A full chapter of this book is dedicated to the discussion of the loss of Scorpion. It has excellent detail of Dr. Craven’s efforts to locate Scorpion and his theory of the cause of her loss.
15. James Oberg, Uncovering Soviet Disasters (New York: Random House, 1986), 3.
16. See an interesting article written by Wayne Grasdock in collaboration with Igor Kurdin of the Russian navy, who was the executive officer of K-219 at the time. See Igor Kurdin and Wayne Grasdock, “Loss of a Yankee SSBN,” Undersea Warfare (Fall 2005), www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/issue_28/yankee2.html.
17. The Russian submarine Kursk sailed out to sea to perform an exercise of firing dummy torpedoes at a Kirov-class battlecruiser. On August 12, 2000, the missiles were fired, but an explosion occurred shortly after on the Kursk. Monitoring equipment showed an explosion equivalent to one hundred kilograms of TNT and registered 1.5 on the Richter scale. Despite a rescue attempt by Russian and Norwegian teams, all sailors and officers aboard the Kursk were lost. The Kursk was eventually recovered from her grave by a Dutch team, and 115 of the 118 dead were recovered and laid to rest in Russia. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_submarine_Kursk_explosion_%282000%29.
18. Gary Weir and Walter J. Boyne, Rising Tide, 73.
19. Information on the Type 092 (Xia-class) was obtained mainly from www.sinodefence.com, September 30, 2005.
20. Chinese Defence Today, www.sinodefence.com, September 30, 2005.
21. “Navy,” Jane’s Sentinal Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia, 20 October 2006, www.janes.com.
22. Chinese Defence Today, www.SinoDefence.com, 28 February 2006.
23. Richard Halloran, “China’s navy prompts US concern,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2005, 8.
24. Ibid., 9.
25. Online News Hour with Jim Lehrer, October 12, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec05/china_10-12.html#.