Introduction

IN JULY 2005, THE DIRECTOR of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, made remarks to the Defense Writers Group about his agency’s view of the Chinese missile threat. Subsequent media reports of his speech raised some eyebrows within the U.S. policy community. As reported by the Washington Post, Obering stated, “What . . . we have to do is, in our development program, be able to address the Chinese capabilities, because that’s prudent.”¹ Taken at face value, the statement represented a remarkable shift in U.S. policy, which had until then insisted that missile defense was not directed at the People’s Republic of China (PRC).² Subsequent clarification from the MDA showed that Obering’s full remarks, which the Post omitted, were consistent with existing national policy.³

Obering asserted that the MDA did not intend to develop the ballistic-missile defense (BMD) system to counter Chinese missiles. Washington’s rationale for monitoring China’s missile capabilities, he reasoned, is premised on the risk that technologies developed by the Chinese might fall into the hands of other countries hostile to the United States. In other words, proliferation (whether intended or unintended), rather than China’s own strategic forces, was what most concerned the MDA. In any event, fears that Obering had committed a diplomatic faux pas proved unwarranted.

Nevertheless, this minor nonevent raises some important issues that deserve further examination. First, a great deal of ambiguity continues to surround Sino-U.S. relations in respect to Washington’s controversial missile defense system. Obering’s carefully phrased statement and the apparent readiness of some observers to jump to the most extreme conclusions about U.S. missile defense planners reflect great sensitivity of Chinese perceptions regarding American intentions. Second, what exactly did Obering mean by “prudent”? How will the United States prudently design its missile defense system in a manner that avoids alarming Beijing? Third, even if Obering’s rationale for watching China’s missile developments was sincere, the expected outcome—a more capable shield against Chinese capabilities—could still potentially harm Beijing’s security interests. How, then, might the PRC respond?

These questions acquire increasing policy urgency as new generations of intercontinental land- and sea-based strategic weaponry are expected to bolster China’s nuclear posture. In particular, the potential capacity of the new strategic missile submarine (Type 094) to virtually guarantee a second-strike capability has been a subject of scrutiny within the U.S. policy community. The level of interest will likely intensify given that Washington’s determination to deploy ballistic-missile defense adds a complicating factor to China’s nuclear calculus and will almost certainly shape Chinese thinking about deployment options for its nascent undersea force.

To address the potential interactions between the future of U.S. BMD system and the emerging Chinese undersea strategic missile submarine fleet, this chapter seeks to examine: 1) Chinese attitudes toward missile defense; 2) the BMD program’s potential impact on Chinese perceptions and responses; 3) factors that are likely to influence the PRC’s nuclear force structure, particularly the strategic submarine force; and 4) operational considerations for China’s emerging undersea fleet.

Chinese Perceptions of U.S. BMD

China’s position on ballistic-missile defense, both official and unofficial, has centered primarily on five objections.⁴ First, Beijing worries that missile defense could undermine the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Chinese analysts have often asserted that even a modest configuration of the proposed system could neutralize China’s small nuclear force.⁵ Currently, the mainstay of PRC’s strategic rocket forces consists of twenty or so aging single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).⁶ Given that the warheads and the liquid propellants are stored separately and that a portion of the missile force is dispersed in caves, launch preparations are a time-consuming challenge.⁷ It is generally assumed that such a posture suffers from low levels of readiness. Observers have long noted that this absence of responsiveness exposes the Chinese deterrent to a disarming first strike. Missile defense, it is argued, threatens to further exacerbate this vulnerability.⁸

However, the validity of this argument, to which Chinese opponents of U.S. BMD often turn, could gradually erode as a new generation of rail or road mobile ICBMs enters service.⁹ The DF-31 ICBM boasts a range of eight thousand kilometers.¹⁰ The mobility of these missiles promises greater survivability compared to their predecessors and thus a more credible second-strike capability. However, reports on the operational status of the DF-31 remain fragmentary at best and often contradictory.¹¹ Since late 2001, the International Institute for Strategic Studies has claimed that the 2nd Artillery Corps has deployed a brigade of eight DF-31s.¹² Jane’s speculates that two brigades armed with eight launchers each may be operational in southern and central China.¹³

In contrast, official reports suggest that the DF-31s are either just entering service or are some years away from deployment. The Pentagon’s latest annual report on Chinese military power places initial operational capability in the 2005–06 timeframe.¹⁴ In a hearing at the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, testified that the DF-31 was still under development and provided no indications that the ICBM was operational.¹⁵ Until a clearer picture of this new missile force emerges, determining whether limited numbers of DF-31s are in service or not remains a speculative exercise. What is less disputable is that as the missiles are fielded over time, China’s second-strike capability will gradually improve in the coming years (the implications of which are more fully explored below).

Second, some of the strongest objections to BMD have been directed at potential U.S. transfers of theater missile defenses to Taiwan. The Chinese contend that the psychological benefits of deploying missile defense regardless of actual effectiveness might embolden the independence movement on the island. The delivery of such a system would significantly enhance U.S.-Taiwan military interoperability and so would contradict Washington’s “One China” principle. As one Chinese scholar points out, “China is opposed to the provision of a missile defense system or its related technology to Taiwan in any form by the U.S., because the essence of such a move would put Taiwan under the U.S. umbrella of military protection, which would be tantamount to the restoration of a quasi-military alliance between the U.S. and Taiwan.”¹⁶ An effective BMD that enhances American invulnerability to a Chinese nuclear deterrent might also increase the likelihood of U.S. intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict.

Third, the Chinese have consistently expressed strong opposition to Japan’s codevelopment of theater missile defense technologies with the United States. To some Chinese observers, Japanese advances in missile defense capabilities could provide an important political and technological foundation for remilitarization.¹⁷ Others contend that American and Japanese collaboration would enhance the capacity of the alliance to contain China. Chinese protests have also been couched in terms of Taiwan. Given that allied missile defense involves very high levels of interoperability, an objective enshrined in the 1997 U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, Tokyo might be forced or dragged into a U.S. intervention over a Taiwan crisis. Still others believe that Japan’s interest in missile defense reflects Tokyo’s determination to intervene in a future contingency over Taiwan.¹⁸

Fourth, Chinese analysts have pointed to the adverse effects that missile defense could have on arms control regimes and the global disarmament agenda. They contend that missile defense would prompt states to accelerate proliferation, engage in arms races, and weaponize space. While this moral posturing is consistent with the PRC’s long-standing rhetoric on nuclear matters, it implicitly admits to China’s likely response to missile defense: a countervailing buildup of its nuclear forces. Finally, China has long opposed American unilateralism. Beijing fears that missile defense will add to Washington’s freedom of maneuver on the world stage and thereby cement U.S. hegemony.

It is noteworthy that most of the objections tend to underscore the political nature of the PRC’s concerns. For example, ambivalence toward Japanese participation in U.S. missile defense development largely reflects Chinese anxieties about Tokyo’s long-term strategic direction. Even in the case of Taiwan, where an actual military contingency is conceivable, missile defense does not rank high in Chinese thinking as an operational concern. China boasts the capacity to saturate theater- and tactical-level missile defenses on the island with its large (and growing) arsenal of short-range ballisticmissiles,¹⁹ which are in any event not vulnerable to ground-based, midcourse interceptors designed to protect the U.S. homeland from long-range missiles. In contrast, the longer-term viability of China’s strategic deterrent vis-à-vis the United States is the one central issue that could necessitate concrete responses on the part of Beijing.

Post-ABM Treaty Perceptions of BMD

The PRC’s vocal opposition to U.S. BMD throughout the 1990s abruptly ended following Washington’s formal withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002. Indeed, China’s diplomatic posture toward missile defense developments has remained consistently restrained. Several factors explain this outward silence.

First, China had to acquiesce to what amounted to a fait accompli. The determination with which the Bush administration sought to leave behind the ABM treaty convinced the Chinese that some type of missile defense deployment was a foregone conclusion. The collapse of the Sino-Russian pact against U.S. missile defense plans further undercut the PRC’s diplomatic leverage. Beijing probably concluded that continued opposition would strain its relations with Washington without producing any favorable outcomes. Chinese decision makers may have also feared that stubborn public displays of displeasure might backfire, thereby driving American proponents of missile defense to embrace arguments favoring BMD systems designed specifically for China. Finally, a steady stream of official American reassurances and China’s own decision to pursue a more constructive relationship with the United States appear to have played an important role in changing Beijing’s calculus.²⁰

Second, the failure of diplomacy to deter or delay U.S. policy ushered in a new phase in China’s reactive strategy focused on concrete responses to the prospective challenge. Political reassurances by U.S. officials notwithstanding, Beijing (or any responsible state for that matter) will almost certainly assume that the BMD might be technically configured to degrade Chinese capabilities.²¹ According to one Chinese observer, “No matter how the Bush administration explains its motivations for deploying NMDs, there is no denying the fact that America’s NMDs would have the ability to intercept and defend against China’s ICBMs.”²² Based on many conversations with their counterparts in China, American analysts have also concluded that the Chinese uniformly reject the argument that missile defenses are designed only for rogue states.²³

One obvious response is to sustain the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent in the coming years. Given that China has been engaged in the development of second-generation nuclear capabilities for the past two decades, the extent to which change in the PRC’s nuclear posture can be attributed to missile defense is somewhat uncertain. Nevertheless, the Chinese have made it abundantly clear that Beijing will respond to BMD. For at least the past five years, Chinese strategists have openly speculated about how China could tailor its nuclear forces to defeat missile defense. Li Bin, a well-respected Chinese analyst on nuclear strategy, called for a moderate buildup of China’s deterrent focused on survivability.²⁴ In another article, he assured his readers that the Chinese leadership has and will continue to study all options in order to counter the missile shield.²⁵

Third, some have argued that the expected near-term capabilities that the United States can realistically field will not adversely affect China’s deterrence calculus. According to one analysis, “Chinese security managers currently are convinced that the offense-dominant global nuclear regime is highly robust from a technological point of view.”²⁶ Shen Dingli, for example, argued that the expected deployment of six to ten interceptors in 2004 would not impact the current size of China’s ICBMs.²⁷ In other words, Beijing has probably concluded that it has the time and capacity to respond to the evolving BMD system. Thus, fears of Chinese over-reaction that could in turn trigger an “arms race” are likely exaggerated.

Key Drivers Behind China’s Likely Responses to BMD

Gauging specific Chinese responses to defeating the emerging U.S. BMD architecture remains problematic. The opened-ended nature of missile defense development (detailed below) renders predictions about the final state of the system virtually moot. In other words, a benchmark with which to measure against the range of Chinese options to counter BMD remains absent.²⁸ Without sufficient data on the expected defensive capabilities of missile defense, Beijing has little basis to make accurate judgments about the types and numbers of offensive systems it would have to acquire to bolster its second strike capability. As such, the offense-defense interactions between the United States and China will remain in flux until the various components of missile defense system mature further.

An assessment of the philosophies and assumptions underlying the missile defense program provides one method for discerning whether China might feel compelled to act quickly or overreact in the face of a looming defensive shield. Given that BMD development has occupied a major place in defense planning under the Bush administration, an exercise of this kind is particularly instructive. Indeed, a closer look at Washington’s current approach to missile defense reveals that the program contains features that are likely to both exacerbate and dampen Chinese fears.

On the one hand, the potential for the BMD program to achieve significant breakthroughs and successes will almost certainly produce incentives for Beijing to accelerate the qualitative and quantitative improvements of its nuclear arsenal. The Bush administration deliberately blurs the operational line dividing national and theater missile defenses. The goal is to create an integrated, multilayered (or “thick”) defensive system designed to intercept a ballistic missile at every stage of its trajectory from boost to terminal phases. The program conspicuously avoids specificity regarding the final status of the missile defense architecture. Proponents of BMD have argued that an undefined “end state” provides the United States with the flexibility to respond and adapt to new and emerging threats in the security environment.²⁹

In theory, such an unrestrained research and development strategy could produce far more effective missile defense systems that are capable of protecting the U.S. homeland from threats beyond those posed by rogue states and accidental launches. This possibility is a principal reason for the PRC’s objections to missile defense. Indeed, throughout the late 1990s, Chinese and American analysts warned repeatedly that even a modest BMD configuration would have required China to depart from its leisurely nuclear posture.³⁰ Further, as noted above, the Chinese do not believe American claims that the BMD system is designed to serve limited objectives. Beijing’s suspicions of U.S. intent and capability could spur it to keep pace with potential BMD as a strategic hedge, especially if the Chinese perceive a shift in the offense-defense balance. In this context, China’s emerging second-strike capabilities and other countermeasures against missile defense (detailed below) will play complementary roles in maintaining the integrity of its deterrent posture.

On the other hand, the technical and financial obstacles that stand in the way of the BMD program’s success will moderate worst-case scenario thinking and the potential for overreaction. Debates about the effectiveness of missile defense against China are still largely theoretical. Hobbling problems associated with technical feasibility and with the current acquisition strategy persist and will likely spill over to the operational viability of the proposed BMD. Technological impediments remain a major problem. The series of test failures that occurred in highly favorable (if not unrealistic) conditions in the past few years point to the technical difficulties inherent to missile defense.³¹ The test record for the ground-based, midcourse interceptor, which is central to intercepting long-range ballistic missiles, has proved sobering: five of the ten “kinetic kill” tests have thus far failed. More recent successes have been based on even less rigorous testing conditions, such as simulating the flight of an imaginary enemy target.³²

Critics of missile defense in the United States have also pointed to major flaws in the current acquisition strategy that the Bush administration has adopted. Known as “spiral development” within the policy community, it is at the heart of the open-ended character of the BMD program.³³ Under this evolutionary approach, various elements of the missile defense architecture would be developed, tested, and deployed along parallel tracks. As each component becomes technically feasible, it would be integrated to enhance the existing architecture.³⁴ Refinements and improvements on existing and future systems would continue in an iterative process. Premised on the Pentagon’s capabilities-based planning process, the architecture would evolve continually until it could cope with the entire range of conceivable missile threats.³⁵

This development philosophy stands in sharp contrast to the traditional acquisition standard that sets out clear operational requirements against which testing and deployment decisions are made. While an undefined architecture provides flexibility to build a robust BMD system tailored to the prevailing threat environment, it also accentuates the risks of unleashing cost overruns that have in turn increased anticipation of greater congressional scrutiny. In other words, the financial sustainability of this approach over the long term could become increasingly questionable.

The technical and financial challenges that the United States confronts have not gone unnoticed in China.³⁶ Some Chinese analysts confidently predict that missile defense would not likely be effective.³⁷ Others suspect that the program was intended as a deception to lure Beijing into a fruitless, costly arms race—resembling the Cold War superpower competition—designed to bankrupt China.³⁸ To some degree, then, there is recognition that time is on China’s side and that Beijing has a choice in how it responds. Short of a radical strategic technical surprise, then, the PRC will be able to pace and match U.S. developments without fear of losing its deterrent credibility in the near term.

The various ambiguities surrounding missile defense suggests that Beijing’s responses will be far more measured than what some Chinese analysts themselves have warned about or threatened. It appears unlikely that China would hastily forecast a highly capable BMD threat until sufficient empirical evidence emerges about the true nature of the proposed missile defense system. Equally important, Beijing would not likely seek to out-build any system that could produce unintended reactions from its alarmed neighbors or from the United States. In particular, the PRC has strong incentives to avoid moves that could justify political arguments already evident in Washington for an expanded BMD system designed to blunt China’s deterrent. In the broader context of Chinese grand strategy, hostile regional reactions to the Beijing’s nuclear posture would undermine China’s painstaking efforts to cultivate perceptions that it will rise peacefully.³⁹ As such, the PRC may be content to emphasize sufficiency: the minimum, requisite force posture needed to defeat BMD. Such restraint is reinforced by and consistent with China’s long-standing minimum deterrent posture as reviewed below.

China’s Nuclear Doctrine Revisited

The starting point for projecting the future force structure of China’s nuclear deterrent lies in a more fundamental debate: whether the PRC will seek to enhance the quality and/or quantity of its nuclear forces to assure the credibility of its modest nuclear posture, or whether Beijing will reformulate its nuclear doctrine to cope with more demanding strategic requirements. There has been considerable speculation in the U.S. policy community about the prospects of a shift in China’s deterrent posture from minimum to limited deterrence for at least a decade.⁴⁰ So, too, Chinese analysts and policy-makers have exhibited greater willingness to reconsider and question the basic merits of a minimalist posture (explored further below). Yet, there is sufficient empirical evidence—at least in terms of what is known about the current force structure—that minimum deterrence remains the bedrock of Beijing’s nuclear doctrine.⁴¹

Reaffirming the continuity in Chinese nuclear doctrine, one Chinese analyst expressed considerable confidence that Beijing will not abandon its cherished tradition of minimalism on the nuclear front.⁴² Most recently, the commander of the 2nd Artillery Corps, General Jing Zhiyuan, assured Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during his visit to Jing’s headquarters that China remains committed to its “no first use” policy.⁴³ A RAND study argues persuasively that Beijing has only recently begun to attain credibility in its minimum deterrent posture.⁴⁴ If true, then China has a long way to go before it can establish a more robust posture connoting the capacity to use nuclear weapons for war-fighting purposes.

One reasonable baseline for analysis, then, is to assume that China would hew closely to its minimum deterrent posture well into the next decade.⁴⁵ To establish credible minimum deterrence, three overriding factors loom large in China’s calculus. First, the ability of its nuclear forces to survive an all-out preemptive first strike, and then to penetrate America’s missile shield would be a critical benchmark. Second, sufficiency would require China to build up enough to defeat BMD but not enough to trigger competitive responses from the United States. Third, comfort with minimum sufficiency would require China to maintain high levels of ambiguity surrounding its retaliatory capabilities. Beijing counts on the uncertainty in the minds of adversaries about the possibility of even a few nuclear weapons to survive a first strike to generate deterrence. Willingness to rely on the psychological effects of ambiguity has been a persistent hallmark of Chinese nuclear doctrine.

How Much Is Enough?

Against the backdrop of China’s well established preference for minimum deterrence, what are the types of force structures that Beijing would consider viable? And, what factors related to missile defense might tend to favor reliance on its nascent ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) fleet? An important intervening variable is Beijing’s calculations concerning the proper force mix and trade-offs between its DF-31s and its sea-based JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic-missiles (SLBMs). Each leg of the dyad presents distinct advantages and disadvantages that will surely influence the PRC’s cost-and-benefit analysis.

In terms of survivability, both land- and sea-based options enhance China’s ability to escape a disarming first strike. The mobility of the DF-31s would maximize the geographic depth that China enjoys, while the next-generation Type 094 SSBN currently under development would impose additional targeting, tracking, and other intelligence challenges on the adversary.⁴⁶ Ideally, an interactively survivable nuclear dyad would greatly increase the versatility of China’s nuclear forces. Adding relatively cheap countermeasures to the warheads of each nuclear leg or mounting multiple warheads would further enhance China’s ability to defeat the BMD.⁴⁷ Modest quantitative increases combined with qualitative advances would largely ameliorate the survivability concern.⁴⁸

Some factors unique to an undersea strategic force (at least in theory) magnify the relative importance of SSBNs vis-à-vis missile defense. A ballistic-missile submarine distinguishes itself even from a road- or rail-mobile ICBM by its stealth and unlimited mobility and endurance, which generate virtually infinite possibilities in terms of launch locations. According to Jing-dong Yuan, “Missile defense would make submarines more attractive as a means of increasing missile survivability and for launching from locations and depressed trajectories where missile defenses have limited coverage.”⁴⁹ Such advantages would severely strain the ability of a missile defense system to gather cuing data, to track, and to engage a launch. Indeed, for at least the next two decades, missile defense as currently conceived will have no answer to a capable SSBN patrolling the open ocean.⁵⁰ The survivability of SSBNs would also reduce temptations for Beijing to adopt land-based postures and policies that undermine crisis stability and escalation control, including increased dispersion and decentralized command and control.

However, the persuasiveness of abstract operational benefits of an undersea strategic force will not likely convince the Chinese leadership to lean decisively in favor of SSBNs over ICBMs. Foremost in the thinking of any political leadership is command and control of its nuclear arsenal. It is unclear whether Beijing would be willing to delegate operational control of a nuclear-armed submarine to a tactical commander. Practical considerations, such as technical feasibility and steep financial costs, could impose burdens that the PRC may be unwilling to carry. The enormous technological, scientific, and engineering challenges of building an SSBN are already well documented.⁵¹ The very troubled history of the first-generation Xia-class SSBN is a testament to the tremendous hurdles that the Chinese had to overcome to master a craft involving extraordinarily high barriers to entry. In terms of costs, the price tags of modern U.S. SSBNs provide a rough sense of the financial liabilities that Beijing confronts. The average per unit cost of an Ohio-class SSBN, measured over ten years from 1981 to 1991, was an estimated $1.2 billion in 1994 dollar terms.⁵² Relying on similar estimates of U.S. expenditures on SSBNs and SSNs, Chinese observers have also commented on the prohibitive costs of nuclear-powered submarines.⁵³ Land basing, then, still appears to have significant financial advantages.

Finally, the attractiveness of SLBMs also depends in part on whether futuristic concepts for sea-based boost-phase missile defenses can be translated into reality. In reference to potential effects that such a capability might have on Russia’s undersea strategic forces, one study notes, “a sea-based boost-phase system would potentially threaten Russia’s submarine-launched deterrent, assuming a capability existed to estimate the general location of the submarine (emphasis added).”⁵⁴ However, the prospects for such a development remain distant as this program is still in the conceptual stages. According to one report, even a primitive prototype of a sea-based boost-phase missile-defense system is not expected until 2015 at the earliest.⁵⁵ Given the long timelines involved, speculation concerning how China might respond to a distant capability is probably not currently a useful exercise.⁵⁶

In theory, a relatively modest number of survivable ICBMs and SSBNs should reduce the probability that “bean counting” would prompt U.S. responses that could be conducive to competition. In other words, Beijing will likely favor configurations that demonstrate restraint in order to maintain a stable deterrent relationship with Washington. Incremental expansions would also restore Chinese confidence in the uncertainty principle of its nuclear doctrine. However, accurately measuring China’s quantitative ceiling of ICBMs and SLBMs that would prevent countervailing U.S. responses is a delicate affair. According to one analysis based on numerous interviews with Chinese strategists, even a moderate response to BMD would likely involve as much as a tenfold jump in the number of China’s strategic missiles or warheads.⁵⁷ Such a dramatic increase would likely raise concerns in Washington, even if the United States enjoyed commanding quantitative and qualitative advantages over China’s nuclear arsenal.⁵⁸ While a classic arms race resembling the Cold War would not ensue as a result of such a shift in the nuclear balance, it is unlikely that U.S. defense planners would respond passively to the expected orders of magnitude increases in the Chinese nuclear inventory.⁵⁹

Several scenarios are conceivable as the PRC meets the BMD challenge. If Beijing is willing to engage in transparency measures (hitherto absent in its current posture) to reassure Washington, then the two sides might be able to avoid the types of overt rivalry that characterized the Cold War. Alternatively, a significant PRC response in securing a credible second strike might be sufficient to demonstrate the futility of BMD in negating China’s deterrent. In other words, Beijing could make good its promises to counter missile defense. It is possible that China would pursue both options—a buildup combined with enhanced openness about its nuclear doctrine and force structure—to preclude costly competition with the United States.

In any event, the potential role of the PRC’s undersea strategic forces would only be one among many factors in Beijing’s calculus as it considers a range of options to defeat BMD. At present, the expected number of Chinese SSBNs remains a subject of contention. The available literature has provided disparate estimates concerning the number of SSBNs that the Chinese plan to, or will be able to, build. One report carefully hedges its prediction that a dozen JL-2 SLBMs would be available by 2005 with a caveat that the missiles’ operational status would depend on the uncertain production schedule of the Type 094.⁶⁰ A more conservative assessment of China’s strategic forces postulates that the first ballistic-missile submarine will not be in service before 2010.⁶¹ Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community and the Pentagon believe that both the JL-2 ballistic missiles and the strategic nuclear submarine will not enter service until the end of the decade.⁶² In contrast, two U.S. analysts cite sources predicting the availability of two to three strategic submarines by 2010.⁶³ Another analyst projects five to six vessels over the next five years.⁶⁴ Jane’s speculates that China will ultimately build four to six Type 094 submarines.⁶⁵ Another study cites both Chinese and Russian sources that place the final numbers of SSBNs at twelve.⁶⁶ The degree of uncertainty over the operational status of the Type 094 was on full public display in Taiwan as politicians openly disputed the veracity of the National Security Bureau’s intelligence report, which claimed that the Type 094 had completed sea trials and would be in service in the near future.⁶⁷ Simply put, the future size of the fleet is still anybody’s guess.

Operational Implications

How might China respond specifically in the operational realm to an effective missile defense system? Recently, speculation concerning the logic of a bastion strategy for China has emerged among U.S. analysts.⁶⁸ China could seek to replicate the Soviet Union’s experience by exploiting the geographical features of the mainland coastline to its advantage.⁶⁹ Beijing could concentrate its SSBNs within the protective confines of the Bohai and Yellow Seas.⁷⁰ Nuclear attack submarines, shore-based fighter aircraft, and surface combatants could be poised as “palace guards” to quickly respond against hostile forces seeking to hold China’s SSBNs at risk. As an alternative to the bastion strategy, the strategic submarines could operate more freely along China’s long coastline under the protective cover of naval and land-based aviation forces on the mainland. One analyst speculates that China could deploy its SSBNs to the South China Sea, enabling the submarines to slip into deeper waters.⁷¹ More ambitiously, China could deploy its submarines out to the Pacific in forays reminiscent of the U.S.-Soviet undersea competition during the Cold War.

Each of these options accrues certain benefits and incurs different types of costs. On the one hand, the bastion approach provides sanctuaries within which high-value SSBNs can operate. In theory, sea- and shore-based assets would be able to identify and hold at bay hostile forces operating near or in the Bohai/Yellow Sea. Moreover, the shallowness and the complex acoustic environment of littoral waters would pose serious challenges to high-speed American hunter-killer submarines designed for Cold War-era open ocean operations. On the other hand, a bastion strategy would 1) constrain patrol patterns; 2) forego the inherent stealth and mobility of an SSBN; and 3) limit targeting options (assuming that the JL-2’s expected range is eight thousand kilometers). In other words, the confined operational space and shallowness of the Bohai/Yellow Sea area could create equally unfavorable conditions for a Chinese SSBN. If the Soviet experiences were any guide, China would have to build a large multidimensional conventional force to protect the SSBNs within the bastion and to break out of it should hostile forces seek to bottle up and hunt down the undersea strategic forces. The main risk is that an overinvestment in protecting its SSBN forces could detract from Beijing’s broader maritime priorities, including nearer-term contingencies related to Taiwan.⁷²

The more expansive options from coastal to open ocean patrols increase Chinese options in several ways. Recent studies have postulated that China has already embarked on an ambitious plan to create “contested zones” along its maritime periphery.⁷³ Premised on the concept of sea denial, Beijing would arrange a formidable power-projection force capable of exercising local superiority roughly within the first island chain stretching from the Japanese archipelago to the northern Philippines. Under this scenario, China might be confident enough to permit SSBN patrols along China’s long coastline, particularly in the Bohai, Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, as well as the Taiwan Strait. Given that China confronts several deterrent relationships in Asia, including India, one analysis argues that the presence of SSBNs in the South China Sea would help shore up its deterrent on the southern flank.⁷⁴ Forward patrols would also force the United States to devote more of its hunter-killers to shadow and track Chinese submarines in different subtheaters of Asian waters, thereby serving to tie down American SSNs that might otherwise be available for a Taiwan or another contingency.

In the late 1980s, some U.S. analysts speculated that the Soviets might reverse its retreat into the bastion areas and patrol closer to American shores. Observers believed that Soviet concerns about the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative could trigger such a breakout.⁷⁵ As noted above, the depressed trajectory of SLBMs reduces vulnerabilities to midcourse missile defenses and significantly stresses the response times of any BMD system. These operational advantages may have been behind the speculations about a potential Soviet reorientation. Furthermore, assuming that China can develop very capable and quiet submarines, Chinese patrols in the Pacific would pose the greatest challenges to U.S. defenders seeking to keep track of and to trail lurking SSBNs. It is therefore possible that China might be tempted to employ open ocean patrols to impose additional stress on U.S. missile defense systems, not to mention antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces.

On the other hand, some real operational risks would restrain Chinese SSBN patrol patterns beyond coastal waters. Of greatest concern, projecting submarine forces beyond the mainland littoral would increase exposure to U.S. and allied ASW.⁷⁶ Throughout the Cold War, the United States developed extensive and highly effective undersea detection networks—most notably the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)—to track the location of Soviet submarines. In the Pacific theater, U.S. submarines aided by SOSUS monitored every movement of Soviet SSBNs in waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula. In the 1980s, American and Japanese naval forces jointly perfected the art of ASW and cooperated closely to bottle up Soviet forces operating in the seas of Okhostk and Japan. These “legacy” systems and well-developed tactics could be effortlessly applied to Chinese SSBNs. For instance, the intrusion of a Han-class SSN into Japanese territorial waters and the Maritime Self-Defense Forces’ (MSDF) subsequent tracking of the vessel demonstrated Tokyo’s relatively high levels of readiness in ASW operations. Remarking upon the incident, a former chief of staff of the MSDF boasted that Chinese submarines seeking to slip into deeper waters of the Pacific via the Ryukyu island chain, north and south of Taiwan, or the Bashi (Luzon) Strait would not be able to escape U.S. and Japanese detection.⁷⁷

Given such potent risks, China would probably avoid blue-water patrols especially during the initial stages of deployment, when training, tactical skills, and doctrine are still immature.⁷⁸ Additionally, Beijing would not likely opt for forward patrols until a larger fleet (assuming that the PRC is willing or able to pay for such an expensive project) eases attrition concerns. Politically, patrols in the Pacific could prove highly provocative to the United States and would almost certainly stimulate competitive responses. Compared against the collapse of Russian deterrent patrols in the Pacific theater since the end of the Cold War, China’s entry into blue waters would likely be perceived as a dramatic change in the threat environment.

The more modest patrol option in the South China Sea also poses problems. Large portions of this body of water are relatively shallow. The principal target for an SSBN in the South China Sea would presumably be India, and could be viewed as a diversion from primary deterrent missions related to the United States. Unless the range of the JL-2 is sufficient to reach the continental United Sates from that location, operating further from American shores may be deemed counterproductive.

Until China builds a sizable number of vessels to permit secondary roles for its SSBN fleet, Beijing is not likely to squander away its precious few assets. These constraining factors suggest that if China chooses to expand submarine deployment patterns, it will probably be sequential and incremental. Beijing would likely favor protection over effectiveness during the early phases of SSBN deployment and would thus rely on some type of bastion strategy. Over time, if sufficient numbers of SSBNs are constructed and the vessels are operationally capable of extended patrols far beyond the Chinese coastline, then China might be willing to relax its protectiveness and permit more forward patrols.

The assessment above suggests that most cost-benefit analyses at the operational level are not directly tied to China’s concerns about BMD. Any meaningful offense-defense racing is a very distant proposition at which point Beijing may possess alternative countermeasures to defeat missile defense.⁷⁹ Even if the PRC is tempted in the near term to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. BMD with open ocean patrols, significant operational risks to the emerging fleet would militate against power projection into the Pacific. Most importantly, assessments about patrol options require a better appreciation for the SSBN fleet’s place within China’s broader maritime strategy.

Future Sources of Doctrinal Change

The above analysis outlines how a restrained Chinese nuclear posture could lead to a relatively stable offense-defense dynamic between Beijing and Washington over the next decade. Nevertheless, it is worth exploring how China’s willingness to retain its minimum deterrence posture could come under significant pressure in the future. Identifying such sources of change may help both sides to avoid crossing red lines that might fuel temptations to engage in nuclear competition.

First, China’s ongoing refusal to acknowledge the utility of an adversary’s nuclear first-strike option, which is central to the concept of minimum deterrence, depends in part on whether the United States wants to be submitted to the logic of assured (but minimal) retaliation vis-à-vis China. There is evidence that some U.S. strategists have dismissed such a mutual vulnerability, asserting that the United States should direct its BMD specifically to negate China’s deterrent.⁸⁰ Reflecting such an attitude, the current U.S. National Security Council Advisor has previously argued that should Beijing continue to exhibit hostile intent toward Washington, particularly with regard to Taiwan, then the United States “may simply have no choice” but build defenses against China.⁸¹ If Washington overtly seeks to deny China a retaliatory option, then Beijing will almost certainly respond with a larger and faster buildup. The consequences of such an offense-defense arms race would be unwelcome, especially for the United States, because the far lower costs of penetrating missile defenses than improving them would favor China’s strategic position.

Second, China’s more leisurely approach to its nuclear posture could come under strain with the emergence of strategic technical surprises. As noted above, the expected performance of the exo-atmospheric, hit-to-kill, ground-based missile defense system currently deployed to defend the U.S. homeland will not severely shake China’s deterrent calculus. It is conceivable (although highly improbable in the near term) that the advent of space-based lasers and other advanced boost-phase capabilities could radically reshape China’s outlook.⁸² The track record of the missile defense program to date suggests that such radical breakthroughs are highly unlikely over the next decade. But, should such a technological contest emerge, then SSBNs might emerge as one among many operationally useful answers to BMD. As mentioned above, cheaper countermeasures, alternative delivery systems, and quantitative increases would also provide a more diverse and credible counter to advanced missile defenses.⁸³

Third, the reconnaissance-precision strike complex that the United States boasts could alter China’s exclusively retaliatory posture. In July 2005, Major General Zhu Chenghu caused a sensation when he declared to the foreign press that, “If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition onto the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.” He argued that if China faced the prospect of defeat in a conventional conflict over Taiwan, then Beijing would have no choice but to conduct a preemptive nuclear strike against American cities. Similarly, in a candid assessment of how Chinese calculations might change, Shen Dingli argues that precision conventional strikes against China’s nuclear forces during a Taiwan contingency could force Beijing to abandon its no-first-use pledge. He asserts that, “If China’s conventional forces are devastated, and if Taiwan takes the opportunity to declare de jure independence, it is inconceivable that China would allow its nuclear weapons to be destroyed by a precision attack with conventional munitions, rather than use them as true means of deterrence.”⁸⁴ In other words, if the effects of America’s conventional attacks are indistinguishable from a disarming nuclear strike, then China’s no-first-use policy would quite sensibly become untenable.⁸⁵ Shen’s conclusion seems consistent with China’s long-standing aversion to nuclear blackmail.

In sum, the future state of overall Sino-U.S. relations, technological change, and calculations about a Taiwan contingency could all interact to lift China’s restraint. This could in turn lead to more competitive interactions, including elevating the significance of the SSBN program.

Conclusion

Despite the apparent theoretical and political character of Chinese objections to BMD, there is genuine merit to Beijing’s concerns stemming in part from deeply embedded fears of nuclear coercion. As such, China will almost certainly respond to missile defenses with qualitative and quantitative solutions to shore up the credibility of its modest second-strike deterrent. In particular, a survivable ballistic-missile submarine would bolster, if not secure, Chinese confidence in the offense-dominant nuclear regime. At the same time, Beijing will likely modernize and build up its nuclear forces with restraint, not least because the technological realities confronting missile defense planners suggest that many of the triggering points for a major Chinese expansion lie far in the future.

The analysis above also underscores how little China watchers know about the Chinese nuclear program. This basic methodological challenge limits any attempt to discern how the PRC will respond specifically to missile defense. To further complicate matters, the potential impact that missile defense will have on decisions concerning the future of the SSBN fleet is less direct and not immediately apparent. Conversely, one would be hard pressed to directly link China’s behavior related to its undersea strategic forces to developments in U.S. BMD, at least at this point. Whether missile defense will compel the PRC to adopt a bastion strategy or a much higher tempo of SSBN patrols in the Pacific remains unknowable. There are simply too many intervening variables that obscure the correlations between the two.

Broader internal and external factors are more likely to determine the future course of China’s SSBN strategy. Domestic debates and decisions about nuclear doctrine are key arbiters of Beijing’s undersea strategic posture. Such discourse is in turn subject to broader strategic/political considerations and other internal determinants, including technological feasibility, resource availability, bureaucratic/interservice politics, and confidence among Chinese leaders to decentralize command and control. The way in which the broader Sino-U.S. relationship evolves will also determine Chinese thinking about nuclear doctrine and associated force structures. If bilateral relations deteriorate significantly and irreparably, then a fundamental reassessment of China’s nuclear posture could very well become necessary.

On the other hand, fears that an expanded arsenal would unnecessarily alarm Beijing’s neighbors and the United States and risk triggering balancing behavior would tend to restrain decisions about a more expansive doctrine. As Paul Godwin notes, “whereas limited deterrence may be attractive to analysts engaged in abstract assessments of nuclear doctrine and strategy, the potential political costs could be viewed as outweighing whatever increases in confidence this nuclear posture may prove.”⁸⁶ For instance, regional hostilities resulting from the PRC’s nuclear buildup would severely set back China’s ongoing efforts to promote the concept of its peaceful rise.

Politics, then, will trump the effects of emerging offense-defense interactions in military technology. In a cautionary tale about the dangers of technological determinism, Stephen Cimbala states, “deterrence and stability are politically driven concepts, and states that are determined to have a war will find ways to do so, regardless of the shifting sands of technology competition.”⁸⁷ Conversely, two countries determined not to fight each other will almost certainly negate the political spillover effects of a technological race. In other words, the broader state of Sino-U.S. relations will dictate how each responds to the technical-military developments of the other. While mutual ambivalence continues to characterize bilateral ties, as long as Washington and Beijing refuse a Cold War-style rivalry, radical shifts in China’s nuclear posture are not likely. Political calculations on both sides of the Pacific, then, will determine the doctrines that in turn shape the future strategy for China’s undersea strategic forces.

Notes

1. Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Missile Defense Being Expanded, General Says,” Washington Post, July 22, 2005, 10.

2. In May 2001, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly reassured the Chinese leadership about U.S. intentions over missile defense. In his departure statement, Kelly explained, “I stressed that our plans for a missile defense system would not be a threat to China. Rather, our approaches are intended to defend against threats or attacks from rogue states as well as from accidental and unauthorized launches.” For the full text of Kelly’s statement, see http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/state/2001/051601.htm.

3. According to the MDA’s full transcript, Obering states, “We are not desiring to go against a Chinese threat, but we need to, in our development program, to address the Chinese capabilities, because that’s prudent, because often times technologies that are developed by one country find their way into other nations, so we need to be cognizant of that . . . and so we are not developing a missile defense for the Chinese, but we need to be cognizant of that, and keep track of their development program.”

4. For an early assessment of China’s responses to BMD during this period, see Michael McDevitt, “Beijing’s Bind,” Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 177–86.

5. See Shen Dingli, “China’s Evaluation of the Adjustment to U.S. Security Policy Since September 11, 2001,” Defense and Security Analysis 19, no. 4 (December 2003): 321.

6. For an estimate of China’s nuclear forces based strictly on publicly available U.S. intelligence sources, see Jeffrey Lewis, “The Ambiguous Arsenal,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 61, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 52–59. The author argues that the modest force structure strongly suggests that China remains tied to the philosophy of maintaining a “minimum means of reprisal” for its deterrent posture. The rest of the ICBM arsenal is deployed in hardened silos, which are presumably identifiable through national technical means.

7. Gen. Eugene Habiger (ret.), former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, asserted that “several tens of hours” would be required for the Chinese to prepare missile launches. Eugene Habiger, “Problems and Prospects of New Alaska Missile Interceptor Site,” Presentation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 20, 2004.

8. Memories of nuclear blackmail (he ezha) during the Cold War remain an integral part of the leadership’s collective psyche. As such, a return to such vulnerability is deemed unacceptable. For a sense of China’s historical perspective on he ezha , see You Guangrong, Ge Hanyi, and Zhou Ying , “Liangdan Yixing de Yenzhi ji Qidui Xinshiqi Wuqi Zhuangbei Jianshe de Qishi ( ),” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 16, no. 6 (2003): 28.

9. The survivability of the DF-31s will depend on whether the PRC permits active patrols. It is possible for China to choose a more “recessed” posture. Consistent with its current low levels of readiness, the missiles and the transporters could be stored separately and readied for mating and deployment in the event of a crisis.

10. Assuming that China possesses small, lightweight warheads, the DF-31 could be armed with multiple reentry vehicles. A modified version, the DF-31A with ten-to-fourteen-thousand-kilometer range, will reportedly enter service within the decade.

11. It is important to note that the DF-31 was originally designed to replace the DF-4s in order to modernize its deterrent against the Soviet Union, and, possibly, India. The range and basing locations appear to validate China’s initial intent. Moreover, the DF-31s are at most capable of reaching Hawaii, Alaska, and perhaps portions of the U.S. West Coast. In this context, it is not at all clear whether the DF-31 substantially changes the Sino-U.S. deterrent relationship.

12. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2004–2005, (London: Oxford University Press, October 2004), 170. IISS began reporting the operational status of the DF-31s in its October 2001 issue of the Military Balance. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) draws on the IISS report in its analysis of China’s nuclear forces. See, SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 592.

13. Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, January 2006), 21. Another Jane’s database reports a lower figure of eight to twelve DF-31s in service. See Jane’s Sentinel, Security Assessment: China and Northeast Asia, (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2005), 96.

14. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, July 2005), 28.

15. Lowell Jacoby, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record, Senate Select Intelligence Committee, February 16, 2005, 11.

16. Liu Xuecheng, “Missile Control and Missile Defense: A Chinese Perspective,” workshop paper presented at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai, July 16–18, 2004, 6.

17. For a fairly typical Chinese interpretation of Japan’s motives for pursuing missile defense, see Li Wensheng and Zhang Huiying, , “Toutian Xianjing: Toushi Riben Fan Dandao Daodan Xitong Jihua ,” Bingqi Zhishi 10, no. 192 (October 2003): 8–12.

18. Kori Urayama, “China Debates Missile Defence,” Survival 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 126.

19. One Chinese analysis calculates that Taiwan’s point defenses, such as the Patriot PAC-2 batteries, can at most intercept forty incoming ballistic missiles. The report confidently asserts that Taiwan would be unable to cope with the waves of Chinese attacks involving hundreds of ballistic missiles. Zheng Zhiren , “Taiwan Fan Dandao Daodan Fangyu Xitong, ,” Bingqi Zhishi 10, no. 216 (October 2005): 57.

20. For an in-depth analysis of the shift in China’s diplomatic posture, see Brad Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003), 32–34.

21. Some U.S. analysts have concluded that missile defense has no other real purpose except to blunt China’s deterrent. For a polemical study on this perspective, see James J. Hentz, “The Paradox of Instability and Stability: United States ‘Primacy,’, China, and the National Missile Defense Debate,” Defense and Security Analysis 19, no. 3 (September 2003): 293–99.

22. Tian Jingmei, “The Bush Administration’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for China’s Security,” Working Paper, Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, March 2003, 15.

23. David M. Finkelstein, “National Missile Defense and China’s Current Security Perceptions,” in China and Missile Defense: Managing U.S.-PRC Strategic Relations, ed. Alan D. Romberg and Michael McDevitt (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 41.

24. Li Bin, Zhou Baogen, and Liu Zhiwei, “China Will Have to Respond,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 57, no. 6 (November/December 2001): 25–28.

25. Li Bin, “The Effects of NMD on Chinese Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 7, 2001.

26. “The Impact of Missile Defence in Asia: The Dilemmas of Transition,” Strategic Comments 10, Issue 6, International Institute for Strategic Studies (August 1, 2004).

27. Julian Pamore, “U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense and China,” Defense and Security Analysis 19, no. 4 (December 2003): 373.

28. Ambassador Sha Zukang, the former Director-General of the Foreign Ministry’s Department of Arms Control, underscored China’s predicament. He observed that the Bush administration (in contrast to its predecessor) provided no technical information of its BMD system to the Chinese side. Transcript of Ambassador Sha Zukang’s Briefing on Missile Defense Issue, Beijing, March 14, 2001 at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/cjjk/2622/t15417.htm#.

29. For an excellent analysis of the Bush administration’s approach to missile defense, see Steven A. Hildreth, Missile Defense: The Current Debate (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 19, 2005).

30. During this period (when the operational status of the DF-31s was still largely in doubt) many observers believed that even the limited National Missile Defense system envisioned by the Clinton administration would have required a corresponding expansion of China’s force structure. It was argued that in the absence of a buildup the few remaining Chinese ICBMs that managed to survive a disarming first strike would have been neutralized by the U.S. BMD.

31. For a scathing critique of the current missile defense plan, see Lisbeth Gronlund, “Fire, Aim, Ready,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 61, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 67–68.

32. See Missile Defense Agency New Release, “Missile Defense Flight Test Successfully Completed,” December 13, 2005 at http://www.mda.mil. By contrast, theater-level, sea-based missile defenses, designed to intercept short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles, have enjoyed far more successes. Since early 2002, five of six tests of the Standard Missile 3 resulted in the interception of the target.

33. Steven A. Hildreth, Missile Defense: The Current Debate, 14.

34. For example, premised on the “test as you fly, fly as you test” standard, MDA deployed eight ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California in September 2004 despite doubts about their actual effectiveness. Presumably, improved interceptors will replace these early versions as they become available.

35. For an analysis of how capabilities-based planning impacts the BMD acquisition strategy, see David C. Isby and Timothy Bigss, “Enabling Defense Transformation: Network-Centric Warfare and Ballistic Missile Defense,” Comparative Strategy 22, Issue 4 (October 2003): 325–34.

36. For instance, an article cites U.S. official and independent reports on the technical difficulties of the proposed BMD. Zhong Jianye , “Shijie Daodan Fangyu zai 2003-nian ,” Bingqi Zhishi 3, no. 197 (March 2004): 42. One analyst describes the test record of the ground-based missile defense system as a “great failure.” But the author is convinced that the United States will press ahead regardless of the difficulties that the program has been experiencing. Le Mengwen , “Lingren Youyu: GMD de Shibai Bingqi Zhishi 2, no. 208 (February 2005): 16–20. Two Chinese observers question the operational capability of what they consider hastily deployed BMDs in 2004. They state, “In reality, America’s first phase of BMD deployment embodies far greater political purpose than military meaning while its military meaning far exceeds its technical purpose.” Li Wensheng and Sun Shihong , “2004 Jieduan Toushi Meiguo Xinban Daodan Fangyu Xitong [2004 ,” Bingqi Zhishi 1, no. 207 (January 2005): 29.

37. Eric A. McVadon, “Chinese Reaction to New U.S. Initiatives on Missile Defense,” in China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies, September 2002), 177. This study was based on extensive interviews of Chinese scholars, strategists, and military officers in late 2001.

38. Brad Roberts, “China and Ballistic Missile Defense,” 29.

39. The “peaceful rise” hypothesis rests on several assumptions and projections. First, China needs a stable external environment to develop its economy. Second, Beijing faces severe internal problems that will distract it from hegemonic ambitions. Third, China’s rise to a “middle rung of advanced nations” will take twenty-five to thirty-five years, by which time the country will be fully integrated into the international system. Finally, China’s military growth is proportionate to the vastness of the country in terms of both geography and population. See Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 18–24. Zheng, the architect of the peaceful-rise theory, is a close advisor to Chinese President Hu Jintao.

40. For the most widely cited work on this issue, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96).

41. Even assuming that the Chinese have deployed up to two brigades of DF-31s, Beijing would still lack the necessary quantity of missiles to substantially change the strategic deterrence equation vis-à-vis the United States. China’s enhanced second-strike capabilities would still likely be confined to countervalue (city busting) targets. It is doubtful that a handful of mobile ICBMs would enable Beijing to credibly conduct counterforce strikes in a bid to engage in escalation dominance. A far larger force, one that lies much farther in the future, would be required for such a fundamental doctrinal shift.

42. For a compelling argument on the durability of China’s minimum deterrence posture, see Sun Xiangli, “Analysis of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” China Security 1 (Autumn 2005): 23–27.

43. Demetri Sevastopulo, “China Rejects Rumsfeld Spending Claim,” Financial Times, October 19, 2005.

44. Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in The People’s Liberation Army as an Organization: Reference Volume v 1.0, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2001), 557.

45. This assumption does not imply any permanence to China’s strategic nuclear posture. Should circumstances (such as a radical reordering of the international security environment) warrant, China would certainly harness the necessary political will and resources to depart from minimum deterrence.

46. The ability of the ICBMs to fully exploit China’s strategic depth would depend on whether the country’s road networks are extensive enough and robust enough to support the mass of the DF-31.

47. For an analysis of the possible ranges of Chinese BMD countermeasures, see Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese BMD Countermeasures: Breaching America’s Great Wall in Space?” in China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, ed. Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew Erickson (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2005), 77–88. For a Chinese overview of ballistic missile decoy technologies, see Li Wensheng , “Manhua Zhanlue Dandao Daodan Youer Jishu ,” Bingqi Zhishi 2, no. 208 (February 2005): 28–31.

48. Paul Godwin calls this qualitative and quantitative mix as “assured minimum deterrence.” His assessment dovetails with conclusions drawn by Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes (cited above) that the second-generation strategic weaponry would finally (after decades of “incredible” deterrence) endow China with a credible retaliatory capability. Paul H. B. Godwin, “Potential Chinese Responses to U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” in China and Missile Defense: Managing U.S.-PRC Strategic Relations, ed. Alan D. Romberg and Michael McDevitt (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 66–67.

49. Jing-dong Yuan, “Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses,” Nonproliferation Review 10, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 89.

50. To illustrate the SSBN challenge, consider the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) missile defense program introduced in the early 1990s. A key component of GPALS involved the now-abandoned Brilliant Pebbles (BP), the most futuristic space-based concept that emerged in the 1980s and survived into the early 1990s. Even such an advanced capability (assuming that it was technically feasible and one that was far more ambitious than those being considered today) would have been hard pressed to deal with SLBMs. A longtime advocate of BP, Gregory Canavan, acknowledges that a salvo launch from a Typhoon-class SSBN near U.S. shores would severely stress GPALS. See Gregory H. Canavan, Missile Defense for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2003), 48. This asymmetry in capability suggests that, for the time being, the only effective response to a capable Chinese SSBN is the employment of traditional antisubmarine warfare assets, particularly hunter-killer nuclear attack submarines (SSNs).

51. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).

52. This study acknowledges cost differentials between two very different economies, including calculations of purchasing power parity. But the figures are suggestive. Ted Nicholas and Rita Rossi, U.S. Weapons Systems Costs, 1994 (Fountain Valley, Calif.: Data Search Associates, April 1994), 6–10. This figure does not include the costs of research, development, training, and education, or the price of SLBMs prior to and during construction of each SSBN. A more recent (although not entirely comparable) program, the new Virginia-class SSN is also instructive of the escalating costs of big-ticket defense items for a modern military. The average unit cost is estimated at $2.5 billion. Ted Nicholas and Rita Rossi, U.S. Weapons Systems Costs, 1994, 6–9.

53. According to an anonymous PLA naval officer interviewed for a report, the cost of a nuclear submarine is simply too high for China. He observes, “the price of one nuclear submarine can buy several, even more than ten, conventional submarines. . . . As a developing country, our nation’s military budget is still quite low, and thus the size of the navy’s nuclear submarine fleet can only be maintained at a basic scale (jiben gueimo .” See “Gangtie Shayu Sanlian Shenhuo Zhoukan 20 (May 19, 2003): 29–30.

54. Hans Binnendijk and George Stewart, “Toward Missile Defense from the Sea,” in Contemporary Nuclear Debates: Missile Defense, Arms Control, and Arms Races in the Twenty-first Century, ed. Alexander T. J. Lennon (Washington, D.C.: MIT Press, 2002), 56.

55. Evan S. Medeiros, Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2001), 4. For an in-depth critique of the viability of sea-based boost-phase missile defense, see Charles V. Pena, “From the Sea: National Missile Defense Is Neither Cheap Nor Easy,” Foreign Policy Brief, no. 60, CATO Institute, September 6, 2000.

56. It is important to note that space-based capabilities are probably a mid-century proposition. By that time, a whole range of technological measures and counter-measures could be available to render this speculative exercise moot.

57. See Joanne Tompkins, “How U.S. Strategic Policy Is Changing China’s Nuclear Plans,” Arms Control Today (January/February 2003): 15. The ten-fold increase seems to be a reasonable estimate. The U.S. intelligence community projects China’s ICBMs to expand to seventy to one hundred by 2015. According to Michael McDevitt, China’s nuclear forces will grow to those numbers regardless of U.S. missile defense plans. Michael McDevitt, “Missile Defense and U.S. Policy Options toward Beijing,” 94. Depending on variations in the force mix, the expansion may not necessarily be “visible” in terms of the quantity of platforms. For instance, Beijing could add multiple warheads to its existing DF-5 ICBMs while holding down the numbers of DF-31s and JL-2s.

58. For instance, Washington’s unwillingness to cut deeper into its nuclear arsenal in part reflects a fear that China may seek to “race to parity.”

59. Despite U.S. nuclear superiority over China, Washington remains acutely aware of the PRC’s nuclear modernization program and has provided explicit policy guidelines to put the Chinese deterrent at risk. See excerpts of the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. Indeed, America’s evolving nuclear posture suggests that defense planners are looking to attain “absolute security” in its deterrent relations with Russia and China. According to a RAND study, major technological advances combined with the anticipated force structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal suggest that the United States will be increasingly capable of executing a “war winning” strategy premised on devastatingly effective preemptive nuclear strikes to disarm the major powers. The report states: “What the planned force appears best suited to provide beyond the needs of traditional deterrence is a preemptive counterforce capability against Russia and China. Otherwise the numbers and the operating procedure simply do not add up.” Glenn C. Buchan, David Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), 92. In this broader context of U.S. nuclear strategy (and assuming that these analysts are right), it is hardly conceivable that U.S. defense planners would stand idly by as China builds up its arsenal.

60. Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses,” in China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies, September 2002), 144. Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun was the first to report an apparent successful test of the JL-2 in waters near Qingdao in June 2005. It remains unclear whether the missile was launched from the trial Golf-class submarine or the 094-type SSBN.

61. CFR Independent Task Force, Chinese Military Power (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 52

62. According to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, “the 8,000+ kilometer range JL-2 . . . likely will be ready for deployment later this decade.” See Michael D. Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 28, 2006, 11. The Pentagon’s 2004 report on Chinese military states, “the JL-2 . . . will be deployed on a new ballistic missile submarine by decade’s end.” See Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2004), 37. The 2005 issue estimates that the JL-2 will be operational during the 2008–10 timeframe. See Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 28. According to a 1999 secret report titled A Primer on the Future Threat, The Decades Ahead: 1999–2020, the DIA estimated that China will have one new SSBN by 2020. Excerpted in Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander (New York: Regnery, 2004), 194–223.

63. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “China Emerges as a Maritime Power,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 2004): 35.

64. Richard Fisher, Jr., “Developing US-Chinese Nuclear Naval Competition in Asia,” International Assessment and Strategy Center website, January 16, 2005 at http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.60/pub_detail.asp.

65. Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, July 2005), 38.

66. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 173.

67. Rich Chang, “Lawmakers Argue over Chinese Sub Intelligence Report,” Taipei Times, October 14, 2005, 2.

68. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “China Emerges as a Maritime Power,” 35. For other studies on the logic of a Chinese SSBN bastion sanctuary, see, for example, Kanwa Editorial Department, “Chinese Navy’s Submarine Development Strategy,” Kanwa Defense Review (July 1, 2005): 44–46, FBIS-CHI, CPP20050801000242. A Japanese analyst speculated that China is propping up North Korea for fear that a collapse scenario would harm Chinese SSBN deployment options in the Bohai Sea, which is flanked by the DPRK. See Junichi Abe, “Why China Does Not Want to See the Unification of the Korean Peninsula,” Sekai Shuho (February 8, 2005): 54–55, FBIS, JPP20050203000035.

69. One Chinese analyst argues that geography is a major determinant of how countries design their SSBNs and associated deployment options. A long coastline directly facing the ocean and quick access to deep waters just off the shoreline are the ideal operational conditions for an SSBN. In an implicit reference to China, he observes that a country, whose long coastal waters are part of the continental shelf, may need to deploy submarines more than two hundred kilometers out to sea to find the necessary diving depth. He concludes that such geographic constraints would force the country to develop smaller SSBNs to operate in shallower sea lanes and harbors. See Wu Xie , “Zhanlue Heqianting Sheji Fangan Jianxi ,” Bingqi Zhishi 4, no. 198 (April 2004): 53.

70. It is worth noting that the Xia-class SSBN is based at the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base, fifteen miles east of Qingdao on the Yellow Sea. For satellite imagery of the Xia at Jianggezhuang, see Thomas B. Cochran, Matthew G. McKinzie, Robert S. Norris, Laura S. Harrison, and Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Nuclear Forces: The World’s First Look at China’s Underground Facilities for Nuclear Warheads,” Imaging Notes, Winter 2006 at http://www.imagingnotes.com/go/page4a.php?menu_id=23. There is speculation that the Type 094 could be homeported at this facility, a location that might favor a bastion strategy.

71. Richard Fisher, Jr., “Developing US-Chinese Nuclear Naval Competition in Asia,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.60/pub_detail.asp.

72. Chinese defense planners have devoted their attention (almost exclusively) to a Taiwan contingency since the 1995–96 missile crises. In this broader strategic context of a more urgent security challenge, it seems unlikely that Beijing would place SSBN protection ahead of another expected confrontation over Taiwan. At the same time, however, it is important to acknowledge that the maritime capabilities developed to protect SSBNs in a Bohai/Yellow Sea bastion might serve complimentary roles in a Taiwan Strait crisis or war. Further, an SSBN fleet could very well play a more direct role in a Taiwan scenario should Chinese nuclear deterrence and/or coercion enter the equation. For an abstract, generic analysis of how nuclear weapons can deter great power intervention on behalf of a client state, see Chang Ying , “Qiantan Heweishe de Liangge Zuoyong ,” Bingqi Zhishi 4, no. 198 (April 2004): 51–52. Some U.S. analysts have speculated that an assured second-strike capability underwritten by a more survivable arsenal could embolden China to engage in nuclear brinkmanship, including a “demonstration shot” in-theater to dissuade U.S. and allied intervention in the strait. Intriguingly, one article describes China’s SSBN as an “assassins mace” (shashoujian that can be employed to deter American and Japanese intervention in a cross-strait conflict. Gao Xintao , Zhongguo Haijun Qianting Zhanlue ,” Guang Jiao Jing (January 16–February 15, 2005): 69.

73. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics,” Orbis 49, no. 4, (Fall 2005): 677–94.

74. Christopher McConnaughy, “China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?” in China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, ed. Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew Erickson (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2005), 44.

75. Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 194.

76. The Chinese are quite aware of the ASW challenge. The permanent homeporting of Los Angeles-class SSNs at Guam has not gone unnoticed in China. For an in-depth Chinese analysis of Guam’s importance to America’s security posture in Asia, see [Li Wensheng], [“Focusing Guam”], Bingqi Zhishi 9, no. 203 (September 2004): 15–19. One Chinese author argues that the PLA Navy must acquire its own ASW platforms to respond to such a shift in U.S. naval posture in the Pacific. See Tai Feng , “Does China Need Anti-Submarine Patrol Aircraft? ”Jianzai Wuqi (March 1, 2005): 70–75.

77. Oga Ryohei, “What the PRC Submarine Force Is Aiming For,” Sekai no Kansen (July 1, 2005): 96–101.

78. A Chinese analysis argues that SSBN open ocean patrols would not occur until the PLA Navy develops a more balanced force structure that included aircraft carriers. Strategic nuclear submarines would then be able to operate in blue waters under the protective cover of carrier-based aviation units. “Heqianting yu Zhongguo Haijun,” Jianchuan Zhishi, no. 306 (March 2005): 13.

79. For instance, the Chinese have devoted substantial energy into developing long-range (possibly nuclear-capable) cruise missiles that can be fired from surface combatants, manned or unmanned aircraft, or nuclear attack submarines. Given the long timelines involved to produce robust missile defenses, any of these developments are possible for the Chinese.

80. Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), 47.

81. Stephen J. Hadley, “A Call to Deploy,” The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 26.

82. For a range of potential technological breakthroughs in the future, see Stephen F. Cimbala, “Nuclear Weapons in the Twentieth Century: From Simplicity to Complexity,” Defense and Security Analysis 21, no. 3 (September 2005): 279.

83. Some analysts have speculated that China might be able to develop and deploy crude but effective missile defenses against counterforce strikes to enhance Beijing’s confidence in the survivability of its deterrent.

84. Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,” China Security 1 (Autumn 2005): 13.

85. For an American analysis of this point, see James Mulvenon, “Missile Defenses and the Taiwan Scenario,” in China and Missile Defense: Managing U.S.-PRC Strategic Relations, ed. Alan D. Romberg and Michael McDevitt (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 58–60. The author postulates a thought-provoking scenario in which Taiwan unilaterally conducts offensive, conventional precision strikes against the mainland during a cross-strait conflict. Unable to determine the real source of these attacks, worst-case thinking could lead Beijing to mistakenly conclude that Washington was exercising its preemptive option to disarm Chinese nuclear forces. At this point in the crisis, the PRC would face the same type of decision-making crossroad that Zhu and Shen identified above.

86. Paul Godwin, “Potential Chinese Responses to U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” 71.

87. Stephen Cimbala, “Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century,” 280.

Toshi Yoshihara

U.S. Ballistic-Missile Defense and China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent

A Preliminary Assessment