FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, two challenges will dominate U.S. national security planning. The first is the so-called global war on terrorism, a protracted war against jihadist terrorist groups and their supporters.1 The second is the long-term geostrategic competition with China.2 These challenges will determine the size and shape of the U.S. armed forces over coming decades.3 Although each service has a significant role to play in meeting each challenge, the war against jihadist terrorists will involve the Army and Marine Corps more heavily than the Navy and Air Force, whereas the competition with China will involve naval and air forces more heavily than ground forces.
To say that the United States is involved in a long-term geostrategic competition with China is not to prejudge its outcome. History contains examples of rising powers coming to blows with dominant powers, as Germany did twice with Great Britain during the twentieth century. But history also contains instances when competitions between emerging and established powers ending amicably, as when Great Britain accommodated the rise of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The U.S.-Soviet competition represents an intermediate case. Although the superpowers managed to avoid direct conflict for four decades, the Cold War was far from bloodless. It spawned conflicts that cost the United States alone more than one hundred thousand dead. And indeed, on a number of occasions, it led to direct combat between the United States and the Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1959, for example, the Air Force and Navy lost at least sixteen aircraft with 164 crewmen killed on reconnaissance missions along the Soviet periphery.4
The long-term competition with China could produce conflict. A war across the Taiwan Strait, which could itself take any number of forms, is the most likely, but hardly the only, such contingency.5 Moreover, as China grows in stature, it will cast its shadow over other relationships—diplomatic, economic, and military—that the United States has in Asia. In recent years Beijing has assiduously cultivated ties with states as diverse as South Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. The U.S.-Chinese competition could also influence other conflicts, such as a war on the Korean Peninsula.
This chapter argues that because we are in a competition with China, we need to understand the character of that competition and develop a strategy to compete effectively over the long term. We need to diagnose the state of the competition, identifying trends, asymmetries, and potential discontinuities. We need to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese navy, and of the U.S. Navy. We need to determine our objectives for the competition and develop a strategy to achieve them. Specifically, we need to bolster areas of U.S. competitive advantage, identify opportunities to shape Chinese resource allocation, and attempt to change the nature of the competition.
This chapter explores one facet of the U.S.-Chinese competition: that which is concerned with China’s nuclear submarine modernization. It begins by assessing the state of our understanding of Chinese naval developments. It then offers a comparison of the U.S. and Chinese submarine forces. It discusses U.S. strategic objectives and how China’s nuclear submarine modernization affects them. It concludes with a series of strategic options for the U.S. Navy to compete more effectively.
China’s military modernization poses a significant challenge to the U.S. intelligence community. Though an important topic, it is but one of a number of areas that is vying for the community’s limited resources. Moreover, monitoring military force modernization requires technical collection systems that are expensive and may have limited utility for the other main challenge that we face—the war with jihadist terrorist networks. During the Cold War, for example, the U.S. intelligence community developed an extensive imagery and signals intelligence infrastructure designed to monitor Soviet military developments.6 Today, however, there is a general perception that the U.S. intelligence community is relatively overinvested in technical collection and underinvested in clandestine human intelligence.
To the extent that the Chinese military is actively exploring new ways of war, it poses an even greater challenge to U.S. intelligence organizations. Intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor the development of established weapons than to search for new military systems. They also tend to pay more attention to technology and doctrine that have been demonstrated in war than to those that have not seen combat. In other words, they experience more difficulty detecting new or unique systems. Finally, intelligence organizations more readily detect foreign developments that mirror those of their own armed forces than those that differ substantially from them.7
There is much that we do not know about the Chinese military. For example, in recent years U.S. analysts reportedly missed more than a dozen significant Chinese military developments.8 As the Defense Department admitted several years ago in a report to Congress on the China-Taiwan military balance:
First, we need to know more about how the authorities in the PRC and Taiwan view their military and political situation—in order to identify the most important conflict scenarios and hence the capabilities central to them; in order to assess whether the balance of forces adequately deters Chinese attack and reassures Taiwan; and in order to understand how both sides’ calculations of priority, risk, and military capability would shape the course and outcome of a conflict. We are unlikely to be able to replicate their precise views on this military balance, but we probably can learn much more about both sides’ ideas about statecraft, their approaches to the use of force, their perceived vulnerabilities, and their preferred operational methods, as well as about the political and military organizations that produce military assessments and plans. Second, as might be predicted, we are less knowledgeable about things that are less visible or tangible—training, logistics, doctrine, command and control, special operations, mine warfare—than we are about airplanes and surface ships. Third, although we can identify emerging methods of warfare that appear likely to be increasingly important in the future—particularly missiles and information warfare—we cannot confidently assess how each side’s capabilities will develop or the interaction of measures and countermeasures that these emerging military competitions will generate.9
Submarines are by nature stealthy, their operations difficult to monitor. Although it is impossible to discuss definitively the extent of U.S. knowledge of Chinese submarine operations in an open forum, it is safe to conclude that our understanding of Chinese submarine technology, doctrine, and operations is far from complete. It appears, for example, that the existence of the Yuan class of diesel submarines (SSK) came as a surprise to many analysts.10
Given the gaps in our understanding of the Chinese navy, there is an understandable tendency to seek analogies, either to the U.S.-Soviet competition or China’s past. Although such analogies may be useful and are at times necessary, they should be treated with great care.
First, the U.S.-Chinese competition is different from the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War. The United States enters this competition in a much stronger position than it possessed during even the early phases of the Cold War. The United States is today the most powerful nation in the world, both militarily and economically. It dominates not only the traditional metrics of power, but also culture. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the U.S.-Chinese competition will ever dominate the U.S. national security agenda the way the U.S.-Soviet competition did. For the foreseeable future, the rise of China will have to compete with the worldwide struggle with jihadist terrorists as well as threats in Southwest and Northeast Asia. Moreover, China’s goals are significantly different from those of the Soviet Union. As a result, the U.S.-Chinese competition is likely to evolve in ways far different from the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War.
Second, there is a danger of mindlessly applying the U.S. Navy’s experience of competing with the Soviet navy during the Cold War to the current situation. To state the obvious, China has a culture and society far different from that of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Chinese armed forces in general, and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in particular, have historical traditions far different from those of the Soviet armed forces.
Third, although China continues to import a wide variety of naval hardware from Russia, including Project 636 Kilo-class SSKs, it would be a mistake to assume that China will employ those submarines the way Russia does or the Soviet Union did. Studies of the diffusion of military ideas and technology show that militaries rarely, if ever, adopt foreign doctrine wholesale.11 Rather, their political objectives, strategy, operational art, military traditions, organizational culture, and professional competence all conspire to produce unique approaches.
Fourth, analogies from China’s past may misinform as well as inform. The PLAN is currently undergoing a period of growth and improvement. Extrapolations from the past are, if anything, likely to understate the pace of improvement of the Chinese submarine force. To the extent that past performance creates expectations about future capabilities, analysts will tend to underestimate the capabilities of the Chinese military.
China’s military modernization may best resemble that of Japan in the 1920s and 1930s. During the early part of that period, analysts accurately reported the Japanese military’s substantial material and doctrinal weaknesses. However, estimates of Japanese military capability failed to keep pace with Japanese military modernization, which accelerated in the second half of the 1930s. As a result, in key respects U.S. intelligence underestimated Japanese military power on the eve of World War II in the Pacific.12
Several considerations shape China’s nuclear submarine modernization. First, China’s development of nuclear-powered submarines, like its nuclear-weapon, long-range missile, and manned-space programs, serves as an expression of national power and prestige. The possession of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) puts China in the same league as the United States, Russia, Britain, and France. Nuclear submarines not only bolster China’s image as a great power, but also provide concrete evidence of Beijing’s technological proficiency. In this respect, China’s nuclear submarine fleet is aimed as much at China’s regional neighbors as it is the United States.
Yet China’s nuclear submarine force is more than just a showpiece. It is also the result of resource allocation decisions the Chinese political and military leadership has made over the course of years and decades. It is axiomatic that no nation’s resources are unlimited. The decision to build nuclear-powered submarines is also a decision to forego other weapons, whether diesel submarines or aircraft carriers or intercontinental ballistic missiles. In other words, the Chinese leadership clearly attaches substantial value to the possession of nuclear submarines.
Finally, and most concretely, China’s submarine force is a military instrument. It is a means to achieve the Chinese leadership’s aims in peace and war.
Weighing the balance between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy, let alone the Chinese nuclear submarine force and the U.S. Navy, is a difficult undertaking. To state the obvious, China and the United States are vastly different countries, with vastly different histories and geography that have created vastly different navies. Even a cursory look reveals asymmetries in the missions of the two navies and the structure and purpose of their submarine forces.
Power projection is the sine qua non of the U.S. Navy. Its ships, submarines, and aircraft are designed for prolonged operations far from America’s shores. Over decades it has built both the technology and the supporting infrastructure for expeditionary operations. Just as importantly, it has built an organizational culture that emphasizes the independent exercise of command.
The main mission of the PLAN, by contrast, is sea denial. It is designed for operations close to China’s coast, though it has conducted more blue-water operations in recent years. Whereas the U.S. Navy is designed for combat far from the United States but close to enemy shores, the PLAN is built to fight close to friendly shores. In promoting officers and selecting leaders, the Chinese prize loyalty and reliability over independence and initiative.
The U.S. and Chinese submarine forces are quite different. First and foremost, the U.S. submarine force is composed entirely of nuclear-powered boats.13 This is an expression of the United States’ insular geography and the U.S. Navy’s power-projection strategy. By contrast, nuclear submarines comprise only 7 percent of the Chinese submarine fleet.14 It is likely that percentage will decrease, at least in the short term, as China acquires Project 636 Kilo diesel submarines from Russia and builds Song- and Yuan-class diesels indigenously.
The U.S. Navy currently possesses fifty-four SSNs and sixteen SSBNs. The Chinese submarine force is composed of five SSNs, sixty-one SSKs, and one SSBN.15 In constructing its submarine force, the U.S. Navy has traditionally emphasized quality over quantity. The Chinese, by contrast, have kept a number of obsolescent submarines, including thirty-five Romeo-class SSKs, in its inventory. Whereas a large portion of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal is deployed at sea, submarine-launched ballistic missiles account for only 14 percent of China’s intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Submarines serve a number of purposes for the United States. According to the U.S. Navy, the primary mission of the U.S. attack submarine force is antisubmarine warfare (ASW). U.S. attack submarines also collect intelligence, deliver Special Operations Forces, conduct antisurface warfare (ASUW) and launch strikes against land targets.16 The United States looks to SSBNs to house a significant portion of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. In the future, it will also deliver conventionally armed ballistic missiles.17 Finally, the U.S. Navy is converting four Ohio-class SSBNs into nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarines (SSGNs), which will have the ability both to launch 154 Tactical Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles and to deliver Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) special operations forces.18
Whereas U.S. attack submarines are designed primarily for ASW, Chinese attack submarines possess little ASW capability. The primary mission of China’s attack submarine fleet is ASUW. The extent to which the Chinese submarine force has conducted intelligence collection is unclear. The incursion of a Han-class submarine into Japanese territorial waters near Tarama Island in November 2004, however—as detailed in Peter Dutton’s contribution to this volume—suggests that this may also be a mission. The PLAN has heretofore lacked the means to launch strikes on land targets, though China’s acquisition of the Klub family of submarine-launched weapons, which includes both antiship and land-attack cruise missiles, could change this.
A diagnostic net technical assessment of U.S. and Chinese submarines is beyond the scope of this chapter. Such an assessment would include a comparison of their acoustic signatures, as well as the capabilities of their sensors and weapon systems. To the extent that U.S. submarines are able to detect Chinese nuclear submarines while remaining undetected, for example, they will enjoy a significant advantage.
Assessments of the effectiveness of the Chinese submarine force vary. Michael O’Hanlon, for example, estimates that “in an extreme case” Chinese submarines would be able to sink “a ship or two” in a war across the Taiwan Strait.19 Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, by contrast, argue that the Chinese submarine force could be significantly more effective.20 Michael A. Glosny contends, based upon a series of simulations, that in the event of a future Chinese submarine blockade of Taiwan, “the PLAN’s small fleet of submarines would inflict an amount of total damage that seems unlikely to be militarily decisive by historical standards.”21
Such a span of opinion is hardly surprising. First, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of the PLAN in general and the Chinese submarine force in particular based on existing information. As noted above, because the Chinese submarine force is undergoing significant change, past performance is unlikely to offer a guide to present or future effectiveness. More generally, there is little available data on the effectiveness of modern submarines in ASW and ASUW. The U.S. Navy and the PLAN conduct naval exercises that include submarine operations, but that is not the same thing as war. And whereas conflicts over the past several decades have included submarines, primarily in a land-attack role, since World War II there has been just one case of a submarine sinking a surface ship (the British SSN Conqueror’s sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the 1982 Falklands War) and no cases of a submarine sinking another submarine.
Several discontinuities are possible over the next several decades. First, the PLAN might adopt new roles and missions. The combination of China’s expanding interests and Beijing’s increasing dependence on oil imports could lead China to adopt a blue-water naval strategy. Indeed, the long endurance afforded by nuclear propulsion would make SSNs an ideal element of a blue-water force. Even if the PLAN did not seek a blue-water capability, the acquisition of increasing numbers of SSNs would give it the ability to contest U.S. naval forces farther from China’s shores.
Second, the development of new technology could alter the character of undersea warfare. One such technological area involves unmanned systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned combat air vehicles have already changed the character of warfare; the deployment of significant numbers of unmanned undersea vehicles for reconnaissance, surveillance, and strike could have a similarly profound impact on undersea warfare. Other developments that could affect undersea warfare could include major changes in submarine quieting or detection.
The potential for such discontinuities should not be dismissed, particularly over the next two to three decades. Rather, it is important to be on the lookout for indicators of such developments. It would be worthwhile, for example, to track the portion of the Chinese submarine force that is composed of nuclear submarines as an indicator of a shift toward a blue-water capability.
A comparison of the U.S. and Chinese nuclear submarine forces is useful for illuminating the asymmetry between the two sides. It is of limited utility, however, for assessing the implications of China’s nuclear submarine force for the U.S. Navy. China’s SSN fleet is one element of its attack submarine force. Attack submarines are one means of conducting ASUW; others include China’s cruise-missile-armed surface combatants and aircraft. China’s ASUW force is, in turn, but one element of China’s antiaccess force. A more comprehensive assessment would diagnose trends in U.S. power-projection capabilities relative to China’s antiaccess capability.
Similarly, China’s SSBN force is one means of delivering nuclear weapons over long range. A more comprehensive assessment of the U.S.-Chinese nuclear balance would also include both sides’ ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers.
Any discussion of the implications of China’s nuclear submarine modernization for the U.S. Navy should begin with a discussion of U.S. objectives. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America lists four strategic objectives: (1) securing the United States from direct attack, (2) securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action, (3) strengthening alliances and partnerships, and (4) establishing favorable security conditions. It argues that the United States should accomplish these objectives by assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression and countering coercion, and defeating adversaries.22
China’s nuclear submarine buildup affects our ability to achieve a number of these objectives. First, China’s SSBN force provides the ability to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. Second, China’s nuclear submarines will contribute to Beijing’s ability to deny the United States access to the seas on China’s periphery. Third, this force has the ability to alter regional balances. Finally, it contributes to an image of China as a great power and a major competitor of the United States.
The United States could adopt several strategies to compete with China in undersea warfare. First, it could choose to bolster areas of current U.S. advantage. During the Cold War, the United States developed a comparative advantage over the Soviet Union in ASW. That capability has languished since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. could, however, reinforce its ASW capability, with particular focus on the need to track Chinese submarines.23
The design of quiet submarines is another area of Cold War advantage that has diminished in recent years.
Finally, the United States could more effectively use its technological superiority in the competition with China. There is a widespread presumption that the U.S. lead in advanced technology gives us the ability to do things that other militaries cannot. This is a presumption that should be nurtured. During the 1980s, for example, the United States inaugurated a strategic deception campaign associated with the Strategic Defense Initiative as a way to make the Soviets believe that U.S. ballistic-missile defense capabilities were more formidable than they in fact were.24 The program was originally designed to block the Soviet Union from gathering accurate information about the U.S. strategic defense program. As it evolved, it sought to force the Soviets into spending fortunes building their own system and countering that of the United States.25
Second, the United States could attempt to influence China’s resource allocation in ways that favor the United States. One approach would be to force the Chinese down paths that are difficult, expensive, and result in low payoff.
Seen from this perspective, it is unclear whether China’s investment in nuclear-powered attack submarines should be a greater concern than other options to perform the same mission. As noted above, the main advantage that nuclear submarines have over diesel submarines is their endurance. Should China opt for a blue-water naval posture, such endurance would be a significant attribute. On the other hand, nuclear-powered submarines are considerably more expensive than diesel submarines. They are also likely noisier than advanced diesel submarines such as Project 636 Kilo-class SSKs.
As the experience of the Cold War demonstrates, building a force of quiet nuclear submarines is a daunting challenge. Although the Soviet Union was able to produce large numbers of nuclear submarines, it had great difficulty producing quiet nuclear submarines, ones that could avoid detection by U.S. attack submarines. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s ability to build quiet submarines depended upon Moscow’s access to technology from the United States and its allies. By contrast, the United States had a significant lead both in submarine quieting and submarine detection.26
There would appear to be few objections to China expanding its SSBN fleet. Such an undertaking is likely to be expensive and offer China little to no advantage in the competition with the United States.
A final strategy would be to attempt to change the nature of the competition in such a way as to render China’s investment in submarines obsolete. Beginning in the second half of the 1970s, the United States pursued a strategy for developing low-observable aircraft in order to render obsolete the Soviet Union’s substantial investment in strategic air defense. The ability to penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of such formidable defenses represented an area of considerable advantage for the United States. As Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger put it in 1987, “Low observable technologies promise to increase further the competitive advantage of our bomber force, to such a degree as to make obsolete much of the Soviets’ air defense infrastructure.” In his view, the ability of the United States to penetrate Soviet air space had already forced the Soviets to invest the equivalent of over $120 billion in strategic air defense.27 The continuing development of stealth rendered the Soviet Union vulnerable and forced the Soviets to divert funds from offensive arms to defensive arms.
This essay has been suggestive rather than definitive. Such an approach is appropriate, considering that we are in a decades-long competition with China.
Still, much more research and analysis is needed. First, we need a much better understanding of the Chinese military in general and the Chinese submarine force in particular. As the chapters in this volume show, much is available through public sources. Much more, however, can be done to analyze these and other Chinese writings on military affairs.
Second, we need to develop strategies to compete effectively with China. Our resources, though substantial, are not unlimited. We must therefore use them wisely if we are to achieve our objectives over the long term.
1. David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (August 2005).
2. Andrew W. Marshall first coined the term “long-term competition” during the Cold War. See A. W. Marshall, Long-Term Competition with the Soviets: A Framework for Strategic Analysis, R-862-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1972). It is in this sense that I use the term throughout this paper.
3. The former tracks with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review’s “defeating terrorist networks,” “defending the homeland in depth,” and “preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction,” while the latter is a subset of “shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.” See Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006).
4. William E. Burrows, By Any Means Necessary: America’s Secret Air War in the Cold War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001).
5. For discussions of this contingency from different viewpoints, see Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 51–86; Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 161–96; Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 125–60.
6. Clarence E. Smith, “CIA’s Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology” in Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), chapter 4.
7. Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 4.
8. Bill Gertz, “Analysts Missed Chinese Buildup,” The Washington Times, June 9, 2005, www.washingtontimes.com.
9. “Report to Congress Pursuant to Public Law 106–113,” at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait_12182000.doc, accessed October 21, 2005.
10. Bill Gertz, “Chinese Produce New Type of Sub,” The Washington Times (July 16, 2004): 1.
11. See, for example, the essays in Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003).
12. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War, chapter 3.
13. Adm. Arleigh Burke made the decision that all future U.S. submarines would be nuclear in September 1955, six months after the first cruise of the USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear submarine.
14. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2004–2005 (London: IISS, 2005), 272.
15. It also includes an SSG and an SS that are used for tests.
16. U.S. Navy Fact File, “Attack Submarines—SSN,” at http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-ssn.html, accessed October 10, 2005.
17. 2006 QDR, 50.
18. “SSGN—A Transformational Force for the U.S. Navy,” at http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/issue_13/ssgn.htm, accessed October 24, 2005.
19. O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” 78–79.
20. Goldstein and Murray, “Undersea Dragons,” passim.
21. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea,” 139.
22. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense 2005), 6–8.
23. Owen R. Coté, Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, Newport Paper 16 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003).
24. General Accounting Office, Ballistic Missile Defense: Records Indicate Deception Program Did Not Affect 1984 Test Results (Washington, D.C.: GAO, July 1994), 3.
25. Tim Weiner, “Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin, and Congress,” New York Times, August 18, 1993, www.nytimes.com.
26. Coté, The Third Battle, passim.
27. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, January 12, 1987).