Paul H. B. Godwin

China’s Emerging Military Doctrine

A Role for Nuclear Submarines?

Introduction

WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF TWO NEW CLASSES of nuclear-powered submarines—the 093 SSN and the 094 SSBN—China has built combatants undoubtedly far superior to their aging predecessors in the attributes that make SSN and SSBN such important components of the leading navies. These virtues are stealth, speed, endurance, autonomy, mobility, and especially in the case of an SSBN, lethality. The new SSBN’s missile has an estimated range of some 5,000 miles—more than four times that of its 1,000-mile-range predecessor. These new nuclear-powered classes are accompanied by the continued acquisition of Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines (SSK) from Russia and China’s indigenous development and production of advanced SSKs. This chapter will assess China’s maritime and nuclear doctrine to suggest how these new and extremely capable submarines may be employed.

In the mid-1980s, China’s maritime doctrine and strategy began a transition from coastal defense (jinan fangyu; ) to offshore defense (jinhai fangyu; ). As that transition has taken place, China’s basic military doctrine and national military strategy have undergone dramatic changes. The most significant revisions reflect more than a response to the technological advances that have so transformed the conduct of military operations. The most critical change results from Beijing’s perception of the United States. Beijing’s defense White Papers make it quite evident that the potential adversary now most feared by China is actually the United States.¹ Albeit currently improbable, the most likely Sino-American military confrontation is over Taiwan. Beyond Taiwan, however, there is the looming question of how Beijing sees China’s role in Asia’s future security environment. Will China continue to accept the dominant position in the western Pacific now occupied by the United States, or will it choose to offset U.S. regional maritime dominance by building a navy with the capability to counter this dominance? A substantial SSN force would serve this purpose well. In terms of doctrine for nuclear forces, does the new SSBN class signal Beijing’s intent to reinforce China’s strategic deterrent with a potent sea-based component to complement its new family of solid-fueled, mobile land-based systems?

Whereas Beijing’s primary concern is the United States, China does have additional security concerns influencing its naval programs. These include maritime territorial claims in the East and South China Seas and defense of increasingly important sea lines of communications (SLOC). With China’s growing dependence on Middle East oil, these SLOCs conceptually include the Indian Ocean. When joined with Beijing’s perception of the potential threat from the United States and preventing Taiwan’s de jure independence, these are major demands on a navy that has only recently begun to enter the modern era. This is especially so for a navy that has so little experience with naval and air operations beyond coastal defense. While recognizing the broader maritime security interests influencing China’s naval developments, this chapter will focus on the central role played by the United States in establishing Beijing’s defense modernization priorities.

The United States as Primary Potential Adversary²

The United States’ role in the priorities established for China’s military modernization programs is evident even if indirectly stated. Beijing’s defense White Paper released in December 2004 asserts that the global military imbalance is widening and that military strength now plays an increasingly important role in preserving national security. Although not directly charged with creating this imbalance, the logic employed by the White Paper to explain the increasing importance of military power and the global military imbalance is manifestly centered on the United States.

First, the metric employed to describe the developments in military capabilities so radically changing the conduct of war is clearly drawn from the technological advances and doctrinal changes found in the U.S. armed forces. What the White Paper refers to as the effects of the “World Wide Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)” on the conduct of war can only refer to the United States. U.S. armed forces are the leaders in incorporating advanced technologies into military operations and have applied these operations in war. Second, the White Paper states that the PLA’s³ modernization is dedicated to “building an informationalized force and winning an informationalized war.”⁴ The principal adversary the PLA will potentially confront in an “informationalized” war is the United States. Third is the rationale provided for granting the PLA’s naval, air, and strategic forces priority in China’s defense modernization programs. The White Paper states that this priority is required “in order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air, and conducting strategic counter-strikes.”⁵ A military confrontation with the United States over Taiwan is the only probable near-term scenario requiring this particular combination of military capabilities.

The PLA Navy’s Status, Mission, and Modernization

The precedence granted the PLA Navy (PLAN) in China’s defense-modernization priorities in the 2004 White Paper is significant. Traditionally, PLA ground forces have held pride of place over the navy and air force. In earlier White Papers, the protocol order was army, navy, and air force, with the 2nd Artillery Corps listed last as an “independent arm” of the PLA responsible for ground-to-ground nuclear and conventional-armed missiles. Placing the navy first in modernization priorities is a major change from past practice. The navy’s enhanced status in 2004 was joined by the air force and 2nd Artillery Corps. For the first time, all three of their commanders have been appointed to the highest policy-making body for the armed forces: the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Military Commission (CMC) chaired by Hu Jintao, the CCP General-Secretary.

The navy’s new status did not change the PLAN’s mission as defined by the defense White Papers. It remains, ensuring China’s maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial waters. Nor did the PLAN’s modernization objectives change. They are directed at extending the reach of the PLAN’s offshore defense operations. This goal is being achieved by developing new combat ships, updating weapons and equipment, improving long-range precision strike capabilities, and acquiring “special purpose aircraft.” Naval modernization is accompanied by exercises designed to improve the PLAN’s joint operations capabilities.

Although China’s defense White Papers assign a nuclear counterattack mission to the PLAN,⁶ Western analysts do not believe China’s single Xia -class SSBN is operational. The boat entered service in 1983, but did not complete a successful submerged missile launch until 1988 and is not known to conduct regular patrols, let alone extended deterrence patrols. Interestingly, the wording of the counterattack mission in the 2004 White Paper changed from the 2002 edition. The 2002 White Paper said “the nuclear-powered submarine force, which assumes the strategic nuclear counterattack mission, is under the direct command of the CMC.”⁷ It further stated that a counterattack could be conducted either independently by the 2nd Artillery Corps or “jointly with the strategic nuclear forces of other services, at the order of the supreme command.”⁸ This distinction suggested that the PLAN has the mission of performing an independent strategic counterattack. Nonetheless, in the discussion of strengthening the Navy to better perform its missions, the 2004 White Paper says only that the PLAN’s “capability of nuclear counterattacks is also enhanced.”⁹ There is no specific discussion of a PLAN strategic nuclear mission.

The Doctrine Dilemma

Despite its common use among Western observers of China’s armed forces, the Chinese lexicon of military terms does not contain a word for “doctrine.”¹⁰ When referring to U.S. military doctrine, for example, Chinese sources translate “doctrine” as lilun or xueshuo which are best translated into English as “theory.” This therefore raises the issue of what to assess as China’s emerging military doctrine? It makes more sense to ask what function doctrine provides to those militaries that do employ the word and then ask if there is a functional equivalent in Chinese documents. The U.S. Department of Defense defines doctrine as: “Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”¹¹ The essential concepts in this definition are that doctrine is an officially endorsed statement of fundamental principles that guide the application of military force. As guidance, these principles require judgment when applied and are therefore not to be understood as Holy Writ. There are many terms employed by Chinese documents that do fulfill the guidance requirement. These include junshi fangzhen which can be translated as “military guiding principles.” Another is junshi yuanze perhaps best translated as “principles of military operations.”

A hierarchy of authoritative documents does exist to guide the PLA as it develops strategy and concepts of operations for future military conflicts. Unfortunately, the substance of these documents is not known. Akin to the U.S. National Military Strategy, the current overarching authoritative source for the PLA’s roles and missions is the “National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” (xin shiqi guojia junshi zhanlue fangzhen; Promulgated in 1993 by Jiang Zemin as the CCP General Secretary and CMC Chairman, this source is clearly authoritative. The new guidelines replaced those issued in 1985 that moved PLA war preparations (zhanbei; ) from “people’s war under modern conditions” to “limited local war” (jubu zhanzheng; ). The 1993 guidelines stemmed from a detailed assessment of the military implications of the 1991 Gulf War, which resulted in modifying PLA war preparations from local war to “local war under high-tech conditions” (gao jishu tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng; ).¹² Beijing has not publicly declared what its national military strategy is beyond stating that “China adheres to the military strategy of active defense” )¹³—to be discussed below.

In 1999, six years after the new national military strategic guidelines were issued, Jiang Zemin ordered the “New Generation Operations Regulations” (xin yidai zuozhan tiaoling; ) to be issued, replacing those published in the mid-1980s.¹⁴ This was followed by a series of six manuals setting out the “essentials” of joint campaigns, ground force campaigns, air force campaigns, naval campaigns, 2nd Artillery campaigns, and campaign logistics.¹⁵ In this use, “essentials” is a translation of gangyao . As a concept, gangyao also contains the meaning of “outline” and “compendium.” Nor is the term limited to military use. The CCP and the Chinese government also use this term for documents establishing authoritative guidance. As Finkelstein has noted, it is useful to think of the PLA gangyao as similar to U.S. military field manuals or the Pentagon Joint Staff’s publications on joint operations. In its own publications, the PLA refers to these U.S. manuals as gangyao.¹⁶ Nevertheless, references to the new gangyao found in the official English translations of the defense White Papers issued in 2000, 2002, and 2004 translate the term as doctrine. These White Papers also note that the PLA is developing operational doctrine as guidance for operational training.¹⁷

Thus, although there is no Chinese word for “doctrine” as this term is used in the United States and other defense establishments, authoritative guidance provided the PLA serves as doctrine. This is especially noticeable at the operational level of war. The U.S. armed forces and those of China have a common understanding of this level. For the United States, it is: “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.”¹⁸ For the PLA, it is zhanyi —campaigns/operations. For convenience, this chapter will employ the concept of “doctrine” to refer to the authoritative guidance the PLAN receives at any level of war.

Two of the six 1999 operational gangyao promulgated in 1999 directly effect the PLAN. “The Essentials of Joint Campaigns of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun lianhe zhanyi gangyao; ) provide authoritative guidance for the PLA’s move toward joint operations. “The Essentials of Campaigns of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy” (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun haijun zhanyi gangyao; ) no doubt includes guidance on how to conduct independent campaigns in addition to joint operations. Although the substance of these manuals is not available for assessment, there is sufficient reliable information about China’s maritime strategy to make a reasonable although speculative assessment of the roles and missions of the PLAN’s nuclear submarines within a mixed submarine force.

China’s Changing Maritime Strategy¹⁹

In the two decades since the PLAN’s first conceptual steps toward offshore defense were taken in the mid-1980s, China’s perceived security environment has dramatically changed. Russia as the USSR’s successor has been transformed from a potential threat to become China’s principal arms supplier and a diplomatic ally. Moscow has granted the PLA access to modern weaponry and military technology that it had not had since the Sino-Soviet split in the late-1950s. In contrast to U.S. constraint following diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1979, Russia apparently places only limited restraint on what it will sell China. Russia’s willingness to sell advanced platforms, weaponry, components, and technologies together with licensed production agreements was made even more significant by the post-Tiananmen embargoes applied by the United States and the European Union in 1989.

Over these same decades, China’s relations with the United States underwent a complex transition from quasi-allies against the USSR to possible adversaries. Each now views the other with apprehension and both follow a policy of pragmatic engagement. For good reason, Washington and Beijing believe their national interests are best served by avoiding confrontation and cooperating in all realms where this is possible. It is within this context that Beijing’s 2000, 2002, and 2004 defense White Papers clearly identified the United States as China’s most important potential foe.²⁰ In doing so, Beijing believes it must prepare for a possible military conflict with the world’s most technologically advanced and powerful military. With the U.S. strategy in the western Pacific rooted in maritime force projection, China’s shift toward offshore defense in the 1980s has taken on a new significance.

First, however, it is necessary to determine what “offshore defense” means to the PLAN. It is now two decades since the first and second island chains were used to define the limits of offshore defense.²¹ They are rarely employed officially today as defining the outer limits of the PLAN’s offshore defense. It seems probable that offshore defense is now a strategic concept with no defined geographical limit and serves the PLAN primarily by declaring that it is no longer a purely coastal defense force.²² The conceptual offshore defense strategy could also be employed in part as a tool the PLAN can manipulate in the PLA budget process to argue for more capable weapons and supporting systems.

The long-standing limitation on the offshore operational range of the Chinese navy has been its weak antiair warfare (AAW) capabilities, making surface combatants dependent on land-based aircraft for air defense. Over the last few years, however, the PLAN has made definite progress in the area air defense capabilities of its new ships.²³ It is yet too early to determine the effectiveness of these new air defense enhancements, but it is evident that the navy is focused on overcoming this critical deficiency. Nonetheless, until the PLAN has effective area AAW to protect more than one or two surface action groups (SAG), or acquires aircraft carriers, the range of its offshore operations for surface ships will be constrained.

To some extent, submarines avoid the constraints provided by the combat range of China’s land-based air power, but they are subject to the airborne, surface, and subsurface antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of an adversary. This is especially true of the capabilities organic to U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups (CSG). These include not only the SSNs that form part of a CSG, but also the airborne ASW of the carrier itself and the defending escort ships. Unless equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP), diesel-electric submarines are required to snorkel on a regular basis, making them particularly susceptible to a CSG’s ASW despite their normal acoustic quietness. Thus far, China is not known to have acquired or developed AIP SSKs. SSNs are less susceptible because they are not required to snorkel. The increasing range of submerged-launch antiship cruise missiles (ASCM), however, will provide SSNs and SSKs some relief from a CSG’s organic ASW capabilities. The Klub ASCM, for example, deployed on the Kilos acquired from Russia, has a range of some 120 nautical miles and supersonic terminal homing.²⁴ The range of these weapons allows the submarine to attack some distance from a CSG, greatly expanding the search area for U.S. ASW. The PLAN nonetheless recognizes the hazards involved in attacking U.S. carrier strike groups.²⁵

Speculations Concerning Emerging Doctrine and Nuclear Submarines

The SSBN

As Beijing works through the doctrinal issues required to guide the future of its nuclear submarine force in an offshore defense strategy, it continues to confront the dilemma faced by Mao Zedong in the civil war with the Kuomintang and the war with Japan. Mao had to develop doctrine, strategy, and concepts operations to defeat an adversary that was superior in the technology of war.²⁶ The core guiding principle developed by Mao and that continues as the heart of the PLA’s doctrinal evolution is “active defense” (jijifangyu; ), which Mao defined as “offensive defense, or defense through decisive engagements.”²⁷ At the operational level of war, this doctrinal principle directed his forces to seize the battlefield initiative through offensive operations. China’s doctrine for nuclear deterrence, however, has stayed close to Mao’s principle for the strategic level of war—strike only after the enemy has struck (hou fa zhi ren; ).

China’s longstanding public doctrine for its nuclear forces is one of “No First Use” (NFU). The consensus among observers is that China’s twenty or so inaccurate, slow-responding, liquid-fueled intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with their huge three–four megaton warheads suggest that Beijing intends to respond to a nuclear attack with a punitive counter-value strike. Beijing evidently believes the potential destruction inflicted by a countervalue strike conducted by even two or three surviving weapons would be so great as to deter any adversary, including a superpower. Western analysts have dubbed this strategy “minimal deterrence.”

The problem Beijing faces is ensuring that China’s deterrent is perceived as credible. To be credible within an NFU doctrine, two issues are involved. First, some of China’s retaliatory force must be seen as possibly surviving a disarming first strike. Second, the adversary must believe that Beijing would launch the remaining missiles. Given the overwhelming number of strategic nuclear weapons in the United States’ inventory, a retaliatory punitive strike from what few Chinese weapons survived could result in China’s destruction. Consequently, a nuclear deterrent composed of a few silo-based ICBMs may lack the required credibility. When ballistic-missile defenses (BMD) become effective, the credibility of this small deterrent will erode even further. In the late 1980s, an internal debate began in China because some analysts doubted the deterrent credibility of a single punitive retaliatory strike. Some advocated a doctrinal transition to a nuclear war fighting capability.²⁸ Thus far, there has been no outward indication that Beijing is changing its nuclear doctrine.

Beijing is, however, fully aware of the credibility problem it confronts. Over the past five decades, China has devoted considerable resources to developing sea-based and mobile land-based weapons. Mobile land-based systems joined with the stealth and endurance found in SSBNs will enhance the survivability of China’s strategic deterrent. However, enhancing the survivability of a second-strike force does not resolve the question of how many weapons must be deployed to counter BMD. The credibility of a small strategic deterrent can be improved by deploying multiple warheads. These can be simple multiple reentry vehicles (MRV) or the far more technologically challenging multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV). Increasing the number of weapons carried by a single launcher enhances the capabilities of a small strategic force. If China can develop the smaller warheads required for MRVs and MIRVs, it could plan to penetrate BMD with the aid of decoys. It could also consider developing maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRV) to cope with missile defenses.

Such enhancements can be applied to both land-based and sea-based weapons. Nevertheless, SSBNs are expensive to build and maintain, and perhaps redundant with the deployment of mobile land-based systems. China’s internal debates on precisely this issue more than a decade ago delayed the development of the 094 SSBN.²⁹ More recently, as Avery Goldstein has reported, Chinese analysts were impressed by the survivability of the mobile Scud missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The allies had great difficulty in finding and destroying these relatively crude weapons, suggesting that pouring resources into SSBNs and their missiles was not necessarily a good decision.³⁰

The fact that the 094 and its missile program, although delayed, were sustained despite these criticisms suggests that Beijing has decided to put more of its strategic deterrent to sea. What percentage of the deterrent should be seabased remains a difficult problem for the Chinese leadership to resolve. At issue is the survivability of an SSBN in an environment where ASW capabilities will likely improve. This would be especially true if the 094 proves to be acoustically noisy enough to be an easy ASW target. One 094 SSBN will carry twelve Julang-2 (JL-Big Wave) missiles. If the number of land-based ICBMs were doubled to around forty by retaining the silo-based Dongfeng -5A (DF-East Wind) and deploying twenty DF-31A mobile missiles, losing one 094 to ASW would mean losing a large percentage of China’s second-strike force. This suggests that China may consider placing its SSBNs in safe havens similar to the USSR’s bastion strategy. Nevertheless, where would they be based? Perhaps the Yellow Sea with its maximum depth of five hundred feet would prove to be attractive.³¹ Alternatively, China could build six 094s to ensure that two are always on patrol. Richard D. Fisher suggests that the PLAN base at Yulin on Hainan Island could host SSBNs. If based in Yulin, the SSBNs with their five-thousand-nautical-mile-range ballistic missiles would have quick access to deep waters for deterrent patrols.³² Either choice obviously invites the United States to invest significant resources in keeping a constant watch on China’s SSBNs, especially if Beijing decided to join a bastion strategy with deterrent patrols. Nonetheless, even if China’s leadership decides to increase its strategic deterrent to one hundred or more weapons, determining the most effective distribution between sea-based and mobile land-based missiles will not be easy.

The SSN

It is important to recognize that despite the overriding principle of “active defense” in China’s basic military doctrine, Chinese sources do not define PLAN strategy as “active offshore defense.” Chinese documents refer only to “offshore defense.” Yet, it must be assumed that “active defense” with its connotation of offensive operations designed to gain battle space initiative in the opening phase of a campaign is at the core of PLAN operational doctrine. Active defense is at the heart of PLA doctrinal tradition, and the PLAN draws on this tradition.

Over the past decade and more, China’s military journals and research centers such as the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS) and National Defense University (NDU) have assessed the requirements for defeating an adversary that is superior in the technology of war.³³ Because this is a long-standing PLA problem extending back to the 1930s, the results are not too surprising. The doctrinal conclusion is that Chinese forces must take offensive operations, striking first at elements of the opposing forces that will degrade their overall combat effectiveness. The concept introduced calls for attacking “critical points” or “key points” in the enemy’s “combat system.” These include command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) nodes, battlefield surveillance, and electronic warfare systems. These are seen as degrading the adversary’s ability to conduct high-technology combat operations. Also to be targeted are the adversary’s major offensive weapons, including “large seaborne combat platforms,” which have to be aircraft carriers.³⁴ Indeed, now, as a decade ago, much of PLA strategy and operational doctrine is clearly devised with the U.S. armed forces as the potential adversary.

When joined with China’s commitment to offshore defense and the resources required to acquire a large force of extremely capable diesel-electric and nuclear-powered submarines,³⁵ the principle of key-point attack seems to make the SSN’s probable mission abundantly clear. If one interprets offshore defense as reflecting an anti-access and sea-denial strategy with a Taiwan scenario currently at its center, then the division of missions between SSKs and SSNs appears to be self-evident. Key point attacks would be focused on defeating or degrading the offensive capabilities of U.S. battle groups. The SSKs would attempt to implement a sea-denial strategy in the Taiwan area of operations (TAO) where Chinese land-based aircraft would threaten U.S. airborne ASW. The SSNs would exploit their endurance, speed, and stealth, seeking targets much farther out to sea in order to implement an anti-access strategy. Assuming the SSN commanders have the confidence of their navy, it should not be beyond their skills to deploy SSNs in areas that would threaten the U.S. Navy far distant from the TAO. The approaches to Yokosuka naval base, homeport to the single forward-deployed U.S. CSG, is one obvious operating area. Another would be the approaches to Guam. Similarly, the PLAN will remember that in March 1996, when the PLA conducted threatening exercises in the area of the Taiwan Strait, the Nimitz CSG was dispatched to the TAO from the Persian Gulf. SSNs could well be employed far from Taiwan to cover the approaches from the Persian Gulf. One possible location is the northern exit from the South China Sea.

Consequently, in a Taiwan scenario, PLAN SSNs would have two military objectives. First, to disable U.S. aircraft carriers, thereby limiting the air power the United States could use for the defense of Taiwan.³⁶ If this were not possible, the second objective would derive from the simple presence of SSNs in the ocean area. Beijing would hope that the mere threat of SSNs with torpedoes and submerged-launch ASCMs would hinder and thereby slow the entrance of U.S. CSGs into the battle for Taiwan.

How many 093 SSNs China will build to buttress the PLAN’s offshore defense mission is not a function of capabilities. Series production of advanced indigenous SSKs is underway, so the ability of China’s shipyards to construct submarines is not a question. It is probable that China has received Russian assistance in SSN construction, which will assist China’s yards in undertaking series production of nuclear-powered submarines. The single most significant limit is the resources Beijing is willing to commit to building an SSN fleet. With five of the original and problematic 091 Han -class SSNs that first entered service in the water in 1974, it would not be excessive for Beijing to be thinking of an SSN force in the range of twenty 093 platforms.

Whereas it is conceptually plausible for SSNs operating at the outer edge of an undefined offshore defense realm to contest the U.S. Navy, when the PLAN will have sufficient submarines and have developed the operational capabilities required to implement the strategy is unknown. A number of questions remain unanswered. PLAN SSNs will have to confront the ASW capabilities of the carrier and its escorts, including the SSNs. If the PLAN were to try to interdict a CSG in the approaches to Yokosuka or any other base, it would be confronted with the capabilities of land-based airborne ASW. If the SSNs patrol far out to sea to avoid land-based aircraft, locating a CSG in what is a very large ocean will be difficult until China has wide-area intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability together with the capacity to communicate the strike group’s location in real time. Although the submerged-launch long-range ASCM is deadly, the weapon’s target must be located, and it will be over the horizon. Communicating target location to a submerged submarine in real time is essential even with the ASCM’s advanced terminal guidance. One has to conclude that the PLAN is a decade away from developing the operational capabilities demanded by its emerging doctrine.

Conclusions

Although the specific doctrinal guidance provided the PLAN to implement China’s evolving offshore defense strategy is not available in open sources, there is sufficient evidence to suggest what this guidance entails. Identifying the United States as driving the priorities for China’s current defense modernization programs provides an important insight. Beijing does have other security concerns that will influence these programs, but the United States is central to the established priorities. Granting the PLAN precedence, together with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the 2nd Artillery Corps, is a definite indicator that U.S. naval, air, and strategic forces are Beijing’s major concern. China’s new SSBN and SSN appear to have critical roles to perform in offsetting what are recognized as superior U.S. military capabilities.

The SSBN mission as a component of the counterattack strategy established by Beijing’s NFU doctrine has been stated in China’s defense White Papers. Nonetheless, because an SSBN’s survivability advantage is eroded by China’s development of mobile land-based systems, whether Beijing will ultimately decide to put a major component of its strategic retaliatory force to sea is unknown. Given the expense involved in building and maintaining SSBNs, it is likely the fleet will remain small. Much will depend on how many Beijing wishes to keep on patrol and/or place in safe havens such as the Yellow Sea. This number will depend on how Beijing views the credibility of its strategic deterrent in a BMD environment. Six SSBNs would allow two to be on patrol at any time. Given the costs involved, this may well be the maximum number built, but the final order of battle could be less. The crucial debate in Beijing will be focused on two issues. One is the size of the total force required to survive a disarming first strike and overcome BMD. The second is how to ensure the credibility of China’s deterrent. The development of mobile land-based ICBMs suggests that the SSBN will play a greater role in the latter issue than the first.

China’s new SSN fits well with the PLAN’s offshore defense strategy and the evident focus on a Taiwan scenario where it is assumed the United States will intervene with aircraft carrier strike groups. At the operational level of war, the strategy applied will be active defense using key-point attacks directing the PLA to seize and maintain battle-space initiative using offensive actions as early as possible in a campaign. Employing SSNs to attack U.S. CSGs far from Taiwan at the earliest opportunity would fulfill this doctrinal principle.

An interesting development is derived from applying this doctrine. The PLAN will not be attacking a soft spot in U.S. Navy defenses but one of the hardest operational targets in the world. The U.S. Navy has had more than sixty years to refine the defense of a CSG against air, surface, and submarine attack. Penetrating this defense is an incredibly difficult task. PLAN focus on acquiring and developing long-range submerged-launched ASCMs and wake-homing torpedoes for its submarines, however, suggests Chinese tacticians believe they have found weaknesses in this traditionally hard defense. Undoubtedly, the PLAN recognizes that executing active defense doctrine against the formidable capabilities of the U.S. Navy remains a dangerous mission. Nevertheless, with active defense at the heart of PLA operational doctrine, joined with concept of key-point strikes conducted by increasingly capable weapons, the aircraft carrier strike group may now be more vulnerable than in even the recent past.

Notes

1. China has published defense White Papers since 1995. The 1995 White Paper was titled China: Arms Control and Disarmament but was functionally a defense White Paper. Beginning in 1998, defense White Papers have been published in alternate years. The most recent is China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing: State Council Information Office, December 27, 2004).

2. This discussion draws from China’s National Defense in 2004, 1–3.

3. The services and branches of China’s armed forces are collectively named the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

4. Ibid., 5–12.

5. Ibid., 6.

6. Ibid., 7.

7. China’s National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: State Council Information Office, December 9, 2002), 7.

8. Ibid.

9. China’s National Defense in 2004, 7.

10. The following discussion draws on David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 56–60; and Dr. David M. Finkelstein, “Thinking About the PLA’s ‘Revolution’ in Doctrinal Affairs,” in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., Thinking About the PLA’s Revolution in Military Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Washington, D.C.: Beaver Press, 2005), 1–27.

11. Joint Publication 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (As amended through 31 August 2005), www.ditc.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.

12. Lieutenant General Chen Bingde, “Intensify Study of Military Theory to Ensure Quality Army Building; Learn From Thought and Practice of the Core of the Three Generations of Party Leadership in Studying Military Theory,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue ( China’s Military Science), March 6, 1998; in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China (hereafter FBIS-China), March 10, 1998.

13. China’s National Defense in 2004, Chapter 2, “National Defense Policy,” 3.

14. “Basic Guidelines for Our Army’s Combat Drill in the New Period—Written on the Promulgation of Operational Ordinance of a New Generation,” Beijing, Jiefangjun Bao ( Liberation Army Daily), January 25, 1999; in FBIS-China, January 25, 1999.

15. Finkelstein, “Thinking About the PLA’s ‘Revolution’,” 13.

16. Ibid.

17. See, for example, China’s National Defense in 2004, 9.

18. Joint Publication 1-02.

19. For a succinct discussion of the changes in China’s maritime strategy, see John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 219–30. For an assessment of China’s changing national military strategy and the PLAN’s role in this strategy, see Paul H. B. Godwin, “From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Towards 2000,” in David Shambaugh and Richard Yang, eds., China’s Military in Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 200–223.

20. See David M. Finkelstein, “The United States, China, and Taiwan: Some Key Issues and Personal Thoughts” (Alexandria, Va.: CNA Corporation, June 2002) for an assessment of China’s apprehensions beyond that seen in the defense White Papers.

21. For a discussion of the first and second island chains, see Alexander Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications,” Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 16ff.

22. Kenneth W. Allen, Conference report, PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century (Alexandria, Va.: CNA Corporation, July 2001), 4.

23. For details see, Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “China Emerges as a Maritime Power,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 2004): 36.

24. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Under Sea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 166.

25. See, for example, Feng Changsong, Xu Jiafeng, and Wang Guosheng, “Six Aircraft Carrier ‘Busters,’ ” Zhongguo Guofang Bao ( China’s National Defense News), March 5, 2002; in FBIS-China, March 28, 2002.

26. For an assessment of how China’s operational doctrine has evolved since the 1930s, see Paul H. B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese War-fighting: The PLA Experience since 1949 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 23–55.

27. Mao Tse-tung, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), 105.

28. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security (Winter 1995–1996): 5–42, for a detailed assessment of this debate.

29. Chinese debates over this issue are discussed in Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, 235–36.

30. Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 244 n. 66.

31. Depth taken from North Pacific Ocean Theme Page accessed through www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/yellowsea.html.

32. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Trouble below: China’s submarines pose regional, strategic challenges,” Armed Forces Journal, March 8, 2006.

33. Assessments of the core products from these PLA research and teaching institutions are found in Mulvenon and Finkelstein, eds., Thinking About the PLA’s Revolution in Military Affairs.

34. This approach to defeating a superior adversary was outlined a decade ago by Colonel Yu Guohua of the PLA NDU’s Campaign Research and Teaching Department. See his “On Turning Strong Forces Into Weak and Vice Versa In a High-Tech Local War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China’s Military Science), May 20, 1996; in FBIS-China, January 3, 1997. For a valuable assessment of “key point attacks” in PLA operational doctrine, see M. Taylor Fravel, “The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhanluexue,” in Mulvenon and Finkelstein, eds., Thinking About the PLA’s Revolution in Military Affairs, especially 93–95.

35. See Goldstein and Murray, “Undersea Dragons,” for an assessment of China’s growing submarine force.

36. Disabling U.S. aircraft carriers has been a constant theme of articles in Chinese military journals and the public press for a decade. In addition to note 25, see Ying Nan, “The Defects of Aircraft Carriers and Anti-Aircraft Carrier Operations, Conmilit (Hong Kong) no. 252 (January 11, 1998): 13–15; in FBIS-China, March 13, 1998.