OF ALL THE NAVIES THAT OPERATE SUBMARINES, only Russia and China build and employ both nuclear and diesel submarines as fighting ships. This peculiarity is rather easily explained. Russia’s submarine fleet is little more than a Cold War artifact, built to help defend the Soviet SSBN bastions. Speaking simplistically, diesel submarines would patrol and defend the approaches relatively close to the motherland, whereas the nuclear ballistic-missile submarines would conduct deterrent patrols in bastions such as the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. SSNs would conduct operations against adversary SSNs, SSBNs, and carrier battle groups at greater distances from Russia. The Soviet Union saw separate roles, and hence strategic requirements, for each type of vessel.
Similarly, the composition of China’s submarine force stems from strategic demands. Deployed in the adjacent, shallow waters of the Yellow and South China Seas, Beijing’s large fleet of diesel submarines was reasonably well suited to the role of opposing foreign invasion. These aging, unsophisticated, Soviet-designed vessels were inexpensive, and could be built with relatively unskilled labor. Much more expensive, but somewhat more capable, are China’s handful of first-generation nuclear submarines. Though limited in capability against modern forces, they have served China as symbols of national prestige. This legacy fleet suited the China of the 1960s through the 1990s well, but was inadequate for responding to Taiwan contingencies in the contemporary strategic environment.
Consequently, China’s submarine force has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis in the last decade. Domestic and imported modern diesel submarines are replacing older vessels, and China’s solitary nuclear shipyard is building two new classes of nuclear submarines. All of these vessels are far more modern and capable than were the vessels they are replacing. This aggressive program of modernization mirrors similar changes occurring within the PLAN surface fleet, within the 2nd Artillery rocket forces, and within the People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). It is a time of great change for the PLAN, constituting a tremendous technological leap forward for the Chinese submarine force. This chapter establishes a full context for our understanding of Chinese nuclear submarine development by surveying both diesel and the nuclear components of the PLAN submarine force, focusing on the developing relationship and also on the critical trade-offs between these respective parts of China’s growing undersea warfare capabilities.
China’s submarine force has long been characterized by a reliance on antiquated submarine designs. Emblematic of this are the PLAN’s large number of Romeo- and Ming-class submarines. China built over eighty of the Soviet designed Romeos from 1962 to 1984, and continues to operate somewhere between twenty and thirty of them to this day.1 Numerous and noisy, they are nearing the end of their service lives. China also operates nearly twenty Ming-class diesel-electric submarines, which were all built between 1971 and 2001. Derived from the Romeos, they too suffer from antiquated design and relatively high noise levels, though some of the newer versions of the class feature such advanced features as flank sonar arrays and noise-absorbing anechoic rubber tiles.2
These older ships are being replaced by much-improved and significantly more modern submarines. Two classes of vessels, known as the Song, an indigenous model, and the Kilo, imported from Russia, make up the vast majority of these replacements. The first Song was launched in 1994 and entered service in 1999. Most sources describe the Song as a modern vessel, and include its advanced seven-blade skewed propeller, its French-origin digital sonar (as compared to the older and less-capable analog systems on preceding classes of Chinese submarines), anechoic tiles, and German diesel engines as its defining characteristics.3 The Song reportedly carries the twenty-two-nautical-mile-ranged C-801 antiship cruise missiles (ASCM), which can be launched while submerged—a first for the PLAN—as well as torpedoes and mines.4 It is likely that the Song is the rough equivalent of a mid-1980s Western diesel submarine, which makes it a formidable, quiet submarine that will be very difficult to detect and locate, at least when the vessel operates on its batteries. Photographs available on the Internet chronicle the development of three different models of the Song, and demonstrate that there are now at least ten of these vessels. Most sources agree that eight Song-class submarines were built in Wuhan shipyard, and that starting in 2004, Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai built and launched the other pair.5
Adding to the PLAN’s stable of modern diesel submarines are the twelve Kilo-class submarines that China has purchased from Russia. Kilos enjoy a reputation for being extremely quiet, and have been noted as being as stealthy when operating on their batteries, as are U.S. Los Angeles-class submarines.6 China has two variants of Kilos, having first imported two export-Model 877 class vessels in 1994, and another two of the formerly only-for-Russian-use Model 636 in 1996. In 2002 China signaled satisfaction with these four ships by signing a contract for an additional eight model 636 Kilo submarines, with final delivery due in 2005.7 These eight Kilos are especially noteworthy since they are being sold with the Klub fire control system and the one-hundred-and-twenty-nautical-mile-range, supersonic homing SS-N-27 ASCM. As of October 2006, all eight Kilos had been delivered.
The first of what is probably Beijing’s newest class of diesel submarine, known in the West as the Yuan, was launched in May 2004 from Wuhan shipyard. Similar in appearance to the Song and the Kilo, the Yuan might best be described as either “a Kilo with Chinese characteristics,” or a “Song with Russian characteristics.” Like the Kilo, the Yuan has a two-over-four torpedo tube arrangement, and the pronounced hump along its back. Like the Song, it has fairwater planes (horizontal control surfaces) on its sail, and a dorsal rudder. The Kilo has neither fairwater planes nor a dorsal rudder, and photos from the Yuan’s launching show that it has a planar array along its circular hull, unlike either the Song or Kilo. These characteristics suggest the Yuan might be well suited to perform ASW, but this is a tentative conclusion. What appears likely is that the Yuan is a new class of submarine that incorporates certain design elements from both Russian and previous Chinese diesel submarines. Hence, the Yuan is probably especially quiet, and like the Song and newer Kilos, almost certainly incorporates a seven-blade screw, modern periscopes, digital sonar, and is capable of launching sophisticated torpedoes, antiship cruise missiles, and mines. Some claim the Yuan has air-independent propulsion (AIP), but there is no information available to confirm or deny such speculation.
A common and sensible practice for a country contemplating incorporating AIP in its submarines is to first build a prototype that can be tested at sea. This usually involves developing a suitable technology, placing the appropriate machinery in a section of submarine hull, and inserting that section into an existing submarine, which is then tested at sea. The Swedish navy did this in 1988 by inserting an eight-meter addition containing a Stirling engine and associated tanks and machinery in the submarine Näcken. The German and Dutch navies also experimented with AIP by adding sections to the ex-German navy Type 205 submarine U1.8 France sold an AIP system to Pakistan that is being inserted into an Agosta-class submarine currently under construction in Karachi. This will increase the vessel’s length by roughly nine meters.9
Based on the above, one could conclude that AIP submarines tend to be much longer—by about nine meters—than those without AIP, but such is not really the case. The examples above involved modifying existing vessels to serve as test beds or “after-market” conversions. As Table 1 indicates, submarines’ physical dimensions do not reveal whether or not they posses AIP. The two smallest submarines listed in the table, the Gotland and the Type 212A, have AIP, whereas the Collins and the Kilo, which are the largest, do not. Size alone does not indicate whether or not the Yuan has AIP.
The newspaper PLA Daily recently released a series of reports describing the successful sea trials of the Yuan,10 but little other official information about this vessel is available. The absence of official Chinese news releases or authoritative naval journal articles leaves analysts guessing as to whether any more of this class are under construction. It seems that the PLAN has two choices in this regard. It could delay Yuan serial production some years as it did with that of the Song, or it could assume that the Yuan is well designed and proceed immediately into serial production. Either course seems feasible, and each is consistent with various Chinese historical precedents.
The four-and-a-half-year interval between the launching of the first and second Song submarines suggests significant “teething problems” with that class, and similar difficulties could be expected with the Yuan. Since the Song’s somewhat troubled beginning, however, at least ten vessels of that submarine class have been built, in three ever-refined versions. This suggests a PLAN submarine philosophy of building a prototype, testing it thoroughly, fixing design and systems integration issues, and then, when confident of the quality of design, embarking on serial production. This pattern, however, has seemingly been abandoned by the PLAN surface and submarine force. As will be discussed shortly in greater detail, two 093 nuclear fast-attack submarines are currently under simultaneous construction.11 Similarly, since 2000 the PLAN simultaneously built two of each of the 052C (pennant numbers 171 and 170), 052B (168 and 169), and 051C (115 and 116) classes of guided missile destroyers as well as a pair of the 054 (525 and 526) frigates. Typifying this apparent newfound confidence in design and systems integration is the immediate serial production of the PLAN’s fast-attack 2208 missile catamaran, of which at least twelve have appeared since photos of the first were published on the Internet in April 2004.12
Table 1. AIP and Conventionally Powered Submarine Dimensions
Notes
1. “The Gotland Class Submarine,” http://www.kockums.se/Submarines/gotland.html.
2. “Collins Class Submarine (SSG),” http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/submarine.html.
3. “Submarines—Type 212A,” https://www.hdw.de/index_en.php?level=3&CatID=1.140.240&inhalt_id=1116.
4. Submarines—Type 209/1400 mod, https://www.hdw.de/index_en.php?level=3&CatID=1.140.240&inhalt_id=1115. The Gotland and the Type 212A are AIP submarines, the Collins and Type 209 are conventional diesel-electric submarines. The Gotland and Collins were designed in Sweden, the Type 209 and 212A are German creations.
5. “Yuan Class (Type 041) (SSK),” Jane’s Fighting Ships, August 23, 2005, http://www.janes.com.
6. “Kilo Class,” Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, April 14 2005, http://www.janes.com.
All of these examples suggest that in recent years the PLAN has become sufficiently confident of its design processes, systems engineering maturity, and manufacturing quality to forego lengthy prototype testing before embarking on serial production. Hence, it is likely that more Yuan-class submarines are already being built. If so, construction of sister ships of the first of the class could conceivably be occurring at both Jiangnan and Wuhan shipyards. Conversely, both manufacturing facilities could be building additional Song-class submarines, or both shipyards could be building both classes. Regardless of which class might be under construction at either shipyard, the 2004 launching of two submarines at each location strongly suggests that China is quite capable of producing four indigenous diesel-electric submarines per year.13 Beijing is also simultaneously building two new classes of nuclear submarines.
China has long devoted significant national will to building and operating nuclear submarines. Its first efforts—the Han SSN and Xia SSBN classes—had numerous technical failings, and are now widely regarded as quite primitive.14 China built five Hans, with the first one going to sea in 1974. The fifth Han was commissioned in 1990. The solitary Xia entered service in 1983, and still goes to sea, albeit very occasionally, and has never made a credible deterrent patrol. Aging, noisy, and obsolete, these early Chinese nukes require replacement and modernization if China’s nuclear submarines are to be at all effective for any purpose other than serving as demonstrations of national prestige. Toward this end the PLAN is building two new classes of nuclear submarines. The first 093 SSN, known in the West as the Jin-class, was launched in December 2002; the second in 2003.15 The second class is the 094 SSBN, known as the Shang-class, and will carry the JL-2 SLBM. This 8,000–10,000-kilometer-range missile was successfully test-launched from underwater in June 2005.16
The fundamental advantage that nuclear submarines have over their diesel-electric counterparts is an ability to harness the tremendous energy resident in their nuclear reactors. This energy can be used to maintain high speeds over prolonged periods of time, to attempt to outrun torpedoes, to keep up with or overtake high-speed targets, or to operate equipment that requires large amounts of power, such as water purifiers, oxygen generators, or air conditioners. The singular feature of this nearly boundless energy is that it is available at all times, under all weather conditions, at any depth. Therefore, it provides nuclear submarines unparalleled tactical flexibility.
Diesel submarines, conversely, store their energy in large banks of batteries. This very limited amount of power must be jealously husbanded, and decisions regarding its expenditure are carefully made. Hence, diesel submarines typically operate at very slow speeds, and can only operate at high speeds for short periods of time.17 When the state of charge of their batteries is low, diesel submarines must approach the surface of the ocean and operate their diesel engines, which are connected to generators that create electricity, which in turn charges the batteries. Snorkeling (or snorting), as this is called, is a very noisy operation, which greatly compromises a diesel submarine’s stealth, and consequently dramatically raises its vulnerability. Snorkeling also requires raising a snorkel mast—essentially a large pipe—above the waves. This provides a supply of oxygen to the diesel engines, but the raised snorkel mast is highly vulnerable to being sighted or detected by specialized radars. Diesel submarines typically have to snorkel several hours a day to maintain their batteries at a desired state of charge, though they can operate for two or three days without snorkeling, if they are willing to nearly fully deplete their batteries.
On the other hand, when operating on the battery, diesel submarines are extraordinarily quiet, and hence proportionally more difficult for opposing forces to detect. As mentioned earlier, modern diesel submarines are as quiet as or even quieter than some of the world’s most capable nuclear vessels. They are also much cheaper to acquire, operate, and maintain; require far less supporting infrastructure; are physically much smaller than their nuclear counterparts; and require smaller crews.18 The weapons they can fire are every bit as lethal as those carried by nuclear submarines.
Most submariners would agree that their vessel’s greatest attribute, regardless of its propulsion mechanism, is stealth. Essentially, a submarine’s stealth allows it to exert an influence over a very wide area in which it is operating, even if it can only deliver its weapons over a relatively small portion of that expanse of ocean.19 Since naval forces do not know the location of patrolling enemy submarines, they must assume that these hidden menaces could be nearly anywhere, and that any submerged artifacts, echoes, or other detected phenomena should be assumed to be a submarine, until proven otherwise.
Frequently, the only conclusive way, or at least the one with the least possibility of catastrophic failure in wartime, is for opposing forces to investigate submerged contacts by shooting live ordnance.20 During the 1982–83 Falklands campaign, Britain’s deployed surface fleet expended nearly its entire inventory of ASW weapons on false submarine contacts.21 The solitary patrolling Argentine submarine remained unscathed. Properly operated, a submarine can maintain its stealth during all phases of an approach and attack, even after it shoots its weapons. Generally, however, once a submarine’s stealth is lost, the advantage rapidly shifts to those hunting the submarine, which can use the speed and endurance of surface and airborne systems to amass enough sensors and weapons to hunt down and kill their quarry.22 This vulnerability certainly applies for diesel submarines, which have limited power available with which they can conduct high speed evasions. Instead, diesel submarine commanders have to rely on cunning and guile—poor but respectable alternatives against modern sensors and weapons.
Herein lies another advantage of nuclear submarines. Once detected, SSNs have the brute power to disengage from unfavorable tactical situations at high speed for prolonged periods of time. The immediate availability of essentially unlimited energy gives the SSN unparalleled flexibility and freedom, but comes with large acquisition and ownership costs. Nuclear submarines require expensive shore infrastructure, and their crews require extensive, specialized training. Most SSNs are also physically large, a feature mandated by the oversized nuclear and propulsion machinery,23 the shielding necessary to protect the crew from the reactor’s radiation, the requirement to use extensive sound-absorbing devices to prevent machinery noises from being transmitted to the ocean, and the need to house the large crews required to operate and maintain these complex machines. This is not to say that diesel submarines are simple machines that are cheap to acquire or easy to operate. They are, nonetheless, less costly to own and operate, and are less complex, than nuclear submarines. Diesel submarines are also readily available on the international marketplace, whereas nuclear submarines are not.24 Adding to the obstacles involved in acquiring nuclear submarines are the irreducible problems associated with developing and integrating the necessary technologies, including the nuclear reactor. Solving these issues requires large investments in time, technology, and infrastructure. Certainly China’s semisuccessful efforts in designing and building the Han and Xia, though admirable—especially given the domestic tumult and international isolation of China during that period—underline the very substantial difficulties involved in fielding submarines that can be expected to fare well in battle (which the Han and Xia most certainly cannot). These are not problems restricted to China, either. India has been trying to develop an indigenous nuclear submarine for years, thus far apparently without success.25
Essentially then, setting aside the vexing and important issue of crew proficiency, countries desiring submarines must make a series of tradeoffs revolving around relative costs as compared to performance. On the one hand, they can quickly purchase quiet, capable diesel submarines from abroad.26 On the other, they can devote decades and immense resources to indigenously developing nuclear submarines. In the past few years, however, a third option of air-independent propulsion has become available.27
Several air-independent propulsion (AIP) schemes offer the potential to revolutionize non-nuclear submarines, and the military missions they are capable of undertaking. AIP gives non-nuclear submarines much greater submerged endurance at speed, and greatly increases the vessels’ operational flexibility.28 Although the mechanisms pursued differ, the net effect of AIP, as it currently exists in German-, Swedish-, and French-built vessels, allows the ships to travel submerged without snorkeling for, it is estimated, up to two weeks, all the while maintaining fully charged batteries.29 This is a revolutionary development, and it can be fairly said that AIP represents a poor man’s nuclear submarine.
The common diesel submarine’s lack of mobility has long led to it being derided by others as a mobile minefield, the implication being that a successful engagement for a diesel submarine was essentially a matter of chance, and that there was little the submarine could control or affect once it had selected its limited patrol area. Conventional wisdom also held that even if a diesel submarine made a successful attack, it would be a suicide mission. But with AIP and a continuously fully charged battery, even a diesel submarine can act like a nuclear vessel, if only for a couple of hours. An AIP submarine can, for example, sprint at high speed to intercept and attack with a wake-homing torpedo a carrier battle group transiting at high speed to a war zone. This gives an AIP submarine an effective combat radius much greater than a non-AIP vessel. Once in position after a high-speed approach, the AIP submarine, even with a flat battery, could still operate at slow speeds by powering its motors and electronics with the electricity generated from its AIP system, and after attacking, could creep away using the same, limited power. A conventional diesel submarine, conversely, would have little choice but to surface and surrender, or stay submerged and suffocate, unless the ASW forces abandoned their prosecution before its air ran out. Consequently, many countries either already operate, or have signed contracts, to obtain AIP diesel submarines.30
China’s large diesel-submarine force matches the nation’s geographic conditions. If, as most analysts tend to agree, China is building its navy and submarine force as a potential means to coerce Taiwan, then China’s continued acquisition and employment of diesel submarines certainly supports that goal. Taiwan is only about one hundred nautical miles from the China coast, after all, and the PLAN’s diesel submarines could arrive in likely patrol areas outside Taiwan’s ports or in the Philippine Sea in just four or five days, if traveling submerged at four knots from their East Sea Fleet ports, or even in as little as a day and a half if traveling on the surface at fifteen knots. Once in place, these submarines could perform intelligence and reconnaissance, lay mines, enforce declared exclusion zones or a blockade, target specific merchant ships, sink Taiwan’s naval ships, and threaten or sink naval ships from intervening countries. Simultaneously, the large number of conventional submarines in China’s inventory would allow some vessels to remain near critical mainland ports in a defensive posture, or to patrol the entrances to the Yellow Sea and Bohai Gulf, if those areas ever become “bastions” for strategic forces.
Although most analysts conclude that a battle designed to create a collapse of Taiwan (presumably before the U.S. could effectively intervene), will—and could—end quickly, such a speedy outcome cannot be assumed by any side. In the event of a prolonged crisis, the close distance between logical PLAN submarine patrol areas and the vessel’s home ports would allow fairly rapid cycling between war patrol and refurbishment and replenishment.
As mentioned earlier, one of the greatest weaknesses of diesel submarines occurs when they are snorkeling. This vulnerability stems primarily from airborne radars, most notably those carried by ASW aircraft such as P3C Orions or Taiwan’s S-2 Trackers. The effective use of these maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), however, is predicated on maintaining air superiority. China’s new area air defense surface destroyers, such as the two 052Cs and the pair of 051Cs, could seriously challenge Taiwan/U.S. air superiority. Another potent threat to MPA may be the PRC’s growing fleet of imported SU-30 MKK air superiority fighters. Making this potential threat more effective will be Beijing’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs)-like battle management aircraft, which are apparently now being developed and tested.
Even with the ability to rapidly deploy submarines into the area of concern, China is still faced with notable limitations. Presumably, the United States has means available to determine whether or not China’s submarines are tied to their piers. Barring some sort of mass exodus from port, China’s submarine fleet remains a fleet in being, and merely a potential threat.31 Further limiting China’s ability to effectively employ its submarines is the likely lack of proficient, professional crews and officers. Certainly, China is making great efforts to change this limitation, but available evidence suggests they have some distance to go before they can be confident of their abilities, especially when subjected to wartime conditions. There is little evidence, furthermore, to suggest that China regularly deploys its submarines to the waters around Taiwan, denying to the PLAN the familiarity with acoustic and hydrographic conditions there that they presumably enjoy in the Yellow Sea and other areas near their submarine ports. Although occasional press reports describe the deployment of Chinese submarines, such forays still seem to be unusual occurrences.32 All of this combines into what is probably an overall lack of experience, which would most likely translate into a lack of decisive battlefield success. Still, warfare is defined partly by chance and partly by preparation, and even marginally skillful submarine commanders can be expected to achieve some successes.
Jane’s estimates that the PLAN has three 093-class submarines in various states of completion, and is expected to build an additional three.33 The U.S. Department of Defense reports that the first 093 should enter service in 2005.34 This imminent incorporation of the first of what might be a relatively large class of submarines begs the question of how large such a fleet could turn out to be, and how the professionalism of such a fleet should be evaluated.
Mao famously said that China would build a nuclear submarine “if it took 10,000 years.” Judging by the 093/094 programs, Mao’s determination still reverberates in PRC leadership circles. As compared to the limitations of Mao’s era, much more money is available with which to purchase these expensive ships, and modern China’s manufacturing capacity could probably support a more robust building program. But even if China wanted to create a large nuclear submarine force, it would run up against some difficult obstacles in its effort to achieve such a goal. As the United States has well learned and as the Russian Federation is painfully aware, modern, state-of-the-art nuclear submarines are exorbitantly expensive. At its peak, the U.S. Polaris program represented 14 percent of the U.S. Navy budget.35 Twelve Franklin-class SSBNs were ordered in fiscal year 1963 alone.36 Similar resource decisions are probably within China’s ability to make, but several conditions argue strongly against such explosive growth in its undersea nuclear force. First, unlike the symmetric Soviet/U.S. nuclear rivalry in the early 1960s, China does not as yet appear to regard any country as an imminent strategic threat. The PRC does not rely on large numbers of nuclear weapons, preferring instead to rely on a minimal deterrent. China also currently has just one shipyard, at Huludao, that has any experience in building nuclear submarines.37 Further, competing fiscal demands will tend to dampen any Chinese desires to greatly expand its nuclear submarine force. China is making significant expenditures on other high-priority military systems, including most notably its burgeoning force of solid-fuel missiles, its modernizing air forces, and its increasing numbers of capital surface ships. Furthermore, China has competing domestic budgetary pressures that would also tend to work against large nuclear submarine fleets.
On the other side of this argument is the possibility that China could determine that a large underwater nuclear fleet is a matter of necessity and a national priority. It would be foolhardy to discount China’s ability to build and maintain such a fleet, but it would also be a mistake to simply assert that since the United States and the Soviet Union did, China will as well. Absent a compelling, unifying strategic rationale, and given other, more-pressing demands, it is much more likely that China will continue to maintain a modest-sized nuclear fleet.
Accurately assessing the professionalism of any size Chinese submarine fleet is an important but difficult matter. Reliable, relevant information is sparse, with Beijing carefully controlling what little information is released. For instance, despite the 093’s imminent incorporation into the fleet, there is only one picture of the 094 SSBN, and no confirmed pictures of the 093 SSN available on the Internet, in contrast to hundreds of pictures of its diesel submarine fleet.38 Still, reasonable estimates can be inferred from analysis of available information. At some level, mirror imaging can be useful. In 2001, Adm. F. L. Bowman, the head of the U.S. Navy’s nuclear reactor program, stated that eight features define a successful nuclear submarine program.39
1. Select, then train, the best people to operate the equipment.
2. Establish high standards of continuous training and qualification.
3. Demand the highest possible quality and reliability of submarine components and equipment.
4. Establish centralized control of submarine systems and components.
5. Learn from experience—adopt an honest acceptance that mistakes will occur and set up a well-defined system for critique, feedback, and corrective action.
6. Require redundancy in critical systems.
7. Design a layered defense for safety.
8. Face the facts. Do not let factors such as costs or schedules lead to accepting questionable actions or to short-cutting established policies.
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that China has implemented some of these standards. For example, a recent series of stories published by PLA Daily related how an inspector at Wuhan shipyard insisted, despite great pressure from the shipyard, that a slightly out-of-specification piece of submarine machinery be replaced. He stuck to his convictions, the part was replaced, and he is now cited as a model worker.40 The article also discussed the painstaking efforts of other naval inspectors to ensure that shaft seals and piping in bilges perform as required in a new class of Chinese submarine. Signs of Chinese desires (if not commitment) to some of the other of the eight standards, such as training, are evident in other releases and articles.
Regarding the training that PLAN submariners undergo, some information is available, but details are lacking. For example, a November 2004 PLA Daily report describes a submarine performing a “confrontation exercise in rough sea.”41 An August 2005 report shows cadets training on how to escape from a damaged submarine via a torpedo tube.42 Occasionally a report will surface that provides genuine insight into PLAN efforts to improve professionalism, such as occurred in a 2002 article that described the overhauling of the curriculum at Qingdao Submarine Academy,43 but for the most part, analysts are left to carefully review the trends reported in innocuous official press releases. Bilateral exercise and military-to-military contacts could be valuable sources of supporting information.
The PLAN submarine force is in the midst of a fundamental transition. For decades it has been a coastal patrol force, hindered by obsolete technology, poor training, and indifferent construction and material standards. Consequently, it has had more than its share of deadly accidents, of which the April 2003 Ming 361 disaster, in which seventy-one sailors suffocated, is emblematic. Despite this humble past, there are many signs that China is rapidly improving its force through aggressive foreign purchases and indigenous submarine construction programs, enhanced weaponry, and renewed efforts to improve the quality and training of the personnel who take those submarines to sea.
Properly operated, modern, quiet submarines are very difficult (for even the most sophisticated and well-trained opponents) to detect and attack. Simultaneously, such submarines, equipped with modern, easy-to-use weapons, are a potentially deadly nemesis for surface naval forces, which are significantly easier for submarines to detect and attack. This imbalance arises not from misplaced training priorities, unrealistic exercises, inadequate funding, or other forms of bureaucratic neglect (though all those causes can exacerbate the problem), but instead, from physics. Physical laws and limitations, akin to gravity and just as difficult to overcome, are what make antisubmarine warfare exceptionally difficult. The PRC recognizes this reality, realizes it can manipulate it to their advantage, and is doing just that. Observers should therefore expect to see a sustained Chinese determination to continue to replace its obsolete submarines and weapons with much more modern equipment.
The U.S. Navy will doubtless find the ascension of China’s submarine force a perplexing, long-term issue.
1. Type 033 (Romeo-class) Diesel-Electric Submarine, at http://sinodefence.com/navy/sub/033.asp.
2. The flank-array sonar can be clearly seen below the sail on Ming hull numbers 360 and 361. See “Ming class type 035 Thread,” and “PLAN subs, an Identification Guide,” http://www.china-defense.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=9559, and at http://www.china-defense.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=6614, respectively. The hull tiles are visible in a photo in Jinchuan Zhishi 285 (June 2003): 6.
3. The source for this consensus opinion is probably the 2002 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf, 21. A multitude of photos of the Song on websites such as the “PLAN Thread (Pics, news, speculations . . . everything),” http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=37296 confirm the presence of the anechoic tiles.
4. See “Song class (Type 039/039G) (SSG),” Jane’s Fighting Ships, February 3, 2006. http://www.janes.com.
5. Ibid.
6. Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolcom, and Ronald O’Rourke, “China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisition: Background and Analysis,” CRS Reports for Congress, October 10, 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30700.pdf, 60–61. Kan, Bolcom, and O’Rourke base this assessment on graphs from United States Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 1996 (United States Government Printing Office, February, 1996), 11. These graphs indicate that the broadband noise of the 877 Kilo, of which China has two, is roughly as quiet as a first-flight Los Angeles, and the broadband signature of the 636 (China’s remaining ten Kilos) is as quiet as that of an improved Los Angeles submarine.
7. See “Russian Shipyard Begins Building Submarines for Chinese Navy,” Agenstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Interfax-AVN), January 15, 2003, FBIS Document No. CEP20030115000216; and “Two diesel subs built for China to be set afloat in April–May,” Kazakh Information Agency, January 20, 2005, http://www.inform.kz/txt/showarticle.php?lang=eng&id=108240.
8. Swedish AIP experiments are discussed in “The Stirling Engine: An Engine for the Future,” http://www.kockums.se/Products/products.html. Similar German efforts involving fuel cells are summarized in Peter Hauschildt and Albert Hammerschmidt, “PEM Fuel Cell Systems—An Attractive Energy Source for Submarines,” http://www.industry.siemens.de/data/presse/docs/m1-isfb07033403e.pdf. Dutch experiments with closed-cycle diesel AIP are summarized in “Air Independent Propulsion Systems,” http://www.thyssen-nordseewerke.de/e/prod/fe_aip_ccd.html.
9. See “SSK Agosta 90B Class Attack Submarine, France,” http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/agosta/.
10. These two Chinese news releases are available at http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2005-08/20/content_277327.htm, and http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2005-08/19/content_277122.htm.
11. “Shang class (Type 093) (SSN),” Jane’s Fighting Ships, February 3, 2006, http://www.janes.com.
12. “New PLAN stealthy fast missile crafts? Catamaran hull, pump-jet propulsion,” China Defense.com, http://www.china-defense.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=6725&st=0.
13. In 2004 Wuhan shipyard launched the Yuan and Song, as indicated by photos at “PLAN New ‘Yuan’ Class Diesel Sub Thread,” http://www.china-defense.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=7256&st=0. Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai launched two Songs that year, one in September, and the other in November. See “039 SSK, Diesel-Sub thread, some pics of improved Song,” http://www.china-defense.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=2046&st=400.
14. These were both first-generation submarines. The United States and the Soviets both also built relatively primitive first-generation submarines (the Nautilus and Seawolf, for instance and the Hotel, Echo, and November-classes) that were roughly equivalent to the Xia and Han. China, however, continues to operate its first-generation submarines nearly two decades after the United States and Soviet Union stopped sending theirs to sea.
15. Jane’s claims that two 093s have been launched. See Commodore Stephen Saunders, TYPE 093 (SSN), Jane’s Fighting Ships, March 14 2005. www.janes.com. Bill Gertz reports that two 093s are under construction, as is one 094. See Bill Gertz, “Beijing Building Deep-Sea Naval Might,” The Washington Times, June 26, 2005, at http://washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050626-113506-6621r.htm.
16. Bill Gertz, “China Advances Missile Program,” The Washington Times, June 22, 2005. http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050621-102521-5027r.htm.
17. Rubin, the bureau that designed Kilo submarines, advertises that the most modern of the class can reach speeds of twenty knots. It is unlikely that this speed can be maintained for more than a very few hours before the ship’s batteries are depleted and must be recharged. A catalogue for the submarine can be viewed online at http://www.china-defense.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=3228&st=75.
18. A U.S. Virginia-class SSN costs approximately $2.5 billion dollars, displaces 7,800 tons, and requires a crew of 134 personnel. Russia sold China Model 636 Kilo class submarines for approximately $200 million each. Kilos displace 2,350 tons, and require a crew of 52. See United States Navy Fact File, “Virginia-Class,” http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-ssn.html, and the Rubin Kilo brochure, posted August 20, 2005, on page four of the “8 New Kilos for China” thread of China Defense.com website, at http://www.china-defense.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=3228&st=75.
19. Most modern torpedoes have an effective range against surface ships of less than ten nautical miles. Chinese Song submarines’ C-801 (YJ-1) antisurface cruise missiles have a range of approximately twenty-two nautical miles. See CSS-N-4 Sardine (YJ-1/-12/-82 and C-801) and CSSC-8 Saccade (YJ-2/-21/-22/-83 and C-802/803), Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, June 8, 2005, http://www.janes.com. The eight new Kilo submarines being delivered to China will include the Russian-built, 120-nautical-mile-range 3M-54E antiship cruise missile. See “China’s Navy,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China And Northeast Asia, June 13 2005, http://www.janes.com.
20. This is known as “classifying with ordnance.”
21. Harry D. Train, “An Analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands Campaign,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 40. It is important to also state that the Argentine submarine did not successfully attack any British ships, suggesting that both antisurface and antisubmarine warfare are difficult enterprises.
22. This was especially true during World War II, when, generally speaking, the allies succeeded in using radar to detect and attack German U-boats via airplanes.
23. These factors are described in detail in Shawn Cappellano-Sarver’s contribution to this volume.
24. To date, with one temporary exception, no country has exported a nuclear submarine to another. The exception occurred in 1988, when for three years India leased from Russia a Charlie-class nuclear-powered guided-missile-carrying submarine. See “Submarines,” in the Indian Nuclear Forces pages of Federation of American Scientists, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/sub/.
25. Ibid.
26. Currently, Russia, Germany, France, Sweden, and Spain are the countries that offer diesel submarines for export. Greece, Italy, and South Korea are all building U212 and U214 submarines of German design, presumably with extensive help from HDW, the German-based conglomerate that designed the vessels. See “U212 / U214 Attack Submarines, Germany,” http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/type_212/.DCN, a combined French and Spanish consortium, designed and builds the Scorpene-class, which is being purchased by the Chilean, Indian, and Malaysian navies. See “SSK Scorpene Attack Submarine, Chile,” http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/scorpene. Kockums, the Swedish submarine manufacturer of the Gotland class, is now a part of HDW. Russia offers the Kilo and, more recently, the Amur series of submarines for export. All the submarines listed in this footnote are offered with AIP technology.
27. For an excellent primer on AIP see Edward C. Whitman, “AIP Technology Creates a New Undersea Threat,” Undersea Warfare 4, no. 1 (Fall 2001): 12–15, 31. http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/issue_13/propulsion.htm.
28. This appraisal is based on the author’s interviews with commanding officers of foreign diesel submarines, including those who have commanded AIP vessels.
29. Kockums offers the Stirling engine. Sweden’s three Gotland-class submarines have been in service now for a decade, with the first commissioned in 1996. See “SSK Gotland Class (Type A19) Attack Submarine,” Sweden, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/gotland/, and “The Gotland Class Submarine,” http://www.kockums.se/Submarines/gotland.html. HDW offers fuel-cell technology. DCN offers the MESMA system for its submarines, and Russia offers fuel cell AIP with its exports. See Don Walsh, “The AIP Alternative,” Navy League of the United States, http://www.navyleague.org/seapower/aip_alternative.htm, and page nine of the Kilo sales brochure, posted August 20, 2005 on page four of the “8 New Kilos for China” thread, http://www.china-defense.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=3228&st=75.
30. Germany and Sweden already operate AIP submarines. Greece, South Korea, Portugal, and Italy have contracts to acquire German technology AIP vessels. Japan has operated the Swedish AIP system for several years on its training submarine, and recently signed a contract to purchase the system for its fleet. Pakistan is installing a French AIP system in one of its Agosta-class vessels. See “Breakthrough in Japan for Stirling AIP,” Kockums News, July 11, 2005, http://www.kockums.se/News/latest-news.html, and “Germany Export Behavior,” Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/submarines/germany/export.htm.
31. “In naval warfare, a fleet in being is a naval force that extends a controlling influence without ever leaving port. Were the fleet to leave port and face the enemy, it might lose in battle and no longer influence the enemy’s actions, but by simply remaining safely in port the enemy is forced to continually deploy forces to guard against it.” From “Fleet in Being,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_in_being.
32. The Han submarine that was detected near the Japan’s Ishigaki Jima in November 2004 was an exception to the rule that Chinese submarines rarely are detected outside their home waters. A November 2003 incident in which a Ming submarine was detected on the surface southwest of Kyushu is another notable exception.
33. See “China’s Navy,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China And Northeast Asia, June 13, 2005, http://www.janes.com.
34. 2005 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf, 5.
35. Harvey Sapolsky, “The POLARIS System Development” (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 169, 172.
36. “SSBN-640 Benjamin Franklin-Class FBM Submarines,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/ssbn-640.htm.
37. In comparison, the United States built its Lafayette- (SSBN-616) class submarines at Electric Boat Shipyard in Groton, Connecticut; at Mare Island Naval Shipyard in California; at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine; and at Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia. The United States also built nuclear submarines at Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi; and at New York Shipbuilding in Camden, New Jersey.
38. One grainy photo of a submarine sail exists that is probably that of the 093 SSN.
39. The points in the text are abbreviated due to space limitations. The full text contains important nuance that directly affect the intent of the standards. For example, item one reads in its entirety: “First, select the best people available. Then train them to operate the equipment under the worst possible conditions,—and educate them to know everything and to do everything necessary, without question, to bring the submarine and her crew home safely—before they step foot aboard their first boat.” “Admiral Bowman, Remarks at Undersea Defense Technology Conference Hawaii 2001,” The Submarine Review (January 2002): 6–11.
40. http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2005-08/19/content_277122.htm.
41. Zhang Luocan and Liang Jianhua, “Submarine Flotilla of South China Sea Fleet Carries Out Confrontation Exercise In Rough Sea,” PLA Daily, July 21 2004, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/militarydatabase/2004-09/14/content_13726.htm.
42. Qiao Tianfu, “Submarine Cadets in Training,” PLA Daily, August 3 2005, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/militarydatabase/2005-08/03/content_265084.htm.
43. The article related how the previous curriculum was completely overhauled, with relevant training replacing dogma, and skills required for safely operating submarines taking the place of political theory indoctrination. See Fan Ping, Liu Ping, and Wang Yongsheng, “Blue Whales Dive Deep to Train Skills of Fighting, Winning—True Account of In-Depth Teaching Reform Under Water at the PLA Naval Submarine Academy,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), October 21, 2002, FBIS CPP20021021000066.