[Jian Jie] 
[“The Legend of the Virtuous Twins”], 22–23. See also 
[Lin Changsheng], 
[“The Combat Power of China’s Nuclear Submarines”], 
[World Aerospace Digest], no. 103 (September 2004): 28.CHINA’S SUBMARINE FORCE DEVELOPMENT has been much in the news of late. Most of this attention has focused on the new indigenous diesel boats emerging at a swift pace from yards at Shanghai and Wuhan, as well as the large batch of eight advanced Kilos that has arrived in China from Russia during 2006. But China’s simultaneous development of two new classes of nuclear-powered submarines, the 093 and 094, suggests a new imperative to focus analytical attention on Chinese naval nuclear propulsion.
Since China’s earlier Han-class (091) is considered by most to be inferior to all other modern submarines, it is important to determine if China has now developed the skills and obtained the technology necessary to support a formidable nuclear undersea fleet. Several Chinese publications imply that China has not only obtained these skills and technology but could perhaps even have developed a completely new generation of submarine propulsion plants. One Chinese source states that the 093 may use a high temperature/ high efficiency reactor plant.1 These reports may not be credible, but after a close look at the progress that China’s nuclear power industry has made over the last two decades it is evident that naval planners must take this possibility seriously.
China plans to build 2GWe (2,000MW electrical) of nuclear power capability per year to address its growing energy needs.2 Western companies are rushing to sell nuclear power plants and technology to China. The drive to get a portion of the estimated $40 billion investment in China’s nuclear power industry has encouraged companies to offer their most advanced designs. Western companies, with the support of their home governments, are involved in upgrading and modernizing the entire Chinese nuclear industry from fuel production to building complete plants. While this is lucrative for the companies, the effects that this has on China’s ability to build advanced weapons systems such as nuclear submarines have not been adequately considered.
There is a close connection between the civilian and military nuclear power programs in nearly all countries that have built nuclear-powered warships. Westinghouse Electric Corporation is one of the nuclear-power industry’s leading companies in the United States; it was also one of the original contractors for the U.S. Navy’s nuclear propulsion program. AREVA Group of France owns both Framatome, which builds civilian nuclear power plants, and Technicatome, which designs the French navy’s nuclear propulsion plants. This close connection, while helpful in building a knowledge and technical base for both programs, means that technology from one program will invariably be present in the other. The building of the plants in China will not only provide technology that will help build better propulsion plants but will also train Chinese engineers to design even more advanced reactors in the future.
The development of a nuclear industrial base with a flow of advanced technology from various countries and a robust research and development program will allow China to develop advanced nuclear propulsion plants for submarines. This process could include improving current pressurized water reactor designs or development of plants based on revolutionary technology such as high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR), in keeping with China’s desire, to leap generations of weapons systems, in order to produce cutting-edge systems.
The Chinese nuclear industry dates back to January 15, 1955, when Chairman Mao Zedong and the Central Secretariat decided to develop atomic weapons.3 The resulting imperative to develop the technical and scientific knowledge required to build bombs laid the technology base for building nuclear-powered submarines and eventually a civilian nuclear-power industry.
The Second Ministry of Machine Building was formed in 1958. It was tasked with the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear submarine propulsion plant, and all associated industries. The Second Ministry controlled the nuclear industry from prospecting, mining, and processing uranium; processing fuel; constructing nuclear facilities; to developing and producing all instruments and control (I&C) equipment.4 In 1982 its name was changed to the Ministry of Nuclear Industry (MNI), and in 1988 it was reorganized into the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). Like the Second Ministry, the CNNC oversees all aspects of China’s civilian and military nuclear programs.5 CNNC consists of over one hundred subsidiary companies and institutions and still controls the vast majority of the civilian and military nuclear programs.6
The China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is the main research and development organization of CNNC. It was created in the early 1950s and directly supervised the development of the first submarine nuclear-power plant as part of the 09 submarine project. In 1958 the CIAE created the Reactor Engineering Research Section,7 renamed the Reactor Engineering Institute in 1964.8 The Reactor Engineering Institute (Code 194) did the initial design studies for the 09 submarine project,9 and today is still the primary design institute for submarine propulsion plants.10
China’s effort to develop nuclear power has not been restricted to the CNNC, however. Several universities have made contributions, most notably Qinghua University, which is often described as China’s MIT. Qinghua’s Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology (INET) was established in 1960. One of its first initiatives was the study of maritime nuclear propulsion. INET actually submitted a design for the 09 propulsion plant in 1965. The design was not accepted,11 but INET contributed to the 09 submarine project by providing technical support.12 INET has continued researching advanced nuclear technologies, including one of the world’s most advanced high-temperature gas-cooled reactors.13
The development of Chinese naval nuclear power followed a slow and painful process. The lack of trained technical personnel, a weak industrial base, and the political upheavals of the late 1950s and 1960s slowed the submarine and its propulsion plant’s development. The final product was marginal by international standards, being both noisy and apparently plagued with significant technical problems. It is nevertheless impressive that a country so politically chaotic and industrially backward could produce one of the most complex machines on earth.
The Chinese naval nuclear power program started in July 1958 when Mao and the Central Military Commission approved the 09 submarine project.14 The Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE, known today as the China Institute of Atomic Energy, or CIAE) studied U.S. and Soviet submarines and selected a pressurized water reactor (PWR) based on the Russian icebreaker Lenin’s propulsion plant. A land-based prototype was built first for testing and training. The IAE created the Reactor Research Section (RRS) and within a few months had recruited over two hundred engineers and technicians to design the plant.
RRS personnel scrutinized foreign textbooks, reports, and any other resources available to determine the plant’s specifications. The design was completed and approved by mid-1960. The Second Ministry of Machine Building was placed under Marshal Nie Rongzhen,15 and between 1961 and 1963 was given control of dozens of factories that were capable of producing the specialized instruments, controls, and major components required for a nuclear propulsion plant.16
The project was greatly affected by the Great Leap Forward (1958–61), the Cultural Revolution (1965–75), and the Third Front movement. These three movements halted the program several times. Despite funding cuts and losses of talented engineers, the land-based prototype design was completed by 1967 and construction started in March 1968. The PLA was required to participate in the construction effort in July 1968 to compensate for the disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution, and the prototype was completed in April 1970. The plant conducted full power operations in July 1970. The prototype was a success, and the plant’s basic design proved adequate.17 The infrastructure built up around Jiajiang, named the Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy, or First Academy, became China’s largest nuclear power industrial complex.
At the same time, the submarine design progressed along with the development of the reactor plant. The layout of the submarine and its subsystems was determined by the use of a full-size wood and steel model used to test fit all the components. This slowed the construction but avoided costly reworks in the actual hull. The reactor was in place by early 1971. The submarine was able to get underway for the first time on August 23, 1971. Not surprisingly, many technical abnormalities occurred during the cruise. It was not until 1974 that the submarine was deemed ready to join the fleet.
The development of China’s first nuclear submarine paralleled that of the Chinese nuclear industry and catalyzed many aspects of China’s industrial system. The technology that was developed by Chinese scientists and engineers on the 09 submarine project and other strategic weapons systems helped to build the confidence of a hitherto undeveloped nation. Surmounting manifold technical challenges amidst the political chaos of the 1960s shows an extraordinary determination by the Chinese to complete the project and their potential to accomplish other high-technology projects.
Due to the structure of the PRC’s heavy industry, the Chinese civilian nuclear power industry is closely related to the military program. CNNC has responsibility for many aspects of both programs. However, the civilian industry is not merely a cover for military programs. It is a viable industry that is rapidly growing to provide power to China’s booming economy.
China’s use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes officially began in 1955 when the Soviet Union agreed to provide other socialist countries, China in particular, with help to “promote the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.”18 This was actually a cover for the nuclear weapons program; however, it did help to create the industrial base discussed above that would develop into the civilian industry. The actual beginning occurred in 1970 when Zhou Enlai delivered a speech emphasizing the development of nuclear power plants to supply electricity.19 This set in motion several reorganizations in the Second Ministry, including the creation of Shanghai Nuclear Engineering, Research, & Design Institute (SNERDI) in 1970 to design civilian nuclear power plants.20
Construction on the first plant was started in 1985 at Haiyan, in Zhejiang Province. This project, known as Qinshan 1, was a pressurized water reactor designed by SNERDI that used mostly Chinese-made components, though the main pressure vessel was purchased from Mitsubishi of Japan. This 300MWe (capable of producing 300,000kW of electricity) reactor was first connected to the electrical grid in 1991. The plant did not start producing at full power until 1994 and was shut down for a year in 1998 for major repairs.21 The design for this plant was used to build the Chasnupp 1 plant in Pakistan that came online in June of 2000. Though the Qinshan 1 plant has had problems, it has operated safely for over ten years. It has also been used to train many of the technicians that operate other nuclear power plants in China.
The next plants built include the Daya Bay 1 and 2 complexes in Guangdong Province, near Hong Kong. These, unlike Qinshan, were built by the French company Framatone, with assistance from Chinese engineers. Started in 1987 and completed in 1994, each of these reactors is capable of producing 900MWe.22 These plants also marked the end of the first phase of nuclear power plant construction. In the mid-1990s China began to plan a second phase of construction that started in the late 1990s. This phase relied heavily on foreign technology and designs, with China pursuing a more self-sufficient nuclear industry by obtaining new skills and technology.
The second phase of nuclear construction started in 1997 with four major projects. China used a variety of foreign companies to build the new plants. Qinshan 2 has two PWRs similar to Qinshan 1 but larger, each producing 600 MWe. The plants rely on Chinese designs but use more Japanese and French technology. Qinshan 3 consists of two Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) 665MWe heavy PWRs, designed and built by Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL). Two huge, imported, French-designed 950MWe plants make up Ling Ao complex located a mile from Daya Bay. All of these plants were supplying commercial power by 2004. Tianwan, in Jiangsu Province, consists of two Russian 1,000MWe PWRs (also known as VVERs), expected to come on line in 2005 and 2006.23 This construction phase has increased China’s nuclear power capacity by 75 percent.
In 2004 China solicited bids for four more reactors, two in Guangdong and two in Zhejiang. Beijing also approved two completely indigenous reactors at Ling Ao and Qinshan. Sixteen other provinces and municipalities have announced intentions to build nuclear power plants within the next decade. Plant construction reveals the following general trends in the Chinese nuclear power industry: (1) PWRs will be the major type of plant; (2) domestic manufacturing of plants and equipment is being maximized; (3) foreign plants will be bought but significant technology transfer and Chinese involvement in all phases of construction will be required.
Beijing seeks to steadily increase domestic nuclear-power generating capacity by about two GWe per year for the next fifteen years or so, while developing a comprehensive, self-sustaining domestic industry.24 The first phase consists of domestically manufacturing fuel assemblies. China has made considerable progress, producing fuel assemblies at Yibin Fuel Plant (FYP) in Sichuan Province25 and Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant in Inner Mongolia.26 FYP produces fuel assemblies for the Qinshan 1 and 2, Daya Bay, and Ling Ao generating complexes. Framatome helped upgrade FYP to produce the fuel for Daya Bay and Ling Ao.27 FYP is reportedly being upgraded with assistance from Russia to produce fuel for the Tianwan reactors. In addition, Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant will supply the fuel for the Qinshan 3 CANDU reactors.28 China’s growth will require enlarging the capacity of these plants or building new ones, but China is well on its way to meeting its goal of being self-sufficient in its fuel supply.
China’s nuclear industry has become more sophisticated over the last two decades. It has developed a regulatory system, albeit a weak one, to ensure safety.29 The National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), established in 1984, set up a Nuclear Safety Center in 1989 to provide analysis to the NNSA. Both staffs have been steadily growing and their technical knowledge is increasing. The largest challenge facing these organizations is the diverse technology that is being used in the nuclear power plants.30 The Chinese are following the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines for such things as emergency preparedness plans and inspections. China has been a member of the IAEA since 1984 and CNNC is a member of several international organizations, such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators, that promote the sharing of operational experience and safety.31
China’s drive to make its nuclear power industry capable of indigenously designing and producing reactor plants has resulted in an impressively robust nuclear R&D system. The Chinese have dozens of institutes working on different components ranging from instrumentation to complete advanced reactor plants. These institutes currently operate at least fifteen test reactors of various types, some of which are considered the most advanced of their type in the world.
The goal of designing and building a commercially viable 1,000-MWe (AC-1000) plant for domestic use and for possible export has been a top priority. The Southwest Reactor Research and Design Academy and SNERDI are both heavily involved in this project. Some design features are unclear, but it appears to be a PWR similar to either Framatome or Westinghouse designs. The design is supposed to reduce construction time and cost while increasing safety.32 The success of this plant will greatly reduce Chinese dependence on foreign companies to build the estimated two power plants per year planned for the next fifteen years.
INET is conducting China’s most advanced research yet on an HTGR. This type of reactor has been in existence since the 1950s but only in the last decade have the technical issues been resolved sufficiently to allow it to be considered for commercial use. One of the HTGR’s advantages is its great efficiency. Normally, a PWR can achieve an efficiency of 18–23 percent, while a HTGR is 36–50 percent efficient. This allows a much smaller core to generate the same electrical power. INET has built a successful HTGR called the HTR 10.33 HTR 10 is not only highly efficient, but has also proven to be very safe to operate.34
The HTR 10 design is being used to design a series of small (200MWe) power plants that can have their major components manufactured in a factory and then assembled at the site. The increased safety of these plants will allow them to be built at industrial sites and close to population centers where the need for power is greatest. The high operating temperatures of these plants will also allow a more economical source of heat for industrial uses such as hydrogen production and heavy oil recovery. The design of this type of reactor plant appears to be scalable, allowing a customized reactor to be built for a specific use.35
The basic operation of the HTGR reactor differs from that of its PWR counterpart in several ways. The first involves the way in which fuel is loaded. Instead of fuel loaded in rods clad in metal, it is formed into ceramic balls. This method for fuel loading is one of the reasons the reactor is safer. Even during the worst accident, the temperature of the fuel does not exceed the design temperature of the ceramic and thus it cannot melt down and release the fission products. This inherent safety will allow this type of reactor to be built much closer to energy consumers.36
The next difference is the much higher temperatures at which the plant can operate. The imperative of maintaining very high pressure to keep the water from boiling limits a PWR’s operating temperature. By contrast, the HTGR is cooled by helium, a gas. This allows operating temperatures as high as 950 degrees Celsius but at a much lower pressure. This high temperature allows for greater plant efficiency and versatility.
Several combinations of generators can create electrical power from the heat produced by the reactor. The most efficient is a gas turbine driven by helium in the primary loop. This configuration would be close to 50 percent efficient but due to maintenance issues it is not currently seen as the most cost effective. One of the limiting factors on this design has been the lubrication of the bearings for the gas turbine and blower. Since conventional oil or water lubrication systems risk contamination of the helium, a new system must be developed. INET has been researching magnetic bearings to eliminate the need for an external lubricant.37
The second system is an external gas turbine system in which nitrogen is heated by the helium in a heat exchanger and then used to turn a gas turbine. This system would simplify the secondary plant since it could use more conventional types of gas turbines; however, the efficiency of the plant would be reduced to 40–45 percent. A steam cycle, similar to the ones used in PWR could also be used, but the efficiency would drop to around 34 percent. The HTR 10 will initially be equipped with a steam cycle; an external gas turbine system will be added later. This combination will allow testing of the most efficient and cost effective combination. China’s ultimate goal is to design a plant with a closed-loop gas turbine driven by the primary helium.
The international nuclear industry has become more integrated over the last two decades. It must balance the imperatives of thwarting military proliferation and spreading technology to make nuclear power both safer and more economical. In several countries, the nuclear industry is also tied closely to the development of nuclear power plants for use in naval nuclear power. It is hard to differentiate between technology used in civilian power plants and that used in naval nuclear power plants. The safety features that are developed for a submarine plant often have applicability to civilian plants and vice versa. This makes it difficult for companies that export civilian nuclear power components and plants not to also export technology that can be directly used to improve naval nuclear power plants.
China has always insisted that any large purchase of nuclear plants or components involve the transfer of technology.38 This has included assistance to retool factories in order to produce more components in China and has clearly been seen in the fuel production area discussed above. Since it is impossible to give a detailed description of every type of technology transfer that has occurred in the nuclear industry, this section will summarize the major companies that have transferred technology and the types of assistance they have provided to China. This is only a small sample of the foreign enterprises involved; the U.S. Embassy in Beijing estimates that over “300 enterprises [are] engaged in the development and production of nuclear technology in China.”39
Washington did not allow direct transfer of nuclear technology until 1998. This did not prevent American companies from legally transferring non-nuclear technology to China, however. The American company Westinghouse Nuclear (recently purchased from British Nuclear Fuels LTD by Toshiba of Japan) is the leading American company involved in the Chinese nuclear industry. Its connection to CNNC and its subsidiaries goes back to the early 1980s, when it assisted the Shanghai Steam Turbine Co. in developing 300- and 600MWe steam turbine generators for use in nuclear power plants. The Qinshan 1 power plant uses one of these turbines.40
The first major joint effort that dealt directly with nuclear technology was a 1994–96 limited technology partnership with Nuclear Power Institute of China to integrate the design features of Westinghouse’s AP-600 with the Chinese AC-600 power plant to produce the CAP-600.41 SNERDI is also listed on the Westinghouse web site as part of the design team for the AP-600. The AP-600 and the AP-1000 (a larger version of the AP-600) are Westinghouse’s most advanced commercial reactors.42
Westinghouse was also involved in the manufacture of the steam generators (SG) for the Qinshan 2 project. Westinghouse’s Spanish subsidiary Equipos Nucleares (Ensa) manufactured two of the SGs, and the Shanghai Boiler Works (with Westinghouse’s technical assistance) manufactured the other two.43 Westinghouse signed two contracts in 2003 to become more involved with Chinese nuclear fuel production. The first is with Shanghai Gaotai Rare and Precious Metals Company to provide engineering services and zirconium-alloy for use as cladding in nuclear fuel cell manufacture. The second contract is with SNERDI to provide technology and engineering services for the design of reactor cores and associated fields. Mike Saunders, senior vice president of Westinghouse Nuclear Fuels, says, “This will ensure that the Chinese have access to the most experienced and widest range of products, technology and services.”44
Westinghouse is currently bidding for the first time to build complete nuclear power plants in China: two in Guangdong and two in Zhejiang. This is a major contract since it could lead to additional projects as China tries to standardize its industry. The projects could be worth up to $6 billion. French, Canadian, and Russian companies are also bidding for the projects. The high value of these projects has drawn the attention of American political leaders, including Vice President Richard Cheney, who on a trip in 2004 reportedly encouraged the Chinese to buy the Westinghouse plants.45 This would result in additional new technology being available to the Chinese.
The Canadian company Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, design authority for the CANDU reactors, was also design authority for the Qinshan 3 project. It consists of two pressurized heavy-water reactors (PHWR) that became operational in 2003. The contract also included training operators and engineers in Canada on the operation and maintenance of the plants. The plants were constructed with close cooperation between AECL and SNERDI engineers. Computer aided drafting and design systems (CADDS) were extensively used during the building of the plants. This appears to be one of the first large-scale projects in China to use this advanced software.46 The building of these plants also involved the upgrade of the Baotou fuel factory to supply the follow-on fuel loading.47
AECL signed a strategic alliance with SNERDI in January 2005. This partnership is to include the establishment of a CANDU Engineering Center at SNERDI to provide technical support to Qinshan 3 and assist AECL in designing the next generation of reactor plants. It specifically calls for the joint refining and application of advanced engineering tools used by AECL in design, construction, and operations.48
AREVA is the major company in France involved in nuclear power. It owns 66 percent of Framatome ANP (Siemens of Germany owns the rest). Framatome has been involved in the construction of or supplying components for eight of China’s nuclear power plants and is also involved in its fuel production. AREVA is also the owner of Techicatome, which designed France’s naval nuclear power plants for submarines and aircraft carriers.
Framatome was the first foreign company to build a nuclear power plant in China. It designed and built the Daya Bay reactors. The contract was signed in 1988; the plants came on line in 1994. The company transferred all the technology for building the plants to the Chinese in 1992. This was also the design the Chinese used for building the Qinshan 2 reactors.49
The French were contracted to build the Ling Ao plants in 1995. These plants were to use more domestically produced components. Framatome assisted the Donofang Boiler Company in the manufacture of the heavy components of reactor islands (vessels), and Shanghai No. 1 Machine and Tool Works in the production of the first reactor cores for the plants. This technology transfer also included full access to all design technology for the newest French reactors operating in Chooz and Civaux, France.50
Framatome is also heavily involved in Chinese fuel cell production. In 1991 it assisted CNNC’s Yibin Fuel Plant in upgrading its technology to provide the fuel cells for the Daya Bay and the Qinshan 2 plants. The plant was upgraded again in 1998 by Framatome to provide more advanced fuel cells that have a longer life. It now also produces fuel cells for the Ling Ao plant.51
Siemens of Germany, in addition to being part owner of Framatome, also has supplied components to the Russian-built Tianwan nuclear power plant.52 The company reports that it has supplied Tianwan with its latest digital instrumentation and safety control system.53 This would make Tianwan one of the most advanced civilian reactor plants in the world.
The involvement of Russia in China’s nuclear power industry is the most difficult to trace due to the endemic secrecy of both countries. It is known that the Soviet Union provided China with its first test reactor in the 1950s and trained many of its early engineers and scientists.54 This aid ceased after the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s. Since the early 1990s, however, the relationship between the two countries has rapidly improved.
The largest project in which Russia is known to be involved is the construction of the Tianwan 1, which will consist of two Russian VVERs (Russian PWRs). The construction started in 1999 and the first plant came on line in early 2005. The second plant is expected to be operational in late 2005.55 This joint project will include technology transfer and personnel training. The Yibin Fuel Plant is being back-fitted to produce the fuel for the Tianwan plants under a production license from the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry.56
Russia has also assisted China in upgrading its Lanzhou uranium enrichment plant in Gansu Province that was originally built in the 1950s with Soviet assistance.57 In addition, the Russian Institute of Atomic Reactors and the China Institute of Atomic Energy have collaborated on a sodium-cooled experimental fast breeder reactor, also located at the Lanzhou site.
The technical support that Russia has provided to China is also estimated to be substantial. The Type 093 nuclear submarine is thought to closely resemble a Russian Victor III submarine and the Russian Rubin Design Bureau might have provided technical assistance.58 This submarine has also been discussed in Chinese articles in which Russian technical assistance is mentioned.59 This suggests the possibility that some level of Russian assistance has been provided directly to China’s submarine nuclear power program.
China is also heavily involved in international cooperation and collaboration on research and development in the nuclear field. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) is a project to research fusion power started by the United States and Japan in the late 1980s. China joined the project in 2003 and has been an active member. The actual ITER will be built in France, with China contributing 10 percent of the cost.
The HTR 10 at INET, part of Qinghua University, has drawn international attention. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has been researching similar HTGR technology in a program funded by the Department of Energy. The two institutes signed a collaborative agreement in 2003 to share research and technology on the development of a commercially viable HTGR.60
The above section demonstrates the extent of foreign nuclear-technology transfer to China. The Chinese civilian nuclear power industry, as discussed above, is closely related to China’s military program. The technology sold to Chinese companies is in fact being sold to CNNC, a state-owned enterprise. It is reasonable to assume that any technology that is brought into China will eventually be transferred to the military.
The basis for any country’s naval nuclear power industry is a strong civilian program that allows for technology to be developed and the cost shared between the two programs. This is certainly the case for the United States and France. The development of a strong civil industrial base in both countries since the 1950s has produced experienced personnel who bring new ideas from one program to the other. This makes both programs advance faster and become more efficient. Every nuclear project that has been built in China has had extensive involvement by Chinese engineers. It is not unusual for a country to require a foreign vender to use domestic engineers and local construction assets; however, it must be acknowledged that since the mid-1980s Western companies have trained a large cadre of Chinese engineers in all aspects of the nuclear industry. This will allow them to vastly improve their ability to develop advanced reactor plants for submarines that are more efficient and reliable than in the past.
China’s ability to produce large, complex structures for use in nuclear power plants has been vastly improved by the technology and training from Western companies. The Qinshan 1 plant, though reportedly produced domestically, had many of its major components imported, including the vessel (Japan) and Main Cooling Pumps (Germany).61 Today, China produces many of these large components domestically. The skills and technology needed to produce components such as turbines, steam generators, and pressure vessels for civilian power plants are essential for producing these components for submarines.
China now uses the most advanced computer software for plant design. The Qinshan 3 project extensively used CADDS provided by AECL.62 This will significantly improve China’s ability to produce complex machinery such as submarines and ships. The use of these types of programs has been integral to the development of the most advanced class of U.S. submarines.63 The agreements that CNNC has signed with AECL and AREVA indicate that this type of software will be used extensively in future design projects, giving the Chinese even more experience with it.
Instrumentation and Control equipment is the most complex part of designing a nuclear reactor. The I&C systems that the Chinese have received from companies such as Siemens, AECL, and AREVA are the most advanced in the world. These can be duplicated and used for many other applications, including propulsion plants of submarines and other ships. The availability of an I&C system that incorporates the latest technology will significantly increase the submarines’ reliability.
The development of China’s type 093 submarine started sometime in the 1980s or before. The first unit was started in 1994 and was not launched until 2002. It is speculated to be similar to a Russian Victor III using two PWRs and other Russian technology.64 Various articles state that the 093 has an advanced high-temperature high-efficiency reactor plant.65 The use of the technology gained by the civilian nuclear industry has the potential to greatly improve submarines designed and built in China.
The transfer of technology has most likely played a part in providing the 093 and future submarines with advanced I&C equipment, a better-designed reactor fuel cell, and higher quality construction of the reactor plant. This is the minimum that China would be able to get from the technology that they had obtained by the mid-1990s, when the 093 was started. The delays on the ship could have been caused by the attempt to continuously update the design as construction progressed. The 093 was laid down in 1994,66 but construction began on Qinshan 2 in 1996 (domestic with French assistance), Qinshan 3 in 199867 (Canadian), and Ling Ao in 1995 (French). The Yibin Fuel Plant was upgraded by the French in 1994,68 and from 1994 to 1996, Westinghouse made the plans for the AP600 available for the Chinese to study.69 Thus, the technology flowing into China during the period from 1994 to 2002 was very substantial by any measure. The Chinese may very well have made the decision early on to delay the 093 in order to incorporate the maximum amount of foreign nuclear technology possible.
The most extreme possibility is that China has already developed a submarine-compatible HTGR. This possibility is worth considering for several reasons. The first is that, if successful, a HTGR would allow for a much lighter power plant. A HTGR is twice as efficient as a PWR, so it would require a substantially smaller core for the same power output. It is also cooled by helium at a relatively low pressure instead of by high-pressure water. This reduces the weight not only of the coolant but also of the piping. The reduced weight would potentially allow the submarine to be faster and smaller.
The second reason is that the Chinese have been discussing that their goal in designing weapons is to use the latest technology to leap ahead. This would support development of a unique reactor system. The research on HTGR in China started in the 1970s,70 before a substantial amount of development in the civilian nuclear power industry began; this may indicate that some type of military use was envisioned. This would also help to explain why it is taking so long to build the 093. The current wisdom that the 093 is similar to a Victor III design, and that the Russians are assisting in its construction would indicate that it would proceed along quickly. This, however, is reportedly not the case, suggesting at least the possibility that there is something significantly different about this submarine.
The technical difficulties that would have to be overcome with the blowers (the need for magnetic bearings) and the fuel-loading system to make an HTGR compatible with a submarine are formidable. This makes the probability of the 093 being equipped with an HTGR small. However, it should be taken into consideration that if not the 093, then a future submarine may have a reactor of this type. This could take a form that is significantly different from current nuclear submarines that are designed for open-ocean, long-endurance operations.
China’s strategy for the next several decades appears to be focused on pushing its defenses out to the first island chain, which includes Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This will require more shallow-water access-denial platforms, instead of long-range open-ocean submarines. A small submarine similar to a diesel electric—save for a small HTGR to recharge its batteries—would be an ideal sea-denial platform. It could stay submerged for extended periods of time while laying in wait for a passing ship. This submarine could have technology currently available from the recently purchased Kilo-class submarines for the batteries and propulsion, while using a reactor on the scale of the HTR 10 (2500 kW generator). An HTGR equipped with an integral gas turbine/blower outfitted with magnetic bearings could be designed to be very quiet.
We would be foolish to underestimate China’s ability to develop complex weaponry. The 091 submarine is often used as an example of Chinese engineering incompetence, since the submarine is viewed as one of the worst in the world. But when considered in context of when it was built and the state of the Chinese economy and political system at the time, it is actually impressive that the submarine was ever finished. No one denies that China’s economy and industrial base have made extraordinary strides since that time, and the level of technical expertise in China has risen dramatically. Combine this with the advanced technology currently available to China and it should seem evident that the 093 submarine is unlikely to be a simple copy of a 1970s vintage Russian design, but rather something significantly more advanced.
The use of nuclear power is vital to China’s economy and to reducing its dependence on coal and imported oil, while also decreasing its greenhouse gas emissions.71 The United States confronts the same issues and is likewise returning to nuclear power. A major concern is how much technology should be transferred to China to make its industry safer. The United States does not want China to have a Three Mile Island- or Chernobyl-type accident, of course, so it is in Washington’s interest to ensure that China has the most advanced technology to operate its nuclear power plants safely. Moreover, there are obviously strong commercial incentives to feed China’s appetite for nuclear power technology. Of course, this same dilemma is present in all technology transfers but few other industries have such direct links between the civil and military programs. U.S. naval analysts should be concerned, lest such transfers aid China in developing a robust nuclear submarine fleet that could unhinge the delicate balance of security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
1. [Jian Jie] [“The Legend of the Virtuous Twins”], 22–23. See also [Lin Changsheng], [“The Combat Power of China’s Nuclear Submarines”], [World Aerospace Digest], no. 103 (September 2004): 28.
2. Oxford Analytica, “China: Expansion to End Power Shortage,” OxResearch, 29 March 2004 [online journal]; available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=592085241&sid=9&Fmt=3&clientld=18762&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
3. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 38.
4. Ibid., 55–59.
5. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “China National Nuclear Corporation,” available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/cnnc.htm.
6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “General Manager Kang Rixan of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) elaborates on the Development Status of China’s Nuclear Power and the Exchanges and Cooperation with International Counter parts.” Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/wgjzxwzx/ipccfw/t199253.htm.
7. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Sea Power: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 24.
8. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Facilities and Organizations,” available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/nucorg.htm.
9. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Sea Power, 25.
10. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nuclear Facilities and Organizations.
11. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Sea Power, 30–31.
12. Ibid., 265–66.
13. Xu Yuanhui, “Power Plant Design: HTGR Advances in China,” Nuclear Engineering International (16 March 2005), 22. Available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc.
14. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Sea Power, 7–8.
15. Marshal Nie Rongzhen was an army marshal and veteran of the Long March. He was placed in charge of the strategic weapons (atomic bomb) program in 1955 and it was he who convinced Mao that China should develop nuclear-powered submarines. Nie was a protégée of Zhou Enlai, who provided political protection for the programs during the Cultural Revolution.
16. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Sea Power, 24–28.
17. Ibid., 45–46.
18. Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 105.
19. Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, “Timeline of the Chinese Nuclear Industry, 1970 to 2020,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc_reactors/china/timeline.html.
20. Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute, “Introduction,” available at http://www.snerdi.com.cn/en-introduction.htm.
21. World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in China, June 2005, Available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/printable_information_papers/inf63print.htm. .
22. Ibid.
23. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “Reactor Summaries,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclaer/page/nuc_reactors/china/reactors.html.
24. World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in China, June 2005.
25. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Yibin Fuel Plant (YFP), available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/yibin.htm.
26. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant, available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/baotou.htm.
27. AREVA, AREVA in China, Available at http://www.framatome-anp.com/servlet/BlobServer?blobcol=url&blobheader=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=presskit&blobwhere=1082483458312.
28. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant.
29. Nuclear Threat Initiative, National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/nnsa.htm.
30. Richard P. Suttmeier, “China Goes Nuclear,” The China Business Review 23, no. 5 (September/October 1996): 19, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=10279722&sid&Fmt=3&clientld=18762&RQT&VName=PQD.
31. Suttmier, 19.
32. Ryan, “China Will Insist on Technology along with Any Nuclear Imports,” Nucleonics Week 39, no. 20 (14 May 1998): 1, available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc.
33. For further information on China’s HTGR development, particularly Qinghua University’s HTR 10, see 
[Wu Congxin] 
[An Advanced Nuclear Reactor System: The High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor] (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 2004), 204–6. For further information on Chinese research and development in the area of nuclear power, see 
[Zhu Qirong], 
[Nuclear Propulsion] (Changsha: National University of Defense Technology Press, 2003); 
[Ma Xuquan], ed., 
[Nuclear Energy Development and Application] (Beijing: Chemistry Industry Press, 2004); 
[Sun Zhongning], 
[Nuclear Energy Equipment] (Harbin: Harbin Engineering University, 2003); 
[Zhang Jianmin], 
[Control of Nuclear Reactors] (Xian: Xian Communications College Press, 2002).
34. International Atomic Energy Agency, “HTTR and HTR-10 Test Reactors,” IAEA-TECDOC—1198: Current Satus and Future Development of Modular High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor Technology, 130. Available at http://www.iaea.org/inis/aws/htgr/fulltext/gcr_review_05.pdf. Accessed on 5 August 2005.
35. World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in China, June 2005.
36. International Atomic-20 Energy-20 Agency, -20 “HTTR-20 and HTR-10 Test Reactors,” 130.
37. Yang Goujun, Geng Wenji, Li Hongwei, and Yu Suyuan, “Study on the Relationship about Magnetic Bearings Rotor Structure and Natural Frequency for 10 MW High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor,” Gaojishu Tongxun [High Technology Newsletter], no. 4 (Beijing: Tsinghua University and Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology, 2003), 72–76.
38. Ryan, 1.
39. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “Future of the Chinese Nuclear Industry,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclaer/page/nuc_reactors/china/outlook.html. Accessed on 18 July 2005.
40. Shanghai Steam Turbine Co., “Introduction,” available at www.nuclear.cetin.net.cn/cnic/hzn/032.htm.
41. Ryan, 1.
42. Westinghouse Electric Company, “Design team,” AP600 website, available at http://www.ap600.westinghousenuclaer.com/D1.asp.
43. Westinghouse Electric Company, “Westinghouse Steam Generators Shipped to Qinshan II Nuclear Station,” Westinghouse news release 24 March 1999, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=127481&TICK=WE&STORY=/www/story/07-09-1999/0000978482&EDATE=Mar+24,+1999.
44. Westinghouse Electric Company, “Westinghouse Wins Two Fuel-Related Contracts in China,” Westinghouse news release 19 August 2003, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=127481&TICK=WE&STORY=/www/story/08-19-2003/0002003475&EDATE=Aug+19,+2003.
45. H. Josef Hebert, “Cheney to Promote American-Made Nuclear Reactors to China,” Detroit News Business, 10 April 2004, available at http://www.detnews.com/2004/business/0404/11/business-118468.htm.
46. Peigen Yu, “Qinshan NPP, Long-Term Plans for Nuclear Power in China,” Inside WANO 9, no. 2 (2001): 6.
47. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Qinshan Nuclear Reactors, available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/qinshan.htm.
48. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “AECL Signs Strategic Alliance” AECL news release 18 January 2005, available at http://www.aecl.ca/index.asp?latid=55&csid=168&csid1=120&menuid-48.
49. AREVA, AREVA in China, Available at http://www.framatome-anp.com/servlet/BlobServer?blobcol=url&blobheader=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=presskit&blobwhere=1082483458312.
50. AREVA, AREVA in China, Available at http://www.framatome-anp.com/servlet/BlobServer?blobcol=url&blobheader=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=presskit&blobwhere=1082483458312.
51. AREVA, AREVA in China, available at http://www.framatome-anp.com/servlet/BlobServer?blobcol=url&blobheader=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=presskit&blobwhere=1082483458312.
52. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Tianwan-1 & 2, available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/jiangsu.htm.
53. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “Reactor Summaries,” Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclaer/page/nuc_reactors/china/reactors.html.
54. Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 105–6.
55. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “VVER Reactors,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclaer/page/nuc_reactors/china/vver.html.
56. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Tianwan-1 & 2.
57. World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in China, June 2005.
58. Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, “Type 093” Submarines: Submarines and Submersible Designs [online] posted 01 March 2005, available at http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=A&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/yb/juws/juws1722.htm@current&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28type+%3CAND%3E+093+%29%29&Prod_Name=JUWS&.
59. Chinese Military Aviation, “Submarines,” available at http://mil.jschina.com.cn/huitong/han_xia_kilo_song.htm.
60. Elizabeth Thomson, “MIT, Tsinghua Collaborate on Development of Pebble-Bed Nuclear Reactor,” MIT press release 22 October 2003, available at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2003/pebble.html.
61. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “Future of the Chinese Nuclear Industry,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclaer/page/nuc_reactors/china/outlook.html.
62. Peigen Yu, “Qinshan NPP, Long-Term Plans for Nuclear Power in China,” Inside WANO 9, no. 2 (2001): 8.
63. Computer Sciences Corporation, “CSC Works With General Dynamics to Build Digital Design Solution,” Aerospace and Defense Case Study, available at http://www.csc.com/industries/aerospacedefense/casestudies/1266.shtml.
64. Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, “Type 093” Submarines: Submarines and Submersible Designs [online] posted 01 March 2005, available at http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=A&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/yb/juws/juws1722.htm@current&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28type+%3CAND%3E+093+%29%29&Prod_Name=JUWS&.
65. See, for example, Chinese Military Aviation webpage, “Submarines,” available at http://mil.jschina.com.cn/huitong/han_xia_kilo_song.htm.
66. Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, “Type 093” Submarines: Submarines and Submersible Design.
67. Peigen Yu, “Qinshan NPP, Long-Term Plans for Nuclear Power in China,” Inside WANO 9, no. 2 (2001): 6.
68. AREVA, AREVA in China, Available at http://www.framatome-anp.com/servlet/BlobServer?blobcol=url&blobheader=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=presskit&blobwhere=1082483458312.
69. Ryan, 1.
70. Xu Yuanhui, “Power Plant Design; HTGR Advances in China,” Nuclear Engineering International (16 March 2005): 22, available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc.
71. 
[Wu Congxin] 
[An Advanced Nuclear Reactor System: The High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor] (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 2004), 1–6.