FOREWORD

Natural Law and the Restoration of Practical Reason

Daniel J. Mahoney

The French political philosopher Pierre Manent has explored the “theological-political problem” in a series of works culminating in his 2015 book Situation de la France, which appeared a year later in English as Beyond Radical Secularism. In this study, Manent expresses reservations about militant secularism, affirms the “Christian mark” of France and other European nations, and sympathetically treats the contribution Jews have made to European civilization. Manent makes the challenging argument that the successful absorption of French and European Muslims depends on European democracy maintaining its civilizational soul. Muslims must not enter an empty space—a “wasteland”—where they would be free to affirm the umma instead of becoming loyal citizens of the countries in which they now live. Further, Manent reflects on “political action and the common good,” contending that the human good is not unsupported, and that we do not live in a merely arbitrary world; political action, he maintains, should be guided and informed by the old cardinal virtues: courage, prudence, temperance, and justice. As Manent put it in a 2014 essay, “Knowledge and Politics” (his farewell address at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales), “If we have the right to speak of humanity as a species sharing a common nature, this is because of this pattern of practical virtues, by which we recognize a courageous and just person in the human being born in the most distant and apparently different latitude.”

Manent published another book in March 2018, La loi naturelle et les droits de l’homme, which deepens the considerations of Beyond Radical Secularism and challenges the humanitarian civil religion that has dominated European intellectual circles since at least May 1968. The new book occasioned lively discussions in France and is now appearing in English from University of Notre Dame Press under the title Natural Law and Human Rights: Toward a Recovery of Practical Reason. In six chapters developed from the prestigious Étienne Gilson lectures at the Institut Catholique de Paris (and in a related appendix on Saint Thomas and the recovery of the intelligibility of law), Manent reflects on the steady displacement of the natural law by the modern conception of human rights. He questions the widely shared notion of human rights that radically separates them, legitimate as they are in their own sphere, from the ends of human freedom. Manent rejects the fiction of human “autonomy”—a groundless freedom, without reasons or purposes, to make our way in the world. Nor is he a partisan of “heteronomy,” where acting human beings take their direction from the will of others. Such categories are far too abstract; they tell us nothing about the “rules” inherent in human action itself. Those rules become clear as we act conscientiously in the world, trying to do justice to the sense of right and wrong that defines us as human beings. Starting from moral and political philosophy, from an eminently “practical world,” and not from theology or metaphysics (although Manent is in no way opposed to metaphysical reflection), Manent sets out to recover natural law as the key instrument vivifying free will, human choice, and moral and political action.

La loi naturelle et les droits de l’homme confronts the prejudices, or dogmas, of those who have repudiated the classical and (especially) Christian notion of “liberty under law.” Manent denies that we can generate obligations from a condition of what Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau call the “state of nature,” where human beings are absolutely free, with no obligations to others. Manent’s book is an exercise in defending liberty under law, in both the Christian and the political senses of the term. In his view, our ever-more-imperial affirmation of human rights needs to be reintegrated into what he calls an “archic” understanding of human and political existence, where law and obligation are inherent in liberty and meaningful human action. Otherwise, we are bound to act thoughtlessly, in an increasingly arbitrary or willful manner. Manent aims to restore the grammar of moral and political action, and thus the possibility of an authentically political order, one fully compatible with liberty rightly understood.

In the opening chapter, “Why Natural Law Matters,” Manent highlights the incoherence of a rights project that combines apolitical universalism and a thoughtless cultural relativism. Commentators such as Olivier Roy condemn, for instance, Christian opposition to LGBT rights but welcome, in the name of cultural tolerance, a far more vociferous opposition to them from European Muslims. The West is always judged severely, in this way of thinking, while the “Other” gets a free pass. As Manent demonstrates, politically and juridically imposed same-sex marriage was not a modest change in the law to make marriage more “inclusive” but a systematic assault on the idea of a normative human nature. It changed the very nature of marriage, undercutting its natural foundations. Marriage—“the crucial institution of a human world organized according to natural law”— no longer acknowledges the complementarity of the sexes or the natural foundations of family life. Transgenderism continues this rejection of the very idea of human nature and an authoritative natural moral law, where sex is radically separated from “gender.” That is surely worthy of reflection and debate before gender ideology becomes a tyrannical orthodoxy beyond dispute.

Manent’s latest work is above all an effort to reactivate the perspective of the citizen or religious believer who truly acts in the human world. In the second chapter, “Counsels of Fear,” Manent challenges a widely held belief that Machiavelli and other early modern political philosophers liberated a salutary practical perspective against the one-sidedly contemplative emphases of classical and Christian thought. This is to turn everything upside down, Manent believes. It was the classics and the Christians who defended “reflective choice” and “free will,” the preconditions of all meaningful action. By contrast, Machiavelli, writing at the dawn of modernity, substituted a theoretical perspective on action that eclipsed the agent’s point of view. The rationale for this assault on practical action shows up most revealingly in chapters 15 and 18 of Machiavelli’s The Prince. Machiavelli could not abide the gap between “what is done” and “what should be done.” This distinction, so central to practical action and reflective choice, becomes, for Machiavelli, an unbridgeable chasm that confuses and enervates human beings. The chasm, he contended, must be closed once and for all. Machiavelli counsels subduing fortuna, but he has no place for reflective choice or moral prudence—the crown of the virtues, according to Aristotle.

Machiavelli succumbs to, and instills in his readers, an excessive desire for clarity, Manent writes, a desire that ends up denying that true action is always and everywhere subordinate to law. Machiavelli’s evocative rhetoric and audacious theorizing helped decisively to undermine the gap between what people do and what they ought to do, which is the horizon and precondition of all reasonable choice. In his assault on “imaginary principalities” (such as the perennial notion of natural law) in chapter 15 of The Prince, he frees “virtuosos of action,” daring revolutionaries of a new type, from adherence to the natural law. “Necessity,” a willingness to move back and forth between good and evil with an exhilarating alacrity, and immoral daring, become the trademark of those “princes” freed from the constraints of the moral law. They feign respect for that law—see chapter 18 of The Prince—but have no real place for it in their souls.

It is in this context, Manent observes, that Machiavelli sets out to promote the “erasure or eradication of conscience.” By “conscience,” Manent does not mean its pale modern substitute: subjective arbitrariness or personal whim. He has in mind that firm interior guide, “brought to light only in a Christian context,” which allowed an acting human being to discern between good and evil, better and worse, in the context of moral and political action. Conscience, however imperfectly, allows us to see our actions as a just God sees them. This is the law “written in the human heart” of which Saint Paul spoke. But conscience is knowable through human experience and self-knowledge and does not depend for its recognition on revelation alone. Manent affirms that “the notion of conscience supports and complements the Aristotelian analysis of practical life and reflective choice so well that the two elements prove to be inseparable” (see n. 21 in ch. 2). Without the notion of conscience, practical reason is bereft and loses its foothold in the human world. By repudiating conscience, by deciding to bury it once and for all, Machiavelli gave birth to a wholly abstract perspective on moral and political life. A new conception of human freedom, ever tethered to necessity, would expel conscience and practical reason from human and political life. For Manent, Aristotle and Christianity, reflective choice and free will and conscience, stand or fall together. They are the indispensable ground of practical life and practical reason.

Machiavellian modernity nevertheless finds powerful reinforcement in the Protestant Reformation’s paradoxical undermining of “liberty under law.” For Martin Luther, there was no free will; salvation owes everything to grace. For the “acting Christian,” the Christian agent, the pre-Reformation Christian, who takes his bearings from conscience and the natural law, there is no certitude about salvation, though “good works” show human freedom, aided by grace, responding to the call of the law; there is no possibility of escaping the tensions between what we are (imperfect sinners) and what we ought to do and become.

The acting Christian does his best to live virtuously in light of the cardinal and theological virtues. Manent is a partisan of this acting Christian, who remains subject to natural law and the requirements of conscience and who does not appeal to a “Christian liberty” contemptuous of natural law. Against Machiavelli and Luther, Manent defends the sempiternal requirements of liberty under law. A scholar following in Manent’s footsteps might feel compelled to develop his suggestive argument that Aristotelian reflective choice (the deliberation and prudence of books 3 and 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics) vitally depends on conscience. Reflective choice and the moral conscience unearthed in a Christian context are the twin pillars of a practical philosophy that respects the “archic” character of human freedom. Human freedom, that is, can never be truly groundless. True freedom is never arbitrary, never simply willful. Action is always accompanied by rules, by ends, purposes, and finalities, which provide guidance for the exercise of human choice. Without natural law, choice is utterly arbitrary and self-destructive, an example of the will willing itself. Reasonable action becomes impossible, and the moral and political agent is left bereft in the world.

The central chapters of Natural Law and Human Rights address the curious relationship between the modern state of Machiavellian and, later, Hobbesian origin (which protects ever-expanding rights but ignores the reasons at the heart of political disputation) and modern man’s singular inability either to command or to obey, in the fulsome sense of those words. Manent provocatively advances the claim that the “empire” of the modern state, representative or not, has witnessed a growing erosion of human capacity for action. The state undermines authentic statesmanship and citizenship, legitimate authority (which is never simply willful or authoritarian), and obedience to a political community that governs wisely and well. This paralysis of command and obedience is rooted in the “irreparable error” of modern natural right, which is to think that it is “possible to produce the command starting from a condition of noncommand”— from that illusion that is interchangeably called “natural freedom” or “the state of nature.”

Moreover, as Manent makes clear in chapter 4, while there “is no human condition without command,” the practical world, the world of reflective choice and deliberation, “is never given over essentially to the arbitrary commands of gods or of human beings.” “The human agent,” Manent observes, “cannot engage in action without entering to some degree into its reasons.” Arbitrary command is thus a contradiction in terms. Once again, we live in an “archic” world—one interwoven with rules and purposes intrinsic to thoughtful action. Law, both positive and natural, is inseparable from our liberty.

Manent does not seek to bury human rights and the regime of modern liberty, as a superficial reading of this book might suggest. He writes, here and elsewhere, with some admiration for the ability of early modern republics to give rise to “common action,” to a prodigious redefinition of the common, or the commonweal. As Manent had already argued in Les métamorphoses de la cité (2010; translated as Metamorphoses of the City, 2013), for a time, modernity unleashed a remarkable energy and put forward new and impressive visions of republican civic life. It gave rise to a truly dynamic, self-confident political and social order. But sometime in the 1960s, we reached a “point of inflection,” where the endless extension of rights began to rob essential institutions of their meaning and substance. In Western Europe, the Catholic Church, the liberal university, and the selfgoverning nation “had to confront a radical contestation of their proper legitimacy and their internal meaning.” Not only were rules relaxed, but the very telos of authoritative institutions was denied in favor of the radical autonomy of the individual, more and more disconnected from the political, social, and moral contents of human individuality.

Today, church leaders and activists alike defend the right of any human being to become a citizen of any country that that person chooses. Through a failure to interrogate itself about its own political and cultural preconditions, the regime of indiscriminate rights ceases to support a meaningful political common good. It has no boundaries in principle and can make no substantive demands on those living within its territory. It depoliticizes democracy and begins actively to war on the ends and purposes that inform a freedom worthy of the name. Rights become the alpha and the omega of the human and political world, and those who make ever-more-insistent rights claims will tolerate no dissent.

Manent does not hide the fact that theoretical liberalism—the liberalism of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bayle—resolutely opposed both the Greek conception of reflective choice and the Christian notions of free will and conscience. Modern materialism and determinism cannot support the common action and moral responsibility that are necessary foundations of human liberty, even under modern circumstances. A true liberalism needs reflective choice, a commonsense affirmation of free will, and a nonsubjectivist notion of conscience to defend the dignity of the acting human being and to establish the space and preconditions of politics, understood as a realm of thoughtful—and common—action.

Thomas Hobbes constructed the edifice of the liberal state and society on the “fear of violent death.” But as Manent rightly observes in chapter 5 (“The Individual and the Agent”), there is something terribly debilitating about treating death as an “extrinsic accident,” with an overweening place in our awareness. For the acting human being and the acting Christian, death cannot be the central concern of human existence. All people fear death, and we should not exaggerate the courage of most in this regard. But the acting person, though “naturally afraid of death,” Manent explains, does not do everything and anything to avoid it. He is concerned above all with doing the right thing, with seeking the right action and respecting the rules and priorities inherent in a serious human life. We are sometimes commanded, not by arbitrary authority but by the authority of what is right and good, to put ourselves at some mortal risk. Selfpreservation can never be the great desideratum for a human being guided by reflective choice and a conscience that honors truth and virtue. The great task of human beings is living well, and not preserving this-worldly existence indefinitely. On this Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, and Saint Paul would surely agree.

Manent exposes the growing toleration of the liberal state for taking the lives of the sick and the infirm. Treating death as an external obstacle leads some to claim, paradoxically, that they can make authoritative judgments on the “subjective sentiment” of a sick or infirm person. The old and always authoritative verity—“thou shall not kill”—is thrown to the wind by the same people who treat the death penalty as an absolute abomination. Modern liberty, in its most extreme theoretical articulations and applications, has replaced liberty under law with a one-sided preoccupation with death as the summum malum. We are clearly in unchartered territory. Only by accepting death as an essential part of life, and not as an “extrinsic accident” to be overcome, can we restore respect for life at every stage of human existence.

Manent’s book concludes with an account in chapter 6 of “natural law and human motives,” which has already appeared in English in modified form in the journal Modern Age. Building on Aristotle, Manent shows how no human being can act without deferring to the three great human motives: the pleasant, the useful, and the honorable (or the just and noble). These are the “objective components of human nature.” Cultures and civilizations vary, and humanity consists, in Plato’s words, of a “coat of many colors.” But because human beings share three great constitutive motives, we are obliged to judge others and ourselves (one might add that we are equally obliged to find the appropriate means to those fixed and enduring ends of human virtue which are courage, justice, temperance, and prudence). Yet we are not prisoners of our motives, since moral virtue demands that we conjugate them in a way that does justice to a balanced and virtuous life. Our human nature is completed by the exercise of the cardinal and theological virtues that allow us to live well as human beings. As Manent explains, the jihadist or Islamist terrorist who kills in the name of a mutilated conception of religion is nothing more than a criminal who has degraded a noble conception of justice. We must judge him for the criminal we would be, too, if we, too, turned justice into an excuse for murder.

In Manent’s words, “The very notion of natural law presupposes or implies that we have the ability to judge human conduct according to criteria that are clear, stable, and largely if not universally shared.” Human diversity, especially in the cultural realm, is fully compatible with rules of justice comprehensible to human beings as human beings. The principal motives of human action—the pleasant, the useful, and the noble—define the criteria for moral judgment and political action. Manent is not deterred by the “fact-value distinction” or the “naturalistic fallacy” beloved by social scientists and some academic philosophers. One can indeed “locate a valid rule of action on the basis of a description” of human motives, since our motives unfold within an “archic” world. There is not an unbridgeable gap but rather a “gentle slope” connecting the “is” and the “ought,” between what we are and what we ought to be. Such is the foundational truth of the human world.

We have seen that Manent refuses to identify the noble with those who have open contempt for the moral law, such as jihadist terrorists. He expands his analysis to discuss communism and a conception of marriage compatible with the natural law. A student of the great anti-communist French thinker Raymond Aron, Manent argues that the communist regime was in violation of the natural law. He speaks of it as “sinister” and acknowledges its terrible crimes. But he thinks discussion of communism has been inordinately preoccupied with the question of communist “ideals,” which lead too many people away from confronting its dark reality. Manent points to another path of judgment, narrower and thus incomplete but nonetheless “rigorously correct” on its own terms: communist regimes so frustrated the “fundamental” wellsprings of human life (think of collectivization, periodic famines in all major communist countries, and systematic consumer shortages) that the regime could never honor basic human needs. It could not do justice to the elementary place of the useful and pleasant in any decent life.

Manent is not unaware of—or silent about—the gulags, torture, and the Big Lie. Elsewhere, he has commented authoritatively on all the sinister features of the ideological regime. Manent perfectly understands the “essential imperfections,” as Raymond Aron called them, of communist totalitarianism. His argument about the incompatibility of communism with the natural law is partial but convincing on its own terms.

Manent argues, as well, that marriage understood in terms of the natural law must give “appropriate place to the three motives”; it cannot be reduced to pleasure-seeking or “changing feelings.” His argument is not explicitly biblical or Catholic, but maintains that marriage cannot be adequately understood within the framework of some alleged human autonomy that justifies jettisoning one’s broader moral responsibilities. The natural law is a starting place for judgment: the cultivation of human nobility can help develop virtuous human conduct in an even richer and more humanizing way. Nobility can enlarge our sense of obligation and can put the useful and the pleasant in their proper place, without denying their centrality in a balanced and morally serious life.

As Manent stresses, prudence plays a key role in all of these deliberations. That is one reason why he is so skeptical of replacing natural-law reasoning with an ever-expanding list of human rights. He decries the “tyranny of the explicit” in regard to rights and rights claims. When rights become too numerous and explicit, they introduce debilitating conflict into civil society. Moral agents need to leave a substantial place for prudence and for genuinely moral and political deliberation. Excessive “rights talk” corrupts moral reasoning and civic debate by making thoughtful compromise much less likely.

An appendix to the book, “Recovering Law’s Intelligence,” originally appeared in the Revue Thomiste in 2014. It appears here with Pierre Manent’s permission. In multiple ways, it clarifies the intentions of Manent’s Gilson lectures. This chapter boldly argues that Thomas Aquinas, the greatest doctor of the church, is “the author who can best help . . . Christians as well as non-Christians” alike to confront and overcome “the loss of law’s meaning.” This return to Saint Thomas cannot, however, be direct or unmediated: “We cannot proceed as if nothing had happened for seven or eight centuries.” During those centuries, the Western world found itself under the tutelage of another Thomas, Thomas Hobbes, who reduced human motives to but one, the desire for power that “ceaseth only in death.” With Thomas Aquinas’s (and Aristotle’s) help, Manent recovers the rich and ample heterogeneity of human motives. Rather than being prisoners of the language of rights, those who return to the wisdom of Aristotle and Thomas (without in any way rejecting the immense practical benefits of the liberal democratic order) can recover the precious idea of an enduring human bond that makes possible “common action” and “commanding law.” What commands is not arbitrary will but an “active political reason” that recognizes citizens and human beings as agents and persons and not as subjects of various determinisms, on the one hand, or the “spontaneous order” of the market, on the other. When Christians and citizens act politically, when they exercise the great virtue of prudence, they participate “in Providence,” by providing for “ourselves and others” (see question 91 of Thomas’s Treatise on Law as discussed and highlighted by Manent in the appendix). Eternal law has a necessary place for natural law, for the exercise of free will and “reflective choice.” Saint Thomas thus allows us to understand the honored place of natural and human law in a world where freedom and responsibility are grounded in the very order of things. Manent once again affirms the primacy of the Good, the fact that the goods of life are not without natural or divine support.

With impressive learning, Manent points us once again to the heterogeneous motives of the human soul and to the humanizing ends and purposes that inform our freedom. In this deep, concise, and instructive book, he shows us the way toward rejuvenating both moral and political judgment and the broader moral foundations of the modern republic. His book is a preeminent example of reflection at the service of truth—and common life.