BY THE EARLY 1990S ALMOST EVERY expert around confidently predicted the imminent collapse of the inefficient, archaic, brutal and at times bizarre regime in North Korea. The policies of the great powers were based on the assumption that a North Korean collapse was imminent. It has been suggested that the U.S. signed the Agreed Framework of 1994 only because most people inside the Beltway believed this flawed agreement would not be carried through anyway. It was assumed that the North Korean regime would collapse well before the expected completion of the light water reactor project.
But this did not happen. Contrary to everyone’s (well, almost everyone’s) expectations the Kim dynasty has survived. Even the disaster of the Great Famine, arguably the worst famine Asia has seen since Mao’s Great Leap Forward, was not enough to undermine its grip on power. No revolution occurred, and no army general drove his tanks into Pyongyang. Why?
One of the reasons is particularly disconcerting to idealists: as long as a modern government is determined to be cruel and is ready to shoot all troublemakers, it is pretty much invincible—at least, so long as it is not subjected to serious pressure from the outside. It has been long known that revolutions tend to erupt not in the worst times of tyranny but when a government wishes to liberalize itself. Bad governments are usually overthrown, not when they are at their most brutal, but when they try to become better. A government which does not play with the dangerous notions of “democracy” or “humanity” is in a much safer position than a government of soul-searching reformers.
In other words, the secret of Pyongyang’s success in handling the situation is its remarkable indifference to the sufferings of the common people. The rulers were prepared to sacrifice as many lives as was necessary to ensure their survival. Had the DPRK government decided to disband the state-run agricultural cooperatives, the famine would not have occurred. But such an act would have brought on unacceptable weakening of central control and hence it was rejected. The death of some 600,000 people was the price that had to be paid, and the rulers couldn’t have cared less.
Ermanno Furlanis, a famous Italian pizza chef, was invited to North Korea to cook for Kim Jong Il and his inner circle in 1997 when the famine reached its height, wiping out entire villages in the northern provinces. And what does the Italian maestro write about his own experience of this famine-smitten nation? “That evening, dinner—a feast worthy of Petronius’ Satyricon—was served with an excellent Burgundy and delicacies from around the world. As an Italian I could not refrain from objecting [to the French wines], and three days later fresh from Italy a shipment of Barolo arrived.” Or: “That evening we had a light dinner back at the base: a pair of lobsters, salad and French white wine.” This is how servants (admittedly, very special servants) of the Dear Leader lived during those hard times. And what about the Great Man himself? “Every now and then a kind of courier would show up from some corner of the world. I saw him twice unloading two enormous boxes containing an assortment of 20 very costly French cheeses, and one box of prized French wines.”
Does this mean that the Pyongyang rulers, the “top thousand,” are cruel? Perhaps they are, but generally they are simply indifferent. Their behavior reminds me of the medieval European aristocracy. When the peasants were starving, the barons enjoyed their feasts, horses and castles without perceiving this behavior as shameful. They belonged to a different stratum, so the lavish feasts, the silk dresses and the occasional round of sex with a pretty maidservant was their birthright.
The North Korean elite has been hereditary since the late 1960s, if not earlier. And I do not mean the Kim clan alone. At the top levels of the state bureaucracy, many important positions are occupied by people who qualify for these posts largely as the sons or grandsons of guerrillas who fought in Manchuria in the 1930s or as descendants of some wartime hero. They have spent all their lives in the comfortable and sequestered environment of the privileged living quarters, special schools and hard-currency shops.
This also renders them less ready to defect. In the old Soviet Union or in China, the former Communist elite defected and transformed themselves overnight from party apparatchiks into capitalists. A similar strategy is unlikely to work in the North. In all probability, the collapse of the regime will lead to unification. And in a unified Korea, the former North Korean bureaucrats will have no chance: for better or worse, capitalism there will be built not by born-again apparatchiks, but by resident managers of Hyundai and Samsung. This means that the collapse of the system will mean the loss of a privileged life—and perhaps even persecution. The North Korean cadres know only too well how they would have treated the Seoul “reactionary puppets” had Pyongyang emerged victorious from the inter–Korean rivalry, and they do not see any reason why they would be treated any differently themselves. Thus they stick together, in the faint hope that they may survive.
And there is another reason as well: since 1990, the world has changed. North Korea is lucky in that it has not been subjected to any concerted attempt to take advantage of its severe economic crisis in order to bring down the regime. None of the countries involved have made a serious attempt to promote dissent within the DPRK.
This is very unlike, one suspects, what would have occurred in the 1970s or 1980s, when the Cold War was at its height and the crusade against the “Evil Empires” or “Evil Kingdoms” of world Communism was being waged. Today, in a less ideological age, North Korea’s neighbors are wary of the inherent risks, troubles and costs associated with any collapse of the North Korean regime, and they are not too eager to hasten the process. An East German or Romania-style collapse of the Kim Jong Il government would undoubtedly lead to outflows of refugees which no neighboring country would be willing to deal with, to uncertain and potentially destabilizing changes in the local military balance, and to huge expenses which South Korea alone would be unable to sustain. Hence, instead of crusading for democracy, North Korea’s neighbors are generally ready to tacitly support the Pyongyang leaders in their efforts to control the situation, and do not ask too many awkward questions about humanitarian or human rights problems resulting from these efforts.
And, of course, there is a nuclear program which is widely and skillfully used for blackmail: Pyongyang expected to be paid for not developing its nuclear weapons. The Geneva agreed framework of 1994 was a masterpiece of blackmail diplomacy, and North Korea received generous aid packages as a reward ... and then proceeded with a nuclear weapons program anyway.
Then, there was (and is) veiled but clearly evident rivalry between China and the USA. Beijing probably does not want a nuclear North Korea, but it is not happy about a unified country which could become—or rather remain—pro–American. It would also like a Communist regime or two hanging around to keep it company and help its current government survive. This means that China is willing to keep North Korea in operation by providing it with aid, especially with food aid.
Finally, there are South Korean phobias to exploit. In dealing with the broader public, nationalism is a favorite choice, but hard-nosed politicians are pressed to feed Pyongyang by a different set of considerations: the South is afraid of a democratic revolution in the North, politely known as an “implosion.” A German-style unification is seen as a disaster since it would lead to a dramatic decline in the living standards of the South Koreans. This is a unique situation with few parallels in world history: a government feeding its enemy precisely to avoid its own swift victory!
All these things combined—the brutal rationalism of internal policies, the pragmatic cynicism of the post–Cold War world system and the admirable skill of the North Korean diplomats—have helped this, the world’s most brutal regime, survive against all odds. It probably lives on borrowed time, but the very fact of its survival until 2006 is indeed an impressive achievement—for the pizza-munching, Burgundy-sipping patricians, that is.
But will this last forever? Probably not: the information is getting in, and this does not bode well for the regime. The gap with South Korea is too huge, and sooner or later the commoners will learn about this. Will they agree to remain poor in some slowly changing “kimilsungesque” state, or will they follow the example of East Germans and choose a seemingly faster solution? I believe that the second option is more likely, but only time can tell.
UNTIL THE MID–1990S, North Korea had been generally neglected in the English-language scholarship, but the recent decade produced a large number of publications dealing with North Korean issues. However, most of those books and articles deal with the international policy of North Korea and the nuclear crisis which has kept Pyongyang in the limelight for over a decade. The publications dealing with the history of the North and internal dynamics of this society, let alone with its daily life, are few and far between.
So far, the closest to our topic has been the work by Helen-Louise Hunter, who in the early 1990s analyzed the then rare testimonies of the defectors:
Helen-Louise Hunter, Kim Il-song’s North Korea (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999).
To some extent, the same approach is shared by Chris Springer’s book, essentially an unofficial and informal guide to North Korean capital city:
Chris Springer, Pyongyang: The Hidden History of the North Korean Capital (Budapest: Entente Bt.; Gold River, CA: distributed by Saranda Books, 2003).
There are a number of books which can be recommended as primers for somebody who want to familiarize himself with North Korean history and politics. As introduction, I would recommend the following works:
Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004). A large compendium of information, based on interviews and numerous publications.
Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). A review of North Korean society in the late 1990s. Perhaps the best general introduction to the country, its history and problems.
Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001). An introduction to the relations between the two Korean states, beginning in the 1970s.
Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999). A review of North Korean history, with special emphasis on the last 20–30 years.
It is also useful to read two quite old but still reliable works written by the founding fathers of North Korean studies in the West:
Suh Dae-suk, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). A political biography of Kim Il Sung, but also a detailed history of North Korea from its inception to the mid–1980s.
Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1972). A thorough description of North Korean society in the 1950s and 1960s, still very useful.
The travel accounts about North Korea are uncommon—not least because the country does not exactly welcome foreign visitors. As a rare example of such a travelogue, one should mention:
Nanchu with Xing Hang, In North Korea: An American Travels Through an Imprisoned Nation (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003).
There are also notes of a Swedish diplomat who worked in North Korea in the 1970s and the 1980s:
Erik Cornell, North Korea Under Communism: Report of an Envoy to Paradise (New York: Routledge, 2002).
There are also two books written by people who lived in Pyongyang, being employed as editors of the North Korean propaganda publications (nearly the only positions available to the those citizens of the developed world who are willing to spend few years under close supervision in a remote and very lonely place):
Michael Harrold, Comrades and Strangers (Hoboken, NJ: Chichester, West Sussex, England: John Wiley amp; Sons, 2004).
Andrew Holloway, A Year in Pyongyang. The book has not been published on paper, but thanks to the efforts of Aidan Foster-Carter it is available online at: http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_in_pyongyang_1.html
Finally, one should mention two English-language books describing the prison world of North Korea:
Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag (New York: Basic Books, 2001). Memoirs of a former inmate in a North Korean prison camp.
David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2003). A thorough research of the prison camp system, based on all available information.
Korean Works
The list of Korean-language publications in North Korea is remarkably longer, and these publications were extensively used for this book. Like English-language scholarship, the Korean literature also tends to dwell heavily on the political and security issues, but the social developments and daily life in North Korea are treated in much greater detail. North Korean studies are booming in recent years, even though the general interest in the “northern brethren” among the South Korean public is clearly small and declining. This academic boom produces literature of very uneven quality, but some of the publications are truly interesting and innovative.
First of all, it makes sense to mention a few books whose authors’ approach was similar to mine: they wanted to use the available data (obtained largely, but not exclusively, via defectors) to reconstruct the daily life of North Koreans. Among such books, one should mention:
Chŏn Yŏng-sŏn, Pukhan-ŭi sahoe-wa munhwa [Society and culture of North Korea] (Seoul: Yŏkrak, 2005). The book pays much attention to daily life of North Koreans.
Kim Sŭng-ch’ŏl, Pukhan tongp’o saenghwal yangsik-kwa majimak hŭimang [The life style of the North Koreans and [their] last hope] (Seoul: Charyowon, 2000).
Pak Hyŏn-sŏn, Hyŏndae Pikhan-ŭi sahoe-wa kajok [Contemporary North Korean society and family] (Seoul: Hanul, 2004).
Pukhan chumin-ŭi ilsang saenghwal-kwa taejung munhwa [The daily life and mass culture of North Korean people] (Seoul: Orŭm, 2003). Collection of articles, with the title being largely self-explanatory.
Pukhan saramdŭl-i marhanŭn Pukhan iyagi [Stories about North Korea, as told by the North Koreans themselves] (Seoul: Chongt’o ch’ulp’an, 2000).
Pukhan-ŭi kajŏng saenghwal munhwa [Culture of family life in North Korea] (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2001). Collection of articles.
Sŏ Tong-ik, Inmin-i sanŭn mosup [How do people’s masses live] (Seoul: Charyowon, 1995). Large two-volume book, compiled by a person who had worked with defectors, based on his interviews and a vast array of published and unpublished material.
Yim Sun-hŭi, Sikryangnan-kwa pukhan yŏsŏng-ŭi yŏhal mich’ ŭisik pyŏnhwa [The food crisis and changes in the [social] roles and self-consciousness of North Korean women] (Seoul: T’ongil yŏnguwon, 2004).
Puknyŏk’ saram ŏttŏk’e salgo issŭlkka? [How do people of the North live] (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2004). The book is an oddity, but increasingly common these days: published by a left-nationalist magazine, it faithfully parrots Pyongyang propaganda, just slightly repackaged for the benefits of South Korean readers; while completely unreliable as a source of information, it gives a good idea of how North Koreans want to present their system to the world.
In the past, every defector who was able to express himself or herself in writing was nearly certain to produce memoirs. However, one must be somewhat careful with those defectors’ writings published before 1990: the official anti–Communism and strict censorship, combined with defectors’ own sincere animosity to Pyongyang regime, often led to distortions (not so much by direct lies, but rather through omissions, over- and understatements and unfounded generalizations). It did not help that the general tone of writing also was remarkably hysterical, and also that the South Korean intelligence censored the defectors’ writings to make sure no secrets or sensitive information would be divulged. As examples of pre–1990 writings by defectors, one might cite:
Kim Pu-sŏng, Nae-ga p’anŭn ttanggul [The tunnel I dug] (Seoul: Kapja munhwa sa, 1976). Memoirs of a North Korean officer who was involved with operations against the South and defected in 1975.
Kong T’ak-ho, Pukkwe kukka chŏngch’i powibu naemak [Behind the scene of the Northern devils’ Ministry for the Political Protection of the State] (Seoul: Hongwonsa, 1976). Heavily censored notes of a former North Korean secret police officer.
The situation changed after 1990, when anti–Communism waned in South Korea and establishment of a democratic regime brought an end to the censorship. The “new” defectors’ writings are different from those of their predecessors: these texts are more neutral in tone, less critical of the North and far more informative. At the same time, only a few defectors write memoirs these days—and their books have to wait a long time before being published. The political changes in Seoul and general loss of interest in North Korea among the South Korean public have had their toll, so I am aware of a number of people who wrote their memoirs but have had a hard time finding a publisher. Among post–1995 writings, one should mention:
Ch’oe Chin-i, Kukkyŏng-ŭl se pŏn kŏnnŏn yŏja [A woman who crossed the border three times] (Seoul: Bookhouse, 2005). Memoirs of a North Korean poetess and feminist who fled the country during the famine and eventually arrived in the South.
Chu Sŏng-il, DMZ-ŭi pom [Spring at the DMZ] (Seoul: Sidae chŏngsin, 2004). Memoirs of a recently defected soldier, with special emphasis on the military.
Hŭin kŏs-to kŏmda [White is black] (Seoul: Nana ch’ulp’ansa, 1996). Collections of articles and short memoirs from various defectors.
Kang Ch’ŏl-hwan, Suyongso-ŭi norae [Song of a prison camp] (Seoul: Sidae chŏngsin, 2005). This book has been advertised as a Korean-language version of The aquariums of Pyongyang, but this is not really the case: the book describes the same events, but with greater detail, and addresses a Korean, rather than Western, reader).
Kang Myŏng-do, Pyongyang-ŭn mangmyŏng-ŭl kkum kkunda [Pyongyang dreams of escape] (Seoul: Chungang Ilbo, 1995). Memoirs of a former bureaucrat who felt out of grace.
Kim Chi-il, Sarang-ŭl wihayŏ, chayu-rŭl wohayŏ [For the love, for the freedom] (Seoul: Koryŏwon, 1992). Memoirs of a North Korean college student who defected to the South while studying in Russia.
Kim Chŏng-yŏn, Pyŏngyang yŏja [A woman from Pyongyang] (Seoul: Koryŏ sŏjŏk, 1995). Memoirs of a North Korean secret police officer, with good description of daily life in the 1960s and 1970s.
Ko Yŏng-hwan, Pyŏngyang 25 si [25 hours of Pyongyang] (Seoul: Koryŏwon, 1993). Notes of a North Korean diplomat, dealing with life of North Korean bureaucracy.
Kwon Hyŏk, Konan-ŭi kanghaeng-gun [March of Hardship] (Seoul: Chŏngt’o, 1999). A very realistic and thoughtful account of daily life in the countryside in the worst times of the famine, in 1998–99.
Sŏng Hye-rang, Tŭngnamu chip [A house under wisteria tree] (Seoul: Chisik nara, 2001). Memoirs of a daughter of South Korean left-wing activists, and eventually Kim Jong Il’s sister-in-law, very well written.
Yi Yŏng-kuk, Na-nŭn Kim Jŏng-il-ŭi kyŏnghowon-i yŏssta [I was Kim Jong Il’s bodyguard] (Seoul: Sidae chŏngsin, 2004). The author indeed once served as Dear Leader’s bodyguard, but the book’s focus is much more on daily life and experiences of a North Korean of his generation.
Also, a number of defectors’ stories, while never being published as a separate book, appeared in South Korean periodicals, both general and specialized (of which more later).
Among the general reference material dealing with North Korea, one should mention:
Pukhan ch’onglam, 1945–1982 [The general review of North Korea, 1945–1982] (Seoul: Pukhan yŏnguso, 1983); Pukhan ch’onglam, 1983–1993 [The general review of North Korea, 1983–1993] (Seoul: Pukhan yŏnguso, 1994). Both books are large volumes dealing with all aspects of North Korean life, and providing a wealth of data.
Pukhan ihae [Understanding North Korea] (Seoul: T’ongil kyoyukwon, 2000–2004). Annually republished reviews of changes in North Korean politics, economy and society.
Pukhan kaeyo [General review of North Korea] (Seoul: T’ongilbu, 2000–2004). Annual reviews of North Korea, prepared and published by the Ministry of Unification.
Pukhan kyŏngje ch’onglam 2004 [North Korean economic review 2004] (Seoul: Kukje chŏngbo yŏnguwon, 2004).
Pukhan ŏhwi sajŏn [Dictionary of North Korean expressions] (Seoul: Yonghap, 2002).
Pukhan yongŏ 400 sajŏn [Dictionary of 400 North Korean terms] (Seoul: Yonghap, 1999).
Yi Chong-sik, Hyŏndae Pukhan-ŭi ihae [Understanding modern North Korea] (Seoul, Yŏksa pip’yŏng sa, 2002).
Among the books dealing with the different aspects of North Korean life, I should probably mention the following books, with generally self-explanatory titles:
Ha Chong-p’il, Pukhan-ŭi chonggyo munhwa [Religious culture of North Korea] (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005).
Pukhan tosi-ŭi hyŏngsŏng-gwa paljŏn [The formation and development of North Korean city] (Seoul: Hanul, 2004).
Pukhan-ŭi munhak-kwa munye iron [North Korean theory of arts and literature] (Seoul: Tongguk taehkkyo, 2003).
Yim Chae-uk, Pukhan munhwa-ŭi ihae [Understanding North Korean culture] (Seoul: Charywon, 2004).
Yu Ho-yŏl, Pukhan-ŭi sahoejuŭi kŏnsŏl-gwa chwajŏl [The construction and disintegration of socialism in North Korea] (Seoul: Saenggak-ŭi namu, 2004.)
In regard to prison camps, one should consider this important work of research:
Ichyŏjin irŭmdŭl [Forgotten names] (Seoul: Sidae chŏngsin, 2004). Biographical materials of all persons known to be in North Koreans camps, contains a lot of data on police control and daily life.
The life of the North Korean refugees hiding in China has been an object of many studies. Perhaps as an introduction one might use:
Tumanhang-ŭl kŏnnŏon saramdŭl [The people who crossed the Tumangang river] (Seoul: Chongt’o ch’ulp’an, 1999). A report about the situation of North Korean refugees in China, based on extensive field research.
By far the largest amount of material can be found in the South Korean press, in numerous dailies and weeklies. In this regard the www.kinds.co.kr website is of exceptional significance. This is a searchable database, supported by the Korean Press Institute, and it provides access to all materials published in major Korean dailies and weeklies from the early 1990s (alas, the only exception is Joonang Ilbo, which happens to publish the best articles on North Korean topics, but it can be searched separately on its own website).
Another important source of information are specialized journals dealing with North Korea and North Korean studies. Such periodicals are quite numerous, but most of them deal with “large” issues of international politics. Among the journals which regularly publish material on daily life and social problems of North Korea, one should mention Pukhan (North Korea), T’ongil Hanguk (Unified Korea) as well as the highly informative DailyNK online daily. Most of the material in the present book was drawn from these periodicals.
My talks to defectors provided a very large part of the material for this book, and my own trips to North Korea, including the most recent, in 2005, were useful as well.