The Attack That Never Was
Considering the amount of intelligence the British had accumulated about activities at Sackets Harbor, the fact that they failed to make a pre-emptive strike to destroy the new American fleet while it was still unfinished and the military advantage of the moment was decidedly in their favour has been criticized by some historians as a critical lapse that significantly affected the development and end-result of the campaigns to come. Admittedly, there is some validity in this argument; but the blame can certainly not be laid at the feet of the local commanders, Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond and Sir James Yeo, as for once their assessment of the strategic situation and the necessity of making just such an attack were synchronized. Instead, and once again, the proverbial “fly in the ointment” was Sir George Prevost’s determination to maintain his priority of defending Lower Canada.
By March 1814, Yeo’s two new frigates, the Princess Charlotte and Prince Regent, were almost ready to be launched and all of the requisite additional fittings were stockpiled on the dockside. Similarly, the new gunboats, Nelly, Lais, and Cleopatra, were already fully fitted-out and ready for action, while the “old” fleet, under new names, had all been refitted as ordered. In addition, the arrival of significant detachments of experienced seamen, drawn or transferred from warships and Royal Navy transports on the east coast, would serve to crew the fleet when it sailed. In the meantime the men were effectively restricted to their quarters at Point Frederick and Point Henry, to the frustration of the local shopkeepers. On the other hand, the ship’s officers were more freely able to visit Kingston to provide custom to the merchants and opportunity to the town’s matrons with eligible daughters.
Conversely, the reports emerging from Sackets Harbor were becoming more and more alarming to Yeo, as they revealed the accelerating and expanding scale of the American efforts to complete the building of their two new brigs (subsequently named the Jefferson and Jones). This was backed by the prospect of one or two new behemoth frigates (subsequently named Superior and Mohawk), following right behind in the production schedule. In addition, there were details of additional land defences being constructed and extra troops being put on the march to swell the garrison, then under Brigadier General Edmund Gaines. Time was running out before the sailing season began, and the longer nothing was done the more likely it became that the Americans would not only catch up but surpass the initial British lead. Especially when intelligence revealed that, in addition to what had already arrived, there was a constant flow of convoys and wagon trains of shipbuilding supplies and armaments (especially long-barrelled cannon) passing along an overland and river-based supply route that ultimately led to the warehouse staging post at Oswego, on the south side of Lake Ontario. From there, these shipments were being ferried up by boats that hugged the American shore to Sackets Harbor. Yeo was therefore in no doubt that a pre-emptive strike, first on Sackets Harbor and then Oswego, was an essential operational priority. However, Drummond saw things differently and believed the priority was to send shipments of arms, equipment, ammunition, food, and reinforcements up to York, Burlington, and the Niagara frontier aboard Yeo’s ships, as soon as possible, before any operation took place against the American bases.
The two commanders eventually met and worked out a mutually beneficial compromise. Their first target would be to attack and destroy Sackets Harbor, using a landing force of over 4,000 troops, backed by Yeo’s entire fleet as fire support. They would follow-up with a similar amphibious assault on Oswego, thus eliminating the two main American bases on eastern Lake Ontario, destroying Chauncey’s fleet before it became too formidable a threat, and cutting the principal supply line leading to the increasing number of American troops now being reported as mustering at the camps outside of Buffalo on the Niagara. Once this was achieved, Yeo would then reciprocate by using his fleet as a fast transports for the new and full-strength regiments, weapons, ammunition, and supplies Drummond wanted to push forward and to return with the exhausted and depleted remnants of the regiments that had thus far shouldered the burden of fighting for the previous twenty-two months on the Niagara frontier. Drummond also showed Yeo a communication he had previously received from Prevost outlining events involving the respective governments of the two warring countries and its likely impact on their plans.
According to the letter, following the January agreement between Britain and the United States to formally undertake peace negotiations, the Americans had forwarded a subsequent notice to Prevost’s attention (through the person of Brigadier General Winder), proposing a mutual cessation of hostilities and the holding of meetings to conclude an armistice that would continue until the results of the negotiations were known. Having constantly been under pressure from his own superiors to remain on the defensive in the pressing of the war in North America and not to provide the Americans with any unifying issue that could escalate hostilities, Prevost took this offer very seriously and passed it on to his subordinates for their assessment — with the added implication that he anticipated their concurrence that negotiations should begin as soon as possible and that no offensive action that could jeopardize these talks should take place.
Lieutenant General Drummond had already replied, stating:
I beg leave most respectfully to submit as my opinion, that the object of Mr Monroe’s letter is twofold. First, To gain time for organizing their Naval and Military Force. Second, To cause the proposal for the Armistice, (the discussion of which is to afford that time,) to originate with Your Excellency. — Unless Your Excellency is in possession of some other pledge than Brigadier General Winder’s assurity of the sincerity of his Government, I should place but little faith in them; as [he] … is one of the most strenuous supporters of the War … We should be extremely cautious in doing anything [to give] the Enemy the smallest reason to infer … [our willingness] … to court, or even too willingly to meet, his advances for a cessation of hostilities. — [because] … the whole of the advantages … to be derived from the Armistice will be reaped by the enemy … Should an opportunity offer, by even a temporary naval superiority, for the destruction of the Enemy’s Fleet, and Arsenal, at Sackett’s Harbour, a vigorous combined attack by the Navy and Army would be highly advisable … [followed by] … the pushing of troops … Stores, etc, to the relief of Fort Niagara and the Right Division.[1]
— Drummond to Prevost,
April 2, 1814
After reading the letter, Yeo sent off his own assessment without hesitation:
After the most deliberate consideration, I am of the opinion that, as far as it relates to Naval operations … to be decidedly of the opinion that were Your Excellency to accept of the proposed Armistice — it would neither conduce to the credit of His Majesty’s Government or the Honor of his Arms; — While it would enable the Enemy to gain time for the launching & equipping more ships — augmenting & concentrating his forces & bring them to bear (should a rupture of the Armistice ensue — a measure, I fear, from the known enmity & insincerity of the American Government, too likely to occur) with redoubled force against us.[2]
— Yeo to Prevost, April 13, 1814
Coincidentally, Yeo’s response was sent on the same day Drummond forwarded the agreed combined operations plan for the attack on Sackets Harbor to Prevost. However, such was the confidence of the two commanders — they were sure that despite their having just contradicted their superior by their strong opposition to an armistice, the obvious necessity of the attack and the sense of their proposal would bring an immediate approval in reply. This confidence went so far that they had proceeded with their assembly of the necessary transport craft, landing boats, supplies, armaments, and ammunition, while drafting movement orders for the appropriate crews and regiments already in Upper Canada that were to be involved in the attack. The only external factor being that the plan needed some 4,000 men to ensure success. This number was far more than were at or near Kingston, or even beyond the total that could be raised by taking the dangerous chance of removing troops and support artillery from Prescott, York, and the Niagara frontier, thus temporarily weakening both those flanks. The only answer, therefore, was that Prevost was going to have to ante up around 800 to 1,000 troops from Lower Canada to get the essential job done.
As they had hoped, the answer came back quickly, but it was not what they expected. Instead of simply agreeing or even rejecting their proposal, Sir George first ridiculed their estimates and plans and then proposed his own outline for an attack on the American base. First, Yeo and his fleet would sail and establish a blockade of Sackets Harbor to trap the American vessels in port. They would then undertake a shore bombardment to support Drummond when his (far smaller than originally proposed and composed entirely of Upper Canada-sourced troops) infantry and artillery force made their overland attack from the north after crossing the St. Lawrence River and making a rapid forced march south to take the Americans from behind. This extraordinary counter-proposal shocked both commanders, as it would not only require an entirely different series of logistics and a difficult degree of coordination (as the two elements came from completely different directions and without any effective real-time coordinating communications), but it would also be a sufficiently smaller size that victory could not be ensured. Why Prevost advanced this proposal is not conclusively known, but as Drummond’s current plan closely mirrored the one implemented but not successfully followed through upon by Prevost the previous May (for details see The Pendulum of War), there are grounds to suspect that any victory with this similar plan and under Drummond would have become an implicit further criticism of Prevost’s lack of success when he was in command.
In reply, Drummond made a bold and forthright reiteration of his previous arguments.
Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellencys Letter … enclosing a plan of a combined attack to be made on the Enemy’s fleet at Sackett’s Harbour, to which I have given that serious attention which the great importance the subject demands.
By my letter sent to Your Excellency of yesterday’s date, written prior to the arrival of your dispatches … you will perceive that I had already in a great measure anticipated Your Excellency’s views with regard to the imperious necessity which exists for an immediate attempt to destroy the Enemy’s fleet, at the same time, I now beg leave to repeat, that in my opinion a force of not less than 4,000 effective troops would be necessary to ensure a reasonable hope of success…. I had a communication with Sir James Yeo relative to the expediency of [your plan for] … a combined attack on the Enemys fleet. I also … had a meeting with him this morning on the same subject, when I submitted to him Your Excellency’s letter and its accompanying document. Sir James entirely coincides in opinion with me that the force to be brought against the place ought to at least what I have before stated…. In addition to the operation in agitation against Sackett’s Harbour, I conceive that a successful attack on their great Naval depot at Oswego would nearly, if not altogether, circumscribe the proceedings of the enemy…. I propose giving Sir James Yeo an adequate number of Troops, to cooperate with him for the accomplishment of this desirable object, as soon after the Squadron can put to sea, as possible.[3]
— Drummond to Prevost,
Noon, April 27, 1814
Prevost obviously did not miss the implied criticism or tones of Drummond’s letters, nor the rejections made by both commanders over the earlier proposed armistice, as he made clear in his quickly returned reply, dated April 30, 1814.
In your despatch[es] … I perceive a more decided opinion on the contemplated movement against Sackett’s Harbour — You consider that a land force to be employed on this service should not be less than four thousand effective Rank and File, to afford a reasonable hope of success…. But the fact is, that the force in this country is insufficient to enable me to concentrate at any one point in Upper Canada, the numbers of regulars you require for this important service, without stripping Lower Canada of nearly the whole of those that are present within it, and committing its defence to Provincials and Militia — The views of His Majesty’s Government respecting the mode of conducting the war with America do not justify my exposing too much on one stake — It is by wary measures and occasional daring enterprizes with apparently disproportionate means, that the character of the War has been sustained, and from that policy I am not disposed to depart. From a presumption that the Government of the United States is animated by a sincere desire of an armistice … I have been induced to accede to the President’s proposal of appointing an Officer of Rank to discuss and arrange tomorrow … the Articles of a suspension of Arms — This circumstances renders it inexpedient that an offensive movement against any of the Enemy’s positions should be undertaken until you shall again hear from me on the subject … .You will please to communicate to Commodore Sir James Yeo, the subject of this letter, but I do not wish it to restrain him from any operations he may have in view until the Armistice shall be officially announced.[4]
— Prevost to Drummond,
April 30, 1814
Drummond received this blunt veto of the Sackets Harbor operation on May 3rd, and immediately conferred with Yeo. Because Drummond was Prevost’s subordinate officer and Prevost would not send up any troops to support the Sackets Harbor plan, there was nothing Drummond could hope to do that would have a reasonable hope of success against that prime target. In addition, his notification that he was going ahead with armistice negotiations, in direct opposition to the adamant recommendations of both officers, was an open slap in the face to their authorities, experience, and dignities. However, reading between the lines, Prevost had also implicitly recognized that while he could order Drummond not to do anything, his authority no longer applied to Yeo.
BRITISH FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE RAID ON OSWEGO, MAY 5–6, 1814
British Fleet
Princess Charlotte (Captain William Mulcaster)
Prince Regent (Captain Richard O’Conor)
Montreal (ex Wolfe) (Captain Stephen Popham)
Magnet (ex Sir Sidney Smith) (Commander E. Collier)
Niagara (ex Royal George) (Captain Francis Spilsbury)
Charwell (ex Earl of Moria) (Captain Alexander Dobbs)
Star (ex Lord Melville) (Captain C. Anthony or Commander Charles Owen)
Plus an unspecified number of gunboats and bateaux
Landing Force (Lieutenant Colonel Fischer)
De Watteville Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Fischer) est. 450 rank and file
Glengarry Light Infantry Regiment (Captain McMillan) est. 50 rank and file
Royal Marines, 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm) est. 400 rank and file
Royal Artillery (1 x 12-lbr, brass, 1 x 5 ½ inch Howitzer) (Captain Cruttenden) est. 24 gunners
Royal Marine Artillery, Rocket Company (Lieutenant Stevens) est. 6 rocketeers
Royal Sappers and Miners (detachment) (Lieutenant Gosset, Royal Engineers) est. 20 rank and file
Royal Navy, volunteer seamen, est. 200 all ranks
It should therefore come as no surprise that within twenty-four hours the British squadron had sailed from Kingston to the sounds of cheering crowds and exchanged cannon salutes from the ships and shore batteries, and with the vessel’s decks filled with Drummond’s troops![*5] Behind him, Drummond left behind his latest regular report for dispatch to Prevost, which again reiterated his strong conviction that a full-scale operation against Sackets Harbor was essential to safeguard Upper Canada and he that hoped Prevost would change his mind — but in the meantime, and until he heard back, he and Yeo would continue with their time-sensitive and preplanned operation against Oswego.