CHAPTER 8
The Invasion of July 1814
Having returned to the Niagara frontier and resumed command on June 7, 1814, much to the displeasure of Brigadier General Scott, Major General Brown oversaw the final preparations for the upcoming invasion. Winfield Scott had seen to the training and discipline and now, finally, additional equipment and uniforms had arrived to outfit the soldiers. However, instead of the regulation high-collared blue coats with a short coattail, the shipment consisted of tailless grey jackets that were usually reserved for use as fatigue clothing or used as an extra layer in winter. Since there was no other supply of clothing available, the decision was made to redistribute the existing blue coats to the Twenty-First Regiment, while the remaining regiments were issued the grey jackets; a decision that would go down in military history and cause identification problems for the British in the days to come.
After the weeks of training and incessant drills, the men of the American Left Division were positively itching to go into action, and on July 2, 1814, they received their orders to commence the latest invasion of Canada. This was undoubtedly the best-trained fighting force the United States had fielded since the outbreak of the war.[*1]
AMERICAN INVASION FORCE, JUNE 30, 1814
“Left Division” (Major General Brown)
First Brigade (Brigadier General Winfield Scott), Ninth Regiment: (Major Leavenworth), 16 officers, 332 other ranks* total: 642 all ranks,
Eleventh Regiment (Colonel Campbell), 17 officers, 416 other ranks* total: 577 all ranks
Twenty-Second Regiment (Colonel Brady [absent]), 12 officers, 217 other ranks* total: 287 all ranks
Twenty-Fifth Regiment (Major Jesup), 16 officers, 354 other ranks* total: 619 all ranks
Total: 2,129 all ranks
Second Brigade (Brigadier General Ripley)
Twenty-First Regiment (Lieutenent Colonel Miller / Major Grafton), 25 officers, 651 other ranks* total: 917 all ranks
Twenty-Third Regiment (Major McFarland), 8 officers, 341 other ranks* total: 496 all ranks
Total: 1,415 all ranks
Third Brigade (Brigadier General Porter)
Fifth Pennsylvania Militia Regiment (Major Wood), 400–500 rank and file
New York Militia Regiments (Detachments)
Canadian Volunteers Regiment (Major Willcocks), 830 all ranks
Artillery (Major Hindman)
Captain Towson’s Battery, 101 all ranks
Captain Biddle’s Battery, 104 all ranks
Captain Richie’s Battery, 138 all ranks
Captain William’s Battery, 73 all ranks
Total: 416 all ranks
Cavalry (Captain Harris)
Total: 1 Troop, 70–80 all ranks
Native Allies (Lieutenant Colonel Granger)
Total: 350–400 Warriors
Unfortunately, in later years the actual strength of this force became a matter of contention between several of the principal participants as they gave testimonies at the official inquiries and court martials dealing with the events that subsequently took place during this campaign. Many later American accounts used the figures marked with * in the sidebar in order to assess the initial size of the invasion force at around three thousand or less. Since this part of the official American regimental rolls only referred to those officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file actually present and on parade on the date given in the returns, it seriously underestimated the real size of the American invasion force, as it ignored all troops otherwise assigned for that day’s guard pickets, camp duties and fatigues, detached duties away from the camp, and those reported as sick. In addition, it ignored all headquarters staff, commissariat and supply staff, musicians, pioneers, surgeons, etc. The total figures of the list do include these additional numbers, but make no breakdown by rank or service/duty. Since virtually all of these latter individuals would have been recalled from their designated duties to participate in the invasion, the actual invasion force entering Upper Canada should probably be assessed at somewhere around 5,000 men. This assessment is further supported by a letter that Brown forwarded to Secretary of War Armstrong on May 30, 1814, stating “General Porter has … from a thousand to twelve hundred [militia] engaged … if we are to be delayed until this force is in condition to act, much time will, I fear be wasted. With your approval I shall not hesitate to cross … with my four thousand Regulars, but it would no doubt be desirable to have a greater force, if a greater could be promptly assembled.”[2] A similar letter followed on June 3rd, “I believe that from four to five hundred Native warriors may be induced to join us…. I shall consider it my duty to pass into the enemies country the moment I find at my command five thousand Regulars.”[3] In return, Armstrong wrote to Brown on June 9th, “Sir … the difference between your effective strength and aggregate numbers is so great as to render it proper that you should immediately despatch an officer to call in and march to their regiments respectfully all absentees of the Line coming within the meaning of this order and are not, in any case, to be exempted from this order….”[4]
Irrespective of the actual numbers of troops involved in the invasion, there were a number of other inherent weaknesses in Brown’s army that could not be explained away by playing with the statistics, and that would cause increasing degrees of problems during the upcoming campaign.
The first of these was Major General Brown’s assumption that he had come to an understanding with Commodore Chauncey for the American naval force to emerge from Sackets Harbor and meet up with his army at Newark (Niagara-on-the-Lake) on or about July 10th. The fleet was intended to bring additional troops, supplies, and, most importantly, the heavy cannon needed to invest and take the fortifications of Fort Niagara and Fort George. Brown had based his entire strategy on this rendezvous and was certain that Chauncey was preparing to move in concert with the invasion. Chauncey, on the other hand, had absolutely no intention of sailing until his new warships were fully ready and able to outgun Yeo’s forces in any battle for control of the lake. Nor was he prepared to place his fleet at the convenience and timetable of any landsman general. As a result, Brown was effectively “on his own!”
Secondly, although he was the titular head of the Left Division, Major General Brown was still considered by some to be an amateur militiaman, and the old American bugbear of prejudice between regular and militia officers still existed, especially in the minds of Brown’s supposed subordinates Scott and Ripley. Scott was of the decided opinion that since Brown had been essentially absent for much of the army’s training, he (Scott) would naturally continue in command once it went into action. Thus, when Brown returned to take up his position in early June, Scott’s nose was definitely put out of joint. Brigadier General Eleazar Ripley was, on the other hand, extremely dubious about the viability of the invasion plans once he was briefed, to the point that he requested a meeting with Brown to push for changes. When these were not forthcoming, he officially submitted his resignation on the eve of the invasion. While this was obviously a stinging vote of non-confidence against Brown’s leadership, the senior commander publically ignored the implications and simply refused to accept Ripley’s resignation because it was not in the best interests of the nation. However, privately it left him bitter toward Ripley, thereafter causing him to question or disregard any advice and recommendations Ripley subsequently submitted. Consequently, Brown’s leadership position and the degree to which he would be able to make command decisions during the campaign — without contradictory input from his brigade commanders — was compromised from the outset.
Finally, although the Left Division was certainly the best-trained American army yet put into the field, it was the only such force that was available to Major General Brown, for no reserves or other forces of a similar quality were available to replace the inevitable losses that would occur once fighting began.
Surprisingly, up to this point the American administration had not issued any directives to Major General Brown about how the 1814 campaign was to be fought, despite the fact that, during his four months at Sackets Harbor, Brown had submitted several alternative plans. Directions did finally arrive at the beginning of June, but once again Secretary of War Armstrong’s instructions and interference only succeeded in causing confusion and difficulties for his commanders in the field. In this latest communication, Armstrong applauded Brown’s April proposal for an amphibious landing at Long Point, followed by a swift march overland to Burlington Heights to cut off Riall’s forces in the peninsula. He also supported Brown’s proposal that Chauncey should simultaneously break through the British blockade of Sackets Harbor with a cargo of supplies and reinforcements and rendezvous with Brown at Burlington Heights, prior to eliminating the trapped British troops on the Niagara frontier and effectively capturing Upper Canada in a single, bold stroke.
At the same time, however, while acknowledging that the proposed attack would require the use of every available ship on Lake Erie to land and then maintain the supply lines for any advance made by the army, Armstrong effectively crippled Brown’s initiative by revealing that he had also ordered the repositioning of many of these same Lake Erie vessels to Detroit for use in a proposed attempt to recapture the fort at Michilimackinac (Mackinac) and secure the upper lakes for the Americans. To complete the confusion of his instructions, the secretary informed Major General Brown that while the amphibious assault was still to be considered the main attack, any implementation of it must wait for Commodore Chauncey to regain the dominant position on Lake Ontario. In the meantime, any delay could be used to the Americans’ advantage as it would allow Ripley and Porter to move up to Buffalo and supplement Brown’s forces with their own brigades in the overall invasion. Finally, in almost an afterthought, Armstrong proposed that since the troops already at Buffalo were ready, “To give … immediate occupation to your troops & to prevent their blood from stagnating — Why not take Fort Erie & its garrison … push forward a corps to seize the bridge at Chippawa, & be governed by circumstances in either stopping there, or going further….”[5] Thus, the single largest invasion of Upper Canada through the Niagara corridor actually took place as the result of a hint on the part of the secretary of war as a measure to prevent Brown’s troops becoming bored.
Unable to implement his earlier plan of attacking via Long Point, Major General Brown revised the route of the invasion to begin with a pincer movement on Fort Erie. Under this new scheme, a flanking force would cross the river at Black Rock. This attack was to be spearheaded by the First Brigade (Brigadier General Winfield Scott), followed immediately thereafter by part of the Second Brigade (Brigadier General Eleazar Ripley). On the other flank, the remainder of the Second Brigade, the Third Brigade (Brigadier General Peter B. Porter), and Native Warrior allies were detailed to move out onto the lake and land further up the Canadian shoreline, before moving north to link up with the right wing, thus surrounding the fort.
Loading the waiting boats sometime after midnight, the leading elements pushed out into the Niagara River under the cover of a downpour of rain. Rowing hard against the current, the boats neared the far shore, only to be met with a volley from a small detachment of some twenty troops from the 100th Regiment stationed there. Undeterred by the immediate discovery of their intended landing, the boats pressed forward and, as soon as he deemed it viable, Winfield Scott swung himself over the side and into the water, determined to be the first to attack the enemy and lead his men by example from the very outset. Almost instantly the general disappeared below the water, only to reappear a moment later, drenched and spluttering; for although Winfield Scott was over six feet tall, he had made the mistake of disembarking directly over a deep pothole in the riverbed. In his subsequent memoirs he recalled the incident.
… sounding with [my] sword, [I] found the water less than knee deep, when personally leaping out, instead of giving the command — Follow Me! [I] Had scarcely time to exclaim — Too Deep! … and … had to swim for [my] … life, … It was a minute or two … before the boat could be brought back to pick [me] up.[6]
For the men in the surrounding boats, who had endured weeks of backbreaking drills and undertaken the extraordinary (and possibly unwelcome) activity of regular bathing under the direct commands of this man, the sight of the general being well and truly dunked in that same cold water was possibly considered divine and sweet justice. What is certain is that these same soldiers knew better than to express their mirth while their commanding officer suffered the indignity of being hauled back into his boat like so much wet laundry. As the boats grounded on the shoreline, the first wave of men rushed forward into the darkness to establish a perimeter for the bridgehead. The British picket, inadequate to the duty of holding back this vastly superior force, retired on the fort to notify the garrison commander, Major Thomas Buck (8th [King’s] Regiment), that the invasion had begun.
THE AMERICAN CROSSING AND INVASION
OF JULY 3, 1814
1. In the pre-dawn of July 3, 1814, the leading wave of General Scott’s First Brigade (1) make their crossing of the Niagara River and land downriver from Fort Erie after encountering only minimal resistance from the riverside picket guard. Establishing a beachhead, American detachments quickly overrun the nearby British shore batteries at the Red House (1a), the Ferry battery (1b), and battery No. 1 (1c). Additional waves of troops wait on the American shore for transport (1d).
2. At Fort Erie the garrison is alerted and prepares their defences (2) while sending dispatch riders (2a) with news of the American invasion to General Riall.
3. Due to delays in the transport of troops across the greater distance and open water of Lake Ontario, the initial wave of Ripley’s pincer movement (3) is substantially delayed in reaching the Canadian shore and fails to arrive at Fort Erie as planned (3a), while subsequent waves encounter additional difficulties and delays (3b).
4. Without Ripley’s support, Scott’s force advances (4) on Fort Erie and establishes a partial encirclement (4a, 4b). Believing the situation makes it impossible to maintain any effective defence, Major Buck surrenders the position.
Placed at the end of the British defence perimeter and with a garrison of only 137 regular troops, plus a detachment of local Lincoln Embodied Militia, Major Buck was in the unenviable position of facing an unknown number of enemy that had already cut off his line of communication to his commander. Buck therefore decided to close the fort’s gate and man the defences in hopes of holding out until Major General Riall could gather his forces and advance to meet the invader.[*7] After shutting the gate, the men realized that no messenger had been sent to Riall to notify him of the situation. The obvious bearers for this communication were the few men of the 19th Light Dragoons, who had been specifically located at Fort Erie for this purpose. But the men’s horses were in a stable outside the fort walls, and Buck was unwilling to reopen the gate lest the unseen Americans rush the fort. Instead, the troopers had to climb over the wooden palisade at the rear wall of the fort and drop into the muddy ditch below, before quietly finding their way to the stable and making their getaway with a warning for Major General Riall.
FORT ERIE, AS IT APPEARED AT THE TIME OF ITS SURRENDER ON JULY 3, 1814
1. Main entrance to the fort and outer gate
2. Eastern ravelin earthworks
3. Eastern ravelin artillery platform (designated for a 9-pounder gun)
4. Eastern ravelin ditch
5. Northeast bastion with artillery platform (designated for a 12-pounder gun)
6. Northeast two-storey stone mess house and barracks (partially repaired and roofed in)
7. Inner gate
8. Southeast two-storey mess house and barracks (burned-out shell and unroofed)
9. Southeast bastion with artillery platform (designated for a 12-pounder gun)
10. Western wooden picket wall
11. Western wall wooden blockhouse
12. Northwestern bastion foundation trace from pre-war period (no development construction work begun by this time)
13. Southwestern bastion foundation from the pre-war period (only consisting of a partial stone foundation rising to ground level)
14. Pre-war partially excavated and trace line of proposed ditch
15. Derelict lime-kiln foundation and small warehouse building
16. and 17. Civilian and military warehouses
By dawn, most of the right wing of the American invasion force was ashore on the Canadian side of the river. However, the left wing was still in the process of crossing. Unwilling to wait, Scott advanced toward Fort Erie with only the Twenty-Fifth Regiment. In response, the guns and muskets of the fort opened fire, inflicting several casualties on the detachment surrounding the Twenty-Fifth’s regimental colours[*8] but with little other overall effect. Major Buck was facing hopeless odds, without possibility of relief for at least one or two days. Conferring with his fellow officers, some called for a to-the-last-man! defence of the fort, but the majority opinion was that surrender was inevitable and the best course was to avoid unnecessary casualties. To this end, Buck sent out a flag of truce and entered into negotiations for the surrender of the garrison. Around 5:00 p.m. Buck’s force marched out into captivity,[*9] while American musicians played “Yankee Doodle” and Captain George Howard’s company of the Twenty-Fifth U.S. Infantry Regiment entered the fort and raised their country’s flag as a sign of ownership by its new occupants.
BRITISH FORCES, “RIGHT DIVISION,” JUNE 22, 1814
Fort Niagara (Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, 100th Regiment)
Staff 21 officers
Royal Artillery 1 officer, 12 other ranks
Royal Marine Artillery 2 officers, 33 other ranks
8th (King’s) Regiment 1 other ranks
100th Regiment 23 officers, 21 drummers,
568 other ranks, 25 other ranks sick
Total: 47 officers, 21 drummers, 614 other ranks, 25 other ranks sick
Fort George and Fort Mississauga (Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, 1st [Royal Scots] Regiment)
19th Light Dragoons 2 officers, 1 bugler, 30 other ranks, 5 other ranks sick
Provincial Light Dragoons 2 officers, 19 other ranks
Royal Engineers 1 officer
Royal Artillery 2 officers, 2 buglers, 19 other ranks, 5 other ranks sick
Royal Artillery Drivers 3 other ranks, 4 other ranks sick
Royal Marine Artillery 3 officers, 1 bugler, 34 other ranks
Incorporated Militia Artillery 4 other ranks
1st (Royal Scots) Regiment 23 officers, 18 drummers,
721 other ranks, 88 other ranks sick
103rd Regiment 4 officers, 1 drummer, 135 other ranks
Coloured Corps 1 officer, 22 other ranks
Total: 38 officers, 23 drummers/buglers, 987 other ranks, 102 other ranks sick
Queenston (Major Deane, 1st [Royal Scots] Regiment)
19th Light Dragoons 9 other ranks
Royal Artillery 40 other ranks
Royal Artillery Drivers 1 bugler, 18 other ranks
1st (Royal Scots) Regiment 10 officers, 4 drummers, 208 other ranks, 8 other ranks sick
Total: 10 officers, 5 drummers/buglers, 275 other ranks, 8 other ranks sick
Chippawa (Colonel Young, 8th [King’s] Regiment)
19th Light Dragoons 5 other ranks
Royal Artillery 11 other ranks
Incorporated Militia Artillery 8 other ranks
Royal Artillery Drivers 7 other ranks
8th (King’s) Regiment 25 officers, 8 drummers, 426 other ranks, 8 other ranks sick
Native allies (John Norton) 300 warriors
Total: 25 officers, 8 drummers, 441 other ranks, 8 other ranks sick, 300 warriors
Fort Erie (Major Buck, 8th [King’s] Regiment)
19th Light Dragoons 1 officer, 24 other ranks
Royal Artillery 12 other ranks
8th (King’s) Regiment 8 officers, 1 drummer, 118 other ranks
Total: 9 officers, 1 drummer, 154 other ranks
Long Point (Lieutenant Colonel Parry, 103rd Regiment)
19th Light Dragoons 3 officers, 1 bugler, 59 other ranks
Provincial Light Dragoons 1 officer, 14 other ranks
89th Regiment 1 other rank sick
103rd Regiment 11 officers, 2 drummers, 200 other ranks
Loyal Kent Volunteer Militia 3 officers, 44 other ranks
Total: 18 officers, 3 Drummers, 272 other ranks, 6 other ranks
Burlington Heights (Colonel Hercules Scott, 103rd Regiment)
Provincial Light Dragoons 3 other ranks
Royal Artillery 1 officer, 18 other ranks, 1 other ranks sick
Royal Artillery Drivers 1 officer, 16 other ranks
1st (Royal Scots) Regiment 1 other rank sick
89th Regiment 1 other rank sick
103rd Regiment 18 officers, 20 drummers,379 other ranks, 20 other ranks sick
Total: 20 officers, 20 drummers, 416 other ranks, 23 other ranks sick
York (Colonel Stewart, 1st [Royal Scots] Regiment)
Royal Artillery 12 other ranks
Royal Artillery Drivers 1 officer, 10 other ranks
Royal and Provincial Engineers 2 officers, 18 other ranks
1st (Royal Scots) Regiment 2 officers, 4 other ranks, 4 other ranks sick
8th (King’s) Regiment 4 other ranks
41st Regiment 29 officers, 17 drummers, 526 other ranks, 12 other ranks sick
Royal Newfoundland Regiment 1 officer, 1 other rank, 1 other rank sick
Incorporated Militia Regiment 29 officers, 11 drummers, 366 other ranks, 25 other ranks sick
Total: 64 officers, 28 drummers, 969 other ranks, 42 other ranks sick
Receiving word of the American invasion around 8:00 a.m. on July 3rd, Major General Riall immediately ordered five companies of the 1st (Royal Scots) Regiment, stationed at Fort George, to march on the Chippawa defence lines and soon followed with his staff to personally assess the situation. At Chippawa the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Pearson (previously the commander of Fort Wellington at Prescott and a senior officer at the Battle of Crysler’s Farm, for details see The Flames of War), had maintained the alert with his garrison since the cavalrymen had passed through during the night, and was subsequently joined by around 300 Native Warriors later in the day. Unfortunately, this supposed reinforcement was somewhat less than reliable, for while it was officially under the leadership of John Norton, it was, in fact, composed of a set of competing factions, due to a political power struggle that had taken place during the winter between Norton and the older (and likely corrupt) Native Department liaison officer, William Claus. Claus had been a person of power amongst the Native tribes before the war but had strongly resented his authority being undermined by the younger and more aggressive Norton as the war progressed. Consequently, Claus took every opportunity to undermine Norton’s authority and leadership, while openly ignoring the orders of generals Drummond and Prevost to support Norton’s Native recruiting activities for the British cause.
AMERICAN CASUALTIES, CAPTURE OF FORT ERIE, JULY 3, 1814
Twenty-Fifth Regiment
BRITISH TROOPS SURRENDERED AT FORT ERIE, JULY 3, 1814
Despite the potential unreliability of his allies, Pearson led a strong reconnaissance force toward Fort Erie in order to gain better intelligence of the enemy’s dispositions, strength, and possible intentions. Reaching the area of the ferry dock opposite Black Rock, Pearson noted the rapid build-up of enemy troops and artillery around the fort. In addition, local residents passed rumours of additional American landings at Point Albino and troops massing on Grand Island for a possible assault on Chippawa. Retiring to the Chippawa River, Pearson left pickets behind to maintain contact with the enemy and report on their movements. By the evening of July 3, 1814, most of the American invasion force was on the west bank of the river and preparing to move north in the morning. At the same time, Riall and Pearson were busily engaged in improving the strong defensive position along the north bank of the Chippawa River by constructing additional earthworks and manning them with the various companies of troops that arrived as the day progressed. Although the Chippawa line gave Major General Riall his best hope of stopping the Americans, he realized he needed to slow down any American advance in order to complete his defences. He also erroneously believed that Fort Erie was still holding out and that most of the American force would be occupied in forcing its surrender, leaving him the possible opportunity of making a rapid counterattack if only a part of the American army advanced on Chippawa. Consequently, Lieutenant Colonel Pearson was ordered to march a strong detachment forward during the night and delay the Americans as much as possible should they advance from Fort Erie.
The following morning (July 4th), the American Army began the day by celebrating their national holiday with a round of volleys. Further celebrations would have to wait, however, as Major General Brown directed Winfield Scott’s brigade to advance toward Chippawa, supported by units of artillery and cavalry.
Marching out from their camp, the First Brigade had only advanced about four miles (6 kilometers) north when it came upon Pearson’s force drawn up on the far bank of Putnam’s Creek, where it entered the Niagara River. Swollen by heavy rains that had fallen during the past several days, the only way to cross the turbulent creek was over a small wooden bridge that the British had partially demolished by tearing up the wooden roadbed. Faced by a force of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, Winfield Scott applied the lessons he had drilled into his troops by changing the brigade formation from column into line-of-battle. True to their training, the various units swung out smartly and took up their positions, ready to commence the attack. However, instead of immediately engaging the enemy, the vastly more experienced Pearson patiently watched and waited as the Americans took the time to complete their manoeuvres and then simply had his artillery and infantry fire a single volley at the deployed Americans before marching off, leaving Winfield Scott and his troops looking at an empty field.
Forced to take additional time to replace the wooden planking of the bridge, Winfield Scott reformed his columns and impatiently awaited the completion of the repairs before recommencing his advance; only to find that Pearson had simply retired three miles (5 kilometers) before redeploying his force on the north bank of the flooded Frenchman’s Creek. Once again the sequence of American deployment, British volley, British retirement, and American repair of the bridge were enacted. Nor did it stop there; as the day wore on, Pearson repeated this delaying tactic at each and every creek, infuriating Scott, who was keen to come to grips with the enemy. By the time the Americans had reached Black’s Creek their desire to fight had outstripped their caution, and a company of the Ninth Regiment (Captain Crooker) saw an opportunity to threaten the British artillery as it commenced limbering up its guns. Pressing forward on the American left flank, the men of Crooker’s company waded through the deep water and advanced on the guns through a belt of trees. Unfortunately, what Crooker failed to note was the troop of experienced cavalrymen of the 19th Light Dragoons (Lieutenant Horton) covering the British withdrawal. Emerging into the open from the woods, the Americans saw, to their alarm, that instead of facing exposed artillery, a detachment of enemy cavalry was rapidly bearing down on them. Under perfect circumstances, the theoretical defence of infantry in line against attacking cavalry would be to “form square,” while an extended line of skirmishers would seek the cover of the nearest physical obstacle to prevent the cavalry running them down. In reality, the usual response of even the best infantry caught in the open and faced with the sight of charging cavalry is to run like h**l. To the credit of Captain Crooker and his men, the company did not break and run; instead it fired a volley at the approaching cavalry before racing toward a nearby farmhouse. This volley hit several of the cavalrymen and the charge faltered, allowing Crooker and his men time to reach the building. From this cover, the infantry engaged the cavalry on far better terms and, after some ineffectual exchanges of gunfire, the British cavalry withdrew once they saw that their guns had been safely withdrawn.
Now no impediment to the American advance remained, except the Chippawa River and its defences. But Pearson’s delaying tactics had used up the bulk of the day and it was near sunset when the American column approached the small hamlet of Chippawa. Once the last of the British rearguard crossed the Chippawa bridge, the centre spans of the roadbed were torn up, making the structure impassable. At a width of over two hundred feet (61 meters) and some twenty feet (6 meters) deep at its mouth, the Chippawa River was well chosen as the primary line of British defence. To prevent the Americans gaining any sort of cover near the bridge, Major General Riall was also forced to order the burning of those houses on the south bank that had survived the depredations of war since 1812. Under the pall of smoke from the burning buildings and a torrential downpour of rain, Winfield Scott’s brigade approached the riverbank, only to be met with a heavy fire from the British artillery batteries on the opposite shore. Recognizing that nothing more could be achieved that day, and knowing his men were exhausted from their daylong march, Scott marched his troops back some two miles (5 kilometers), to a position alongside Street’s Creek. Here he established his camp and decided to await the arrival of Major General Brown with the remainder of the army before tackling the significant barrier of the Chippawa and its defences. After midnight, Ripley’s second brigade finally arrived. Too tired to erect tents, the men simply lay on the sodden ground for the remainder of the night, perhaps thinking that this was no way to pass a national holiday.
