24
The Causes of the Peloponnesian War and the Athenian and Spartan Strategies
CHAPTER CONTENTS
24.1 Thucydides’ View of the Causes of the Peloponnesian War
24.2 The Epidamnus and Potidaea Affairs
24.3 The Megarian Decree (432?), Corinthian Pressure, and Spartan Demands
24.4 Aristophanes on Pericles, Aspasia, and the Megarian Affair
24.5 The Spartan (Archidamian) Strategy
24.6 King Archidamus Advises the Spartans About the War
24.7 The “Periclean Strategy”
24.8 Athenian and Spartan “Characters” and Strategies
The Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431–404) was considered a watershed event in Greek history already in antiquity. The man responsible for making it relevant beyond its time is the historian Thucydides (see Introduction III.3). Our dependence on him for the events of the war is no more evident than in dealing with its origins. Modern discussions of this topic either follow Thucydides’ analysis of the causes of the war or react to it with varying degrees of disagreement.
This chapter presents Thucydides’ analysis of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. It reports on an Athenian decree against Megara that contributed to the outbreak of the conflict and on the pressures that were exerted on Sparta to go to war. The chapter then considers Spartan demands for Athenian concessions, and concludes by examining the strategies of both sides at the beginning of the war.
24.1 Thucydides’ View of the Causesof the Peloponnesian War
Generally, Thucydides offers two categories of causes for the Peloponnesian War. The one he favors is what he terms as the “truest cause,” which is distinguished from the publicly stated “reasons” or “complaints” that the sides proffered against each other.
Thucydides 1.23.4–6
(1.23.4) The Athenians and Peloponnesians started the war when they broke the Thirty-Year Peace that they concluded after the capture of Euboea [445]. (23.5) I have first given an account of the reasons for their breaking the treaty and for the disputes between the two states, so that no one will in future need to look for the cause of such a momentous war amongst the Greeks. (23.6) In my opinion the truest cause [prophasis] was the one least admitted, namely that the growing power of the Athenians, which inspired fear in the Lacedaemonians, forced them into war. The reasons [aitiai] publicly expressed by each side for breaking the peace and opening hostilities were as follows.
Having stated the “truest cause” for the war, Thucydides goes on to describe what he categorizes as complaints or grievances. These involve clashes between Athens and Corinth in conflicts that originated in the city-state of Epidamnus in northwestern Greece (436–433), and in Potidaea on the Chalcidice peninsula (433–432). See WEB 24.2.I for the Epidamnus affair, and WEB 24.2.II for the Potidaea affair, which includes an Athenian commemoration of their dead in Potidaea.
Questions
1. What was the “truest cause” for the Peloponnesian War, according to Thucydides? Do the events leading up to it beginning from the Thirty-Year Peace (20.15, 20.17, 20.20, 21.5) justify his opinion?
2. What were the main arguments in Athens in favor of making Corcyra an ally (WEB 24.2.I)?
3. What were the Corinthians’ main arguments against making Corcyra an ally (WEB 24.2.I)?
4. Why did Athens make Corcyra her ally (WEB 24.2.I)?
5. Who was involved in the conflict in Potidaea and how (WEB 24.2.II)?
24.3 The Megarian Decree (432?), CorinthianPressure, and Spartan Demands
In contrast to his detailed descriptions of the Corcyran and Potidaean affairs, Thucydides is less informative about two other grievances that contemporaries apparently deemed no less important in provoking the war. One involved the island of Aegina, which was a tribute-paying city in the Athenian empire. Thucydides says that Aeginetans supported Corinth’s call to go to war against Athens and complained that “they did not enjoy the autonomy prescribed by the treaty” (1.67.2). The nature of the Aeginetan autonomy, or how the Athenians suppressed it, is unclear. The other grievance is better attested and concerns what is commonly known as the Megarian Decree.
24.3.A Thucydides on the Megarian Decree
Thucydides 1.67.1, 4
(1.67.1) While Potidaea was under siege, the Corinthians did not remain inactive: they had people in the town, and they were also worried about losing the place. They immediately invited their allies to Lacedaemon, and coming there themselves they strongly accused the Athenians of having broken the truce and of committing acts of aggression against the Peloponnese … (67.4) Of note amongst those who came forward with various complaints were the Megarians who, after putting forward no small number of other grievances, focused specifically on their exclusion from the ports in the Athenian empire as well as from the market of Athens, in contravention of the treaty.
The Spartans would put the Megarian Decree on top of their list of complaints against Athens (Thucydides 1.140.4). It was proposed no later than 432 and possibly earlier. Its backdrop was a dispute between Athens and Megara over sacred land near Eleusis and a Megarian refusal to return runaway slaves (Thucydides 1.139.2). Plutarch shows how the dispute with Megara evolved, stressing Pericles’ adamant refusal to revoke the decree and hence his responsibility for the war. The biographer seemed to rely on a collection of Athenian decrees. Plutarch also cites verses from Aristophanes’ comedy Acharnians (produced 425), which blame Pericles for initiating the Peloponnesian War for Aspasia’s sake. See WEB 24.4 for Aristophanes on Pericles and Aspasia, and for more of his verses.
24.3.B Plutarch on the Background to the Megarian Decree
Plutarch Pericles 30.2–31.1
(30.2) Pericles, it would seem, had some personal resentment against the Megarians. The charge he openly made against them in public, however, was that of appropriating some of the sacred land,1 and he proposed a decree that a herald be sent to them and also to the Lacedaemonians, making that charge against the Megarians. (30.3) Now the decree of Pericles contained a fair and humane justification of his action, but Anthemocritus, the herald sent on the mission, was killed, and it was thought that the Megarians were responsible.2 Charinus then proposed a decree against them to the effect that there should be a state of deadly and implacable enmity maintained against them, that any Megarian setting foot in Attica should be given the death penalty, and that when the generals took the customary oath they should also swear to invade the land of Megara twice every year.3 It was further proposed that Anthemocritus be buried at the Thrasian Gates, now called the Dipylon.4 (30.4) The Megarians for their part disclaimed responsibility for Anthemocritus’ murder, and shifted the blame for everything onto Aspasia and Pericles, citing the notorious and popular lines from [Aristophanes’] Acharnians [524–527]:
“Young men came to Megara after drinking and kottabos,5 and abducted the whore Simaetha.
Then the Megarians, infuriated with garlic-fueled pain, abducted in revenge two whores of Aspasia.”
(31.1) The original circumstances of the decree are not easy to ascertain, but everybody lays at Pericles’ door responsibility for not rescinding it. Some, however, claim that Pericles’ recalcitrance stemmed from a combination of high principles and a conception of the state’s best interests, that he thought that the demand for its repeal was a test of the city’s assertiveness, and that submission was a confession of weakness. Others claim that it was a sort of stubbornness and truculent desire to show off Athens’ strength that made him thumb his nose at the Lacedaemonians.6
Notes
1. Plutarch’s distinction between Pericles’ real personal reasons and his ostensible public ones cannot be substantiated.
2. Killing a herald or envoy was considered impious and could result in divine punishment for both the killer and his community.
3. Scholars are divided on whether the economic sanctions against Megara were included in Charinus’ decree or were proposed separately.
4. Later testimonies mention the landmark of Anthemocritus’ tomb, which continued to remind the Athenians of what they regarded as a Megarian atrocity. The Thrasian Gates formed the most important city gate, which was rebuilt in the fourth century and renamed the Dipylon (double-gate).
5. Kottabos was a popular game in a symposium that involved throwing dregs of wine at a target. See WEB 24.4 for a fuller quotation of Aristophanes’ verses.
6. The first interpretation of Pericles’ conduct reflects Thucydides (1.140), the second is unattested elsewhere.
Among Sparta’s motives for going to war was the desire to accommodate Corinth. Corinth was Sparta’s most important Peloponnesian ally whose wealth and strong navy were second only to Athens’. Well aware of their status in the league, the Corinthians used it to pressure Sparta to go to war. Thus, before Sparta made up its mind about fighting Athens, Thucydides has Corinthian envoys urging the Spartans to move against Athens, failing which Corinth would seek a better ally. The most viable candidates were Athens and Argos. Corinth, of course, did not drag a reluctant Sparta into the conflict. The vote for war in both Sparta and Athens reflected the will of their respective people. But it was the allies, rather than the big powers, who provided the spark for the conflagration.
24.3.C Corinth Urges Sparta to Go to War
Thucydides 1.71.4–7
(1.71.4) “Let there be a limit to your tardiness, which has persisted until now. Bring the help you promised to your other allies, too, but to Potidaea especially, with a prompt invasion of Attica. Do not put your friends and relatives at the mercy of their bitterest enemies, and do not make the rest of us turn in despair to some other alliance. (71.5) We would not be acting unfairly in doing that, not in respect of the gods who witnessed our oath, nor in the eyes of judicious men. For those who break treaties are not those who turn to others when they are deserted, but those who fail to give assistance to those to whom they swore they would. (71.6) If you show some willingness we shall remain committed to you. We would then be acting impiously in changing sides, and we would not find more like-minded allies elsewhere. (71.7) Consider this matter carefully, and try by your leadership to leave the Peloponnese no less great than it was when your fathers left it to you.”
The Spartans voted on a war against Athens and an assembly of their Peloponnesian allies approved a similar decision. In the winter of 432/1 the two powers exchanged charges. The Athenians denied any wrongdoing and offered to go to arbitration. The Spartans demanded that the Athenians banish the “cursed,” i.e., the Alcmeonids, including Pericles through his Alcmeonid mother, for their killing of the Cylonians two centuries earlier (6.6: “A Failed Attempt at Tyranny in Athens: Cylon”). The Athenians retaliated by demanding the elimination of the Spartan curse following the Spartan authorities’ starving to death of Pausanias, their asylum-seeking regent, a generation or so earlier (WEB 18.13.II: “Pausanias’ Second Recall and Death”).
24.3.D The Spartan Demands
Thucydides 1.139.1
(139.1) Such were the demands that the Lacedaemonians made on the first embassy, and the counter-demands received in turn, concerning expulsion of people under a curse. On a number of later visits to Athens the Lacedaemonians ordered the Athenians to quit Potidaea and leave Aegina independent; but the point they made most emphatically and clearly was that there would be no war if the Athenians rescinded the Megarian Decree by which the Megarians were forbidden access to the ports in the Athenian empire, and to the market of Athens.
Thucydides suggests, then, that the Spartans still gave peace a chance. In response, Pericles highlighted Sparta’s refusal to go to arbitration and warned that Athens could not afford to make concessions. An unsuccessful attack by Thebes, a Spartan ally, on Plataea, an Athenian ally, in the spring of 431 constituted for Athens a clear breach of the peace. By then the Spartans had already proclaimed war on Athens (Thucydides 1.68–2.7).
Questions
1. What did the Megarian Decree entail, what were the reasons for it, and what does it suggest about Athenian power and foreign policy (24.3.A–B, WEB 24.4)?
2. Why, according to the Corinthians, would they not be breaking the treaty with Sparta if they sought another alliance (24.3.C)?
3. What were the Spartan demands of Athens on the eve of the war (24.3.D)? Does this suggest Spartan fear of Athens’ growing power, which according to Thucydides led to the war?
24.5 The Spartan (Archidamian) Strategy
Both the Athenian and the Spartan strategies for the Peloponnesian War were based on the principle of pitting their strengths against the enemy’s weakness. Yet the parties’ respective strengths – Athens on the sea, Sparta on land – were so overwhelming that for a long time both sides chose to avoid direct confrontation rather than put themselves at risk. This policy greatly prolonged the war and only rarely allowed the full might of one state to clash with the other.
See WEB 24.6 for the advice of the Spartan king Archidamus [II] to the Spartans to wait a few years and build up power and resources before entering the conflict.
The Spartans, however, decided to go to war with what they had. They could mobilize many allied hoplites, presumably three times as many as Athens. Yet, unlike the professional Spartan army, these hoplites included many peasants who could afford to leave their farms only for a short time. Also, in comparison to the Athenian empire, the Spartan allies were more independent and less vulnerable to sanctions from Sparta. These realities and limited financial resources dictated Spartan strategy for the first years of the war. Wishing to take advantage of their superior infantry, and based on their experience in 446 of invading Attica (20.13: “The Peloponnesian Invasion of Attica”), the Spartans aimed to ravage Athenian fields and thus provoke the Athenians into a battle that the Spartans would likely win. Thucydides describes Spartan hopes in a speech that Archidamus delivered to the invading Peloponnesian army in the summer of 431.
24.5.A Spartan Estimates of the Athenian Reaction
Thucydides 2.11.6–8
(2.11.6) “We are advancing on a city that is not incapable of defending itself – in fact, on one very well prepared in all respects. Thus we must fully expect that they will take the field, and that, even if they are not already setting out before our arrival, they will do so when they see us in their lands plundering and destroying their property. (11.7) For anger inevitably strikes men when they see that they are suffering some unfamiliar loss, and see it happening right before their eyes; and at that point, unable to stop and think, they are most prone to impulsive action. (11.8) The Athenians are more likely than others to react in this way because they think they have the right to rule others, and that it is they who should be invading and plundering their neighbors’ lands rather than seeing it happen to their own.”
The Spartans’ plan of engaging the Athenians in a land battle was frustrated by Pericles’ strategy (24.7). Since Sparta left the sea to Athenian control, it could not effectively aid rebellious Athenian allies. Instead, it relied on propaganda that used the old and honorable Panhellenic slogan of freedom to the Greeks – not from Persia, but from Athens. The liberation campaign, however, enjoyed only meager success.
24.5.B Greek Enmity Toward Athens
Thucydides 2.8.4–5
(2.8.4) Popular support inclined very much toward the Lacedaemonians, especially since they had declared that they were liberating Greece. Every individual and every city was eager to give the Spartan cause all possible moral and practical support, and they thought the effort was held back if they were not personally involved. (8.5) So great was the anger that most people felt toward Athens, some wanting to be freed from its empire, and others fearful of falling under its sway.
Question
1. What advantages and constraints shaped the Spartan strategy (24.5.A–B, WEB 24.6)?
24.7 The “Periclean Strategy”
Pericles’ strategy relied heavily on Athens’ financial strength to sustain the war effort. He advocated a policy of avoiding fighting the Spartans on land, preserving the integrity of the empire, and shunning new territorial acquisitions. It appears that Pericles aimed to win the war by bringing the Spartans to the realization that they could not defeat Athens.
Thucydides has Pericles describe his strategy and Athens’ resources in a speech prior to the Peloponnesians’ first invasion of Attica in the summer of 431. See also Thucydides 2.65.6: WEB 19.14.II: “Pericles’ Leadership.”
24.7.A Pericles on the Athenian Strategy
Thucydides 2.13.2–8; cf. 1.143.4–144.1
(2.13.2) As for the present situation [summer 431], Pericles gave them the same advice as before, telling them to prepare for war and bring their property in from the fields. They were not to go out to battle, but come into the city and protect it, and they should fit out the fleet, their area of strength, and keep a tight grip on the allies. Their might derived from the financial revenues provided by the allies, he declared, and success in war came mostly from strategic thinking and abundant finances. (13.3) They should have confidence since the city had an average income of 600 talents per annum in tribute from the allies, other revenue apart, and there was still a reserve of 6,000 talents of coined silver on the acropolis (the maximum had been 9,700 talents, but from that sum moneys had been spent on the Propylaea of the acropolis, on other buildings, and on Potidaea).1 (13.4) There was, in addition, uncoined gold and silver in private and public votive offerings, various religious objects used for processions and competitions, Persian spoils and the like, amounting to not less than 500 talents. (13.5) He further added the money in the other temples (no meager sum) on which they could draw;2 and if they were completely bankrupt, they could make use of the gold plating of the goddess [Athena] herself (he noted that, in refined gold, the statue had a weight of forty talents, and that it was all detachable).3 This they could use for their security, he said, but they would have to replace it in its entirety.
(13.6) Such were Pericles’ words of encouragement in the area of finance. He then added that Athens possessed 13,000 hoplites, not including those in the garrisons and those defending the wall, who totaled 16,000. (13.7) These were the numbers on guard duty at the start, when the enemy made their attacks, and they comprised the oldest and youngest fighting men, and metics [resident aliens] who were hoplites. For the wall of Phaleron ran for 35 stades [ca. 6.3 km] to the wall encircling the city, and of that encircling wall 43 stades [ca. 7.7 km] were manned (though a section, between the Long Wall and the wall of Phaleron, remained unmanned). The Long Walls ran for forty stades to Piraeus, and the outer one was manned. The entire length of the wall encircling Piraeus and Munychia ran to sixty stades, and half of it was garrisoned. (13.8) Pericles also noted that they possessed 1,200 cavalry, including the mounted archers, 1,600 regular archers, and 300 seaworthy triremes …
Notes
1. The tribute quota lists mention only around 400 talents income for this year, and Thucydides’ figure of 600 may include potential revenues. The 6,000 talents is a probable reference to the treasury of Athens. When Potidaea surrendered in 430/29, the total cost of its siege ran to 2,000 talents (Thucydides 2.70.2).
2. If what is known as Callias’ decree (ML no. 58) was proposed in 434/3, those treasuries were consolidated into one.
3. The Athenians never used the emergency “fund” of the gold on Athena’s statue.
Given the underdeveloped stage of siege warfare in 431 as well as the Peloponnesians’ inability to mount a prolonged and costly siege, Athens could feel secure behind its walls and well provided for thanks to its navy. Even so, Athens’ reaction to the invasion was not entirely passive, because the Athenians harassed the enemy with their cavalry. Its navy too made seaborne raids on Peloponnesian shores. Indeed, the Athenians must have felt that as a maritime power, they had a built-in strategic advantage over Spartan land power.
The author of the Constitution of the Athenians, wrongly attributed to Xenophon, lists Athens’ maritime advantage over a land power.
24.7.B The Superiority of Naval Power
[Xenophon] Constitution of the Athenians 2.3–6
(2.3) As for the mainland cities now under the sway of the Athenians, the large ones are ruled by fear, and the small ones entirely by necessity. For there is no city that does not need to import and export goods, and a city will not be able to engage in such activities unless it obeys those who control the seaways.
(2.4) Next, those who rule the seas are able to do what those with control of the land can do only occasionally, that is lay waste the land of those stronger than them; for they can sail to points where there is no enemy, or where the enemy is few in number – and if he approaches they can simply board their ships and sail off. And anyone doing that is less frustrated than the man coming to help with infantry.
(2.5) Next, those in control at sea can sail as far from their country as they please, but land powers cannot make a journey of many days from theirs – marching is slow, and a man on foot cannot carry food sufficient for a long period. Moreover, advancing on foot one must pass through friendly territory, or else conquer the land by fighting, while the man sailing can disembark where he is stronger, and not disembark in the area where he is not. He can, instead, sail off until he reaches friendly territory or an enemy weaker than himself.
(2.6) Then there are the crop diseases that are sent by Zeus. Those who have power on land are badly affected by these, but the sea power bears them easily. For not all the land is struck with the blight at the one time, so that alimentation comes to those controlling the sea from where the land is in good condition.
See WEB 24.8.I for Thucydides on the Athenian and Spartan “national characters” that impacted their strategies, and WEB 24.8.II for comments on problems in the strategies of both states.
Questions
1. What were the “dos” and “don’ts” of the Periclean strategy and why?
2. What made land power inferior to maritime power, according to the “Old Oligarch”? What advantages did land power have?
Review Questions
1. Discuss the causes of the Peloponnesian War according to Thucydides. Do you agree with his ranking of them in order of significance (24.1, WEB 24.2.I–II)?
2. What was Corinth’s role in the Peloponnesian War (24.1, 24,3, WEB 24.2.I–II)?
3. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Spartan war strategy (24.5, WEB 24.6, WEB 24.8.I–II)? What accounted for them?
4. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Athenian war strategy (24.7, WEB 24.6, WEB 24.8.I–II)?
5. What were the risks for Athens and Sparta in not going to war? Do they justify their decision to fight?
Suggested Readings
The causes of the Peloponnesian War: Kagan 1969; Ste Croix 1972; Cawkwell 1997, 20–39; Lazenby 2004, 16–30; Rhodes 2006, 80–89. The Corcyran affair: J. Wilson 1987, 2–64; Crane 1998, 93–124. The Megarian Decree: Fornara 1975. Aspasia: M. Henry 1995, passim, esp. 10–28; Podlecki 1998, 109–117. Athenian resources: Kallet-Marx 1993; Samons 2000; Kallet 2001. Spartan resources: Loomis 1992. The Athenian and Spartan strategies: Westlake 1945 (Athens); Brunt 1965 (Sparta); Kagan 1974, esp. 17–42 (both); Cawkwell 1975 (Athens); Kelly 1982 (Sparta); Strauss and Ober 1990 (Athens); Lazenby 2004, 31–38 (both). The short-term effect of the Peloponnesian invasions: Hanson 1998, but see also Throne 2001. Athenian cavalry and the Peloponnesian invasion: Spence 1990. Acharnia: Whitehead 1986, esp. 397–400.