31
The Spartan Hegemony, the Corinthian War, and the Peace of Antalcidas (404/3–388/7)
CHAPTER CONTENTS
31.1 Sparta and Persia
31.2 The Lessons of the Anabasis
31.3 Agesilaus’ Asian Campaign and Lysander’s Demotion
31.4. Lysander’s Alleged Plan to Reform Spartan Kingship (396)
31.5 The Outbreak of the Corinthian War (395)
31.6 Criticism of the View that Persian Bribes Led the Greeks to Fight Sparta
31.7 The Loss of Spartan Maritime Hegemony (394)
31.8 The Battle of Cnidus (394)
31.9 The Dexileus Monument
31.10 Peltasts and the Battle of Lechaeum (390)
31.11 Iphicrates’ Military Reforms
31.12 The Peace of Antalcidas (388/7)
31.13 Comments on the Significance of the Peace of Antalcidas
31.14 The Call for a Panhellenic Campaign Against Persia
At the end of the Peloponnesian War Sparta assumed control of the Athenian empire, collected tributes, and established narrow oligarchies in the cities. But the failure of the oligarchic regime in Athens led to the abolition of Spartan-sponsored oligarchic regimes elsewhere, probably in 403. In Asia Minor, Sparta recognized the right of the Persian king to collect tribute from the Greeks, who were nevertheless supposed to remain autonomous. This chapter discusses the history of Spartan hegemony on sea and land. It records how Sparta and Persia became enemies following Spartan support of Cyrus’ (failed) attempt to usurp the Persian throne and Sparta’s decision to campaign in Asia Minor under Agesilaus. The chapter examines the outbreak of the Corinthian War that forced Agesilaus to return to Greece, and the loss of Spartan maritime hegemony in the Aegean following a naval defeat. The Athenians are represented in this chapter by a relief depicting a cavalryman who died in the Corinthian War, and by a description of the (unusual) defeat of a Spartan force against lighter-armed peltasts under the Athenian general Iphicrates. The chapter concludes by recording the Peace of Antalcidas (388/7), which restored Sparta’s hegemonic status, and a call by the Athenian intellectual Isocrates for Greek unity by means of an all-Greek campaign against Persia.
31.1 Sparta and Persia
In 401, Cyrus tried to usurp the throne from his brother Artaxerxes II, the new Persian king, and asked Sparta to repay him for his assistance during the Peloponnesian War. The local Greeks supported his request.
31.1.A Cyrus Requests Spartan Aid
Xenophon Hellenica 3.1.1
… After that Cyrus sent messengers to Lacedaemon and asked the Lacedaemonians to give him the same level of support that he had given them in the war with Athens. The ephors thought that his appeal had merit. They sent word to Samius, their admiral at the time, to perform for Cyrus any service he might require, and Samius readily did what Cyrus asked of him. At the head of his own fleet, and accompanied by that of Cyrus, he skirted along the coast to Cilicia, and made it impossible for the governor of Cilicia, Syennesis, to mount any opposition on land to Cyrus during the latter’s march on the king.
Xenophon’s Anabasis (“marching upward”) tells the story of Cyrus’ failed attempt to take over the throne, his death, and the return of the “Ten Thousand” (actually about 8,000) Greek mercenaries in his army to Greece (400–399). For contemporaries and especially for later generations, the failure of the Persians to stop the Greeks’ return exposed the weakness of the Persian Empire. See WEB 31.2 for conclusions drawn by the Athenian intellectual Isocrates from the expedition.
Cyrus’ march led the Persian king to reassess his relationship with Sparta and with the Greeks of Asia Minor who supported Cyrus.
31.1.B Spartan Aid to Cyrus
Xenophon Hellenica 3.1.3–4
(3.1.3) Tissaphernes was reputed to have given creditable assistance to the king in the war against his brother, and he was sent to the coast as satrap both of the lands he himself had earlier governed and of those governed by Cyrus. He then immediately demanded that all the Ionian cities fall under his command. These cities, however, wished to remain free, and they also feared Tissaphernes because they had chosen Cyrus over him when Cyrus was alive. They therefore barred his entry into their cities, and sent emissaries to Lacedaemon to seek help; the Lacedaemonians were the champions of all Greece, they said, and should also look after the Asiatic Greeks, ensuring that their territory was not plundered and that their freedom was maintained. (1.4) The Lacedaemonians sent them Thibron as their commander [harmostês], and gave him troops made up of about a thousand freed helots [neadamodeis] and some 4,000 other Peloponnesians. Thibron also requested 300 horsemen of the Athenians, saying that he would himself furnish their pay. The Athenians sent him a number of men who had served in the cavalry under the rule of the Thirty, for they thought it would be good for the democracy if these men went abroad and were killed.
Questions
1. How did the Persian king deal with the retreating Greek mercenaries? What does this reveal about him and the Persians, according to Isocrates (WEB 31.2)?
2. How did Cyrus’ failed attempt to usurp the throne affect Persian and Spartan policies in the region (31.1)?
31.3 Agesilaus’ Asian Campaign and Lysander’s Demotion
From 400/399 the Spartans campaigned in Asia Minor against the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus with meager success. In 396 king Agesilaus took charge of operations. Xenophon links his mission to intelligence about the Persians’ mobilization of a large fleet, claiming that the idea to send Agesilaus there was Lysander’s. Agesilaus viewed the Persian campaign or wished Greeks to see it as a Panhellenic war led by a new Agamemnon against the new Trojans. He even tried to reenact Agamemnon’s sacrifices at Aulis prior to his departure to Troy. But important Spartan allies such as Athens and Corinth refused to join him, and the Boeotians added insult to injury by disrupting Agesilaus’ sacrifice. Agesilaus apparently never forgot the affront, and his career showed him often initiating hostilities against the Thebans.
31.3.A Agesilaus’ Asian Campaign
Xenophon Hellenica 3.4.2–5
(3.4.2) The Spartans were agitated (about the reported build-up of a Persian fleet), and they brought together their allies and considered what to do. Lysander meanwhile calculated that the Greeks would enjoy a marked superiority with their fleet, and he also took into consideration the fact that the infantry force that had marched up-country with Cyrus had returned safely. He prevailed upon Agesilaus to undertake an expedition into Asia, if the Spartan authorities would provide him with thirty Spartiates, approximately 2,000 freed helots, and an allied contingent of about 6,000. In addition to his logistical calculations, Lysander had a personal motive for wanting to join Agesilaus’ expedition. This was to reestablish, with Agesilaus’ aid, the decarchies that he had established in the cities and which had been dissolved by the ephors, who had ordered a return to their traditional constitutions.
(4.3) When Agesilaus committed himself to the campaign, the Spartans complied with his every request and furthermore gave him provisions for six months. He then made the requisite sacrifices, and in particular those for the border-crossing, and set off. He also sent messengers to the various cities with instructions on the number of men to be sent from each and where they were to muster. He himself wished to go and offer sacrifice at Aulis, which was where Agamemnon sacrificed when he was setting sail for Troy. (4.4) When he reached there, however, the Boeotarchs,1 on being apprised that he was sacrificing, sent horsemen and told him to make no further offerings; and they also hurled from the altar any already-sacrificed victims that they came across. Agesilaus, furious, called on the gods to witness this act and then boarded his trireme and sailed off. On reaching Geraestus, he gathered together as large a force as he could and embarked on a journey to Ephesus.
(4.5) When he arrived in Ephesus, Tissaphernes sent and asked him what his purpose was in coming. Agesilaus replied it was “to see that the cities in Asia should also be autonomous, like those with us in Greece”…
Note
1. The Boeotarchs were the magistrates of the Boeotian confederacy.
In a short time, Agesilaus established his own authority in camp by demoting Lysander. The two competed for power and patronage, and Agesilaus used his royal office to weaken his senior advisor and humiliate him. According to Plutarch (Lysander 23.7), he even gave him the servile duty of being his meat carver.
31.3.B Agesilaus and Lysander
Xenophon Hellenica 3.4.7–8
(3.4.7) Agesilaus was passing his time at Ephesus in leisurely repose, and meanwhile there was constitutional upheaval in the Greek cities (there were no longer democracies as there had been during the Athenian hegemony, and no decarchies either, as during Lysander’s ascendancy). Since everyone knew Lysander, they pressed him with requests to get what they wanted from Agesilaus. As a result there was always a teeming crowd fawning on him and following him around, making Agesilaus look like an ordinary citizen and Lysander like a king. (4.8) That this also infuriated Agesilaus was only later made clear, but the thirty Spartiates with the king could not from envy hold their tongues, and they commented to Agesilaus that Lysander was contravening the law in behaving with more-than-regal self-importance. When Lysander began to bring some people before Agesilaus, the king would invariably send off with a negative response those whom he knew Lysander was supporting. And as things were consistently turning out contrary to Lysander’s wishes, he soon realized what was going on and no longer allowed the crowd to follow him about, flatly telling those asking him to work on their behalf that they would be worse off if he championed their cause.
Lysander left for the Hellespont and later went home. See WEB 31.4 for Lysander’s alleged plan to reform the Spartan kingship.
Questions
1. What were Agesilaus’ and Lysander’s considerations in support of an Asian campaign? What was the campaign’s official goal (31.3.A)?
2. Why was Agesilaus so furious with the Boeotians (31.3.A)?
3. Why did Lysander lose the conflict with Agesilaus (31.3.B, cf. WEB 31.4)?
31.5 The Outbreak of the Corinthian War (395)
In 395/4 Agesilaus assumed unprecedented joint command over operations both on land and sea and would henceforth be Sparta’s most powerful man until his death in 360/59. He gained a measure of success in Asia both militarily and diplomatically by exploiting the rivalry between the Persian satraps. The Persians, who failed to reach a compromise with him, supported with money anti-Spartan politicians on the Greek mainland in the hope of starting a war there and thus drawing Agesilaus away from Asia. Pro-Spartan Xenophon describes their move as nothing short of corruption and bribery. The author of the Oxyrhynchian Greek history (7), however, rightly suggests that the Greeks’ enmity toward Sparta needed little encouragement. See WEB 31.6 for his criticism of the view that Persian bribes led the Greeks to fight Sparta.
31.5.A The King Sends Money to Greece
Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.1–2
(3.5.1) [The Persian governor] Tithraustes, however, thought he had discovered that Agesilaus had scant respect for the power of the king and that he had not the slightest intention of quitting Asia but had, in fact, high hopes of getting the king in his clutches. At a loss how to exploit the situation, he sent Timocrates the Rhodian to Greece, giving him gold to the value of about fifty silver talents and instructing him to do his best to pass it on to the leading men in the various cities (taking from them the most secure guarantees) on condition that they undertake a war against Sparta.
Timocrates then went off and gave the money to Androcleidas, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus in Thebes, to Timolaus and Polyanthes in Corinth, and to Cylon and his supporters in Argos. (5.2) The Athenians took no part of the money but were eager for war in any case, thinking that hegemony in Greece belonged to them. Those who had accepted the money then proceeded to make anti-Spartan comments in their respective cities; and having roused them to hatred for the Spartans, they began to forge unity amongst the largest of them.
Xenophon attributes to a Theban envoy to Athens in 395 a speech that successfully appeals to the Athenians to join Thebes in a war against Sparta. The speaker lists the Greeks’ grievances against Sparta and alludes to Athens’ renewed imperial ambitions.
31.5.B Greek Grievances Against Sparta
Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.11–15
(3.5.11) … If you reflect, you will immediately see that we are telling the truth. Who is there still left sympathizing with the Spartans? Haven’t the Argives always remained hostile to them? (5.12) Now, too, the Elians, robbed of much of their land and numerous cities, have been added to their list of enemies.1 And what are we to say of the Corinthians, the Arcadians, and the Achaeans? In the war against you, following urgent appeals from the Spartans, these shared all the hardships and expenses, but when the Spartans had reached their goal, what share of the power, the glory, or the money did they give to them? In fact, they think it quite all right to establish helots as governors, and now that they have achieved success they have revealed themselves as tyrants over their allies, free though these are.
(5.13) In fact, it is clear that they have also duped those whom they detached from you. Instead of liberty, they have given them slavery twice over: these peoples endure tyranny of the governors as well as that of the decarchy whom Lysander appointed in each city. Then there is the king of Asia. It was he who made the greatest contribution to their victory over you, but how is the treatment he now receives any different from what it would have been had he been on your side subduing them?
(5.14) So, aren’t you now likely to become by far the greatest people in history if you in turn champion those who are so clearly victims of injustice? For in the time of your hegemony, your leadership was, of course, limited to maritime peoples. Now, though, you would become the leaders of all peoples – of us, of the Peloponnesians, of those whom you ruled before, and even of the king himself with his enormous power. We were very valuable allies of the Spartans, too, as you know; and it stands to reason that our support for you as allies will now be in every way stronger than it was at that time for them. For our assistance will not be given, as it was then, on behalf of islanders or Syracusans or non-Greeks, but on behalf of ourselves for injustices suffered. (5.15) And you should be aware of this, too, that the acquisitive power of the Spartans is much easier to overthrow than was the empire that was yours. For you had a fleet and ruled over people who did not; these people, few in number, are greedily seeking power over men many times more numerous than they and not at all their inferiors in arms. This, then, is all we have to say, but know well, men of Athens, that we think we are inviting you to enjoy advantages that will be far greater for your state than for ours.
Note
1. In 400 Sparta defeated Elis and forced it to give autonomy to its perioeci. Sparta also disbanded Elis’ navy and stripped its harbor of its defenses.
Questions
1. What is Xenophon’s view of the causes of the Corinthian War, and what does the Oxyrhynchian historian have to say about it (31.5.A, WEB 31.6)?
2. What complaints did the Greeks have about the Spartan hegemony, and what were the benefits for Athens in joining the anti-Spartan coalition, according to the Theban speech (31.5.B)?
31.7 The Loss of Spartan Maritime Hegemony (394)
The outbreak of the Corinthian War in Greece (395/4–387/6) and a crisis of leadership at home led to Agesilaus’ recall from Asia in 394. By then the Spartan Asian campaign had already suffered a heavy blow at Cnidus. The satrap Pharnabazus recruited the former Athenian general Conon to command a fleet against the Spartans. (Conon had gone from the battle of Aegospotami in 404 to serve the Cyprian ruler Evagoras.) In 395 Conon encouraged Rhodes to defect from Sparta, and in 394 he and Pharnabazus led a Persian fleet to victory against a Spartan fleet near Cnidus. See WEB 31.8 for events leading to Agesilaus’ recall and the battle of Cnidus.
The Persian naval victory put an end to Spartan supremacy in the Aegean. Conon and Pharnabazus expelled Spartan forces from Asian coastal cities and the islands and won the locals’ goodwill by promising them autonomy. In 393 they arrived in Greece, raided Laconia, and garrisoned the island of Cythera south of Sparta. Conon then sailed into the Piraeus bringing money for the rebuilding of the Long Walls (a project that had already been initiated before his arrival).
Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.9–10
(4.8.9) Conon said that if Pharnabazus allowed him to take charge of the fleet, he would provide for its upkeep from the islands, and that he would also sail to his native city and help the Athenians with the reconstruction of the Long Walls and the wall around Piraeus. He knew of nothing, he declared, that would be more painful for the Spartans. “And,” he added, “by this act you will have done the Athenians a service, and taken revenge on the Spartans. You will be nullifying what they worked hardest for.” On hearing this, Pharnabazus happily sent Conon to Athens and supplied him with additional funds for the reconstruction of the walls.
(8.10) When he arrived, Conon erected a large section of the wall, providing his own manpower, paying the carpenters and masons, and covering any other necessary expenses. There were parts of the wall, however, that the Athenians themselves helped rebuild, along with volunteers from Boeotia and other cities. The Corinthians for their part used the funds left by Pharnabazus to furnish crews for ships; and, giving command to Agathinus, they attained mastery of the sea in the gulf around Achaea and Lechaeum. To counter this, the Spartans also manned a fleet, which Podanemus commanded.
Questions
1. Why would Conon’s rebuilding of the Athenian Long Walls be “more painful” for the Spartans (cf. 20.7: “The Long Walls”, 28.12: “Athens’ Defeat and the End of the Peloponnesian War”)?
2. What were the ramifications of the loss of their maritime hegemony for the Spartans (31.7)?
31.9 The Dexileus Monument
In 394 the Athenians who died in the Corinthian War received the traditional honor of a burial in the city’s public burial ground (demosion sema), and their names were listed by tribe (IG II2 5221 = Harding no. 19A). Yet apparently some Athenians looked for greater distinction. A separate monument listed the names of twelve cavalrymen who died at Corinth (in the battle of Nemea of 394?) and in the battle of Coronea in Boeotia later that summer (IG II2 5222 = R&O no. 7). The family of young Dexileus decided to commemorate his memory by building him an individual monument in the family plot outside the Sacred Gate (Figure 31.1). By this time the legal prohibition on elaborate steles was rescinded, and important wealthy families honored their dead with expensive grave reliefs. The striking monument for Dexileus, now at the Kerameikos Museum, Athens, shows a cavalryman about to dispatch a fallen warrior in heroic fashion. He wears a short tunic (chiton), a cloak (chlamys), and boots. His bronze Thessalian hat and spear are lost. Similar scenes appear on other memorial reliefs commissioned by the state and individuals.
Figure 31.1 The Dexileus Monument. akg-images/Nimatallah.
Image not available in this digital edition.
At the base of the monument an inscription reads (IG II2 6217 = Harding no. 19C, p. 33):
Dexileus, son of Lysanius, of Thoricus, was born when Tisandros was archon [414/3], died when Eubulides was archon [394/3] at Corinth, one of the five cavalrymen.
The meaning of the “five cavalrymen” is unclear, and perhaps refers to a special unit. The dating of the young man’s birth and death is exceptional in Athenian funerary inscriptions. Scholars have interpreted this as an attempt to show that Dexileus, the cavalryman, was too young to be one of the cavalry who cooperated with the tyrannical Thirty. Indeed, one vase buried in the site depicts the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Yet one wonders how many readers of the inscription knew or bothered to check who were the archons during the Thirty’s rule.
Question
1. What themes in the Theban speech to the Athenians about fighting Sparta (31.5.B) throw light on Dexileus’ monument and grave?
31.10 Peltasts and the Battle of Lechaeum (390)
One event in the convoluted history of the Corinthian War had implications that ranged beyond the conflict. This was the victory of the Athenian general Iphicrates over a hoplite Spartan force near Lechaeum in the Corinthiad in 390. Iphicrates was a skilled Athenian general who was stationed in the Corinthiad at the head of a mercenary force made up largely of peltasts. Peltasts were light-armed troops whose name was derived from peltê, a crescent-shaped shield, which they used in battle (Figure 31.2). Originating in Archaic Thrace, peltasts became widely used in Greece during the Classical period. They went into battle with their shield, which was rimless and smaller than the hoplite shield, a spear (or in earlier times javelins), and a slashing sword, but no body armor or metal helmet. Peltasts were inexpensive to equip and especially to hire, and hence often served as mercenaries. The sources tend to ignore or marginalize their contribution on the battlefield because they were commonly used for skirmishes or similar tasks, because of their lower-class origin and status, and because their hit-and-run tactics offended hoplite ideals.
Peltasts were useful for surprise attacks, scouting, and protecting roads or fortifications. They and other light-armed troops could also be successful against hoplites and stand their ground when they had numerical superiority and fought on an uneven terrain (as in Pylos). In 390, however, Iphicrates’ nimble peltasts defeated a Spartan mora (regiment) made up primarily of hoplites on the plain near Lechaeum. The peltasts were aided by Athenian hoplites, but the peltasts did most of the damage. The engagement started when a Spartan polemarch (officer) in charge of a garrison at Lechaeum was escorting Spartans from the village of Amyclae on part of their way home. The Amycleans were obliged to participate in the festival of Hyacinthia that was associated with a joint cult of Apollo and his beloved Hyacinthus. They were accompanied by hoplites and cavalry regiments. Xenophon describes the Spartan defeat.
Figure 31.2 A Thracian peltast. A red-figure cup from the end of the sixth century. Antikenmuseum der Universität Leipzig.
Image not available in this digital edition.
Xenophon Hellenica 4.5.12–17
(4.5.12) When they were roughly twenty or thirty stades from Sicyon, the polemarch proceeded on the return journey to Lechaeum with the hoplites, who were about 600 in number, and ordered the cavalry commander to come after him with the mora of cavalry once they had escorted the Amycleans as far as the Amycleans requested. The Spartans were well aware of the presence of large numbers of both peltasts and hoplites in Corinth, but because of their earlier successes they arrogantly assumed that no one would lift a hand against them. (5.13) In the city of Corinth, however, Callias son of Hipponicus, who commanded the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates, who had charge of the peltasts, could see that the Spartans were not many in number and that they also lacked the support of peltasts and cavalry, and so they thought it safe to attack them with their peltasts. If the Spartans continued along the road, they reasoned, they could be attacked with javelins on their unprotected side and wiped out; if they tried offensive action, it would be easy for peltasts, being the most lightly armed troops, to outrun hoplites. Realizing this, the two led out their men.
(5.14) Callias deployed the hoplites not far from the city, while Iphicrates took the peltasts and attacked the Spartan mora. The Spartans now came under pressure from javelins, and some were wounded and some killed, so they ordered the shield-bearers1 to take up the casualties and carry them away to Lechaeum. And these were the only men in the mora who really escaped. The polemarch then ordered the ten-year men [aged 20–30] to chase off the attackers. They, however, were hoplites chasing peltasts a spear’s throw away, and so they caught none of them; for Iphicrates had given the order for the peltasts to draw back before the hoplites came close. (5.15) And when the Spartans withdrew, they were out of order since each man had been pursuing the enemy as fast as he could. At this point Iphicrates’ troops wheeled around, and some once more hurled their javelins facing the enemy, while others ran along the flank hurling them at the Spartans’ unprotected side. And in the very first pursuit they brought down nine or ten of the Spartans with the javelin; and this result made them press the attack with greater bravado.
(5.16) The Spartans were under severe pressure, and the polemarch gave another order for pursuit, this time to the fifteen-year men [aged 20–35]. But as these withdrew, even more of them fell than on the first occasion. When their best fighters had already been killed, the cavalry joined them, and with these they once more attempted pursuit. The peltasts fell back, but at that point the cavalry botched their charge. Instead of continuing their pursuit to the point of inflicting casualties, they kept a continuous line with the hoplites both in the chase and in wheeling back. The Spartans persisted with this, and experienced the same results time and again, and their numbers were continually diminishing and their spirit ebbing, while the enemy was gaining confidence and ever greater numbers were joining the assault.
(5.17) At a loss what to do, the Spartans gathered in a body on a hillock, about two stades from the sea and about sixteen or seventeen stades from Lechaeum. The men in Lechaeum became aware of their plight, and they boarded some light craft and sailed along the shore until they were abreast of the hillock. But their troops on the hillock were at an impasse. They were being badly mauled and losing their lives, and there was nothing they could do about it; and when, in addition, they saw the enemy hoplites bearing down on them, they ran. Some threw themselves into the sea, and a few escaped to Lechaeum with the cavalry. In all the various engagements and in the flight roughly 250 of them died.
Note
1. The shield-bearers were helotic attendants who, among other things, carried the hoplites’ shields when on the march. A cavalry mora was composed of perhaps sixty horsemen.
See WEB 31.11 for Iphicrates’ military reforms in later years.
Questions
1. Why were the peltasts so successful against the Spartan hoplites? How could they be neutralized?
2. Compare the equipment of Iphicrates’ troops (WEB 31.11) with that of the Classical hoplite (8.1: “Hoplites and Their Weapons”). What were the differences and their likely impact?
31.12 The Peace of Antalcidas (388/7)
Athenian victories in Greece and in the Aegean led to a change of policy in both Persia and Sparta. Athens’ support of the revolt of the Cyprian ruler Evagoras against Persia made the Persian king more attentive to Spartan claims that the greatest threat to his western front came not from Sparta but from his old Athenian enemy. Sparta also dropped its Panhellenic mission of freeing the Asian Greeks in favor of a Persian alliance that would secure Persian hegemony in Asia Minor. The man most intimately associated with these developments was the Spartan diplomat and general Antalcidas, but Agesilaus must have given Antalcidas the go-ahead.
In 388/7 Antalcidas, who held the office of admiral (anarchies), and Tiribazus, the satrap, obtained peace terms and promises of military aid from king Artaxerxes. The key to ending the Corinthian War was Athens. Accordingly, Antalcidas assembled a navy, took control of the Hellespont, and diverted grain ships sailing to Athens to other destinations. This, and the new Spartan–Persian alliance, convinced Athens to agree to stop the war, and her mainland allies followed suit. Xenophon sums up the motives of the warring parties for joining this common peace and reports on the royal edict their envoys heard at Sardis that defined peace terms. It became known as the Peace of Antalcidas and included the disbanding of foreign garrisons and the display of copies of the treaty in major Panhellenic sanctuaries. The two major beneficiaries of the peace were Persia, which regained control over Asia Minor, and Sparta, which was now the enforcer of peace and autonomy and the undisputed hegemonic power in Greece.
Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.29–31
(5.1.29) When they saw the large number of enemy ships, the Athenians were afraid of being totally crushed as they had been before, the king having now become an ally of the Spartans, and they were also suffering depredations at the hands of raiders based in Aegina. For these reasons they were very eager to make peace. The Spartans, too, were fed up with the war. They had a mora garrisoning Lechaeum, and another garrisoning Orchomenus; they were keeping an eye on their allied states, both those they trusted, so they would not be destroyed, and those they did not trust, so they would not secede; and there was all the trouble they were facing and themselves causing around Corinth. The Argives, too, were all for peace. They knew that the Spartans had called a troop-levy against them, and that the excuse of “the sacred months”1 would no longer be of any use to them. (1.30) So when Tiribazus sent instructions for a meeting of all those wanting to hear the terms of the peace treaty that the king was sending them, they all quickly appeared on the scene. When they had assembled, Tiribazus showed them the king’s seal and read out the message. It went as follows:
(1.31) “King Artaxerxes considers it just that cities in Asia should belong to him, along with Clazomenae and Cyprus of the islands.2 The other Greek cities he thinks should be left autonomous, whether great or small, apart from Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which should belong to the Athenians as they did of old. If either side refuses to accept this peace, I shall, joining the side wanting to accept it, make war on those people by land and sea, using my fleet and my resources.”
Notes
1. In 388 the Argives redated a festival and its holy truce in a failed attempt to stop a Spartan invasion.
2. Cyprus was in revolt at the time, and Clazomenae was independent.
See WEB 31.13 for explanatory comments on the significance of the Peace of Antalcidas and its character as a “Common Peace.”
Questions
1. Why did the main powers in Greece sign the Peace of Antalcidas?
2. What were the terms of the peace? Who were its major beneficiaries and why (31.12, WEB 31.13).
31.14 The Call for a Panhellenic Campaign Against Persia
Some Greeks, full of patriotic indignation, regarded the Peace of Antalcidas as a disgraceful sellout. For them it proved the need to assert a Panhellenic identity and take common action against the barbarian Persian enemy. See WEB 36.8.I–III (“Contrasting Greeks with Barbarians”) for the Greek/barbarian dichotomy and Greek images of barbarians.
Already in the fifth century, some Greek intellectuals argued that the solution to the political, social, and economic problems that beset the Greeks at home was to unite in a war against the Persians. In the fourth century, Isocrates was among the most prominent authors to call for homonoia (concord) among the Greeks by conducting such a campaign. He tried in the course of his long career to persuade different states and rulers to lead it in the hope that it would solve domestic problems such as poverty and homelessness. In his literary speech Panegyricus (from panegyris, a festive assembly), written on the occasion of the 380 Olympics, he reproaches Sparta for treating Greeks like enemies and for signing the Peace of Antalcidas with Persia. He strongly promotes the claim of Athens to lead Greece, and calls upon both states to share command of a Greek campaign against Persia. Isocrates was an Athenian patriot, but he did not cynically use the idea of a Panhellenic crusade to promote Athenian interests. In the following extracts, he discusses the benefits and justice of pursuing a predatory policy against the Persians.
Isocrates 4 Panegyricus 133–134, 150–152, 173–174
(133) I think that if people coming here from elsewhere saw the current state of affairs they would charge both of us with sheer lunacy. For we expose ourselves to such risks for little gain, when it is possible for us to have considerable possessions without fear, and we are destroying our own lands while we omit to derive profit from Asia. (134) For the Persian king nothing is more important than looking for ways to insure that we shall never stop our internecine fighting. And we for our part are so far from throwing his affairs into confusion, or creating discord for him, that when chance produces conflicts for him we actually try to help him bring them to an end. Indeed, there are now two armies operating in Cyprus, and we allow him to make use of the one, and to put the other under siege – and both of them belong to Greece.1
Note
1. Isocrates refers to Greek mercenaries who fought one another in the service of the Persians and the Cyprian king Evagoras, respectively.
Isocrates goes on to give examples of military campaigns that showed the Persians’ weakness and deficiency as warriors.
(150) Yet none of these events was beyond understanding; all turned out as one might expect. For it is not possible for men brought up like that, and living under such a form of government, to have courage as others do, or to set a victory trophy over their enemy in the battlefield. How could a brilliant commander or fine soldier spring up in an environment like theirs? The bulk of them constitute an unruly mob with no experience of danger, faint-hearted with regard to warfare, and better schooled in servitude than slaves are amongst us.
(151) Those enjoying the greatest reputation, on the other hand, have never lived on terms of equality, developing social or citizen-like sensibilities. Instead, they spend all their time humiliating some people and being subservient to others, which is the most effective way in which human nature can be corrupted. Because of their wealth they become physically soft, but because of their monarchical rule they are in spirit abject and fearful, putting in an appearance at the palace and prostrating themselves1 and taking every opportunity to habituate themselves to self-limitation. They do obeisance before a mortal man, address him as a god, and have less regard for the deities than they do for human beings.
(152) As a result, those of them who come down to the coast – the so-called “satraps” – feel no shame about their upbringing there but, rather, continue with the same mores. They are treacherous to their friends and cowardly before the enemy; their lives are a combination of self-abasement and superciliousness; and they despise their allies and fawn on their enemies …
Note
1. Persian custom ordained inferiors to do obeisance to their superiors, which the Greeks misinterpreted as a sign of worshipping the king.
Toward the end of the speech Isocrates sums up his plan for achieving peace and concord among the Greeks by means of a war against the barbarians.
(173) We must push aside these schemes and embark on such projects as will make living in our cities safer and our interrelationship more trustworthy. What is to be said about this is simple and straightforward. A lasting peace cannot be reestablished without our joining forces to combat the barbarians, nor can the Greeks be united until we derive our gains from the same peoples, and also direct our hazardous ventures against the same peoples. (174) Once this is achieved, and the distress engulfing our lives is removed – for distress destroys friendships, turns family ties into antipathy, and brings all men into conflict and factional strife – then it is certain that we shall be harmonious and feel sincere goodwill toward each other. Accordingly, we must consider our priority to be the removal of the theater of war from here to the continent of Asia in order that we may reap this one benefit from the dangerous situations we have put each other in, namely taking the decision to use against the barbarian the things we have experienced at his hands.
Questions
1. What are the errors of the Greeks’ Persian policy and how should the policy be changed, according to Isocrates?
2. What are the Persians’ deficiencies, according to Isocrates?
3. Were Isocrates’ Persians a mirror image of the Greeks?
Review Questions
1. How did the Spartan–Persian relationship evolve from Agesilaus’ Asian campaign to the Peace of Antalcidas (31.3, 31.5, 31.7, 31.9–10, 31.12, WEB 31.2, WEB 31.6, WEB 31.8, WEB 31.13)?
2. Discuss the role that Persian subsidies played in Greek affairs (see 31.1.A–B, 31.5.A, 31.12, WEB 31.6).
3. What challenges did the Spartan system face and how well did it fare in dealing with them (see 31.3, 31.7, 31.10, WEB 31.4)?
4. What was wrong with the Peace of Antalcidas, according to Isocrates? How would the Greeks who signed it disagree with him (31.12, 31.14)?
5. In what way did Persia benefit from the Peace of Antalcidas (31.12, 31.14, WEB 31.13)?
Suggested Readings
The march of the Ten Thousand: G. Nussbaum 1967; Dillery 1995, 59–109. Spartan hegemony and king Agesilaus: see the Suggested Readings for Chapter 30. The Corinthian War: Hamilton 1979. The Dexileus monument and Athenian cavalry: Low 2002; R&O, 40–43; Fields 2003; Hurwit 2007. Peltasts: Best 1969; J. Anderson 1970, 111–138 (as well as other light-armed troops); Pritchett 1974, 2: 117–125; Griffith 1981; van Wees 2004, 197. The Peace of Antalcidas and the Common Peace: Ryder 1965; Badian 1991; Schmidt 1999. Isocrates and Panhellenism: Flower 2000b.