32
From the Peace of Antalcidas (388/7) to the Battle of Leuctra and Its Aftermath (371)
CHAPTER CONTENTS
32.1 The Boeotian Federation in the Fourth Century
32.2 Greek Federations and the Boeotian Federation Before the Fourth Century203
32.3 Sparta Dissolves Greek Federations in the Name of Autonomy
32.4 Xenophon and Diodorus on the Union Between Argos and Corinth (392–386)
32.5 Spartan Occupation of the Cadmea (Citadel) of Thebes (382)
32.6 Views of the Spartans at the Cadmea
32.7 The Sphodrias Affair (379/8)
32.8 Plutarch on Sphodrias’ Attempt to Capture Piraeus
32.9 The Formation of the Second Athenian League (378/7)
32.10 Desiring Peace
32.11 The Common Peace of
32.12 The Sacred Band
32.13 The Battle of Leuctra (371)
32.14 Plutarch on the Battle of Leuctra
32.15 The Foundation of Messene (370/69)
32.16 The Dissolution of the Peloponnesian League (365)
The Peace of Antalcidas gave Sparta the legitimacy to enforce peace and autonomy in Greece. Agesilaus soon showed how this mission could be cynically and selectively used to enhance Spartan power. This chapter focuses on the high-handed Spartan policy in Greece, the Greeks’ reactions to it, and the end of Spartan hegemonic power. Agesilaus used the principle of autonomy to force the Boeotian federation to disband; the chapter describes both the structure of this confederacy and its dissolution in 386. It then discusses two cases of blatant Spartan violation of the same principle of autonomy. Athens reacted to Sparta’s actions by establishing a second Athenian league, as attested in an inscription produced here. A statue of deified Peace illustrates the longing for peace in this period in Greece, and the chapter includes both an illustration of the statue and a report on the Common Peace of 371. In that same year Sparta lost the battle of Leuctra to Thebes. The chapter reports on the elite unit of the Sacred Band that contributed to the Theban victory and produces accounts of the battle itself. It then describes how the Spartans’ loss was greatly augmented by the Theban foundation of an independent Messene. It concludes by documenting the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League.
32.1 The Boeotian Federation in the Fourth Century
Greek federations allegedly violated the principle of autonomy of the single polis, and Agesilaus used this principle to disband federations he regarded as a threat to Sparta. Among them were the union between Corinth and Argos and the Boeotian federation. The latter was an old institution, and a discussion about its structure is warranted at this point.
The best account of the organization and government of the Boeotian federation comes from the Oxyrhynchian historian. The author describes the federation’s structure in the context of the outbreak of the Corinthian War (31.5). It is hard to imagine, however, that its earlier or later government were significantly different. The hegemonic status of Thebes is demonstrated by the fact that Thebes had more Boeotarchs (generals and chief magistrates) than any other state, that it provided more troops and money, and that the federal council met in its citadel of the Cadmea.
Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 16.3–4
(16.3) They continued to administer their own civic affairs in this manner, but the method laid down for administration of Boeotian affairs was as follows. All people living in the land were divided into eleven districts [sg. meros], and each of these districts would furnish one Boeotarch. The Thebans provided four, two for the city and two more for Plataea, Scolus, Erythrae, Scaphae, and for the other districts formerly part of their polity but at that time subject to Thebes. Two Boeotarchs were supplied by Orchomenus and Hysiae; two by Thespiae along with Eutresis and Thisbae; one by Tanagra; and another by Haliartus, Lebadea, and Coronea, each of the towns sending one in its turn; and one would also go from Acraephnium, Copae, and Chaeronea on the same principle.
(16.4) This, then, was the manner in which the districts produced their magistrates. They also provided sixty council members for each Boeotarch and provided them with per diem expenses. In the case of the army, each district was ordered to provide about a thousand hoplites and a hundred cavalrymen. Simply put, it was the number of magistrates that determined how far they profited from the common weal, to what extent they paid taxes, sent jurymen, and shared all of the disadvantages and advantages of the community. Their entire people was run in this manner, and the councils and communal assemblies of Boeotia sat on the Cadmea.
After the Boeotian federation was disbanded by Agesilaus in 386 and reconstructed in the 370s, it had an archon, an assembly, and seven Boeotarchs. The new organization was more democratic, but Thebes continued to dominate the league quite aggressively. In 373–371, Thebes destroyed the Boeotian cities of Plataea and Thespiae and turned their residents into refugees.
Figure 32.1 shows a Boeotian silver coin from 395–387. Like other federal coins it shows the Boeotian buckler or shield on the obverse. The reverse shows the infant Heracles strangling two serpents; to the right is a bow, which was one of Heracles’ weapons. According to the myth, Heracles killed serpents placed in his cradle by Hera, Zeus’ jealous wife. Heracles’ mortal parents came from Thebes and he figured prominently on Boeotian coins. The letters Th E stand for Thebaion. Many federal coins were minted in Thebes.
Figure 32.1 A Boeotian federal coin. © The Trustees of the British Museum.
Image not available in this digital edition.
See WEB 32.2 for more on Greek federations and the Boeotian federation before the fourth century as well as a link to Boeotian coins.
Questions
1. Describe the structure of the Boeotian federation from the bottom up (see also WEB 32.2).
2. How did the federation restrict the autonomy of its individual constituents?
32.3 Sparta Dissolves Greek Federations in the Name of Autonomy
One of the principles of the Peace of Antalcidas that ended the Corinthian War in 387 was the preservation of Greek autonomy. This was supposed to protect individual poleis from more powerful states. Shortly after the meeting in Sardis where the peace was announced, representatives of different states came to sign it in Sparta. Agesilaus used the occasion to dissolve the Boeotian federation; later (386), he disbanded the Argive–Corinthian union. His actions were ostensibly to promote autonomy, but in fact they were in Sparta’s interests. The union between Argos and Corinth (392–386) is described by Xenophon and Diodorus in WEB 32.4.
The disbanding of both the Argive–Corinthian union and the Boeotian federation demonstrated the failure of political units larger than the polis to face up to external threats, which had been partly the reason for their creation.
Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.32–34
(5.1.32) After listening to this, the representatives of the Greek city-states reported back to their various states. And they all swore to ratify the accords, except for the Thebans, who claimed that they should take the oath on behalf of all Boeotians. Agesilaus, however, refused to accept the oaths unless they swore, following the instructions in the king’s letter, that every state would be autonomous, be it large or small. The representatives of the Thebans, however, said they had received no such instructions. “Then go now and ask your people about it,” said Agesilaus. “And add this to your report, that if they do not conform, they will have no place in the treaty.” With that the representatives left.
(1.33) Because of his animosity toward the Thebans, however, Agesilaus lost no time in winning over the ephors and immediately making the sacrificial offering. The border-crossing sacrifices were favorable, and on arrival in Tegea he sent a number of horsemen off in various directions to hurry on the mobilization of the perioeci, and he also sent mercenary commanders to the allied cities. Before he moved out of Tegea, however, the Thebans arrived declaring that they would allow the city-states to be independent. The Spartans accordingly went home, and the Thebans were obliged to comply with the treaty, leaving the cities of Boeotia independent.
(1.34) The Corinthians, however, would not discharge their Argive garrison.1 Agesilaus then made a public declaration to these people threatening them with war – against the Corinthians if they failed to discharge the Argives, and against the Argives if they failed to leave Corinth. Both parties were fearful, and so the Argives left and the city of Corinth became an independent state. Those guilty of the bloodbath and their accomplices left Corinth of their own accord, and the rest of the citizens willingly took back those who had been exiled earlier.2
Notes
1. Corinth and Argos formed a united polis called Argos, which Agesilaus forced them to disband: see WEB 32.4.
2. Xenophon refers to a violent stasis in Corinth that preceded the union with Argos, which resulted in the temporary exile of pro-Spartan opponents of the union.
Question
1. How did disbanding the Boeotian federation and the Argive–Corinthian union serve Spartan interests?
32.5 Spartan Occupation of the Cadmea (Citadel) of Thebes (382)
In 382, two Chalcidian cities that feared being absorbed into the Chalcidian federation led by Olynthus invoked autonomy in their appeal to Sparta for help, and the Spartans obliged. For the first time in the history of the Peloponnesian League, allies could contribute money instead of troops for the campaign, perhaps because they were unable or reluctant to send soldiers. Sparta used the money to hire mercenaries (Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.21–22) and sent to Chalcidice a force led by Eudamidas. Later the Spartans sent him reinforcements under the command of his brother, Phoebidas. On his way to Chalcidice, Phoebidas passed through Boeotia to collect forces drafted by his brother. There he blatantly violated the principle of autonomy espoused by the Spartans.
Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.25–29, 32, 35–36
(5.2.25) After bringing together what remained of Eudamidas’ men, Phoebidas took command of them and set off on his march. On reaching Thebes, they encamped outside the city, in the vicinity of the gymnasium. Thebes was in the throes of factional strife, and Ismenias and Leontiades, who happened to be polemarchs,1 were at loggerheads, and each was the leader of one of the two opposing political groups [sg. hetaireia]. Because of his hatred for the Spartans, Ismenias did not even approach Phoebidas. Leontiades, by contrast, made a point of cultivating him and, after establishing a close relationship, he spoke to him as follows:
(2.26) “Phoebidas, it is possible for you to render your fatherland the greatest service on this day. If you follow me with your hoplites, I shall lead you to the acropolis. Once that is done, you can count on it that Thebes will be entirely in the power of the Spartans and of us, your friends. (2.27) Now, as you can see, there has been a proclamation expressly forbidding any Theban from joining your campaign against Olynthus. If you join us in putting our plan into action, however, we shall immediately send many hoplites and many cavalrymen along with you. The result will be that you will assist your brother with a large force and, while he is making ready to bring Olynthus under his control, you will have already brought Thebes, a much greater city than Olynthus, under yours.”
(2.28) Hearing this, Phoebidas was elated. To bring off some brilliant stroke was something for which he felt greater passion than he did for living; but he was an impetuous and not very prudent man. When he agreed to the plan, Leontiades told him to set off, as if he were all prepared to make his departure from the city. “When the moment arrives,” said Leontiades, “I shall come to you and personally guide you.”
(2.29) The Council was then in session in the stoa in the agora, since the women were celebrating the Thesmophoria2 on the Cadmea; and, as it was summer and the middle of the day, the streets were pretty much deserted. This was when Leontiades rode out on his horse and made Phoebidas turn back. He led him straight to the acropolis, where he installed him and his troops, and gave him the key to the gates. Then, after instructing him not to allow anyone access to the acropolis without his authorization, he went straight to the Council.
Notes
1. The polemarch was a Theban magistrate who replaced the former Boeotarch.
2. The Thesmophoria was a festival celebrated exclusively by women in honor of Demeter.
Leontiades then told the Theban Council that the Lacedaemonians had seized the Cadmea, Thebes’ citadel, and that he had arrested the democratic leader Ismenias. Three hundred of Ismenias’ supporters fled to Athens.
(5.2.32) This done, the Thebans chose another polemarch to replace Ismenias, and Leontiades immediately proceeded to Sparta. There he found the ephors and most of the city displeased with Phoebidas for having taken such action without his city’s authorization. Agesilaus’ response was that if Phoebidas’ initiative had been detrimental to Lacedaemon, he would deserve punishment, but if it had been beneficial then it was the custom of old to allow such improvisation. “This, then, is the one germane consideration, whether what was done was good or bad for us.”
Leontiades spoke in the Spartan assembly and said that the new government would reverse Thebes’ anti-Spartan policy.
(5.2.35) Hearing this, the Spartans decided that, since the acropolis had been seized anyway, they would keep it garrisoned and put Ismenias on trial.1 After this they sent out as his judges three men from Sparta, and one from each allied state, great or small. It was only when the court was in session that the charges were brought against Ismenias, and they were: that he promoted the barbarian’s interests; that he had done Greece no good by becoming the Persian satrap’s friend; that he had taken a share of the king’s money; and that he and Androcleidas were the men most responsible for all the turmoil in Greece.2 (2.36) Ismenias mounted a defense against all the charges, but failed to convince his hearers that he was not a man of mischievous undertakings on a grand scale. He was condemned and executed. Leontiades’ followers were now in possession of the city, and they provided even greater services for the Lacedaemonians than was actually required of them.
Notes
1. According to Diodorus (15.20.2: 32.6.I), the Spartans fined Phoebidas.
2. Taking the king’s money referred to Persian subsidies of Sparta’s opponents prior to the Corinthian War. Androcleidas was an anti-Spartan leader at Thebes.
Plutarch (Agesilaus 24.1) mentions suspicions that Phoebidas followed Agesilaus’ directives, while Diodorus of Sicily reports that the Spartans planned secretly to capture the Cadmea: see WEB 32.6.I.
Scholars are divided about Agesilaus’ involvement, and it is not easy to dispel the cloud of suspicion that hangs over him. The consequences of the capture of the Cadmea are clearer, however. Sparta lost the moral high ground of enforcing autonomy on others and provided ammunition to her critics. She also made other Greek states, especially Athens, both resentful and suspicious. Even the pro-Spartan Xenophon thought that Sparta did wrong: see WEB 32.6.II.
Questions
1. Who was chiefly responsible for Phoebidas’ occupation of the Cadmea according to Xenophon (32.5) and Diodorus (WEB 32.6.I)? Which version is the more likely and why (cf. WEB 32.6.II)?
2. Why were the Spartans displeased with Phoebidas and why did they then change their minds?
3. What might have been Ismenias’ defense in his trial (cf. 31.5.B: “Greek Grievances Against Sparta”)?
32.7 The Sphodrias Affair (379/8)
The pro-Spartan government in Thebes held firm for just a few years. In 379/8, Theban exiles, assisted by Athens, sneaked into the city, eliminated the oligarchy, and established democracy there. The Spartan governor of the Cadmea withdrew his force and was punished for it at home. Then came an attempted raid of Attica that exacerbated Sparta’s already tense relationship with Athens. Xenophon reports that the new democratic Theban government bribed Sphodrias, the Spartan commander (harmost) in Thespiae in Boeotia, to invade Attica.
32.7.A Sphodrias Invades Attica
Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.20–23
(5.4.20) In the case of the Thebans, they too were fearful, but their fear was that nobody would take on the fight with Spartans apart from themselves, and they came up with the following ploy. They persuaded Sphodrias, the harmost in Thespiae (they gave him money, it was suspected), to invade Attica, the aim being to set the Athenians on a war footing with the Spartans. Sphodrias agreed, and claimed that he would take Piraeus because it was still without gates. He then had his men eat early, and led them from Thespiae, saying that they would complete the march to Piraeus before dawn. (4.21) However, they were only at Thria [in western Attica] when day was breaking, and then Sphodrias did nothing to conceal his position. In fact, when turning back, he took off cattle as plunder and put the torch to homesteads. Moreover, a number of people who had encountered him during the night fled to the city and reported to the Athenians the approach of an army of considerable size. The Athenians, cavalry as well as hoplites, immediately took up arms and stood on guard over the city.
(4.22) There also happened to be in Athens some ambassadors of the Spartans – Etymocles, Aristolochus, and Ocyllus – and they were at the house of their guest-friend [proxenos] Callias. When the incident was reported, the Athenians arrested them and kept them under guard in the belief that they, too, were involved in the plot. These men, however, were thunderstruck at what had happened, and defended themselves on the grounds that they would not have been such imbeciles as to place themselves in the hands of the Athenians within the city had they known of the attempt to capture Piraeus – and at their guest-friend’s house, at that, where they would have been found in an instant! (4.23) They further stated that it would become clear to the Athenians, too, that the city of Sparta had no knowledge of these events – they were sure, they said, that they would hear of Sphodrias’ execution by the city. The ambassadors were then judged to have no knowledge of the affair and were released.
See WEB 32.8 for Plutarch’s different version of Sphodrias’ attempt to capture Piraeus and his possible motives.
What scandalized the Greeks, and especially Athens, was Sphodrias’ fate. Instead of being punished, he was acquitted in a way that shows the workings of personal networks in Sparta.
32.7.B Sphodrias’ Acquittal
Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.24–26
(5.4.24) The ephors recalled Sphodrias and indicted him on a capital charge. Sphodrias, in fear, did not appear to face the charge, but even so, despite his failure to appear in court, he was acquitted. To many that seemed to be the most unjust verdict ever given in Sparta. There was a reason for it, however, which is as follows.
(4.25) Sphodrias had a son, Cleonymus, who was at the age of having just left boyhood, and he was the finest looking and most respected of those of his generation. Archidamus [III], Agesilaus’ son, happened to be in love with him. Now Cleombrotus’ friends, being close comrades [hetairoi] of Sphodrias, were all for acquitting him, but they were afraid of Agesilaus and his friends and, indeed, of those who stood between the two camps – for what Sphodrias had done seemed terrible. (4.26) Sphodrias therefore said to Cleonymus: “Son, you can save your father if you plead with Archidamus to get Agesilaus on my side at the trial.” And on hearing this, Cleonymus did venture to approach Archidamus and beg him to become, for his sake, his father’s savior.
Cleonymus pleaded with Archidamus to ask his father to intervene on Sphodrias’ behalf, and Archidamus reluctantly agreed. Agesilaus at first would not hear of it but later changed his mind. Xenophon lets another Spartan, Etymocles, explain his reasons.
Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.32
One of Sphodrias’ friends, in conversation with Etymocles, remarked: “I suppose all you friends of Agesilaus want to execute Sphodrias.” Etymocles replied: “By Zeus, we shan’t be in accord with Agesilaus in that case. He says the same thing to everyone he talks to – that it is impossible to find Sphodrias not guilty but that, when a person as child, boy, and young man has continually acted with honor, it is difficult to execute such a man, since Sparta needs soldiers of this sort.”
Questions
1. What led Sphodrias to try to attack Piraeus, according to Xenophon (32.7.A) and Plutarch (WEB 32.8? What is similar and different in their accounts?
2. What made the acquittal of Sphodrias “the most unjust verdict ever given in Sparta” (32.7.B)?
3. Why was Agesilaus’ justification of Sphodrias’ acquittal acceptable in Sparta (32.7.B)?
32.9 The Formation of the Second Athenian League (378/7)
The Athenians formed the Second Athenian League following the Spartan blunders of capturing the Cadmea and Sphodrias’ failed raid on Attica. The two incidents gave Athens the freedom and justification to build a system of alliances that promised to adhere more faithfully than Sparta to the principles of the Peace of Antalcidas.
In 378/7 Athens invited Greeks and barbarians to join it in forming a multiple defensive alliance. Xenophon fails to mention the foundation of the Second Athenian League, but Athenian inscriptions, and especially what is known as the “Decree of Aristoteles,” as well as Diodorus’ history provide information about it. The decree shows an effort to comply with the Peace of Antalcidas and thus not to give Sparta or the Persian king reason to oppose it. It even implies that Sparta violated the Common Peace (lines 9–12). The Athenians are careful to impress upon the allies that they do not aim to imitate their ancestors and create a second Athenian empire. The inscription is followed by a list of members that starts on the front of the stele and continues to its left side. Over a period of time names were added and erased, thus reflecting the league’s history. The extant list includes approximately fifty-eight names, although Diodorus (15.30.2) mentions seventy members and the orator Aeschines seventy-five (2 On the False Embassy 70). Generally, new members joined the league following a show of Athenian force in their regions, either in support of or threatening them. After 375–373 the Athenians stopped adding new names for reasons that are unknown. Lines 12–15 are a modern reconstruction following their erasure, perhaps when Athens was on bad terms with Persia.
32.9.A The Decree of Aristoteles
The Decree of Aristoteles IG II2 43 = R&O no. 221
Translation: R&O no. 22, pp. 92–99
In the archonship of Nausinicus [378/7]; Callibius, son of Cephisophon, of Paeania, was secretary; in the seventh prytany, of Hippothontis; resolved by the council and the people; Charinus of Athmonum was chairman. Aristoteles proposed:2
(7) For the good Fortune of the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians. So that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in security, [and so that the peace and friendship sworn by the Greeks and the King in accordance with the agreements may be in force and endured]3 be it decreed by the people:
(15) If any of the Greeks or of the barbarians living in Europe or of the islanders, who are not the King’s, wishes to be an ally of the Athenians and their allies, he may be – being free and autonomous, being governed under whatever form of government he wishes, neither receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor nor paying tribute, on the same terms as the Chians and the Thebans and the other allies.4
(25) For those who make alliance with the Athenians and the allies, the people shall renounce whatever Athenian possessions there happen to be, whether private or public, in the territory of those who make the alliance, and concerning these things the Athenians shall give a pledge.5 For whichever of the cities which make the alliance with the Athenians there happen to be unfavorable steles at Athens, the council currently in office shall have power to demolish them.
(35) From the archonship of Nausinicus it shall not be permitted either privately or publicly to any of the Athenians to acquire either a house or land in the territory of the allies, either by purchase or by taking security or in any other way. If any one does buy or acquire or take as security in any way whatever, it shall be permitted to whoever wishes of the allies to expose it to the synedroi [council’s delegates] the allies; the synedroi shall sell it and give one half to the man who exposed, while the other shall be the common property of the allies.
(46) If any one goes for war against those who have made the alliance, either by land or by sea, the Athenians and the allies shall go to support these both by land and by sea with all their strength as far as possible.
(51) If any one proposes or puts to the vote, whether official or private citizen, contrary to this decree that any of the things stated in this decree ought to be undone, the result shall be that he shall be deprived of his rights, and his property shall become public and a tenth belong to the Goddess, and he shall be judged by the Athenians and the allies for breaking up the alliance.6 He shall be punished with death or with exile from wherever the Athenians and the allies control; and, if he is assessed for death, he shall not be buried in Attica or in the territory of the allies.
(63) This decree shall be written up by the secretary of the council on a stone stele and set down besides Zeus Eleutherios; the money for the writing-up of the stele shall be sixty drachmas, given from the ten talents by the treasurers of the Goddess.7 On this stele shall be inscribed the names of the cities, which are allies and any other which becomes an ally. This is to be inscribed.
(72) The people shall choose immediately three envoys to Thebes, who are to persuade the Thebans of whatever good thing they can.8 The following were chosen: Aristoteles of Marathon, Pyrrhandrus of Anaphlystis, Thrasybulus of Collytus.9
(79–83) Chios; Mytilene; Methymna; Rhodes; Byzantium.
(79) Thebes
(80–84) Chalcis; Eretria; Arethusa; Carystus; Icus.
(85–89) Perinthus; Peparethus; Sciathus; Maronea; Dium.
(79) Tenedos
(82) Poeessa
(i. 89) Paros; O –; Athenae (Diades); P –
(ii. 85–90) Pall (?) –
(131–134) The People of Zacynthus in Nellus.
(97–130) The People of Pyrrha; Abdera; Thasos; the Chalcidians from Thrace; Aenus; Samothrace; Dicaeopolis; Acarnania; of Cephallenia: Pronni; Alcetas; Neoptolemus; [erasure];10 Andros; Tenos; Hestiaea; Myconus; Antissa; Eresus; Astraeus; of Ceos: Iulis, Carthaea, Coresia; Elaeus; Amorgus; Selymbria; Siphnus; Sicinus; Dium from Thrace; Neapolis.
Notes
1. The translation does not distinguish between the restored and legible parts of the inscription.
2. The third-century CE author Diogenes Laertius (5.1.35) identifies Aristoteles as a writer of forensic speeches.
3. The restoration of these lines follows S. Accame, La lega Ateniese del sec. IV a./C. (Rome, 1941), p. 51.
4. In 384/3 the Athenians made a defensive alliance with the island of Chios that might have served as a precedent or model for the present treaty: IG II2 34 = Harding no. 31, p. 45. A fragmentary inscription has also survived of an Athenian treaty with Thebes in 378/7 (IG II2 40 = Harding no. 33).
5. The renouncing of Athenian property abroad did not include possessions in Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros.
6. It is unclear whether the violator would be judged by the synedrion (allies’ council) and an Athenian court or, less likely, by a joint court.
7. The cost of sixty drachmas for the stele was at least double that of other steles. The ten talents was apparently a fund designed for such purposes.
8. Since Thebes was already a member, the purpose of this embassy is unclear.
9. The membership list follows attempts to reconstruct the order in which members were inscribed.
10. Following Neoptolemus, a name ending with an N was erased. Against the common restoration of it as Iason, that is, the Thessalian potentate Jason of Pherae, is the strong possibility that the name had six letters. For Jason see WEB Chapter 33.
32.9.B Diodorus on the Second Athenian League
Diodorus also reports on the foundation of the league. I follow the scholarly view that he misdates it to 377/6 instead of 379/8, and mistakenly places it prior to Sphodrias’ abortive invasion of Attica. Diodorus adds elsewhere that “the Athenians also voted to restore the lands that had been made into cleruchies to those who had earlier been the owners, and passed a law that none of the Athenians should farm outside Attica” (15.29.8). The dismantling of cleruchies did not include those on Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. In 365 Athens colonized Samos.
Diodorus of Sicily 15.28.2–5
(15.28.2) The Athenians sent the most respected of their number as ambassadors to the states aligned with Sparta and appealed to them to espouse the notion of liberty that they all shared. For because of the extent of the power they wielded around them, the Spartans were disdainful and oppressive in their rule of subject states, and as a result many of those aligned with them began to fall away and turn toward Athens. (28.3) The first to heed the call to secession were the Chians and Byzantines, to be followed by the Rhodians, the Mytileneans, and a number of other island peoples. In the ever-increasing momentum toward this goal amongst the Greeks, a large number of city-states joined the Athenians. The Athenian people were elated by the favor shown by the states, and established a joint council for all the allies, appointing councilors from each state. (28.4) By general agreement it was determined that the council should sit in Athens, but that every city, large or small, should be of equal status and have one vote, and that all should be autonomous but regard Athens as their leader.
The Spartans could see that the city-states’ impetus to secede was unstoppable, but they still aspired to bring the secessionists back into line by means of deputations, kind words, and even promises of favors. (28.5) In addition, they applied their thoughts assiduously to war preparations, since they expected the war with Boeotia to be for them momentous and long-protracted because the Athenians, and the rest of the Greeks who were members of the council, were allies of the Thebans.
Diodorus wrongly claims that Athens appointed the allies’ representatives. In fact, the allies’ council (synedrion) did not include Athenian representatives and operated separately from the Athenian Council. The synedrion put proposals to the Athenian assembly, which discussed them, but it could not impose conditions that the allies opposed. It is unclear how the league’s operations were financed. Apparently each member paid for its own forces on an ad hoc basis. Later, money was collected but, to avoid the odor of empire, the terminology was changed from phoros (tribute) to syntaxis (contribution).
Harpocration Lexicon s.v. Syntaxis = Harding no. 36
They used to call the payments of phoroi [tributes] “syntaxeis” [contributions] because the Greeks disliked the name “phoroi.” Theopompus says in the tenth book of the Philippics that Callistratus named them thus [FGrHist 115 F 98].1
Note
1. If Callistratus is Callistratus of Aphidna, he was a prominent Athenian politician and orator, who was put to death in 355.
32.9.C “Contributions” to the League
Questions
1. What were the goals of the new Athenian alliance, according to Aristotele’s decree (32.9.A)? According to Diodorus (32.9.B)?
2. What were the league’s institutions and how did they operate (32.9.A–B)?
3. What were the allies, including Athens, allowed and forbidden to do under the treaty (32.9.A)?
4. What might have deterred a Greek city from joining the league (32.9.A–C)?
Figure 32.2 Eirene with Wealth (Plutus). München, Staatliche Antikensammlungen und Glyptothek. Photo © bpk.
Image not available in this digital edition.
32.10 Desiring Peace
Following the foundation of the league, Athens and Thebes, which regained her hegemonic power in most of Boeotia, cooperated against Sparta. In 375, Sparta and Athens, as well as the Persian king who needed mercenaries, arranged for a common peace that was immediately broken. Yet Athens was unnerved by Thebes’ increasing power, her destruction of Plataea, and her operations against Thespiae and Phocis. In 371 Athens called for a Greek congress in Sparta to discuss a common peace. Expectations for peace must have been high for quite some time. In 375/4, Athens instituted a cult for Eirene, Peace, and no later than 369/8 commissioned a bronze statue of this personified deity from the sculptor Cephisodotus. Eirene stood holding a scepter in one hand and carrying the child Plutus, Wealth, in the other. She wore a peplos, a heavy woolen garment, that underlined her maternal, nurturing figure as well as the theme of fertility. Together with the figure of Wealth, Eirene expressed the Athenian yearning for times of peace and prosperity. Figure 32.2 shows a marble Roman copy of the statue, with Eirene’s right arm, Plutus’ arms, and the jug restored.
32.11 The Common Peace of 371
The Greek congress in Sparta in 371 that was initiated by Athens decided on the following peace terms.
Xenophon Hellenica 6.3.18
… Harmosts were to be withdrawn from the cities; armed forces, both naval and land, were to be disbanded; and the city-states were to be left autonomous. In the case of contravention of these terms, anyone so wishing could help the cities suffering the injury, but anyone not so wishing was not bound by oath to fight alongside the injured parties.
32.11.A The Terms of the Common Peace of 371
The ancient accounts diverge at this point. According to Xenophon, when the Thebans asked to amend the list of signatories to the peace from “Thebans” to “Boeotians,” Agesilaus refused and gave the Thebans the option of excluding themselves from the peace. Xenophon says that this made the Athenians glad and hopeful for the destruction of Thebes, while the gloomy Thebans went home (Hellenica 6.4.19–20). Plutarch’s version of these events is different. He describes a confrontation between Agesilaus and the Theban leader Epaminondas, who spoke in the name of freedom and equality, and substituted Sparta for Persia as the Greeks’ common enemy. He also extended the principle of autonomy into Laconia proper when he questioned the legitimacy of Spartan control over the perioeci. He would later give freedom and autonomy to the Messenians (but not to the cities of Boeotia: 32.15).
Plutarch Agesilaus 27.3–28.2
(27.3) … A comprehensive peace seemed to all parties to be a good idea, and ambassadors from all over Greece converged on Sparta to arrange the cessation of hostilities. (27.4) One of these was Epaminondas, a man reputed for his learning and philosophy, but who had not yet demonstrated his capabilities in military strategy.1 Epaminondas saw all the others deferring to Agesilaus, and he alone had the spirit to speak frankly. He embarked on a speech that was not on behalf of Thebes, but on behalf of Greece in general, pointing out that war made Sparta stronger, but only at the cost of suffering in all the other states, and he urged that peace be settled on a footing of equality and justice. Peace would endure, he said, only when all the signatories were on equal terms.
(28.1) Agesilaus saw that the Greeks were listening to Epaminondas with great admiration and rapt attention, and so he asked him if he thought justice and equality demanded that Boeotia’s cities be independent. This drew a swift and bold reply from Epaminondas, who asked in turn if Agesilaus thought justice demanded that the cities of Laconia be independent. At this Agesilaus jumped to his feet and angrily told him to state clearly whether he would make the Boeotian cities independent. (28.2) Epaminondas merely restated the very same question, whether Agesilaus would make the Laconian towns independent, and Agesilaus became so truculent that he welcomed the excuse to immediately erase the name of Thebes from the treaty and declare war on her. He then told the rest of the Greeks to leave, since they were by and large reconciled and would settle what was remediable with the peace treaty, and what was not with war. For it was difficult to clear away and resolve all their disputes.
Note
1. Epaminondas was a pupil of the Pythagorean philosopher Lysis of Taras and a man reputed to be indifferent to poverty.
32.11.B Epaminondas in Sparta
Questions
1. How was the Common Peace of 371 different from the Common Peace of Antalcidas of 388/7 (31.12)?
2. What was the cause of disagreement between Sparta and the Boeotians in the Greek congress of 371? Who was in the right?
3. To what extent was the dispute between Sparta and Boeotia reflected in the terms of the Common Peace of 371?
32.12 The Sacred Band
The dispute in the peace congress in Sparta led to the battle of Leuctra in 371 between the Spartans and Thebans and their respective allies. The Theban contingents included a unit called the Sacred Band (hieros lochos), which has attracted much attention. It was an elite force of 300 hoplites who were said to be pairs of male lovers. If true, the Thebans, like the Spartans, used homoerotic relationship to foster martial solidarity. The unit was maintained at public expense. It excelled under the Theban general Pelopidas, who was instrumental in the creation of Theban hegemony in Greece after the battle of Leuctra.
Plutarch Pelopidas 18.1–3, 5, 19.3
(18.1) It was [the Theban commander] Gorgidas, they say, who first put together the Sacred Band, which consisted of 300 hand-picked men. They had their camp on the Cadmea, and the city provided them with training and upkeep, for which reason they were also called the “City Band” (for people at that time rightly termed the acropoleis cities). Some, however, say that this corps was made up of lovers and their loved ones. (18.2) A playful comment is attributed to [the Theban general] Pammenes to the effect that Homer’s Nestor showed no knowledge of tactics in bidding the Greeks to deploy by tribes and clans [phratries] “so that clan may help clan, and tribe help tribe” [Homer Iliad 2.363]. Rather, says Pammenes, he should have advocated deploying lover next to loved one. In crises, he claims, clansmen do not have much concern for clansmen, nor tribesmen for tribesmen; but a unit constituted on the basis of erotic feelings is inseparable and unbreakable. Lovers, from shame before their loved ones, and loved ones from shame before their lovers, both stand their ground in critical moments to protect each other. (18.3) And this is not surprising, since they have more regard for their partners, even when the partners are absent, than for all others who are present. Witness the man who, when a foe was about to finish him off as he lay on the ground, begged and pleaded with him to drive the sword through his chest, “so that my loved one may not be ashamed at seeing me with the wound in my back.”…
(18.5) The band remained undefeated until the battle of Chaeronea, it is said.1 After that battle, Philip purportedly looked upon the corpses, and stood at that spot on which the 300 lay dead. They had faced his pikes [sarissas], and all of them were lying in their armor, their bodies indiscriminately interspersed with each other. Philip was dumbfounded, and when he was told that this was the company of lovers and their beloved, he shed tears and said: “A miserable death to those who think that these men did, or had done to them, anything disgraceful!”2
(19.3) Gorgidas initially distributed members of this Sacred Band amongst the front ranks and set them in the vanguard of the entire hoplite phalanx. By doing that, however, he did not make the valor of the men conspicuous, nor did he exploit their strength by directing it against a common target. That strength was diluted and mixed in with a mass of troops of inferior quality. However, at Tegyra3 their valor was truly conspicuous. There they fought as a unit and did so around Pelopidas, and so Pelopidas no longer kept them dispersed and scattered but employed them as a unified body, deploying them in the most dangerous positions in his greatest battles.
Notes
1. In 338 Philip of Macedonia and a Greek coalition fought each other in the battle of Chaeronea (38.15).
2. See 38.16.II (“The Monuments of Chaeronea”) for the Thebans’ tomb in Chaeronea.
3. In 375 Pelopidas defeated two Spartan regiments at Tegyra in Boeotia.
32.13 The Battle of Leuctra (371)
The battle of Leuctra in southwestern Boeotia in 371 was one of the most significant battles in Greek history. For reasons of age and politics, Agesilaus stayed home. King Cleombrotus, who was already in Thespiae at that time, led the Peloponnesian forces. The ancient accounts of this battle are at best incomplete, but in general Xenophon describes it from the Spartan point of view, while Plutarch (WEB 32.14) and Diodorus (15.55.1–56.4) describe it from the Theban side. About 10,000–11,000 Peloponnesians fought 6,000–7,000 Boeotians in this battle, but the shortage of Spartan manpower allowed them to contribute only 700 Spartan citizens to the coalition army. Moreover, in the decisive clash between Cleombrotus and Epaminondas, the latter might have enjoyed a numerical superiority.
Epaminondas, the architect of the Theban victory, introduced important tactical innovations. He skillfully integrated infantry and cavalry, but more important was his deployment of the infantry. In a traditional hoplite battle, the strong right wing fought the enemy’s weaker left wing, which was supposed to hold on until its right wing decided the battle. Epaminondas, however, pitted his fifty-deep left wing, that is, his main force, against the enemy’s strong right wing. His advance in oblique formation encouraged Cleombrotus to try to outflank him, thus creating a gap between his troops and the rest of the line. Into this gap Pelopidas rushed with the Sacred Band.
32.13.A Xenophon on the Battle at Leuctra
Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.8–15
(6.4.8) … Cleombrotus’ last council of war was held after lunch and, as they drank a little at midday, people said the wine had stimulated them somewhat. (4.9) Both sides took up arms, and it was clear by now that there would be a battle. So, first of all, the people who had furnished the market, a number of camp-followers, and those who did want to fight began to withdraw from the Boeotian army; but the Spartan mercenaries under Hieron, the Phocian peltasts, and the Heraclean and Phliasian cavalry performed an encircling movement and attacked them as they retreated, turning them around and driving them back to the Boeotian camp. The result was that they greatly increased the size and compactness of the Boeotian force.
(4.10) Next, as the ground between the two armies was even, the Spartans deployed their cavalry before their phalanx, and the Thebans deployed theirs opposite them. The Theban cavalry force was well trained because of the wars with Orchomenus and Thespiae, whereas at that particular time the cavalry of the Spartans was in very poor condition. (4.11) This was because it was the richest Spartans who reared the horses, and the appointed rider came along for a horse only when the troop mobilization was called. He then simply took his mount, and whatever arms were supplied to him, and with no further ado went off to war. Moreover, the men on the horses were physically the least robust and also the least ambitious of the Spartan troops.
(4.12) Such, then, was the cavalry on both sides. As for the phalanx, people said that the Spartans led out each half-company [enomotia]1 three lines deep, and this meant that the total depth of the phalanx was no more than twelve men. The Thebans, however, were formed up no less than fifty shields deep. They reckoned that if they defeated the troops around the king everything else would be easily achieved.
(4.13) Cleombrotus now began to lead his men against the enemy but, right at the start, even before the troops with him were aware that he was moving them forward, the cavalry had actually engaged and that of the Spartans was quickly defeated. As they fled, the horsemen ran into their own hoplites, and in addition the Theban troops were now on the attack. Even so Cleombrotus and his men had the upper hand in the fight at the beginning, and one can confidently make this deduction from this clear piece of evidence, namely that they could not have picked him up and carried him off alive if those fighting alongside him were not then having the best of it. (4.14) However, when the polemarch Dinon had been killed, and Sphodrias, who was one of the king’s tent-companions, and Sphodrias’ son Cleonymus also fell,2 the cavalry, the so-called polemarch’s adjutants, and the others all gave ground, pushed back by the mass of Theban troops. Furthermore, when those on the left wing saw the right being pushed back, they too gave way. They had suffered many casualties and were now defeated but, even so, after crossing the ditch that was before their camp they set their weapons down on the spot from which they had started out. The camp, in fact, was not on completely level terrain, but on rising ground.
After this, some of the Spartans found the disastrous result intolerable, and declared that they should block any enemy attempt to set up a trophy, and try to recover their dead by fighting, not under truce. (4.15) The polemarchs could see, however, that the Spartan dead totaled close to a thousand, and that of the roughly 700 Spartiates in the battle some 400 had been killed. They also observed that all their allies had lost their spirit for the fight, with some not even upset over what had happened; and so they brought together the most important members of the force and considered what to do. They all agreed to gather up the dead under a truce, and they sent a messenger to discuss its terms. After this the Thebans erected their trophy, and gave back the bodies under a truce.3
Notes
1. The full complement of the “half-company” was forty men.
2. See 32.7 for Sphodrias’ failed attempt to capture Piraeus and its consequences.
3. Diodorus (15.55.1–56.4) reports that Archidamus, Agesilaus’ son, also fought in this battle, and that Epaminondas instructed his right wing to avoid battle and retreat if necessary. Diodorus adds that the Peloponnesians attacked both wings in a crescent formation (which is unlikely), and that the Thebans lost about 300 men.
See WEB 32.14 for Plutarch’s description of the battle of Leuctra.
The Theban messenger who came to announce the victory at Leuctra to the Athenians was given the cold shoulder. The Spartans reacted with their version of a stiff upper lip, showing, as in the battle, that they had learned nothing.
Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.16
Following these events, the man sent to report the calamity to Lacedaemon arrived there on the final day of the Gymnopaedia, when the men’s chorus was in the theater. On hearing of the disaster, the ephors were distressed, as I suppose they were bound to be; but rather than dismiss the chorus, they allowed it to continue to the end. Furthermore, while they gave the names of the fallen to the various relatives, they ordered the women not to shriek out in lamentation but to bear their suffering in silence. The following day one saw those whose kinsmen had fallen appear in public with bright, beaming faces, but you could have seen only a few of those whose relatives had been reported alive, and these were going about sullen and dejected.
32.13.B The Spartan Reaction to the Defeat in Leuctra
Questions
1. Try to draw the lines of the battle of Leuctra according to Xenophon’s account (32.13.A). Who, according to this historian, was responsible for the Spartan defeat and why?
2. How does Plutarch’s account of the battle of Leuctra (WEB 32.14) modify Xenophon’s (32.13.A)?
3. What was characteristically Spartan in the battle of Leuctra and its aftermath (32.13.A–B)?
32.15 The Foundation of Messene (370/69)
The battle of Leuctra effectively ended Spartan hegemony in Greece. The loss of 400 Spartans was too heavy for a state that suffered from an acute shortage of male citizens, and Epaminondas made sure he kept Sparta in a weakened position.
In 370 Arcadian Mantinea, which Sparta had disbanded in the past, reunited and Sparta was too weak to prevent it. Together with other Arcadian communities, Mantinea formed an Arcadian federation that soon allied itself with Argos, Elis, and Thebes. This meant that Sparta now had a strong new and inimical state on its border. In 370/69, for the first time in recorded Spartan history, its territory was invaded. Encouraged by information about a perioecic revolt, a coalition army led by the Theban generals Epaminondas and Pelopidas entered Laconia from different directions. In desperation the Spartans promised to free helots who would join their ranks, and 6,000 helots did so. The invaders plundered and burned Spartan property but did not converge on the unwalled city of Sparta, partially because of the Spartans’ counter-measures. Instead, Epaminondas did something worse: he liberated most of Messenia. Xenophon says nothing about this event, but Diodorus fills the gap.
Diodorus of Sicily 15.66.1
Epaminondas was by nature a man of ambitious projects, one who yearned for perpetual fame. He now advised the Arcadians and the rest of the allies to resettle Messene, which had been deprived of its original inhabitants by the Spartans many years earlier, and whose territory was well situated for an attack on Sparta. All were in agreement. Epaminondas then made a search for what remained of the Messenians, and also chose volunteers for citizenship and refounded Messene, giving it a large number of inhabitants. By dividing the land amongst them, and by rebuilding, he restored a distinguished Greek city and earned a great reputation amongst all men.
Figure 32.3 Messene’s walls. © Vanni Archive/CORBIS.
Image not available in this digital edition.
Messene’s foundation was accompanied by large-scale sacrifices to the gods and traditional Messenian heroes (Pausanias Description of Greece 4.26–27). The site encompassed Mt. Ithome, formerly a center of resistance to Sparta, and thus contributed to the creation of an independent Messenian identity. The Messenians also built massive walls that encircled their city and the countryside. The walls were very well built, reaching in places a height of 7–9 meters (Figure 32.3).
32.16 The Dissolution of the Peloponnesian League (365)
As if losing a substantial part of its infrastructure was not enough for Sparta, in 370/69 the Arcadians founded the city of Megalopolis, perhaps on Epaminondas’ initiative and certainly with his blessing. The Spartans were now surrounded by hostile neighbors to the west and north.
Sparta nevertheless managed to recover somewhat from these blows. Over the next five years Sparta, Athens, and Thebes competed for control and influence in the Peloponnese. There were also violent changes of government in various cities there. In 365, however, Sparta lost the Peloponnesian League. The initiative came from its old ally, Corinth, whose relationship with Arcadia and Athens became tense. The Corinthians sought to make peace with Thebes, with whom Sparta was at war, and the Spartans granted them their request. Sparta continued to play a role in Greek affairs afterwards, but its ability to influence them was much reduced.
Xenophon Hellenica 7.4.6–7, 9–10
(7.4.6) … The Corinthians were now thinking that security would be difficult for them to attain. Even before this they had suffered defeats on land, and now they had to face the antipathy of Athens as well. They therefore decided to gather together mercenary troops, both infantry and cavalry. Taking charge of these, they proceeded to give the city protection, and also to inflict considerable damage on enemies living close by. In addition, they sent a deputation to Thebes to ask whether they might obtain a peace settlement if they came seeking one, and (4.7) the Thebans told the Corinthians to come as a settlement would be forthcoming. The Corinthians then asked the Thebans to permit them also to go to their allies so that they could include in the peace those wanting inclusion, and simply leave those who chose otherwise to continue fighting. The Thebans made this concession to them, too, and the Corinthians came to Lacedaemon and spoke as follows …
The Corinthians pleaded with the Spartans to allow them to make peace with Boeotia and invited the Spartans to join them.
(4.9) On hearing this, the Spartans advised the Corinthians to make peace, and they also left it to their other allies to withdraw if they did not wish to continue the war alongside them. But they declared that they themselves would continue fighting and take whatever result heaven decided on – Messene was a land they had received from their fathers, and they would never accept being deprived of it! (4.10) The Corinthians accordingly made their way to Thebes to negotiate the peace. The Thebans thought they should also take an oath binding them to an alliance, but the Corinthians replied that an alliance was not a peace treaty, but only a change or wars. The point of their being there, they said, was to negotiate a fair peace, if the Thebans were in accord. The Thebans felt admiration for them because, despite their perilous situation, they were unwilling to put themselves on a war footing with their benefactors; and they granted peace to them, as well as to the Phliasians and the others who had accompanied them to Thebes, on condition that each party retain its own territory. And such were the terms on which the oaths were taken.
Questions
1. Why did the Spartans refuse to join the Corinthian peace initiative, and what did their allowing Corinth and others to pursue it mean?
2. Why did the Corinthians refuse the Theban offer to become their ally?
Review Questions
1. How did Sparta take advantage of the Common Peace (see 32.3, WEB 32.4)?
2. Discuss the history of the conflict between Sparta and Thebes from the Peace of Antalcidas to the Peace of 371 (32.1, 32.3, 32.5, 32.7, 32.9, 32.12, WEB 32.6, WEB 32.8, WEB 32.14).
3. What do the Phoebidas and Sphodrias affairs indicate about Sparta’s difficulties abroad (32.5, 32.7, WEB 32.6.I–II, WEB 32.8)?
4. What were the aims of the Second Athenian League and how did it meet the concerns of its members (32.9–10)?
5. How did Thebes deprive Sparta of its hegemonic status (32.13, 32.15–16)?
6. It has been argued that what led to the Spartan mismanagement of their empire and defeat at Leuctra was Spartanism. Do you agree?
Suggested Readings
The Boeotian federation and its government: Demand 1982 (fifth century); Buck 1994, esp. 6–10; Beck 2000; Buckler and Beck 2008, 127–198. The Phoebidas and Sphodrias affairs: Cartledge 1987, 136–138, 156–159; Hodkinson 2007; V. Parker 2007; Buckler and Beck 2008, 71–84. The Second Athenian League: date of foundation: Rice 1975; Fauber 1999; R&O, 100; its organization and history: Cargill 1981; Badian 1995; Harding 1995; Baron 2006. Eirene in Athens: H. Shapiro 1993, 45–50; Stewart 1997, 152–153; Stafford 2001, 173–197; Smith 2003, 11. Sacred Band: DeVoto 1992; Ogden 1996; Leitao 2002 (questions its historical existence), but see Davidson 2007, 432–441. Battle of Leuctra: Cawkwell 1972; contra: Cartledge 1987, 236–241, and see also Tuplin 1987; V. Hanson 1988 (disputes the use of innovative tactics); Buckler and Beck 2008, 111–126. Sparta, Thebes, and Arcadia after Leuctra: Roy 1971; Buckler 1980; Cartledge 1987, 382–392; T. Nielsen 2002, 306–510. Messene’s foundation: Luraghi 2002a, 2008 (argues that Messene was actually inhabited by helots and perioeci who appropriated the ancient Messenian identity to themselves).