35
Running the Athenian Polis
Politics, Finances, Grain, and Trade in the Fourth Century
CHAPTER CONTENTS
35.1 The Restored Athenian Democracy: Laws and Decrees
35.2 The Fourth-Century Assembly and Council
35.3 The Presidents of the Assembly and Their Duties
35.4 Fourth-Century Democratic Leadership
35.5 Plato on Athenian Speakers and Their Audience
35.6 The Jury Courts
35.7 State Revenues and Taxation
35.8 Athens’ Income and a Taxable Property
35.9 Liturgies
35.10 Lightening the Burden: The Antidosis
35.11 The Theoric Fund
35.12 Financing Military Operations
35.13 The Grain Import
35.14 Athens and Grain
35.15 A Law of Coinage Certification
35.16 A Maritime Contract
To Athens’ credit, after the fall of the Thirty the city succeeded in avoiding a renewal of civil war and enjoyed a stable democracy. This was due to the strength of the city’s political institutions and democratic ideology. This chapter discusses how Athens met her political and other public needs. It shows how the Athenians ranked laws above popular will, as exemplified in popular decrees. The chapter reports on the democratic institutions of the assembly, Council, and jury courts and the nature of democratic leadership in the fourth century. It also examines state revenues and a system of taxation that relied almost exclusively on the rich to finance public functions. The chapter then discusses how state monies were allocated for civilian and military purposes. Finally, aspects of Athenian economy and society are illuminated through descriptions of grain importation, an inscription about the certification of coins, and a maritime trade contract.
35.1 The Restored Athenian Democracy: Laws and Decrees
One of the major accomplishments of the restored democracy in Athens was the completion of the codification of her laws. The project commenced in 410, but was completed only in 400/399 because of delays and interruptions. The codified laws were inscribed on the walls of the stoa of the king archon.
At the same time, the Athenians made a distinction between permanent laws (sg. nomos) and decrees (sg. psephisma) of the assembly or the Council. Decrees dealt with specific circumstances or individuals and were ranked below laws in significance and authority. In Andocides’ defense speech against a charge of impiety in 399, the orator cites regulations concerning this distinction.
35.1.A The Greater Authority of Laws
Andocides 1 On the Mysteries 87
Laws: The authorities are not to avail themselves, in any matter, of an unwritten law. No decree, be it of the Council or the assembly, is to have greater authority than a law. A law cannot apply to an individual without the same law being applicable to all Athenians, unless a resolution is passed by the (assembly of) six thousand in a secret ballot.
So, what remained after that? The following law remained. Read it, please.
Law: All decisions reached in private suits or by arbitration as came into force when the city was a democracy are to have authority. But one may avail oneself only of laws passed since the archonship of Eucleides [403/2].
The new procedure for proposing laws assigned a major role to the annually elected board of Nomothetae, “Lawgivers.” The Nomothetae also decided in cases of contradictory and unclear laws. There was no change in the procedure for passing decrees. Andocides cited a 403/2 law that established the procedure for proposing laws.
35.1.B Tisamenus’ Decree
Andocides 1 On the Mysteries 83–84
(1.83) (Decree) The demos decreed, with Tisamenus proposing the motion, that the form of the Athenian government be in accord with their ancient traditions. The Athenians should follow the laws of Solon, and use his weights and measures, and the statutes of Draco, which we used in former times. If any further legislation is needed, the Nomothetae chosen by the Council are to record it on tablets, and set it out before the eponymous heroes for anyone who so wishes to inspect.1 They are then to pass it on to the magistrates during the course of this month.
(1.84) When the laws have been handed over, the Council and the 500 Nomothetae2 chosen by deme-members under oath are to give them prior examination. Any private citizen who so wishes is permitted to appear before the Council and make any suggestion that might benefit this legislation. Once the laws are ratified, the council of the Areopagus3 is to take charge of them to insure that the magistrates put into service only those laws that have been ratified. Those of the laws that have been validated they are to inscribe on the wall on which laws were inscribed in earlier times, for anyone who wishes to see.
Notes
1. The bases of ten statues of the eponymous heroes of the ten Athenian tribes served as an official bulletin board.
2. These Nomothetae are different “lawgivers” from the ones mentioned in 1.83.
3. It is unclear how much supervisory power the Areopagus council had.
Questions
1. What distinguished a law from a decree (35.1.A)?
2. Describe the procedure for proposing a law from its initiation to publication (35.1.B).
35.2 The Fourth-Century Assembly and Council
The primacy of laws over decrees suggested that the postwar democracy set limits on its own powers, including that of the assembly (ekklesia). The assembly transferred its judicial powers to the law courts, which oversaw popular decisions and policy. At the same time, the city provided incentives for its citizens to attend the assembly. Probably starting from the late 390s, those who came on time to the assembly meetings received three obols and later six (nine for special assemblies). The place of the assembly on the Pnyx was enlarged in the second half of the century. The historian M. H. Hansen estimates a regular attendance of 6,000 men out of, in his assessment, around 30,000 citizens, which was half the number of citizens in the fifth century (Hansen 1991, 130–132; 1994). Other estimates of the Athenian citizen population on the eve of the Peloponnesian War (431), however, range between ca. 30,000 and 60,000. The restored democracy readopted Pericles’ law limiting citizenship to legitimate male children of two Athenian parents. Normally, the assembly met four times every prytany (one-tenth of the year). Ath. Pol. reports on the agenda and procedures of the assembly and the Council.
35.2.A The Assembly’s Agenda
Ath. Pol. 43.3–6
(43.3) Those of their number who are prytaneis first of all take dinner together in the Tholos, receiving money from the city.1 Then they schedule meetings for the Council and the assembly, every day for the Council, unless it is a holiday, and four times each prytany for the assembly. (43.4) The prytaneis also give notice in writing of the agenda of the Council, of what it is to do each day, and where it is to sit. They also give notice in writing of the meetings of the assembly. There is one principal meeting, at which they must confirm the magistrates in office if they seem to do well in their position, and discuss the grain supply and national defense. It is on that day, too, that those wishing to lay prosecutions connected with crimes against the state [eisangeliai] must do so; and it is the day of reading the list of confiscated properties, and of reading of applications regarding land allotments and heiresses, so that no vacancy in an estate escapes notice.
(43.5) In the sixth prytany they also, in addition to the above, vote by show of hands on whether an ostracism should be held, and consider litigation against vexatious litigants (sykophants), both against Athenian citizens and resident aliens (to a maximum of three cases of each), and against anyone failing to render a service to the people that he had promised. (43.6) Another meeting is devoted to supplications. At these anyone who wishes will, after placing an olive branch on the altar, address the popular assembly on any matter he chooses, be it of a public or private nature. The two remaining meetings are concerned with the rest of state business. At these the laws prescribe discussion of three cases concerning religious matters, three involving heralds and embassies, and three of a non-religious nature. Sometimes they even hold their meetings without an advance vote (of the Council). In addition, heralds and ambassadors come first to the prytaneis, and also carriers bring their letters to them.
Note
1. The prytaneis were 50 Council members of the same tribe who fulfilled the functions described here for one-tenth of the year. The Tholos was a round building also called the Prytaneum.
The assembly decided most affairs and elected magistrates who were not selected by lot. Citizens voted by show of hands except in secret ballots, when they used pebbles. See WEB 35.3 for the presidents of the assembly and their duties.
Following a ceremonial opening and oath-taking, the assembly meeting commenced when the president put up for discussion a motion (probouleuma) that had been previously prepared by the Council. The motion could be approved without discussion, modified, amended, or rejected. The discussion started with the proclamation “Who wishes to speak?” Many Athenians exercised this right. The equal right to speak (isegoria) demonstrated the citizens’ liberty and equality, two principles that were identified with democracy (cf. 23.5 where these principles are articulated in Euripides’ Suppliant Women).
Freedom and the equal opportunity to speak were intimately linked to the concept of parrhesia, the freedom to speak one’s mind without repercussions. Speakers used this freedom to tell their audience what they did not always want to hear. The audience, for its part, regarded heckling, interrupting the speakers, mocking them, and even not allowing them to speak as their privilege and as an expression of their power and superiority.
In 392 or 391 Aristophanes produced the play Assemblywomen, which comically depicted some of the above practices and procedures. The play revolves around the women of Athens who decide to take control of the polis and establish a communal regime there. In the following scene, one male citizen tells another how the women, disguised as men, passed a motion in the assembly that enabled them to rule the city.
35.2.B An Assembly Meeting
Aristophanes Assemblywomen 376–391, 394–426
(376) BLEPYRUS: “… But where have you come from?”
CHREMES: “From the ekklesia [assembly].”
BLEPYRUS: “It’s broken up already?”
CHREMES: “Yes, and right at dawn, too. And, by Zeus, the red rope they were throwing around provided lots of fun.”1
(380) BLEPYRUS: “Did you get the three obols, then?”
CHREMES: “Wish I had! I got there too late, so I’m ashamed to say I’ve nothing but my empty purse!”
BLEPYRUS: “Why’s that?”
CHREMES: “There was a huge crowd of people that filled the Pnyx as never before. (385) Seeing them, we were all comparing them to cobblers.2 It was really strange to see so many white faces in the ekklesia. So I myself and lots of others didn’t get the pay.”
BLEPYRUS: “So I wouldn’t get it either if I go there now?”
CHREMES: “What? You wouldn’t have even if you’d gone there when the cock crowed the second time …”
(394) BLEPYRUS: “What should draw such a crowd so early?”
CHREMES: “What else but the prytaneis3 deciding to take opinions about the safety of the city? And straightaway bleary-eyed Neocleides crept up to speak first. And then the people shouted out (you can imagine it): (400) ‘Isn’t it terrible that this man dares to address us – and on the question of safety, too? He wasn’t able even to save his own sight!’ He shouted out, looking around, ‘What am I supposed to do?’ ”
BLEPYRUS: “ ‘Grind up some garlic with silphium, (405) throw in some Laconian spurge, and rub it on your eyelids in the evening.’ That’s what I’d have said had I happened to be there.”
CHREMES: “After him the clever dick Euaeon came forward, and he was naked, or so it seemed to most people. (410) He, however, claimed he was wearing a cloak; and then he gave a speech aimed at the really common people:
‘You can see that I’m needing to be saved myself – four staters is what I need! Still, I’ll tell you how to save the city and its citizens. (415) If the clothiers provided cloaks for those who need them when the sun turns for winter, pleurisy would overtake none of us. And those who have no bed or coverlets should wash and then go to sleep in the tanners’ shops. (420) Any tanner shutting the door on them in winter should be fined three cloaks.’ ”
BLEPYRUS: “By Dionysus, that’s good! No one at all would have voted against him if he’d added the further suggestion that the grain merchants must give the needy (425) three measures of meal for everybody’s dinner, or else get a good beating.”
Notes
1. A red painted rope marked those who were late to the assembly and so lost the right to the three-obol attendance fee.
2. Working indoors, cobblers were pale like women.
3. At the time of the play’s production, the assembly meetings were still run by the prytaneis.
The speaker goes on to compare men unfavorably to women.
Questions
1. What were the fixed items on the assembly’s agenda? How many of them involved the public sphere, and how many the private (35.2.A)?
2. What were the powers of the presidents of the assembly (WEB 35.3)?
3. What seems to motivate those who attend the assembly and make proposals there, according to Aristophanes (35.2.B)?
4. What procedural and other guidelines of the assembly meeting are suggested by Aristophanes’ description (35.2.B)?
35.4 Fourth-Century Democratic Leadership
In addition to occasional speakers and those who made proposals, there were men who were more active than others in the assembly, the Council, or the courts. The sources use different terms to describe them, but the commonest are “politicians” (politeuomenoi) and “speakers” (rhetores). They were not elected to their positions, and in the absence of political parties at Athens rhetorical skill and training were their main means of garnering support and influencing Council members, assemblymen, and jurors; this explains their limited staying power, except for a very few.
The rhetores often described themselves as advisors of the city as opposed to those who decided policy, i.e., the sovereign demos. This did not prevent the people from holding orators accountable for bad decisions. See, however, WEB 35.5 for Plato’s criticism of the assembly’s speakers and their audience.
The rise of rhetores marked a new development in the city’s political leadership. Formerly, a leader was expected to fulfill both civic and military duties, which he did through the office of the general. In the fourth century these duties were separated. The fourth-century generals were often “professional” soldiers, while the orators focused on politics and, unlike their predecessors, came from different walks of life and seldom from the aristocracy. The trend toward expertise in leadership also encompassed financial management (see 35.11).
Sometime after 355, the conservative Athenian intellectual Isocrates called on Athens to renounce her ambition for hegemony over other Greeks and become the champion of peace. He also made an unfavorable comparison between contemporary political leadership and that of the past, which he idealized.
Isocrates 8 On the Peace 54–55
(54) We are very different from our forefathers. They made individuals leaders of the city and chose the same people as army commanders, in the belief that if a man was able to give excellent advice on the speaker’s platform, that same man would also reason very well on his own. We do the opposite. (55) When we have men whose advice we follow on the most important matters, we do not think we should elect these as our generals, as though they were lacking in brainpower. Instead, we send out, with plenipotentiary authority, men whose advice no one would seek either on private or on national business, as if in that capacity they will be more intelligent, and will find it easier to deliberate on matters concerning the Greeks as a whole than on those matters set before us for deliberation here.
Question
1. What faults do Isocrates (35.4) and Plato (WEB 35.5) find with Athens’ leaders and their followers?
35.6 The Jury Courts
The jury courts embodied the people’s sovereignty perhaps even more than the assembly. We have noted that the Athenians made a distinction between private actions (dikai) and public legal suits (graphai; see 9.9: “Solon’s Judicial Regulations”). Both legal actions reflected the notion that peer citizens should decide the dispute. They also demonstrated the democratic wish to diminish individual advantage in court due to background or legal expertise. Because the state appointed public prosecutors only in special cases, any citizen who noticed a violation of public law could volunteer to prosecute the case. Needless to say, there were citizens who were more motivated and proficient than others in using the legal system.
Indeed, prosecutors or defendants who could afford it hired a speechwriter to write a speech for them in order to improve their chances. They would rarely admit it, though, and instead professed lack of skill or expertise and an inferior position to their adversary. For example, sometime after 390 Lysias wrote a defense speech for a man who had inherited from his father a charge of illegally holding state property. The speechwriter had his client plead for the court’s consideration on account of his poor speaking ability and his position as a defendant.
35.6.A A Defendant’s Difficulties
Lysias 19 On the Property of Aristophanes 1–3
(1) This particular trial presents me with great difficulties, Gentlemen of the Jury. I am aware that, if I do not speak persuasively now, not only shall I myself be considered guilty, but my father will, too, and that I shall be deprived of all my worldly wealth. And so, even if I am not naturally adept at this, it is incumbent on me to come to the aid both of my father and of myself, to the best of my ability. (2) You can see the intrigues and the fervor of my enemies, and of that I need not speak; but my own inexperience is also known to all who are acquainted with me. I shall therefore ask of you a favor that is just and easily granted, namely that you hear me, too, without anger, as you did my accusers. (3) For a man defending himself has to be at a disadvantage, even if you accord him an impartial hearing. You see, they have long been making their plans and have not faced personal risk as they formulated their prosecution, while we are struggling as we face fear, vilification, and the greatest danger. It is only fair, then, that your feelings for those defending themselves should be more indulgent.
35.6.B Jurors
In Athens, the category of men called sykophantes (sg.), or vexatious litigants, was notorious for abusing the legal system and often came to symbolize all that was wrong in an Athenian citizen. Yet the power of experts in court was limited. There were laws against sykophants, and a litigant could be helped by supportive speakers who served on his defense or prosecution team and thus level the playing field. Generally, the spirit of amateurism and the distaste for professionalism in court enhanced the perception of a fair legal contest.
Figure 35.1 A juror’s token (pinakion). From S.C. Todd, “A Pinakion,” in The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 85, fig. 6.1. Based on a photograph belonging to the Brooklyn Museum, New York 34, 678 = Kroll 1972 no. 86. Reprinted with permission of Oxford University Press and the Brooklyn Museum.
Image not available in this digital edition.
Jurors served in large groups in an effort to curtail bribery. A water clock made sure that each litigant had the same amount of time to present his case. At the end of the pleadings, there was no deliberation by the jurors but a secret vote that was decided by majority. If a defendant was found guilty and the law did not prescribe punishment, both prosecutor and defendant recommended the desired penalty, and the jurors decided between them. The Athenian juror, then, was a composite of juror and judge.
Jurors who sat in judgment were men at least thirty years old who volunteered to serve in court. Each of the ten tribes was supposed to provide at least 600 jurors, and if the number of volunteers exceeded 6,000, those who would be called to service was decided by lot. The juror was assigned a case and a court only on the day of trial to avoid pressure and corrupting influence. He received a token (pinakion) that had on it his name, deme, and a letter (alpha to kappa) that was used for the selection of jurors by lottery and for assigning them to different courts. Tokens found in Athenian graves suggest that jurors were proud of their duty and social status.
The bronze token shown in Figure 35.1 belonged to Lysanias of the deme Euphyridae. The letter “eta” and the symbol of the three obols in the left corner identify him as a juror. The symbols on the right are unclear.
Question
1. What were the speaker’s alleged constraints in 35.6.A and how did they relate to democratic fairness?
35.7 State Revenues and Taxation
Athens had nothing like a national budget, not to mention a deficit. The state allocated monies on an annual basis to public institutions, say, the assembly, or to specific projects such as military campaigns. When there was surplus money it went to special funds or to temple treasuries from which the state could borrow. Conversely, when in 348 there was no money to pay for jurors, no courts were held.
State expenditures included the financing of public projects such as roads, structures, and festivals, as well as payments, albeit modest, to assemblymen, Council members, jurors, and magistrates. Athens, however, spent much of its revenue on military campaigns and the maintenance of its navy. See WEB 35.8.I for Athens’ revenues and the orator Demosthenes’ description of Athens’ annual income ca. 341. The bulk of public revenues came from taxing the rich, whether they were citizens or resident aliens (metics). WEB 35.8.II describes the taxable property of Demosthenes’ wealthy father.
Among the taxes that the Athenians collected was an import tax of 2 percent. Like other taxes and duties, the state auctioned tax collection to private individuals and companies. In a trial speech, the politician Andocides describes an alleged conspiracy to defraud the city of revenues by subverting the auction of this tax. The alleged chief villain was the politician Agyrrhius, otherwise best known for introducing and raising the payment for assemblymen in 403. Andocides’ account should not be taken at face value because he aims to malign Agyrrhius, his legal adversary, and to praise himself while appealing to conspiratorial Athenian attitudes. Nevertheless, his report shows that the state revenues of 30–36 talents from this tax in 402–400 were relatively modest.
35.7.A Import Tax
Andocides 1 On the Mysteries 133–134
(133) I am going to tell you why these men now think like this. It is the third year since Agyrrhius here, this fine gentleman, became the chief contractor of the two percent tax, a position he bought for thirty talents. All these men who assembled with him under the poplar were involved in his business, and you are aware of their character. It seems to me that they assembled there for two purposes, which were to get money for not exceeding his bid and also to have a share in the tax, which had been sold at a bargain-basement price. (134) They made a three-talent profit, and discovered how the business worked and what a great amount it made. So they got together and, giving shares to the others who were bidding, they intended buying the position once more for thirty talents. Since there was nobody bidding against them, I appeared before the Council and kept on bidding above them until I bought it for 36 talents. After beating them off and providing you with guarantors, I raised the money and paid it to the city. I did not make a personal loss, either; in fact, those of us involved in the affair made a slight profit. And so I saw to it that Agyrrhius and these men did not split six talents of your money amongst themselves.
35.7.B Property Tax (Eisphora)
A frequently mentioned Athenian tax was the eisphora, or property tax, which ranged between 1 and 2 percent (see also 26.2: “Athenian Finance”). It was imposed irregularly on people with a certain amount of property in order to finance ad hoc projects, mostly military ones. The second-century historian Polybius reports on the income from this tax in 378/7.
Polybius 2.62.7
They decided at that time to meet expenses for the war from taxation, and they conducted an evaluation of all of Attica, its buildings, and the rest of its property. Even so the entire evaluation fell 250 talents short of 6,000.1
Note
1. Demosthenes (14 On the Symmories 19) mentions an estimated tax revenue of 6,000 talents for 354/3.
It appears that prior to 378/7 each taxpayer paid the same amount of tax. Starting from 378/7 taxpayers of the eisphora were divided into one hundred companies, called symmories (symmoriai), which were collectively responsible for the payment. Taxpayers also paid in proportion to their assessed wealth. In this way the burden was shared more equitably. From 364/3, a procedure called proeisphora was introduced according to which the three richest members of each symmory advanced the state the sum due from the group, then collected it from its members. In a speech charging his enemy Midias of hubris, Demosthenes boasts of his public service and sacrifice when he advanced the eisphora, contrasting his conduct with that of the wealthy Midias.
35.7.C Paying the Property Tax
Demosthenes 21 Against Midias 157
You know, I was the head of a symmory for ten years, and I contributed the same amount as Phormio, Lysitheides, Callaeschrus, and the richest people. And I did that not from property that I actually possessed – I had been robbed of that by my guardians – but on the credit of what my father had left me, which I had the right to acquire once I came of age. So that is how I behaved toward you [the jury] – but how did Midias behave? Never yet, to this very day, has he been head of a symmory, and he was deprived by nobody of any of his inheritance – no, he received a substantial property from his father.
In 358/7, the Athenian Periander proposed that the 1,200 richest Athenians be divided into twenty symmories that were supposed to pay for trierarchies and the eisphora. His law divided the burden of the tax equally among these taxpayers and allowed them to pay regular small sums instead of irregular large ones. All these measures demonstrated the difficulties that the state had in securing revenues and collecting taxes fairly and effectively. Indeed, in 340, following constant criticism of the system, Demosthenes changed it by establishing that a group of 300 wealthy citizens would pay for most of the tax.
Questions
1. How did Athens manage to launch military expeditions in spite of its empty coffers, according to Demosthenes? What, does he suggest, was expected of wealthy taxpayers (WEB 35.8.I)?
2. How did Demosthenes’ father diversify his income (WEB 35.8.II)?
3. Describe the tax collection system in Athens. How could it be abused (35.7.A–C, WEB 35.8.I)?
4. Why was Demosthenes allegedly a better citizen than Midias (35.7.C)?
35.9 Liturgies
A common means of taxation in Athens was liturgies (sg. leitourgia), which were imposed on citizens whose property amounted to no fewer than 3–4 talents. One type of liturgy was the choregia, which assigned to a wealthy individual the duty of paying for a dramatic performance in the city’s festivals (see WEB 22.6: “Selecting and Producing Plays”). The other liturgy was the trierarchy (trierarchia), which required a citizen to pay for the maintenance of a trireme and often to captain it. The galley, its basic equipment, and the crew’s (modest) wages were provided by the state. The trierarch, however, defrayed the considerable remaining expenses and supplemented the state payments.
There were Athenians who tried to avoid paying the liturgies by liquidating their assets and thus concealing their wealth. Of those who fulfilled their duty, some complained that they paid for the indolent poor. Yet only few wealthy Athenians appeared to have been impoverished because of taxation. Conversely, the reward for a liturgist was public recognition and honor, especially if he was victorious in dramatic competitions in the festivals, or in contests in performance of triremes. A liturgist could also expect to collect a debt of gratitude for his financial sacrifice. Speakers in Athenian courts elaborated on their public services and expenses in order to establish a record of useful citizenship and to tell jurors that it was in the city’s best interests to decide in their favor. The speechwriter Lysias harped on this theme in a speech he wrote for an anonymous Athenian, who had been charged with illegally holding public property shortly after the democracy was restored in 403/2. The speaker begins his address to the court by enumerating his many public services and expenses. The list, if not inflated, is exceptional by any measure, and totals more than 63,000 drachmas. However, it tells us something about the kinds of financial obligations expected by the state.
Lysias 21 On the Charge of Accepting Bribes 1–5, 12
(1) You have been sufficiently apprised of the charges, Gentlemen of the Jury, but I think you should also hear the other pertinent information so you will know the character of the man on whose verdict you will be voting. I came of age [passed the dokimasia] in the archonship of Theopompus [411/0]. Then, on being made a choregos for tragedy, I spent thirty minas, and two months later I spent 2,000 drachmas winning with a men’s chorus at the Thargelia; and in the archonship of Glaucippus [410/9] I spent 800 at the Great Panathenaea on a chorus of Pyrrhic dancers.1 (2) Furthermore, in the same archonship, I won at the Dionysia as choregos for a men’s chorus, and spent on it, with the dedication of the tripod included, 5,000 drachmas; and at the Lesser Panathenaea in the magistracy of Diocles [409/8] I spent 300 on a cyclic chorus.2 (3) Meanwhile, over a period of seven years, I was trierarch and spent six talents.3
Despite such expenses, and despite the daily perils I faced on your behalf and despite all my journeys abroad, I still paid property tax, thirty minas in one case, and 4,000 drachmas in another. And after sailing home during the archonship of Alexias [405/4], I immediately began serving as a gymnasiarch for the Prometheia, and I won after spending twelve minas.4 (4) Later on I was made choregos for a boys’ chorus, on which I spent more than fifteen minas. In the archonship of Eucleides [403/2] I was a choregos for a comic production for Cephisodorus, and I won at the cost of sixteen minas (including the dedication of the equipment); and at the Lesser Panathenaea I was choregos for some beardless Pyrrhic dancers, spending seven minas.
(5) I have been victorious with a trireme in a race at Sunium, on which I spent fifteen minas, and apart from that there were the headship of sacred delegations and directorship of the procession [errhephoria],5 which cost me more than 30 minas in expenses. With regard to the expenditures that I have listed, I should not have spent a quarter had I wanted my liturgies to accord with what is prescribed in law.
(12) If I must lose my possessions, that does not bother me so much; but I could not accept to be insulted, and to have it put into the heads of people who shirk their liturgies that what I have spent on you earns no gratitude, while they appear to have taken the right decision in having surrendered to you none of their own resources. So if you listen to me, you will be voting for what is right and also choosing what is expedient for yourselves.
Notes
1. Pyrrhic dances were performed by men in arms.
2. The cyclic chorus was a chorus of dithyrambic hymns in honor of Dionysius.
3. In the fourth century a trierarchy was normally taken every three years.
4. The gymnasiarch was an official in charge of the upkeep and training of athletes in the gymnasion, in this case, runners in a torch-race in the Prometheia festival in the Kerameikos.
5. The errhephoria was a procession of young women carrying baskets at the Panathenaea.
Questions
1. What public services did the speaker perform?
2. Why, according to the speaker, should the jury vote in his favor?
35.10 Lightening the Burden: The Antidosis
The state came up with several measures to ease the burden of liturgies. Toward the end of the Peloponnesian War, two men could share a trierarchy as syntrierarchs. Later it was customary not to impose a trierarchy more than once in three years and a choregy in two. A trierarch could additionally hire someone to replace him as the ship’s captain. The Athenians also instituted in the name of fairness the procedure of antidosis (lit. “giving in exchange”). A man who was assigned a liturgy could challenge another, who was free of it but whom the liturgist deemed wealthier than him, either to take up the liturgy or to exchange properties. Most of those challenged opted to take up the liturgy. Those who declined went to court, which decided who should assume the liturgy. This was the case for the intellectual Isocrates, who lost a trial in which he claimed not to be sufficiently wealthy to carry a liturgy. He wrote a fictitious court speech entitled Antidosis in which he defended himself against the charges of being a teacher for hire (sophist), a corrupter of students, and a man who hid his own wealth to avoid public service. In the following section he makes the not-uncommon assertion that he is not as wealthy as people think him to be.
Isocrates 15 Antidosis 155–158
(155) So none of the people called sophists will be found, in general, to have amassed a lot of money; in fact, some passed their lives in straitened circumstances, and others in circumstances that were quite modest. The man who acquired most, within our memory, was Gorgias of Leontini.1 He spent time in Thessaly in the period when its people were the wealthiest of the Greeks, and he had a long life, which he dedicated to making money. (156) He was also not a permanent resident of any city, and so he had no outlay for communal expenses, nor was he subject to property tax. In addition to these advantages, he did not take a wife or have children – no, he was also free of this liturgy, which is the most enduring and expensive of them! Even with this head start over all the others in terms of acquisition, Gorgias left only a thousand staters [2,000 drachmas]. (157) Indeed, when it comes to each other’s wealth, we should not listen to those who make thoughtless claims, and we should not think of the work of sophists and actors as being equally remunerative. Rather, we should make comparative judgments about those who are in the same professions, and assume that those with similar capability in each field have like material returns.
(158) So if you put me on a level with the man who is the greatest achiever in our field, and compare me with him, you will not appear to be making totally wild inferences about such matters. Nor, in that case, would I be found to have been a bad manager either with regard to affairs of the city or to my own personal affairs, having in fact lived on less than I have spent on my liturgies. And it is certainly just to praise those who are more thrifty in their personal expenditures than in their spending on the state.
Note
1. Gorgias of Leontini was a famous fifth-century sophist and teacher of rhetoric.
Question
1. How did the management of private affairs relate to performing liturgies?
35.11 The Theoric Fund
The Theoric Fund (Theorika), whose origins some sources date to Periclean Athens, in the fourth century distributed money to the needy. From the mid-fourth century it assumed additional responsibilities under the guidance of the politician Eubulus. These included financing public projects, administering the navy, and, especially, organizing major festivals. The fund was mostly known for giving citizens subsidies to buy tickets to the theater during the festivals. Indeed, the late fourth-century orator Demades described the fund as “the glue of democracy” (Plutarch Platonic Questions 1011B). The revenues came from surplus monies, and Eubulus legislated that diverting this money to the military fund would be punishable by death. Because there was no limit on reelection to the office of the fund’s manager until the 330s, Eubulus’ control of it gave him political clout, which he used to oppose aggressive foreign ventures like those recommended by the famous orator Demosthenes. The second-century CE lexicographer Harpocration describes the Theoric Fund and its manager.
Harpocration Lexicon s.v. Theorica = Harding no. 75A
Translation: Harding no. 75A, p. 98
Demosthenes in the Philippics. Festival money was certain state money gathered from the city’s revenues. This was previously kept for the needs of wartime and was called military money but later was transferred to public building-projects and disbursements, the initiator of which was Agyrrhius the demagogue.1 Philochorus [FGrHist 328 F 33]2 in the third book of his Atthis says, “The festival fund (theorikon) was first considered ‘the drachma for the seat in the theatre,’ whence it got its name,” etc. Philinus in his speech against the statues of Sophocles and Euripides, speaking of Eubulus, says, “It was called the festival fund because, when the Dionysia were imminent, Eubulus made a distribution (of funds) for the festival, so that all might take part in the festival and no one of the citizens might fail to attend through poverty.”3
Notes
1. For Agyrrhius, see 35.7.A.
2. For Philochorus, see 19.11: “Pericles’ Citizenship Law.”
3. Philinus was a late fourth-century orator. The citation is from a speech against a proposal to set up statues of the two playwrights.
Question
1. What made the Theoric Fund democratic?
35.12 Financing Military Operations
Financial pressures and the reluctance to channel money away from civilian purposes to the military fund had an impact on Athenian military operations and foreign policy. For example, one of the reasons Athens joined a common peace in 375 was lack of money for military campaigns (Xenophon Hellenica 6.2.1). Underfunded military expeditions forced generals (and not just from Athens) to hire themselves and their troops as mercenaries to Persian satraps or the king. They also financed campaigns by hiring sailors as agricultural laborers, and even resorted to extortion. The Athenian general Iphicrates employed some of these means when he arrived on the island of Corcyra in 372. Sparta and Athens and their respective allies had been fighting for control of the island since 374. Iphicrates defeated a Syracusan fleet that fought for Sparta and arranged for the crews to be ransomed.
35.12.A Iphicrates’ Financial Methods
Xenophon Hellenica 6.2.37–38
(6.2.37) Iphicrates supported his sailors for the most part by having them do farm work for the Corcyrans, but his peltasts and hoplites from the ships he took over with him to Acarnania. There he gave assistance to any of the cities friendly to him that needed help, and opened hostilities against the Thyrians, who were truly brave warriors and who in addition possessed a strong fortress. (2.38) He also attached to his navy the fleet at Corcyra, which numbered somewhere around ninety ships, and, sailing to Cephallenia first, he raised money, some giving willingly, others reluctantly. He then prepared to wreak havoc on Spartan territory and to win over those of the enemy states in the region prepared to join him, and make war on those who could not be persuaded to do so.
In his speech On the Chersonese (341), Demosthenes describes the general Diopeithes’ fundraising methods. In 343/2, Diopeithes was sent to defend the Thracian Chersonese and Athenian settlers there who were threatened by Philip of Macedonia. His expedition was poorly funded, and he had to pay his mercenaries. So Diopeithes resorted to attacks on Greek cities in Asia and collected booty or payments from them. In addition, and not unlike modern criminals’ offering “protection,” he extorted money by offering his eunoia (favor) to Athens’ allies and merchant ships, including those that sailed to Macedonia. In the following passage Demosthenes defends the general against his critics at home and abroad. His defense reveals the dilemma that many generals faced. On the one hand, they did not receive sufficient funds from the state. On the other, the Athenians expected results and were ready to punish generals for failing to achieve them or for their fundraising methods.
35.12.B “Granting Favors”
Demosthenes 8 On the Chersonese 24–28
(24) Now some of you should learn what effect this can have. I shall speak frankly – I could not do otherwise. All commanders that have ever sailed out from you – if this is not true I condemn myself to any punishment whatsoever – gather money from the Chians, the Erythraeans, and from whatever peoples they variously can. I refer to those peoples inhabiting Asia. (25) Those at the head of one or two ships gather less, those with a greater force more. And those who give the money do not give it, small amount or large, in return for nothing – they are not as crazy as that! Rather, in giving it, they are also buying protection for the traders sailing from their ports, insuring that they are not robbed, and that their vessels receive safe conduct, and the like. They call such gifts “favors” [eunoiai], and that is the word applied to these corrupt earnings.
(26) And now, too, of course, since Diopeithes has an army, it is clear that all these people will give him money. For from what other source do you think he is going to finance his soldiers when he receives nothing from you, and has no personal resources from which to pay them? From heaven? No; he makes ends meet from what he gathers, begs, and borrows. (27) So those people amongst you who are accusing him are doing nothing other than cautioning you all not to give him anything, because he is going to pay the penalty for what he will do in future, not to mention for what he has done and achieved for himself. That is the meaning of those utterances: “He is going to conduct sieges,” “He is betraying the Greeks.” For is any one of these men concerned about the Greeks living in Asia? But, in that case, they would be better at looking out for others than for their own country. (28) This, too, is what lies behind their sending another commander to the Hellespont. For if Diopeithes is doing terrible things, and is driving merchant vessels to shore, then a short decree, Gentlemen of Athens, just a short decree could prevent all this, and the laws tell us to impeach those who commit such crimes, and not, by Zeus, to keep watch over our own men with such costs and so many triremes, since that would be extremely foolish.
Question
1. How did Iphicrates and Diopeithes finance their campaigns, and how might their methods have harmed Athens?
35.13 The Grain Import
In addition to financial concerns, Athens was much occupied with insuring a regular supply of grain to the city, preferably at affordable prices. Wheat was a fundamental staple of the Greek diet, and the demand for it by the large population of Attica could only be met by import. This affected Athenian foreign and domestic policies. For example, among the reasons for Athens’ insistence on controlling the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros in violation of Greek autonomy was that these islands were important stations on the maritime grain route from the Hellespont to Attica (as well as to central and southern Greece). The islands also had Athenian settlers who, together with landowners in Attica, contributed to the Athenian grain supply.
A well-preserved inscription from the Athenian agora is highly informative in this regard. It records a law, which the politician and former tax collector Agyrrhius put forward in 374/3 (for Agyrrhius see 35.7.A). The law ordained the collection of a 12 percent tax from Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, not in money but in kind, that is, in wheat and barley, which was cheaper and less popular. The law also insured that the grain would go nowhere but Athens. Private individuals or companies (symmories) were to bid on collecting the tax in fixed units of 500 medimnoi each. A medimnos was a measure of capacity of about 52.5 liters (1.5 bushels). In this case, however, it was a measure of weight, which was more accurate than capacity. In Agyrrhius’ law, the weight of a medimnos of barley, 27.47 kg, and the heavier medimnos of wheat, 32.96 kg, are significantly lighter than the otherwise attested medimnos, which weighed 39.3 kg. The difference in weight may have made up the bidders’ profit. Alternatively, bidders may have profited from selling grain that was left after recovering their bid and other expenses. Bidders were to ship the grain to Athens at their own risk and expense, and pay taxes on it. The city provided a free storage area in the agora, the Aeaceion, but it supervised the sale through elected officials and by letting the assembly fix the price for the grain. In keeping with democratic principles, these officials were accountable to the people. It has been estimated that Athens could expect to get from this tax about 30,000 medimnoi of grain, enough to sustain 70,000 people per month (R&O, 127).
Agyrrhius’ Decree SEG 47, no. 96 = R&O no. 26
Translation: R&O, pp. 118–123
Gods. In the archonship of Socratides [374/3]. Law concerning the one twelfth of the grain of the islands.
(5) Agyrrhius proposed: in order that the people may have grain publicly available, sell the tax of one twelfth at Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, and the tax of one fiftieth, in grain.1
(8) Each share will be five hundred medimnoi, one hundred of wheat and four hundred of barley. The buyer will convey the grain to Piraeus at his own risk, and will transport the grain up to the city at his own expense and will heap up the grain in the Aeaceion.2 The city will make available the Aeaceion covered and with a door, and the buyer will weigh out the grain for the city within thirty days of whatever the date when he transports it to the city, at his own expense. When he transports it to the city, the city will not exact rent from the buyers.
(21) The buyer will weigh out the wheat at a weight of a talent for five [hekteis] sixths [32.96 kg], and the barley at a weight of a talent for a medimnos [27.47 kg], dry and clean of darnel, arranging the standard weight on the balance, just as the other merchants.
(27) The buyer will not make a down-payment but will pay sales taxes and auctioneers’ fees at the rate of 20 drachmas per share.3 The buyer will nominate two creditworthy guarantors, whom the Council has scrutinized, for each share.
(31) A symmory [group] will consist of six men and the share 3,000 medimnoi. In the case of a symmory the city will exact the grain from each and all of those who are in the symmory, until it recovers what belongs to it.
(36) Let the people elect ten men from all the Athenians in the assembly, when they elect the generals [in March], to have oversight of the grain.4 When these officials have the grain weighed according to what has been written, let them sell it in the Agora at whatever moment the people decide is right; but it is not to be possible to put to the vote the question of selling before the month of Anthesterion [February/March].
(44) Let the people set the price at which those elected must sell the wheat and the barley. Let the buyers of the twelfth transport the grain before the month Maemacterion [November/December]. Let the men elected by the people exercise oversight so that the grain is transported at the stated time.
(51) When those who have been elected sell the grain, let them render their accounts before the people and let them come before the people carrying the money and let the money raised from the grain be assigned to the military fund.
(55) The Receivers [apodektai] are to allocate the down-payment from the islands and as much of the fiftieth tax as was last year brought in from the two tenths;5 on this occasion it is to be for the financial administration, in future the two tenths are not to be taken away from the moneys deposited.
Notes
1. Possibly a tax on grain to be paid in Athens. A similar or identical tax was paid on exports and imports.
2. The Aeaceion (Aeaceum) was a sanctuary of the hero Aeacus where the city’s grain was stored.
3. Stroud (1998, 63) estimates that the sales tax and the auctioneer’s fee were around 1 percent.
4. Because election was normally reserved for “experts” such as generals or treasurers, it is puzzling that these officials were not chosen by lot. A cynic might say that Agyrrhius, who proposed the decree and was a former tax collector, hoped to be elected to the post.
5. The two-tenths were a payment advanced by the bidders.
See WEB 35.14.I for Athens’ cultivation of good relationships with grain producers in the Crimea, and WEB 35.14.II for the regulations governing the grain trade and its products in Athens.
Questions
1. What roles did the state play in the grain trade, according to Agyrrhius’ decree?
2. What privileges did Athens’ Crimean friend grant grain importers to Attica (WEB 35.14.I)?
3. How could the state manage the retail price of grain (35.13, WEB 35.14.II)?
Figure 35.2 A counterfeit coin. From R.S. Stroud, “An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage,” Hesperia 43 (1974), pl. 25: e. Courtesy of the Trustees of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
Image not available in this digital edition.
35.15 A Law of Coinage Certification
In addition to supervising trade, the state also tried to attract grain and other merchants to the city. It allowed resident aliens (metics), who were well represented among traders, the citizen’s right of buying land in Attica and gave foreign merchants the right to build sanctuaries. The city also enacted laws and regulations that aimed to help traders. One such law, which was passed in 375/4, offered traders a state official and procedures to certify the value of the coins they tendered. It is unclear what exactly led to this measure. At that time Athens no longer forced its coinage on others, but the imitation of her highly valued coins, especially in the Levant and Egypt, was probably an issue. The city defaced and confiscated counterfeit or base coins, but since the value of coins was measured by their weight and metal components, it is unclear how they treated identical or close imitations of Athenian silver coins.
The chapter follows Stroud’s (1974) restoration and interpretation of lines 8–9 below. Stroud thinks that it was obligatory to accept and circulate identical imitations, as opposed to others (e.g., Martin 1991, 26–27) who suggest that Athenian-like coins were returned to those who had tendered them. Of interest is the certifier or approver (dokimastês) of the coins. Private bankers and moneychangers employed slaves to reject or accept coins. In this case the city employed a public slave for the purpose who was probably skilled in the art, but who, unlike a citizen, could be subjected to corporal punishment if he failed to perform his duty. Figure 35.2 shows an Athenian tribolos, which the certifier has marked through with a cut as counterfeit.
Stroud (1974), pp. 158–161 = Harding no. 45 = R&O no. 251
Translation: R&O no. 25, pp. 112–117
Resolved by the nomothetai.2 In the archonship of Hippodamas [375/41]. Nicophon proposed:
(3) Attic silver shall be accepted when it is found to be silver and has the public stamp.
(4) The public approver [dokimastês] shall sit between the tables [of bankers and moneychangers] and approve on these terms every day except when there is a deposit of money, but then in the bouleuterion [Council house].3 If any one brings forward foreign silver having the same stamp as the Attic [–] he shall give it back to the man who brought it forward; but if it has a bronze core or a lead core or is counterfeit, he shall cut through it immediately and it shall be scraped property of the Mother of the Gods and he shall deposit it in the council.
(13) If the approver does not sit, or does not approve in accordance with the law, he shall be beaten by the conveners of the people [syllogeis tou demou]4 with fifty lashes with the whip. If any one does not accept the silver which the approver approves, he shall be deprived of what he is selling on that day. Exposures [phaseis]5 shall be made for matters in the corn-market to the corn-guardians [sitophylakes],6 for matters in the Agora and the rest of the city to the conveners of the people, for matters in the import-market to the overseers of the import-market [epimeletai tou emporiou] except for matters in the corn-market, and for matters in the corn-market to the corn-guardians. For matters exposed, those that are up to ten drachmas the officials [archontes] shall have power to decide, those that are beyond ten drachmas they shall introduce into the jury-court. The thesmothetai shall provide and allot a jury-court for them whenever they request, or they shall be fined 1,000 (?) drachmas. For the man who exposes, there shall be a share of a half if he convicts the man whom he exposes. If the seller is a slave-man or a slave-woman, he shall be beaten with fifty lashes with the whip by the officials commissioned in each matter. If any of the officials does not act in accordance with what is written, he shall be denounced [eisangellein] to the council by whoever wishes of the Athenians who have the right, and if he is convicted he shall be dismissed from his office and the council shall make an additional assessment up to 500 drachmas.
(36) So that there shall also be in the Piraeus an approver for the ship-owners and the import-traders and all others the council shall appoint from the public slaves if available or shall buy one and the apodektai [treasury officials] shall make an allocation of the price. The overseers of the import-market shall see that he sits in front of the stele of Poseidon,7 and they shall use the law in the same way as has been stated concerning the approver in the city.
(44) Write up this law on a stone stele and put it down in the city between the tables and in Piraeus in front of the stele of Poseidon. The secretary of the council shall commission the contract from the poletai [auctioneers], and the poletai shall introduce it into the council.
(49) The salary payment for the approver in the import-market shall be in the archonship of Hippodamas from when he is appointed, and the apodektai shall allocate as much as for the approver in the city, and for the time to come the salary payment shall be from the same source as for the mint-workers.
(55) If there is any decree written on a stele contrary to this law, the secretary of the council shall demolish it.8
Notes
1. The translation does not distinguish between the restored and legible parts of the inscription.
2. The Nomothetae were a board of lawgivers who decided the legality of a new law.
3. The approver was supposed to check in the Council house the quality of coins paid as state revenues.
4. The conveners of the people were a board of thirty Council members who were otherwise known to perform religious duties.
5. The procedure of exposing a person (phasis) was open to any citizen, who was rewarded for his initiative.
6. The corn-guardians regulated the grain market.
7. The location is unknown.
8. Laws (nomoi) were superior to decrees (psephismata), hence the instruction to abolish contradictory decrees.
Questions
1. What was the penalty for circulating uncertified money?
2. What were the sanctions against those in charge of enforcing the law?
35.16 A Maritime Contract
From the mid-fourth century Athens enacted mercantile laws that were restricted to transactions performed in the Athenian market and to voyages to and from the city. The laws provided easy and speedy access to court and saved traders and ship-owners the need to wait their turn for trial. Most mercantile cases (dikai emporikai) revolved around written contracts, which often recorded a loan. Following the verdict, those who refused to pay the sum owed were sent to prison to reconsider. One such contract, which is preserved in a trial speech concerning an unpaid loan, shows the international character of maritime trade in Athens. The mercantile laws made no distinction between Athenian and foreign merchants, although speakers at court might appeal to the prejudices of Athenian jurors against non-Athenians. Points of interest regarding the contract are that the interest rate on the loan was about 25 percent and that it went up to 30 percent if the borrower risked sailing past the sailing season. The security for the loan was the cargo, which the borrower had yet to buy. Finally, according to the norms of maritime trade, the loss of a ship and its cargo at sea freed the borrower from his debt. Both the risks and the opportunities for dishonesty in maritime trade were considerable.
Demosthenes 35 Against Lacritus 10–13
(10) Androcles of the [Athenian] deme Sphettus and Nausicrates of Carystus [in Euboea] have made a loan of 3,000 silver drachmae to Artemon and Apollodorus of Phaselis [in Lycia] for a voyage from Athens to Mende or Scione [in Chalcidice], and from there to the Bosporus. Then, if they wish, the two can go as far as the Borysthenes [Dnieper River], following the left coast [western coast of the Black Sea], after which they will return to Athens. The rate of interest is 225 drachmae per thousand but, should they sail from the Pontus [Black Sea] to Hieron [on the Asian coast of the Bosporus] after the rising of Arcturus [September], the rate is to be 300 per thousand. Security on the loan is three thousand jars of Mendean wine, to be shipped from Mende or Scione aboard the twenty-oared ship owned by Hyblesius. (11) They give this security not owing anyone else any money on it, and they will not contract a further loan on it. In addition, they will bring back to Athens, in the same ship, all merchandise taken on board in exchange in the Pontus. The merchandise safely conveyed to Athens, the borrowers shall pay to the lenders the money that falls due according to the contract, and do so within twenty days of their arrival in Athens. The money shall be paid in full, exception being made for what was jettisoned [in rough water] by agreement made together by the passengers, and for any ransom paid to enemies; it shall be fully paid with respect to all else. And they shall provide the lenders with the security, untouched, to remain in their authority until the borrowers give them the money accruing under the contract.
(12) If the borrowers fail to pay the money within the agreed time, the lenders shall have the right to use the goods provided as security or to sell them at market price. If the money due to the lenders under the contract falls short of the loan, the lenders are to have the right of seizure from Artemon and Apollodorus of all of their property on both land and sea, wherever it happens to be, as though they had been found guilty in court and had defaulted on payment. This right shall be accorded to the lenders, both individually and jointly.
(13) If the borrowers do not enter the Pontus and remain in the Hellespont for ten days at the time of the dog-star [late July], setting ashore their merchandise where the Athenians have no right of reprisals1 and then sailing from there to Athens, they are to pay the interest registered in the contract the previous year. And if the ship in which the merchandise is transported suffers irreparable damage, but the secured goods survive, whatever is left is to become the common property of the lenders. With regard to all this, nothing is to have greater validity than the contract.
Witnesses: Phormio of the deme Piraeus, Cephisodotus of Boeotia, Heliodorus of the deme Pithos [Athens].
Note
1. The right of reprisal allowed a citizen to seize a foreigner or his property in the citizen’s homeland if he had a claim against him or if the foreigner’s state had harmed his state; cf. 13.5: “A Treaty Concerning Seizure of Men Abroad.”
Questions
1. What were the risks of lending money in maritime trade?
2. How did the lenders try to secure their loan?
Review Questions
1. What made the difference between laws and decrees significant (35.1.A–B)?
2. What hurdles did a popular decision have to pass before being voted on (see 35.1–2, 35.4, WEB 35.3, WEB 35.5)?
3. How did democracy supervise the functioning of its officials and leaders (35.1–2, 35.4, WEB 35.3, WEB 35.5)?
4. What were Athens’ major public expenses and how were they met (35.7, 35.9–12, WEB 35.8.I–II)?
5. What problems did the state face in securing its grain supply and how did it deal with them (35.13, WEB 35.14.I–II)?
6. What were the constraints on trading in Athens (35.13, 35.15–16, WEB 35.14.I–II)?
7. How could a taxpayer, tax collector, and trader in Athens defraud the system and get away with it (35.7, 35.10–12)?
Suggested Readings
Athenian democracy in the fourth century: Sinclair 1988; Hansen 1991; Rhodes 2004a, 1–236. Codifying the laws and their authority: Ostwald 1986, 412–524; Rhodes 1991. Legislative procedure and the Athenian assembly: Hansen 1974, 1987. Athenian freedom: Hansen 1996; Raaflaub 2004, esp. 166–249. Freedom of speech: Sluiter and Rosen 2004, 1–340. Equality: Roberts 1996. Rhetores and leadership: Hansen 1983; Ober 1989, 118–126; 1996, 86–106. Athenian courts and legal system: MacDowell 1978; Hansen 1990b; Todd 1993; Boegehold 1995. Sykophants: Osborne 1990; contra: Harvey 1990; Christ 1998. Taxation and liturgies: Davies 1981; Gabrielsen 1994 (esp. trierarchies); P. Wilson 2000, 89–95 (choregia). Eisphora: Wallace 1989b; Christ 2007. Andocides and the 2 percent tax: E. Burke 1985, 262–285; Roisman 2006, 102–103. The Theoric Fund: Hansen 1976; Harris 1996. Antidosis: Gabrielsen 1987; Christ 1990. Military funds and finance: Millett 1993. Grain and food shortages: Garnsy 1988, 89–164; 1998, 183–200 (downplaying Athens’ dependence on foreign grain before the Peloponnesian War); contra: Whitby 1998. The grain tax: Stroud 1998; Harris 1999; Moreno 2003; R&O, 118–128. The silver coinage law: Stroud 1974; Giovannini 1975, 191–195; Martin 1991; R&O, 112–118. Maritime trade and lending in Athens: Isager and Hansen 1975; Millett 1991; E. Cohen 1992; Reed 2003.