Although Singapore spent all of two years in the Federation of Malaysia, its role in the creation of Greater Malaysia was immense. Indeed, had it not been for Singapore’s precarious political situation in 1960–1961, the Greater Malaysia plan which created the Federation of Malaysia may never have materialised.1 Although Singapore was tied, like the proverbial umbilical cord to the Malay peninsula, the two territories developed differently because of the nature of British political intervention in the 19th century. By the 1920s, when the first discussions of closer association between the two territories were being articulated, Singapore had grown quite apart from the rest of the Malay States and nothing was achieved. The end of World War II offered the British another opportunity to merge the territories, but this failed because of the rise of Malay nationalism in the Malay States and the rise of Communist Open Front activities in Singapore. In this chapter, I will argue that while the avowed motivation for merger — at least from the Singapore perspective — had always been economic survival, the reality was that the Federation came about because of the People’s Action Party’s political struggle to survive, and British support for Lee Kuan Yew.
The British acquired Malaya in parts, starting with the island of Penang in 1790. Next came Malacca, a Dutch territory that was handed over to the British for ‘safekeeping’ in 1795 when France invaded Holland during the Napoleonic wars and which was ceded to Britain in 1824. Singapore, where the British established a trading post in 1819, was also ceded to Britain by treaty in 1824. Thus, Penang, Malacca and Singapore — collectively known as the Straits Settlements — became Britain’s first territories in Malaya. British intervention into other parts of the Malay peninsula proceeded more slowly and it was only in 1873 that the first British Resident was forced onto the state of Negeri Sembilan. This was followed by British Residents being appointed in Perak and Selangor (1874) and Pahang (1887).2 These four states signed the Treaty of Federation in 1895 and collectively came to be established as the Federated Malay States.3 The remaining Malay States — Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu — did not constitute a single legal or political entity under international law and were administered as stand-alone British protectorates. Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, British possessions in Malaya comprised territories that operated under three separate constitutional systems: a colony (Straits Settlements) and two types of protectorates with varying degrees of British control (Federated Malay States and Unfederated Malay States). This untidy and fragmented state of constitutional affairs remained in force right up till February 1942 when the Japanese invaded Malaya and Singapore and the British surrendered.
Interestingly, the first ideas of a ‘federation’ of territories for Malaya did not involve the union of Singapore and Malaya — since that was deemed inevitable — but rather between the North Borneo territories and the ‘protected States of the Malay Archipelago’. In the House of Lords debate on the future of the beleaguered North Borneo Company and the cost of maintaining the dependencies on the British taxpayer, Lord Thomas Brassey suggested that ‘the North Borneo Company, Sarawak — should the Rajah consent — the protected States of the Malay Archipelago, and the Straits Settlements, should be combined into one large colony.’4 Brassey’s concerns had nothing to do with rationalising the colonies and dependencies of Britain in Southeast Asia but rather with how costly it was to maintain North Borneo. Nothing came of Brassey’s suggestions and the British North Borneo Chartered Company survived till 1946.5
The first efforts in constitutionally consolidating Britain’s Malayan possessions were made by Sir Laurence Guillemard, who was Governor of the Straits Settlements and concurrently High Commissioner to the Federated Malay States from 1920 to 1927. In his effort to persuade the Unfederated Malay States (UFMS) — Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu — to join the Federated Malay States (FMS), Guillemard proposed a plan of decentralisation, under which more powers would be devolved to the Malay rulers and the State Councils of the FMS.6 This decentralisation scheme met with fierce opposition from the business community over fears that this was nothing more than a scheme by the Straits Settlements Governor to arrogate more powers to himself. The proposal was all the more problematic because it was seen as a ploy by Guillemard to get rid of the post of Chief Secretary which was held by his opponent, Sir William George Maxwell, an old Malayan civil servant.7 Guillemard left Singapore in 1927 without succeeding to push his scheme any further and it was left to Sir Cecil Clementi to take up the cudgels again. Clementi, who assumed office in 1930, pursued decentralisation as a matter of urgency as he feared that if he failed to do so, local nationalist sentiment could prove troublesome for the British.8
Despite his best efforts, decentralisation failed. Many reasons account for this failure: ‘the rulers’ mistrust of the British, tension between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, differences between commercial, planting, and mining interests, and the ambitions of officials.’9 Clementi retired as Governor of the Straits Settlements in 1934 and was replaced by Sir Shenton Thomas. Thomas, who was not a ‘decentralisation enthusiast’10 and thought it ‘an extravagant, dilatory and discriminative form of government’11 did not pursue the policy with any vigour and so remained the state of things till the Japanese Occupation.
Months before the fall of Malaya and Singapore, American criticism of Britain’s imperialism was already widespread. To forestall further demands from the Americans, the Foreign Office and Colonial Office pressed for a policy statement on Britain’s Far East Colonies. The need for such a policy was made all the more urgent by two key events. The first was when British Colonial Secretary, Lord Cranborne learnt from his Dutch counterpart, Dr Van Mook, that the Dutch were already making reconstruction plans for their own territories in the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). The second was the upcoming Institute of Pacific Relations Conference scheduled for December 1942 in Canada. It was thus necessary to prepare a post-war settlement policy for the British delegation to outline at the Conference.12
Post-War policy for Malaya and Singapore was devised by officials from the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office, and the Malayan Planning Unit (MPU). The first group was led by Edward Gent, a Malayan specialist and Assistant Permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies. He later became the first and only Governor of the Malayan Union. The MPU consisted of a group of Malayan Civil Service officers who gathered in London sometime in 1943. Notable among them were Major-General Ralph Hone (later Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Malaya) who had not served previously in Malaya, Brigadier Patrick McKerron (later Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Singapore) and Alexander Newboult (later Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Malaya).13 As Britain was at war, Malaya and Singapore came under the British Military Administration (BMA). As such, the MPU came under the War Office even though they worked closely with the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office worked out the broad outlines of colonial policy while the MPU worked out the administrative details such as finance, manpower requirements and municipal structures.
Since the early 1930s, Gent had favoured a closer association of Malayan states, but was cautious in broaching the issue in 1942, especially in the face of mounting American criticism. Gent’s first step was to propose that new treaties be negotiated with the Sultans to restore Britain’s former treaty relations with the Malay States and that sovereignty be reasserted over the Straits Settlements.14 Lord Cranborne, then Secretary of State for the Colonies did not agree, preferring to focus on defence. Gent then justified the idea of a ‘Malayan Union’ — comprising all the Malay States — on the basis of establishing a security association of Britain’s possessions in Southeast Asia. With this new union, better co-ordination and consistency on policy could be ensured.
From the outset, Singapore was always considered a special and separate case. Only once, in 1942, did Singapore feature in the larger reorganisation plan when a union comprising the Malay states, the Straits Settlements, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei was proposed, with Singapore as the capital. This concept was abandoned as being premature.15 In the meantime, the Colonial Office worked desperately and on 20 March 1943 prepared a memorandum entitled Plans for Constitutional Reconstruction in the Far East.16 Singapore’s ‘special position’ was singled out and it was suggested that a supreme British regional authority be established over all chief officers of each territory. In respect of Singapore, it was suggested that ‘special status’ be given to Singapore for four reasons: (a) that it be preserved as a free port; (b) that it was an important naval base; (c) that its wealth was resented by the other Malay states who feared their interests being subordinated to those of Singapore; and (d) Singapore was much more urbanised and was thus faced with its own special problems of government. To the original four reasons for treating Singapore separate can be added Lord Hailey’s17 penetrating observation that the ‘strongest argument for its treatment as a separate entity lies in the great predominance of Chinese in the population.’18
The paper proposed that Singapore should be kept out of any federation or union with the rest of the Malay Peninsula. However, Singapore could be an important base and headquarters of the Governor-General for the Far East Territories.19 Singapore would thus be something like a District of Columbia for the British colonies in the Far East.20 Towards the end of 1943, a draft constitutional blueprint21 was ready and the Colonial Office submitted it to the War and Foreign Offices for approval. This Master Plan stated that:
… it is desirable that the Island of Singapore should be a separate constitutional entity. Reference has been made above to the divergence of economic interest between the Island and the mainland of the Peninsula. Singapore also possesses special political features, due to the predominantly Chinese nature of its population which would make it difficult of assimilation at once into a Pan-Malayan Union. Nevertheless, it should be made clear that HMG has no desire to preclude or prejudice in any way the fusion of these two administrations in a wider Union at any time should they both agree that such a course were desirable. For immediate purposes, the basis for its separate organisation already existed in the Municipality of Singapore, but the appointment of a separate Governor for the Settlement will be desirable.22
This plan was a hard-headed one. It clearly identified the key factors that made Singapore’s inclusion in the Malayan Union difficult, and in many ways foresaw the problems which the two territories would face some twenty years later. Not everyone at the Colonial Office agreed that separating Singapore from the mainland was a good idea. Sidney Caine, economic advisor to the Colonial Office and later Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malaya pointed out that it did not make economic sense to separate the two entities.23 Gent was, however, unwilling to entertain such fundamental changes at this stage, especially when Cabinet approval was being sought.24 According to Gent, the political imperatives far outweighed the economic imperatives:
Our first and foremost object is to secure a unification of the Malay States. That must be the essential basis for any larger union. It is the general view of those with experience that this will be assisted by the non-inclusion of Singapore at any rate at the first stage. That in itself is a very important and almost overriding argument.25
The first public utterance of this policy, or at least the broad outlines of the policy, was made in Parliament by Oliver Stanley, Churchill’s Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 1 December 1943 in reply to a question from Labour MP John Dugdale on the future of Malaya. Stanley explained that the first objective was to liberate Malaya from the Japanese, and then to develop ‘its capacity for self-government within the Empire.’26 The Malayan Union plan was put before the Cabinet Committee constituted on 6 January 1944 and approved at a later meeting on 22 March 1944. On 31 May 1944, the War Cabinet approved the plan and work began in earnest on the new constitution.27 With the Colonial Office’s pre-occupation with the Malayan Union proposals, the future of Singapore’s constitutional arrangements were sadly neglected. As Turnbull observed:
Once the separation of the island from the rest of Malaya … was approved by the Cabinet, the Colonial Office virtually ignored Singapore and concentrated on the more complicated peninsular problems.28
It was not till January 1945 that Gent instructed the MPU’s McKerron to prepare a paper outlining Singapore’s future constitutional policy. Two months later, McKerron submitted a ten-page document entitled ‘Future Constitutional Policy for Singapore’ to Gent.29 It was the first of several subsequent McKerron memoranda. After several revisions, the final memorandum and its recommendations were submitted to Sir George Gater, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies on 21 August 1945.30 McKerron’s proposals were eventually discussed by the Secretary of State, George Hall and other key members of the Colonial Office on 19 October 1945 and approved.
Two key events shaped the course of colonial policy for Malaya and Singapore. The first was the British general election of July 1945 and the second was Japan’s unconditional surrender in mid-August 1945.31 The Labour Party, who had spent the war years as junior partner in Churchill’s Conservative-led coalition, scored a landslide victory (393 seats to the Tories’ 197). Clement Atlee became Prime Minister and George Hall32 was the new Secretary of State for the Colonies. This emphatic victory allowed the Labour Party, among other things, to put in operation its colonial policy which had, by this time, hardened against imperialism.33 With Labour in power, there was increasing resistance in Whitehall to policies that would appear exploitative and which did not promote greater involvement of the colonial peoples in the management of their own affairs.
Japan’s sudden unconditional surrender caused a panic in the Colonial Office since all its plans were premised on the British returning to Malaya as conquerors. Victory was to be fought for and not handed to them on a platter. Its first task was thus to resolve the legal and political situation in Malaya. As such Singapore’s constitutional plans were temporarily put on the back-burner while the Colonial Office rushed frantically to get Cabinet approval for its Malayan Union plan.
The Malayan Union plan involved an extremely sensitive and delicate political and legal manoeuvre in getting the Malay Sultans to re-negotiate their treaties with the British. In a nutshell, the UK’s Special Representative, Sir Harold MacMichael, was assigned to get all the Sultans to surrender their sovereignty to the British so that the British could politically consolidate the peninsula by offering a common legal framework and constitution under which all the Malay States could operate.
The question of whether Singapore should have been included as part of the new united Malayan Union continued to plague both the Colonial Office and local politicians long after the British embarked on their new Malayan Union plan. At the inauguration of the first post-war Legislative Council, Singapore’s Governor Franklin Gimson himself broached the issue and revived interest in the merger issue.34 Gimson had consistently urged the Colonial Office and his Malayan counterpart, Edward Gent to work more assi duously towards a union of the two territories. Gent was not convinced. He felt that Singapore’s economy was so different from that of Malaya’s that her inclusion would upset the Malays since Singapore would again economically dominate the peninsula as it had done before the War. Above all, Gent, as well as the Colonial Office, were anxious not to upset the sensitive negotiations he was then conducting with the Malay Sultans.35
Gimson was by no means the only one agitating for the fusion of the two territories. At an Extraordinary Private Session of the Advisory Council on 4 March 1948, where Lord Listowel, Colonial Secretary, was present, members of the Advisory Council voiced their concerns about the merger issue. Most of them urged the Colonial Office to speed up the process of union since ‘the political separation of the two territories had caused such delays in reaching decisions on matters of pan-Malayan concern, and had led to possible misunderstanding … as well as to a spirit of parochialism which would be deplorable for the future development of Malays.’36 Signals were also being sent to the Colonial Office through Gimson. The Malayan Democratic Union — Singapore’s first political party — had already boycotted the 1948 elections arguing that the consti tutional arrangements for Singapore and Malaya were unsatisfactory. Sir Roland Braddell, constitutional advisor to the Sultan of Johore, and a prominent, third-generation Singaporean lawyer, warned Gimson that if Singapore developed ‘as a separate Colony and put aside hopes of amalgamation with the Federation, the position of the British in SE Asia would be very seriously affected.’37
While Gimson was eager to expedite the merger process, Gent was cautious to the point of obstinacy. He was worried that any Colonial Office initiative to hurry the merger of the two territories would ‘create suspicion and hostility in the minds of Dato Seri Onn and his supporters.’38 Malcolm MacDonald, Governor-General of Southeast Asia, was placed in the unenviable position of trying to co-ordinate the two Governors — Gent and Gimson — and to get them to agree on a suitable date for the unification of Singapore with the Federation. Finally, it was decided that a small committee — comprising the old MPU trio of Newboult, McKerron and Hone — would be formed to look into the procedure of merger.39 However, before the committee could discuss anything, the Emergency broke out in Malaya in June 1948. Hopes of an early constitutional union were dashed when Dato Seri Onn announced that ‘there could be no question of Singapore coming into the Federation and aggravating the already considerable Chinese problem.’40
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was formed in 1930, taking the place of the earlier South Seas (Nanyang) Communist Party. Its development42 echoed concurrent developments in mainland China where the communists were positioning themselves for an all-out battle against the Japanese and the Kuomintang. As was to be expected, most of the MCP leaders and members were Chinese. While it was proscribed by the British, the MCP succeeded in infiltrating the trade union movement and succeeded in organising a series of strikes throughout the 1930s. By the late 1930s, the MCP claimed to have some 40,000 members, about half of whom were in Singapore. During the Japanese Occupation, the MCP gained respect and credibility when its armed forces took to the jungles as the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and fought the Japanese.
The suddenness of the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945 took everyone by surprise. The British, who expected to fight their way back into Singapore — and thereby regain some of their lost prestige and legitimacy — were caught flat-footed and could not mobilise their forces quickly enough to reoccupy Singapore. Indeed, it was only on 8 September that the British forces arrived. In the meantime, the MPAJA had occupied the power vacuum and were seen by Singapore’s inhabitants as its liberators. For some two years, the MCP was allowed to operate as a legal organisation. In June 1948, the MCP’s Central Committee adopted a policy of armed insurrection and terrorism at their Fourth Plenary Meeting and commenced a campaign of murder and terrorism, leading up to armed revolution.43 On 19 June 1948 Gent issued a set of Emergency Regulations applicable to the whole of Malaya, effectively proclaiming a state of emergency for the peninsula. The Singapore authorities followed suit on 23 June 1948. Exactly a month later, the MCP and its satellite organisations were outlawed.
Over the next five years, the British succeeded in crippling the communist organisations in Singapore44 and as such were generally spared the ‘horrifying experience of the armed struggle in the mainland.’45 The battle against the MCP in Malaya lasted till 1960, when the Emergency finally came to an end. In the meantime, all talk about merger evaporated as both the Malayan and Singapore publics pushed towards self-government. Progress was faster in Malaya than in Singapore and in 1957, the Federation of Malaya became an independent state. Malaya’s independence spurred Singapore’s politicians to push for self-government. After three rounds of constitutional talks between 1956 and 1958, Singapore became a self-governing colony with full control over all its affairs save for foreign relations, defence and internal security. An Internal Security Council (ISC), comprising three members from Singapore, three members from the UK, and one member from the Federation of Malaya, was responsible for all decisions relating to internal security in Singapore.
Between 1946 and 1957, the Malay states had progressed through three constitutional transformations and achieved independence from Britain. The Malayan Union Plan — hatched during the war years in London — came into effect on 1 April 1946 with Sir Edward Gent as its first Governor. Before long, the Union — which in fact agglomerated all the Malay States into a single Colony — was in trouble. The Malays — led by Dato Seri Onn bin Jaafar and his United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) — opposed the constitutional framework that diminished the status and power of the Sultans and gave citizenship to non-Malay immigrants. The Malays were also unhappy over the way the British strong-armed the Sultans into surrendering their powers and feared being swamped by the economically-dominant Chinese.
By January 1948, a new constitutional framework was established, transforming the Union into a federation. The Federation of Malaya Constitution restored the symbolic position of the Sultans and a modicum of their power. However, the problem of Chinese economic dominance was not settled till independence negotiations and the formation of the Reid Constitutional Commission in 1956. The Merdeka (independence) Constitution of 1957 contained provisions protecting the special position of the Malays as the indigenous people of the land and legalised the implementation of quotas for Malays in education and the civil service. Islam was declared the ‘religion of the Federation’,46 and Malay its official language. It is against this backdrop that further discussion on Singapore’s merger with the federation must be considered.
When David Saul Marshall became Singapore’s first Chief Minister following the general election of 1955, he pushed unsuccessfully for the British to grant Singapore independence. He did, however, succeed in getting the British government to agree to speed up its timetable for the grant of self-government to the colony. The old Rendel Constitution of 195548 was replaced by a new Constitution in 1958.49 In the ensuing general election of May 1959, the People’s Action Party (PAP) won a landslide victory, securing 43 of the 51 seats in the Legislative Assembly. The PAP sought merger with the Federation of Malaya as a matter of urgency for two main reasons: first, to achieve political independence and second, to guarantee Singapore’s economic survival. Merger was, for many people in Singapore, inevitable. Without natural resources, not even enough water for its people, an independent Singapore was not a viable option.
Indeed, by the late 1950s, politicians of all stripes were pushing for union with Malaya as soon as possible. The PAP gave the merger issue the hardest push, considering the formation of a Malayan nation ‘a historical necessity’50 and launched the most coherent and persuasive campaign for merger. Unlike the tentative steps to a merger between the two territories in the 1940s, there was much greater urgency in this resurgent effort. By this time the Federation of Malaya had become independent and invariably calls for Singapore’s independence were resounding down the corridors of Whitehall. While the British could certainly have shoehorned Singapore into the Federation of Malaya in 1948, it was in no position to do so after 1957. Merger would require the consent of the Malayan government led by Tunku Abdul Rahman.
Our ultimate objective is a Confederation between the five present territories of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. We have already agreed that this should be achieved in two stages: first by the combination of (a) Singapore and the Federation and (b) the three Borneo Territories as separate entities; and second, by bring [sic] together these two groups under one appropriate constitutional government.
— Malcolm MacDonald, 2 April 1955 51
The Tunku (as he was affectionately referred to) was nervous about incorporating Singapore into the Federation for the same reasons that the British kept the two territories apart. The huge numbers of Chinese on the island, which would have outnumbered the Malays on the peninsula, had grown larger. Worse than that, many of the Chinese were seen as chauvinistic and supportive of the MCP. Indeed, when the Tunku first discussed the issue with Malcolm MacDonald, former Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, in December 1958, the latter reported that the Tunku was adamant that ‘he and his colleagues would never consider a merger between Malaya and Singapore alone’ because of the ‘Chinese problem’.52 However, the Tunku liked MacDonald’s idea of a ‘Super-Federation’ comprising the ‘Federation of Malaya, Singapore and Government of three Borneo territories.’53 By May 1960, this ‘Super Federation’ concept was being referred to in the Colonial Office as the ‘Grand Design’.54 The Tunku’s rationale, as Sir Robert Scott — MacDonald’s successor as Commissioner-General — astutely observed:
… is due mainly to a feeling that the indigenous races and the Malays living in those territories would be an accretion of strength, tipping the racial balance against the Chinese, which might provide a safeguard sufficient to justify the risk of accepting the incorporation of Singapore. No doubt the Tunku is aware also of the relative stability and prosperity of Sarawak and North Borneo, and the oil revenues of Brunei must appear a prize worth much effort to acquire.55
While this idea was certainly attractive to the Tunku and to Singapore’s PAP, it was much less attractive to the peoples of the three Borneo territories — Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. Sarawak and Sabah (formerly North Borneo) were considered to be underdeveloped and politically backward and the British felt that it would take a number of years before they would be ready for any kind of federation. In any case, thinking at the Colonial Office was that a gradated process of federation be adopted. First, the Borneo states would form a federation among themselves. This new federation would then be amalgamated with the Federation of Malaya. Only after this was accomplished would Singapore be brought into the Federation. The timeline for this process was indeterminate especially since it was unclear how long would be required to prepare the Borneo territories for self-government. Writing in 1961, Lord Selkirk, British High Commissioner in Singapore opined that:
All three Borneo territories are quite unfitted as yet to enter an association of this sort on the basis of popular representation. But they will continue to be so unfitted for many years to come. I should give Sarawak about ten years and North Borneo at least twenty years before a clear-cut electoral opinion could be given on this subject [of merger].56
When he first took office as Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew also believed that merger would only be achieved in the long term and factored up to twenty years to realise this object.57 While this was certainly a realistic timetable, it was to become untenable for Lee and the PAP over the next eighteen months.
The PAP’s performance during its first year in office had not been good and its popularity dropped.58 Not only was the Cabinet having a hard time running the country, the PAP was facing dissention in its ranks and attacks from the opposition bench, especially from Ong Eng Guan and his United People’s Party. The radical left-wing faction of the Party was putting pressure on Lee Kuan Yew to get the ISC to free the rest of the political detainees who had been locked up under the British in 1957 but Lee prevaricated. This led them to suspect that Lee was intentionally keeping his would-be political opponents incarcerated while blaming the Malayans and British for this state of affairs. At the same time, calls for greater autonomy and independence in Singapore grew ever more vociferous. Faced with this unrelenting pressure, Lee needed a major issue to galvanise the public and garner support for his moderate PAP faction and to pressure the British into helping him.
The issue would be Merger. As the pressure kept piling on Lee and the PAP to hasten towards independence, it was time for the British and the Malayans to sit down and discuss this issue seriously. If no discussions were forthcoming, Lee’s credibility would suffer and his position would soon be untenable. As Henry Bourdillon, Deputy High Commissioner in Singapore, noted, Lee and the PAP Government could not ‘survive indefinitely in static or deteriorating circumstances.’59
In May 1961, Lee Kuan Yew submitted a Memorandum entitled ‘Future of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories’60 to the Colonial Office. He laid down the options available and highlighted the perils if no progress towards independence was achieved:
… the pace of political changes taking place throughout the whole world and the rate at which pressure is mounting in Singapore, with or without the aid of the MCP makes it imperative that agreement on principle on some constitutional arrangements must be achieved soon, or they may never be achieved at all … The next step forward from the present constitutional position in Singapore is independence. The alternative is a standstill with minor constitutional readjustments of a purely window-dressing nature. If no constitutional advance takes place, the PAP cannot hold the position in Singapore. It will probably be replaced by a pro-MCP and pro-China Singapore Government. It is likely that this Government would be intelligent enough to avoid a direct clash of arms with the British until the international position is such that direct Chinese armed intervention is possible. The effect of a pro-MCP and pro-China Government in Singapore on the Chinese in the Federation will accentuate in the Federation the communal conflicts and dissolve the Chinese will to resist ‘Chinese’ Communism. This will sooner or later end up in an independent Singapore. A Singapore independent by itself must pander to its 75 per cent Chinese population and will end up with greater appeals to Chinese chauvinism and eventually all talk of Malayan culture, national language, national solidarity and nation-building will disappear with tremendous adverse repercussions on the Chinese in the Federation of Malaya. The consequences are incalculable and would certainly put an end to any hope of building a united community composing of Malay, Chinese, Indian and other races in Malaya. The solution lies in the larger federation, with the strength and stability from the centre. This course of events can only be avoided if Singapore is merged into the larger entity described below, and such tendencies contained.61
The issue of merger was also Lee’s means of precipitating a break with the radical left-wing and pro-communist elements within his party. The first head-on attack against the PAP came through its former Minister for National Development, the right-wing Ong Eng Guan, who resigned his seat in Hong Lim constituency in April 1961 and challenged the PAP to contest the seat. Ong won, scoring a decisive victory against the PAP’s Jek Yeun Thong, winning 73 per cent of the votes.
The PAP’s loss of Hong Lim constituency sent a chill down the spines of the Tunku and the British. If this pattern of losses persisted, there was a real likelihood that Lee’s moderate faction would actually lose power. In such as case, Singapore — as Lee predicted in his paper — would be controlled by extremists and communists. In his memorandum ‘Political Developments in Singapore since June 1959’,62 Lord Selkirk made it plain that the British should help Lee and the PAP in every way possible to secure independence within Malaysia or face the possibility that Lee would have to go empty-handed to London in 1963 for constitutional talks. Lee needed to show ‘some advance or commitment towards a merger with the Federation of Malaya or he has to face up to the prospect of going to London for constitutional talks in 1963 where he could ask for virtually no significant changes and lose the General Election or ask for big changes which he does not at present consider to be in Singapore’s best interests.’63
On 27 May 1961, the Tunku, who had hitherto been lukewarm to the idea of a Greater Malaysia, proposed that Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories (comprising, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei) ‘be brought closer together in political and economic co-operation.’64 This was the signal the British and Lee had been waiting for. Lee knew that this was his chance to rid his party of its left-wing elements. The opportunity came when Baharuddin Mohd Ariff, the PAP’s Assemblyman for Anson constituency died suddenly in July 1961. The radical left-wingers used this by-election to try to capture the PAP leadership. The ‘Big Six’ trade union leaders — Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, Sandra Woodhull, Dominic Puthucheary, ST Bani and Jamit Singh — issued a press statement calling for ‘genuinely full internal self-government’ which enabled Singapore’s government to ‘exercise all the rights over matters of internal security.’65 The next day, 3 June 1961, Lee Kuan Yew once again called for ‘independence through merger’ and the battle lines between the two factions of the PAP were drawn.66
On 20 July 1961, Lee Kuan Yew tabled a motion in the Legislative Assembly asking his party members to ‘publicly declare where they stand.’ Sixteen Assemblymen (including thirteen PAP members) abstained and were expelled from the Party on 26 July, along with twenty-two other branch officials. The expelled members proceeded to establish the Barisan Sosialis or Socialist Front with Dr Lee Siew Choh as Chairman and Lim Chin Siong as Secretary-General. As there were then no laws to disqualify members who resigned their parties to join or form another party or remain independent (anti-hopping laws), the Barisan became the largest opposition party in the Assembly. With the rupture of the Party, the PAP was left with a majority of only one member. It was with this meagre majority that the PAP took the fight for merger to the people of Singapore.
The Barisan was determined to avoid merger because the staunchly anti-Communist Tunku had threatened time and again to use the draconian Internal Security Act against anyone perceived to be communist or pro-communist. As Barisan leader Lee Siew Choh astutely observed, the PAP ‘is now hoping … that such [merger] arrangements will allow the Federation Government to purge its political opponents before the next general elections.’67 But to reject merger outright meant postponing Singapore’s independence from Britain and this ran right against the grain of popular sentiment. Their only option was to derail merger by attacking the terms of merger and the constitutional process by which it was to be achieved. The Barisan decided to capitalise on the citizenship provisions in the new federation. Under the terms of merger, Singapore citizens did not automatically have Federal citizenship. The debate on the White Paper on Merger ran from 17 November 1961 to 17 January 1962 with lots of filibustering and very few interruptions. The Barisan were not alone in attacking the PAP’s White Paper (Heads of Agreement). They were joined by the entire opposition bench including former Chief Minister David Marshall (now Labour Party) and former PAP minister, Ong Eng Guan (United People’s Party).
The Barisan attacked the PAP’s merger plan on two fronts. First, that it amounted to no more than a ‘phoney-merger’ since the PAP ‘did not tell the people of Singapore they wanted to make [them] … second-class citizens.’68 And second, that the PAP failed to consult all segments of society by failing to convene an All-Party Conference to discuss the terms of merger thus denying the opposition parties ‘the right to participate in charting the course of our own constitutional future’.69 If the All-Party Conference failed to resolve the terms of merger, Dr Lee suggested that there should be general elections to resolve the problem.70
The PAP rejected Dr Lee’s suggestions. There was no need for an All-Party Conference or a general election since it won a mandate in 1959 to secure merger on terms which were as favourable to Singapore as possible. This was a weak argument since the PAP that won the 1959 election was no longer the same party by 1961. Nonetheless, the PAP managed to hold its ground because the Barisan’s disruptive tactics both inside and outside the Assembly began alienating it from large segments of the public. The constant agitation, strikes and civil unrest they precipitated alienated both the Tunku, his government and the Singapore public at large. To blunt the Barisan’s objections over the lack of consultation, Lee Kuan Yew decided to hold a referendum on merger.
The idea for a state-wide referendum was first mooted in July 1961 at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference which was held in Singapore and attended by representatives from Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. In August 1961, Lee met the Tunku and a formal in-principle agreement was announced. The date for the referendum was fixed for 1 September 1962.
Three options were offered to the electorate in the referendum. Since all the political parties in Singapore favoured merger, there was no question as to whether the people wanted merger or not. The question was on what terms and arrangements would merger be achieved. The first option, Option A was the PAP’s proposal, in keeping with the Heads of Agreement set out in the White Paper which gave ‘Singapore autonomy in labour education and other agreed matters set out in Command Paper No 33 of 1961 with Singapore citizens automatically becoming citizens of Malaysia.’ Option B offered the voter ‘complete and unconditional merger for Singapore as a state on an equal basis with the other eleven states in accordance with the Constitutional documents of the Federation of Malaya’ and Option C offered the electorate merger on ‘terms no less favourable than those given to the Borneo territories.’
The Barisan’s next move was to block the referendum. In June 1962, a Council of Joint Action (CJA) — comprising the Barisan, the Liberal Socialists, the Workers’ Party, the United Democratic Party and the Partai Rakyat — was established to block the referendum. The Council decided to take their object to the referendum to the United Nations Committee on Colonialism.71 Nineteen CJA members signed a memorandum condemning the referendum on the grounds that the proposed constitutional changes were ‘devised by the British Government to assure its continued right to bases in Singapore, and to protect its privileged economic position.’72 The CJA also criticised the terms and the lack of choice in the referendum. The PAP submitted its own memorandum, arguing its 1959 election mandate to negotiate merger. It also asked for and received a right of hearing before the Committee. On 26 July 1962, both Lee Siew Choh and Lee Kuan Yew appeared before the Committee and presented their respective cases. The Committee decided not to take any action on the protest.73
Between 27 June 1962 and 11 July 1962, the Legislative Assembly met to decide the framing of the questions to be asked at the Referendum. This was the Barisan’s last chance to topple the PAP government. They tried their best to pressure PAP Assemblymen to cross the floor and join the opposition. Once the PAP lost its majority, the government would have had to resign. On 13 July 1962, Barisan leader Lee Siew Choh tabled a motion of no-confidence in the government, but this was defeated by a majority of twenty-four votes against sixteen, with seven abstentions.74
By the end of July 1962, the Barisan was on the defensive. It failed to win the parliamentary motion to establish an All-Party Conference and it had failed to pressure the PAP into calling a snap elections. Its efforts to derail the referendum at the United Nations also came to nought. Its last strategy was to push for merger under which Singapore would enter the Federation on the same terms of Penang and Malacca (two former Straits Settlements colonies) as the twelfth state of the Federation. In such a plan, Singapore citizens would automatically qualify for Federal citizenship. This strategy also backfired for as the PAP’s Dr Goh Keng Swee gleefully pointed out the rules provided that in the case of Penang and Malacca, only those born in those two territories automatically qualified as citizens. Out of the 634,000 voters in Singapore, only slightly more than half of them — about 320,000 — were actually born in Singapore. If they backed the Barisan’s proposal, about half of Singapore’s voting population would be disenfranchised. Furthermore, Lee had managed to secure the Tunku’s agreement to give all Singaporeans federal citizenship. Lee had blown the Barisan’s argument apart.
Realising their mistake, the Barisan’s leaders persuaded voters to cast blank votes instead. This move was clearly one of desperation since the terms of the referendum provided that anyone casting a blank vote was deemed content to leave it to the Legislative Assembly to choose for him. Even with a slim majority in the Assembly, this meant giving the vote to the PAP’s Option A. This tactical change was calculated at achieving a propaganda victory if most of the votes were blank. In such an instance, the Barisan could easily allege that the PAP ‘faked the people’s wishes and were trying to bring about a phoney merger.’75 The PAP was quick to counter-attack by telling the people that if most of the votes were for Option B, they would have no choice but to count the blank votes as being in favour of Option B. This clever manoeuvre sent half the electorate not born in Singapore ‘into a state of confused panic, which Goh Keng Swee cultivated by sending out some 40 trucks fitted with loudspeakers to warn the flummoxed masses that if they cast blank votes, they stood to lose their citizenship.’76 The final results of the referendum swung overwhelmingly in favour of the PAP’s Option A with 71 per cent of the voters opting for merger on the Government’s terms. The Barisan was beaten.77
After Lee broke with his left-wing colleagues, the British determined to put their full weight behind a ‘crack programme’ of merger and to support Lee and save his political fortunes.78 In September 1961, Lord Selkirk wrote a lengthy and urgent memorandum to the Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, outlining his assessment of the situation and stressing the importance of locking in the terms of merger as quickly as possible. Uppermost in Selkirk’s mind was the timely confluence of facts that made this the ideal time to push the Federation into accepting Singapore. The biggest problem was the Borneo territories. As Selkirk noted:
All three Borneo territories are quite unfitted as yet to enter an association of this sort on the basis of popular representation. But they will continue to be so unfitted for many years to come. I should give Sarawak about ten years and North Borneo at least twenty years before a clear-cut electoral opinion could be given on this subject. This means bluntly that if we proceed by normal constitutional methods, and assuming the Tunku will not compromise, merger between the Federation and Singapore is virtually out.79
He acknowledged that the British could not be expected to ‘remain in the Borneo territories for another ten or twenty years’ while these territories were being nurtured to political maturity.80 Selkirk was anxious that the British not be seen to be abandoning the Borneo territories, but hammered home the point that if they were not brought into Greater Malaysia now, they may eventually become independent only to be absorbed by China or Indonesia.81
Selkirk proposed that new constitutions be drafted for the Borneo territories. These constitutions could be brought into operation in stages, leaving either the Tunku or the Colonial Office to determine when these constitutions would become fully operational. However, the British were still anxious that the merger arrangements would be agreeable to the people of the Borneo territories and some form of consultation had to be made within the next year or two. This came sooner rather than later. In November 1961 the Joint Statement by the Governments of the Federation and the United Kingdom was presented to the British Parliament.82 It stated that both the United Kingdom and Malayan governments were ‘convinced that this [Merger] is a desirable aim.’ However, the Statement emphasised the need to obtain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak83 as well as those of the Sultan of Brunei. A Commission would be appointed to carry out the task of ascertaining these views.
The Commission was appointed in January 1962 and was headed by Lord Cobbold, a former Governor of the Bank of England. Members of the Cobbold Commission84 arrived in Kuching on 19 February 1962 and spent two months in Sabah and Sarawak. All persons wishing to submit written memoranda to the Commission were invited to do so. Over 2,200 letters and memoranda were received, and the Commission held fifty hearings in thirty-five different centres in Sarawak and North Borneo. In all, they spoke to over 4,000 persons from 690 groups, and in August 1962, a report was presented to the British Parliament.85 The result was generally positive.86
Opposition to the Malaysia plan came mainly from Borneo’s political leaders87 who feared Malay domination of their territories. At the same time, the Chinese and native non-Malays feared racial discrimination, given the advocacy of Malay as the national language and Islam as the official religion. That the new federation would be named ‘Malaysia’ did not help matters.88 In addition, Borneo political leaders ‘saw in Borneo’s separate development towards self-government and independence their eventual inheritance of political power and rule … [and] Malaysia was initially seen … as a proposal which would deny them their rightful legacy.’89 They were upset because the proposals were ‘considered improper, coming as it did from an outsider, and without prior consultation.’90 Furthermore, some leaders felt that the Borneo territories were being used as pawns to solve ‘the Singapore problem’.
Not all the Commission members thought the Malaysia plan would benefit the Borneo peoples. British members, Sir Anthony Abell and Sir David Watherston recommended the formation of Malaysia in two distinct phases, with a ‘transitionary period’ of about five years.91 Malayan members, Dato Wong Pow Nee and Encik Mohamed Ghazali bin Shafie were convinced that the transfer of sovereignty should take place within the next twelve months92 as any further delay ‘would expose these territories and their people to dangerously disruptive influences both internally and from outside’ which would ultimately lead to racial strife.93
In mid-July 1962, the Tunku led a three-man delegation94 to London for talks with the British. The talks were ‘tough and protracted’, lasting over two weeks. The British continued to insist on securing merger between Singapore and the Federation before admitting the Borneo territories. The Federation delegation was adamant that, unless Sabah and Sarawak came in at the same time, there would be no merger. The Malayan delegation threatened to break off the talks and the British capitulated on 30 July 1962. Interestingly, the Cobbold Commission’s report was only published on 1 August 1962, yet the British and Malayans proceeded as if the findings were a foregone conclusion.
The Federation of Malaysia came into being on 16 September 1963. This was just slightly over two years after the Tunku made up his mind to pursue the Grand Design. His decision had been precipitated partly by his desire to add the Borneo territories to the Federation, but mainly because of his fear that Singapore could turn communist. For Lee Kuan Yew, merger saved his career and, to his mind, Singapore from becoming communist. It also helped that in everyone’s anxiety to achieve federal union by August 1963, Lee was also able to use his position on the ISC to detain most of his erstwhile political opponents — both communist and non-communist. Brunei withdrew from merger negotiations and the Borneo states were rushed headlong into a merger designed primarily to ensure that Singapore could survive. With Operation Coldstore in February 1963 — under which over 110 left-wing politicians and activists were detained under the Internal Security Act — Lee’s opponents were effectively decimated. What initially passed for a merger that would economically benefit Singapore ended up being a merger to secure the survival and future dominance of the PAP in Singapore.
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1 See generally, Tan Tai Yong, Creating ‘Greater Malaysia’: Decolonization and the Politics of Merger, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008.
2 See JM Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States, 1870–1920, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1992; and CD Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control, London, Oxford University Press, 1961.
3 See Roland St John Braddell, The Legal Status of the Malay States, Singapore, Malayan Publishing House, 1931.
4 Lord Thomas Brassey, Speech in the House of Lords, 23 June, 1982, House of Lords Debates, vol 5, col 1812.
5 See generally, KG Tregonning, Under Chartered Company Rule: North Borneo, 1881–1946, Singapore, University of Malay Press, 1958.
6 For a detailed study of this plan and the controversies surrounding it, see Yeo Kim Wah, The Politics of Decentralisation: Colonial Controversy in Malay 1920–1929, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1982.
7 See Yeo Kim Wah, ‘The Guillemard-Maxwell Power Struggle, 1921–1925’ (1981) 54(1) Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol.54, No.8.
8 See Smith to Cunliffe-Lister, 3 May, 1932, CO 717 Vol 88.
9 AJ Stockwell, ‘Guillemard, Sir Laurence Nunns’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2008. www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/96297.
10 Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore, 1945–55, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973, p.8.
11 Quoted in Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945 –1950, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.18.
12 See Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy 1942–1948, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991. pp.30–31.
13 See generally, CM Turnbull, ‘British Planning for Post-War Malaya’, Journal of Southeast Asian History, 1974, V(2). pp. 239–254.
14 Op.cit., p.35.
15 See CO 825/35/I no 55104/1/1942, cited in Turnbull, op.cit., p.243.
16 See CO 825/35/6 dated 20 March 1943. The memorandum was originally drafted be WBL Monson, Principal of the Eastern Department and revised many times before it was finally adopted as a Cabinet memorandum. See AJ Stockwell, ‘British Policy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment 1945–1948’, MBRAS Monograph no 8, 1979, p.21.
17 William Malcolm Hailey (1872–1969) was one of Britain’s most important and respected colonial administrators. From 1924 to 1928 he was Governor of the Punjab and from 1928 to 1934, served as Governor of the United Provinces in India. After his retirement in 1934, he spent time in Africa to supervise the writing of African Survey and remained a potent and influential voice in the Colonial Office up till the 1950s.
18 See Hailey to Gent, 19 Sept, 1943, CO 825/35/6.
19 See ‘Constitutional Reconstruction in the Far East’ CO 825/35/6 dated 30 July 1943 which stated: It is suggested that in future the plans should envisage the appointment of a supreme British Regional Authority (for convenience referred to as the Governor General) without direct Governmental functions within any of the Units concerned but with direct supervisory control over all the chief Officers of the several Administrations. The Island of Singapore seems an appropriate centre for residence for such a Governor General.
20 See Turnbull, op.cit., p.243.
21 See Colonial Office, ‘Future Constitutional Policy for British Colonial Territories in South-east Asia’ CO 825/35/6.
22 Op.cit., p.15.
23 See Caine to Gent, 30 Nov, 1943, CO 825/35/6; Gent to Caine, 1 Dec, 1943, CO 825/35/6; and Caine to Gent, 1 Dec, 1943, CO 825/35/6.
24 See Lau, op.cit., p.58.
25 Gent to Caine, 1 Dec, 1943, CO 825/35/6.
26 See Oliver Stanley, ‘Malaya (Political Future), House of Commons, 1 Dec, 1943, House of Commons Debates, Vol 395, col 384W.
27 See Lau, op.cit., pp.79–82.
28 See Turnbull, op.cit., p.251.
29 See CO 273/675 Pt II no 50823/17.
30 See Gent to Gater, 21 Aug, 1945, CO 273/675 Pt II no 50823/17.
31 Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender to the Allies on 15 August 1945 but the official surrender took place on 2 September 1945 on board the USS Missouri.
32 Hall remained in office only till 1946 when be became First Lord of the Admiralty. He was succeeded by Sir Arthur Creech Jones.
33 See generally, Peter C Speers, ‘Colonial Policy of the British Labour Party’ (1948) 15(3) Social Research, pp.304–326.
34 At this meeting, Gimson welcomed Gent and members of his Federal Council, who were in the audience, and said that their ‘presence indicates the close association between the two Governments, and the co-ordination which is necessary if the prosperity of the peoples of Malaya and Singapore is to be fully developed.’ See Governor’s Inaugural Address, 1 Apr 1948, First Legislative Council, 1st Session, at B7.
35 See generally, Lau, op.cit., pp.267–268.
36 See Minutes of Advisory Council Extraordinary Private Session, 4 Mar 1948, CO 537/3669, no 52243/14, at p 2.
37 See minute by Gimson, 8 Mar 1948, CO 537/3669, no 52243/14.
38 See Lau, op.cit., p.271. Dato Seri Onn bin Jaafar was founder and leader of the United Malays Nationalist Organisation (UMNO). In 1951, he resigned from UMNO and formed the multi-racial Independence of Malaya Party.
39 See Minutes of Governors’ Conference, 10 May 1948, CO 537/3669 no 52243/14.
40 See minute by Morris, 4 January 1949, CO 537/3669 no 52243/14.
41 Of the numerous books written on the Malayan Emergency (1948–60), the most authoritative are Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960, London, Frederick Muller, 1975, and Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948–1960, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1989. For a more personalised account, see Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960, London, Cassell, 1966.
42 For accounts of the development of communism in Malaysia and Singapore, see Justus M Van de Kroef, Communism in Malaysia and Singapore: A Contemporary Survey, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, and Gene Z Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1971.
43 During the first half of June 1948 alone, there were nineteen murders and attempted murders and three cases of arson. In the second half of June, there were twenty-six murders, twenty-two attempted murders, two cases of arson and armed attacks on police stations and isolated villages. See JH Brimmell, A Short History of the Malayan Communist Party, Singapore, Donald Moore Press, 1956, p.20. On the origins of the Emergency, see Michael R Stenson, Repression and Revolt: The Origins of the 1948 Communist Insurrection in Malaya and Singapore, Ohio, Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1969.
44 See Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948–1960, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.231.
45 See Yeo, op.cit., p.224.
46 Article 3(1), Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 1957.
47 The subject of Singapore’s merger and separation with the Federation has been extensively covered in numerous monographs and articles. See for example, Milton E Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia, Ithaca, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1964; Nancy Fletcher, The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia, Ithaca, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1969; Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysia Region 1945–65, Kuala Lumpur, Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1976; Nam Tae Yul, ‘Malaysia and Singapore: The Failure of a Political Experiment’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Iowa, 1969; Charles Richard Ostrom, ‘A Core Interest Analysis of the Formation of Malaysia and the Separation of Singapore’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1971; Robert Allan Anderson, ‘The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia: A Study in Political Involution’, unpublished PhD dissertation, The American University, 1973; Michael Leifer, ‘Singapore in Malaysia: The Politics of Federation’, 1965, 6 Journal of Southeast Asian History 54; Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1998; Patrick Keith, Ousted, Singapore, Media Masters, 2005; Willard A Hanna, ‘The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia’, 1965, vol 13, No 21, AUFS Reports; and RS Milne, ‘Singapore’s Exit from Malaysia: The Consequences of Ambiguity’, 1966, VI, Asian Survey, 175.
48 Singapore Colony Order in Council, 1955, SI 1955 No 187 (UK).
49 Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council 1958, SI 1958 No 156 (UK).
50 S Rajaratnam, ‘Towards a Malayan Nation’, The Tasks Ahead: The People’s Action Party’s Five-Year Plan 1959–1964, Singapore, People’s Action Party, 1959, p.12.
51 Quoted in AJ Stockwell (ed), British Documents on the End of Empire: Malaysia, Series B, Vol 8, London, The Stationery Office, 2004, p.xxxvii.
52 See Memorandum by Malcolm MacDonald, 22 Dec, 1958, DO 35/10019 no 12, E/3.
53 Ibid.
54 See Martin to Allen, 18 May, 1960, CO 1030/1126 no 5.
55 Scott to Lennox-Boyd, 29 Jan 1959, DO 35/10019, no 21.
56 Selkirk to Macleod, 24 Aug 1961, CO 1030/982 no 498C.
57 Goode to Lennox-Boyd, 26 Jun 1959, CO 1030/652, no 103.
58 PJ Thum, ‘The Fundamental Issue is Anti-Colonialsim, Not Merger’, Singapore’s “Progressive Left”, Operation Coldstore and the Creation of Malaysia, ARI Working Paper No 211, Singapore, Asia Research Institute, p.8.
59 Minute by Bourdillon in ‘Annex A of dispatch from Selkirk to Tory’, 30 Jan, 1961, CO 1030/978, no 199.
60 Lee Kuan Yew, ‘The Future of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories’, 9 May 1961, CO 1030/973 no E203.
61 Op.cit.
62 CO 1030/1149 nos 68-71, 19 May 1961.
63 Op.cit.
64 The Straits Times, 28 May 1961.
65 The Straits Times, 3 June 1961.
66 See John Drysdale, Singapore: Struggle for Success, Singapore, Times Books International, 1984, p.39.
67 See Singapore Legislative Assembly Official Reports, 17 January 1962, col 235.
68 See speech of the Barisan’s ST Bani in the Legislative Assembly, Singapore Legislative Assembly Official Reports 17 January 1962 at col 268.
69 Ibid, col 229.
70 Ibid, col 233.
71 The full name of the Committee was ‘The United Nations Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’.
72 See Milton Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia, Ithaca, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1964, p.26.
73 Ibid, p.27.
74 The seven Alliance members and the independent member abstained. Three MPs were absent.
75 See Drysdale, op.cit., p.312.
76 See Dennis Bloodworth, The Tiger and Trojan Horse, Singapore, Times Books International, 1984, p.261.
77 Ibid.
78 See Selkirk to Macleod, 24 Aug, 1961, CO 1030/982 no 498C.
79 Ibid.
80 See Selkirk to Macleod, 16 Sep, 1961, CO 1030/983 no 615.
81 Ibid.
82 Federation of Malaysia: Joint Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya, Cmnd. 1563 (London, 1961).
83 Ibid, p.3.
84 The Commission comprised Sir Anthony Abell, former Governor of Sarawak and Sir David Watherston, former Chief Secretary of the Federation of Malaya (nominated by United Kingdom), and Wong Pow Nee, Chief Minister of Penang and Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs (nominated by the Federation of Malaya Government).
85 Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962, Cmnd 1794, August 1962.
86 Ibid, para 144, pp.41–42.
87 For a detailed study of these responses, see J.P. Ongkili, The Borneo Response to Malaysia, 1961–1963, Singapore, Donald Moore, 1967. Many of these are summarised by Sopiee, above, op.cit., pp.150–5.
88 Sopiee, above, op.cit.
89 Ibid, p.151.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid, para 152(I). The actual recommendation goes further to suggest a minimum of three years and a maximum of seven years.
92 Ibid, para 188.
93 Ibid.
94 This group included his Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin.