NOTES

Research for this account came from interviews conducted since September 11, 2001, in the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. All interviews, unless otherwise indicated, were by the author. Interviews marked JG were conducted on my behalf by John Goetz, who assisted with research in Germany. No CIA official is named unless previously identified publicly.

PROLOGUE

1. Description from a visit to Damascus, including the Sheraton Hotel and Palestine Branch, May 28-June 1, 2006.

2. Interviews with Maher Arar in Ottawa on December 10, 2003, Abdullah Almalki in London on November 21, 2005, and Nizar Nayouf in Paris on June 9, 2006, all former residents of the Palestine Branch.

3. Interview with Maher Arar on December 10, 2003.

4. Interview with Abdullah Almalki by phone on April 20, 2006.

5. As described in Chapter 3, Syria brought no charges against him. In Canada, Arar has never been accused of any crime. Nor was he charged with any by the United States. “Imad Moustapha, Syria's Highest-ranking Diplomat in Washington, told CBS, 'We could not substantiate any of the allegations against him.’” “His Year in Hell,” Sixty Minutes II, CBS, broadcast January 21, 2004.

6. “By 1984, one branch of the mukhabarrat had acquired a machine known as the 'German chair,' which slowly broke the vertebrae of the victim strapped into it. It had allegedly been manufactured in East Germany, although there was later a less refined instrument which was locally produced and thus called the 'Syrian chair.' This broke backbones more quickly.” Pity the Nation, by Robert Fisk (London: Oxford, 1990), p. 179-

7. Arar is held at the Palestine Branch from October 9, 2002, to August 19, 2003. His account of torture was examined by Professor Stephen J. Toope, in an official fact-finding report for Canada's Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in relation to Maher Arar. In July 2005, Toope was instructed to “investigate and report on Mr Arar's treatment during his detention in Jordan and Syria” (p. 3). Toope's report, delivered October 14, 2005, concluded that “Mr. Arar was subjected to torture in Syria. The effects of that experience, and of consequent events and experiences in Canada, have been profoundly negative for Mr. Arar and his family” (p. 25).

8. Interview with Abdullah Almalki on April 20, 2006, Maher Arar on December 10, 2003; and chronology prepared by Almalki.

9. A former prisoner, Driss bin Lakoul, first recounted Zammar's treatment in “AlQaeda Recruiter Reportedly Tortured,” by Peter Finn, Washington Post, January 31, 2003. I obtained more details in interviews with Abdullah Almalki, in London on April 20, 2006, and with Maher Arar on December 10, 2003, both of whom were held nearby Zammar in the Palestine Branch.

10. Detailed in a report to the German parliament, “Federal Government Report Responding to the January 25, 2006, Request of the Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Events Connected to the Iraq War and the Fight Against International Terrorism,” including annexes and additions classified as secret, issued on February 15, 2006; hereafter, called “Classified report to German Parliament.” According to the report, the CIA told German foreign intelligence, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), in July 2002 that “Zammar, following a US request, was arrested in Morocco and deported to Syria.” In return for its cooperation, the report said, the CIA urged Germany to “avert pressure [on Morocco] from the EU side because of human rights abuses in connection with the arrest because Morocco was a valuable partner in the fight against terrorism.” The CIA also “offered to ask written questions provided by the BND to be used in the interrogations of Zammar and that the respective results would be provided to the German side.” Syria also offered to provide access to Zammar, but only in return for the lifting of charges against Syrian intelligence agents in Germany accused of threatening Syrian dissidents. These charges were then dropped, and a team from Germany went to Damascus. His interrogation (November 21-23 2002) by German agents in Damascus was first reported in an article in Der Spiegel (“The Forgotten Prisoner,” by Holger Stark, November 21, 2005). Translation from Der Spiegel Web site. After posing their last questions, the German delegation went out for a celebratory dinner with Asef Shawqat, the head of Syrian military intelligence, reported Stark.

11. Full names: Abdel Halim Dalak and Omar Ghramesh; the name of the teenager in cell 12 is unknown. Source: interviews with Abdullah Almalki in London, November 21, 2005, and by telephone, April 20, 2006.

12. Flightlogs of N379P indicate the plane's presence in Amman, Jordan, on the date when the prisoners were transferred; prisoners transferred to Syria were generally sent through Amman, according to former inmates of Palestine Branch (interviews cited above) and former CIA officers interviewed (interviews 2004-2006).

13. Interview with Abdullah Almalki in London, November 21, 2005. Details of raid described in “How the Perfect Terrorist Plotted the Ultimate Crime,” by Jason Burke, The Observer, April 7, 2002; “Anatomy of a Raid,” by Tim McGirk, Time Asia, April 15, 2002.

14. Full names: Barah Abdul Latif (cell 17) and Bahaa Mustafa Jaghel (cell 7). Sources: Interview with Abdullah Almalki, November 21, 2005; interview with Walid Saffour of the Syrian Human Rights Committee, London, April 6, 2006.

15. “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” U.S. State Department report (www.state.gov/s/ct/cl4l51.htm; accessed on May 25, 2006).

16. White House press release, November 6, 2003; Bush was referring to both Iraq and Syria.

17. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Syria, 2002” (Published March 2003) (www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18289 .htm).

18. In “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction,” a speech by John Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security, to the Heritage Foundation, May 6, 2002, he said:
Beyond the axis of evil, there are other rogue states intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction. … I want to discuss three other state sponsors of terrorism that are pursuing or who have the potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction or have the capability to do so in violation of their treaty obligations …. Syria, which has signed but not ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), is pursuing the development of biological weapons and is able to produce at least small amounts of biological warfare agents.
The three “rogues” he discussed were Libya, Syria, and Cuba (www.state.gov/t/us/rm/9962.htm). In May 2006, the United States resumed full diplomatic relations with Libya. See “U.S. Restores Full Diplomatic Ties with Libya,” by Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, May 16, 2006.

19. “Consul Visits Canadian Detained in Native Syria After U.S. Deportation,”Stephen Thorne, Canadian Press, October 23, 2002 (www.cp.org).

20. Born September 11, 1965. “The Shy Young Doctor at Syria's Helm; Bashar alAssad,” New York Times, by Susan Sachs, June 14, 2000.

21. Transcript of press conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair and Presidental-Assad, December 16, 2002. (www.numberlO.gov.uk/output/Pagel744 .asp). “Of course we don't have in Syria what are called organisations supporting terrorism. We have press offices,” said Bashar. Also see “Britain to Host Arab Summit on Middle East,” by Ewen MacAskill, Michael White, and Chris McGreal, We Guardian Weekly, December 19, 2002.

22. Summary of press briefing by Alastair Campbell, the prime minister's official spokesman (PMOS), on December 16, 2002: “Asked to comment on reports at the weekend that the CIA was willing to engage in the torture and assassination of Al Qaida members, Campbell said that we never commented on the security policies of other countries. This was a question that should be directed to the American authorities. We had always made clear that the British authorities acted in accordance with British and international law. In answer to repeated questions on the subject, the PMOS declined to elaborate further” (www.pm.gov.uk/output/Pagel503.asp).

23. Menu for Syrian president's banquet provided by the City of London, under a Freedom of Information request, on January 13, 2006.

24. Interview with Maher Arar, October 2003.

25. William Burns, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. State Department, told the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia on June 18, 2002: “It is true that the cooperation the Syrians have provided in their own self-interest on al-Qaeda has saved American lives, and that is a fact, but our agenda goes well beyond that” (commdocs.house.gov/ committees/intlrel/hfa80287.000/hfa80287_0f.htm).

“The Government of Syria has cooperated significantly with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations and individuals.” U.S. State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 2002, Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism” (www.state.gov/documents/organization/20117.pdf).

INTRODUCTION: NOT FOR THE SQUEAMISH

1. Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 456. The description in the first two paragraphs is based on pp. 455-56.

2. Agee resigned from the CIA in 1969 and went to live in the United Kingdom, where his book was first published. He was later expelled from the UK and a number of other European countries. He eventually settled in Cuba, where he still lives.

3. In remarks to veterans of the OSS, October 23, 1991, President George H. W. Bush said Agee's publication of the name of Richard Welch, and Welch's position as a CIA station chief, had led to his murder by left-wing terrorists. “I don't care how long I live; I will never forgive Philip Agee and those like him who wantonly sacrifice the lives of intelligence officers who loyally serve their country,” he added.

4. NSC 10/2 (June 18, 1948) directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” U.S. State Department, “Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, Note on U.S. Covert Action Programs” (www. state. gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xx vi/4440. htm).

5. Horton resigned in 1984 over his refusal to bring a report on Mexico into line with administration policy. He wrote an article: “Why I Quit the CIA,” Washington Post, January 2, 1985. He also participated in a Discovery Channel documentary in 1997 marking the fiftieth anniversary of the CIA, entitled, CIA: America's Secret Warriors.

6. “His Legacy: Realism and Allure,” by Jerrold Schecter, Time, January 24, 1977.

7. This was Operation Mongoose, described in a CIA Inspector-General's report on “Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro,” p. 77, delivered May 22, 1967, and finally declassified in 1993.

8. Over twenty thousand people were killed, according to the Church Committee Report: “the Phoenix program which took at least 20,000 lives in South Vietnam.” See: “Church Committee Report, Book I, Section II (Foreign and Military Intelligence Operations of the United States: An Overview“), by U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, aka the Church Committee, p. 27 (www.aarclibrary. org/publib/church/reports/book 1/html/ChurchB 1_0018a. htm).

9. Christopher Robbins, Air America (New York: Avon, 1979), p. 5: “At its zenith Air America was, in terms of the number of planes it either owned or had at its disposal, the largest airline in the world.”

10. Ibid., Alfred McCoy, in The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), reported: “In Laos the CIA created a Meo mercenary army whose commander manufactured heroin for sale to American GIs in South Vietnam,” and concluded that “the CIA's role in the heroin traffic was simply an inadvertent but inevitable consequence of its cold war tactics” (p. 8).

11. “A Study of Assassination,” National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Available at www.gwu.edu.

12. “Church Committee Reports 1975-1976.” Available at: www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm.

13. Gerald Ford signed executive order 11905 on February 18, 1976. Section 5: Restrictions of Intelligence Activities reads: “No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.”

14. Interview with Jack Devine, former CIA deputy director of operations, New York, April 19, 2006.

15. See remarks to members of the National Press Club on arms reduction and nuclear weapons by President Ronald Reagan, November 18, 1981.

16. The story was told in June 2000 by David Gergen, a former adviser to President Clinton, in an interview with Chris Bury for PBS's Frontline show. In an interview with James Woolsey (December 10, 2001), he told me: “I had two semiprivate meetings with the president in two years.”

17. Details of Clinton's “scrub” described in Chapter 6.

18. Meet the Press with Tim Russert, September 16, 2001.

19. He said in full: “All I want to say is that there was 'before' 9/11 and 'after' 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off.” From Cofer Black's testimony to the Joint Committee Investigation into September 11th: Fourth Public Hearing, September 26, 2002.

20. Quoted in “Special Operations Soldiers Expected to Be on Leading Edge,” by Anne Griffin and Raleigh Bureau, Charlotte Observer, September 21, 2001.

21. This phrase is cited in “Preparing for Role in War on Terror; Navy Base in Cuba to House Taliban, Al Qaeda Detainees,” by Sue Anne Pressley, Washington Post, January 10, 2002. Vice President Dick Cheney also called the detainees “the very worst of a bad lot. They are very dangerous,” quoted in “Debate Continues on Legal Status of Detainees,” by John Mintz, Washington Post, January 28, 2002.

22. He was chairman from 1997 until August 2004.

23. Transcript of interview with Porter Goss, December 14, 2001, conducted jointly with Richard Miniter for the Sunday Times.

24. Interview with a CIA contractor, spring 2002.

25. Early reports of rendition will be dealt with in Chapter 5. Among the earliest references to rendition were from the London-based Egyptian dissident Yasser al-Sirri, who issued statements about the capture and transfer of terrorist suspects as early as 1998. In the Western media the first mentions appeared after 9/11; the first seems to be an article in the Boston Globe by Anthony Shadid (“America Prepares the War on Terror; U.S., Egypt Raids Caught Militants,” October 7, 2001) and Barton Gellman's series in the Washington Post (including “Broad Effort Launched After '98 Attacks,” December 19, 2001). The first reference to the use of executive jets appears to be a report in a Pakistan newspaper by Masood Anwar {The News, Islamabad, October 26, 2001), followed by the Washington Post's piece about the rendition of Mohamad Iqbal Madni, “U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects,” by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Finn, March 11, 2002.

26. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, vol. 1 (1974), vol. 2 (1975), vol. 3 (Fontana, 1978).

27. Anne Applebaum admits in Gulag that it is impossible to state accurately the numbers of dead. Official “archival” sources have given a figure of almost three million, although Applebaum speculates the true figure must be much higher. As for the total number of inmates, she writes, “Adding the numbers together, the total numbers of forced laborers in the USSR comes to 28.7 million. I realize, of course, that this figure will not satisfy everybody.” Anne Applebaum, Gulag (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 520.

28. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, vol. 1 page x. “Zek” is the term for an inmate of the gulag.

29. The apparatus of the gulag was camouflaged in day-to-day banality. “From the outside, the 'Black Ravens' [transport trucks], as they were nicknamed, appeared to be regular heavy-goods trucks. In the 1930s, they often had the word 'bread' painted on the sides, but later more elaborate ruses were used. One prisoner, arrested in 1948, remembered traveling in one truck marked 'Moscow Cutlets' and another labeled 'Vegetables/Fruits.’” Applebaum, Gulag, p. 160.

30. The Lion, The Witch, and The Wardrobe, by C. S. Lewis (Collins, 2001); Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone, by J. K. Rowling (Scholastic, 1999).

31. Author visit to Egypt, September/October 2003.

32. Chapter 2 describes the case of Binyam Mohamed, an Ethiopian arrested in Pakistan and transferred to Rabat by the Americans on July 21, 2002; an Italian citizen named Abu al-Kassem Britel was also brought by “a small American plane” from Pakistan to Morocco on May 24, 2002.

1 .THE MEN IN BLACK

1. The detailed chronology of the events that evening are laid out in the Swedish Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman's report of March 22, 2005: “A Review of the Enforcement by the Security Police of a Government Decision to Expel Two Egyptian Citizens.” Hereafter the “Swedish Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman Report.” The weather at Bromma on December 18, 2001 is from Weather Underground: Web site www.wunderground.com/NA.

2. Telephone interview with Paul Forell, January 3, 2005.

3. Paul Forell, January 3, 2005.

4. Paul Forell, January 3, 2005.

5. Swedish Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman's Report, March 22, 2005.

6. Paul Forell, January 3, 2005.

7. “The Broken Promise, Part 2,” Kalla Fakta, May 24, 2004.

8. Flightlog of N379P

9. “Mystery Man Handed Over to U.S. Troops in Karachi,” by Masood Anwar, The News International, Pakistan, October 26, 2001.

10. Testimony of Bisher al-Rawi to British lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith, at Guantánamo Bay; sent to author by e-mail March 22, 2006.

11. Testimony of Binyam Mohamed to CSS at Guantánamo Bay; recorded in memo dated June 10, 2005; referred to from now on as “CSS Memo June 10, 2005.”

12. See Chapter 4.

13. Weather at Johnston County airport on December 17, 2001: overcast 53-57 °F, from Weather Underground.

14. Interview with former CIA pilot, 2005/2006.

15. Sherman announced Lee's surrender from the steps of the Johnston County Courthouse in Smithfield in April 1865.

16. Visit to Smithfield, March 2006.

17. “The Broken Promise, Part 1,” Kalla Fakta, May 17, 2004.

18. Sweden's Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman's Report, March 22, 2005, Section 2.4.3.

19. Account based on Swedish government sources interviewed for Kalla Fakta'sinvestigation.

20. Timings, officer's testimony, details of search operation and flight are from Swedish Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman's Report, March 22, 2005.

21. On November 17, 1997, fifty-eight tourists and four Egyptians were massa- cred by members of Gama'a al'-Islamiyya at Deir el-Bahri in Luxor, Egypt. Statistics from State Dept. Report, “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.”

22. Interview with Montasser Al-Zayat, Cairo, Egypt, October 5, 2003.

23. See Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans, by J. Rothschild (Al Saqi Books, 1985), pp. 28, 41-43.

24. “Pharaohs in Waiting,” by Mary Anne Weaver, Atlantic (October 2003).

25. Interview with Kjell Jonsson, January 12, 2005, for File on Four, BBC Radio 4, February 8, 2005.

26. Interviewed in January 2005 in Cairo by Hossam al Hamalawy, who collaborated in researching this book. He now works for the Los Angeles Times and was a co-author of the Human Rights Watch report, The Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt, May 2005.

27. “Swedish Government Repatriates Two Suspected Terrorists to Egypt,” by Karl Ritter, Associated Press, December 20, 2001.

28. “In Shift, Sweden Extradites Militants to Egypt,” by Anthony Shadid, Boston Globe, December 31, 2001.

29. An article in Jane's Intelligence Review explains: “Other al-Jihad leaders disagreed with al-Zawahiri's alliance with Bin Laden, fearing it would incur the wrath of the world's superpower—as indeed now seems to be case. They broke away from al-Zawahiri.” From “Ayman al-Zawahiri: Attention Turns to the Other Prime Suspect,” by Ed Blanche, October 3, 2001.

30. Al-Sirri was on Egypt's most wanted list, and was accused by the United States of being an Al Qaeda financier. He runs the Islamic Observation Center in London.

31. Massoud's killers had introduced themselves to him with a letter apparently printed on the stationery of al-Sirri's organization. But it was discovered that the letter had been faked on the computer of Ayman al-Zawahiri, later recovered in a Kabul auction by a journalist from the Wall Street Journal, Alan Cullison. “British Court Frees a Muslim Arrested After 9/11,” by Alan Cowell, New York Times, August 10, 2002.

32. Interview in January 2005 in London for File on Four, BBC Radio 4, February 8, 2005; and subsequent telephone conversations.

33. Amnesty issued a press release on December 20, 2001 that read: “Muhammad Muhammad Suleiman Ibrahim el-Zari and Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza were forcibly returned to Egypt by the Swedish authorities on 18 December. In Egypt both men are at grave risk of torture and unfair trial.” From: “Sweden: Deportations Leave Men at Risk of Torture in Egypt,” AI Index EUR 42/003/2001.

34. Interview with Kjell Jönsson, Brussels, March 23, 2006.

35. Agiza v. Sweden, United Nations Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) deci- sion CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, par. 12.11, May 20, 2005.

36. Comments by the Swedish government to the UN Human Rights Committee:“It is the opinion of the Swedish Government that the assurances obtained from the receiving State are satisfactory and irrevocable and that they are and will be respected in their full content. The Government has not received any information which would cast doubt at this conclusion.” Comments by the Government of Sweden on the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/CO/74/SWE, par. 16, May 6, 2003.

37. UNCAT decision 199/2002, par 4.8, November 24, 2003, concerning expulsion of Agiza's wife and children.

38. UNCAT decision 233/2003, par 13.10.

39. A speech given to the International Commission of Jurists by a member of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights states: “The Swedish Consulate was prevented from attending the first two hearings of Agiza's trial held on the 15th and 13th April 2004. The Swedish Secondary Secretary at the Swedish Consulate Asa Pousard was unexpectedly allowed to attend the third hearing without being informed why she was banned from attending the previous hearings.” Speech delivered by Hafez Abu Saeda at the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Biennial Conference, Berlin, August 27, 2004. Also in Kalla Fakta, “The Broken Promise: Part I,” May 17, 2004.

40. Interview with Swedish diplomat in Cairo, October 4, 2003 on condition of anonymity.

41. Kalla Fakta, “The Broken Promise, Part I,” May 17, 2004.

42. “America's Gulag,” by Stephen Grey, New Statesman, May 17, 2004.

43. “A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects,” by Craig Whitlock, Washington Post, July 25, 2004.

44. For example, these figures quoted by George Tenet, in oral testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Wednesday, March 24, 2004.

45. “Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails,” by Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, New York Times, March 6, 2005.

46.BBC news monitoring service translation of report by Iranian Students News Agency of a press conference given by Iranian intelligence minister Ali Yunesi on July 17, 2005: “[S]o far over 1,000 Al-Qa'idah members have been identified, detained, deported or tried. Currently, about 200 of them are in jail.” Figures for Egypt from the Egyptian prime minister, Ahmed Nazif, speaking on NBC News' Meet the Press, May 15, 2005. Figures for Sudan from a speech by the Sudan expert, Janet McElligott, at the Former Members of Congress Annual Meeting, May 15, 2003. She refers to them as “extraditions.”

47. Figure quoted by President Bush in a statement at Crawford, Texas, Decem- ber 28, 2001.

48. According to The New York Times, “an intelligence official estimated that the number of terrorism suspects sent by the United States to Tashkent was in the dozens.” Don Van Natta, “U.S. Recruits a Rough Ally to Be a Jailer,” New York Times, May 1, 2005. Routine memos from the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) to Counter-terrorism Department show repatriations listed for prisoners from Bagram, although no destinations are visible. Available at: www. aclu. org/torturefoia/released/FBI_3910_3927. pdf

49. Written statement to the author from the legal division of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, April 28, 2006. Referred to from now as the “Red Cross comments.” See further detail on this point in Chapter 7.

50. Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, Article 17; the Third Geneva Convention covering civilians captured also stated in Article 31 that “no physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them.”

51. According to the Red Cross comments, the current situation in Afghanistan, after the holding of LoyaJirga (council of elders) and the establishment of a new lawful government on June 19, 2002, was defined as a “non-international armed conflict.” It added: “The ICRC no longer views the ongoing armed conflict as international but as non-international, since it no longer involves opposing States.” Prisoners captured in such a conflict would not be POWs but their rights, in addition to customary international humanitarian law, were defined in a common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which stated that anyone no longer taking part in a conflict—for example, after their detention—should “in all circumstances be treated humanely” and not be subject, among other things, to “cruel treatment and torture” or “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”

52. According to the Red Cross comments, the term “global war on terror,” was a political description. The law depended on whether a prisoner was seized within what the law clearly defined as international armed conflict or non-international armed conflict. It said: “The designation 'global war on terror' does not extend the applicability of humanitarian law to all events included in this notion, but only to those that involve armed conflict …. When armed violence is used outside the context of an armed conflict in the legal sense or when a person suspected of terrorist activities is not detained in connection with any armed conflict, humanitarian law does not apply. Instead, domestic laws, as well as international criminal law and human rights, govern.”

53. A White House fact sheet on the status of detainees at Guantanamo, issued February 7, 2002, states: “The United States is treating and will continue to treat all of the individuals detained at Guantánamo humanely and consistent with military necessity, to the extent appropriate and in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.”

54. Between 1990 and 2000, there were 56 terrorist incidents in Egypt, resulting in 142 fatalities and 212 injuries. Data from the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base, accessed March 31, 2006 (www.tkb.org).

55. Interview with Robert Baer by phone, January 17, 2005, for File on Four, BBC Radio 4, February 8, 2005.

56. Baer, January 17, 2005.

57. When President Jimmy Carter brokered a peace treaty between President An- war Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel; it was signed on September 17, 1978, at the White House.

58. Since 2001, the amount of FMF to Egypt has represented over 50 percent of U.S. aid to the country. In 2003 total aid to Egypt was $1.75 billion ($1.29 billion as FMF); in 2004, these figures were $1.95 billion and $1.29 billion respectively Figures from the “Greenbook,” compiled and updated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to give “a complete historical record of U.S. foreign aid to the rest of the world.” Available at: qesdb. cdie. org/gbk/index. html.

59. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), “Budget of the United States Gov- ernment, Fiscal Year 2007, Budget Appendix, International Security Assistance, Foreign Military Financing Program” (U.S. GPO, 2006). Of a budgeted $4.5 billion in FMF, Israel is to receive “not less than $2.28 billion” and Egypt “not less than $1.3 billion.” Available from GPO Access, the U.S. Government Printing Office.

60. The most extensive research on renditions to Egypt was carried out by Hossam al Hamalawy.

61. Flightlogs: N379P (fifteen visits), N85VM (four visits), N313P (one visit).

62. Interview with Jack Cloonan, New York, April 19, 2006.

63. “Detainee Says He Was Tortured in U.S. Custody,” by Raymond Bonner, New York Times, February 13, 2005.

64. Telephone interview with Professor Joe Margulies, for File on Four, BBC, January 14, 2005.

65. Bonner, New York Times, February 13, 2005.

66. Statement by Ian Kemish to the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on June 2, 2004. Kemish was then first assistant secretary for public diplomacy at the consular and passports division of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

67. Dateline: The Trials of Mamdouh Habih, SBS Television, Australia, broadcast on July 7, 2004.

68. Ibid.

2. THE FOG OF WAR

1. “Attorney General John Ashcroft Regarding the Transfer of Abdullah al- Muhajir (Born José Padilla) to the Department of Defense as an Enemy Combatant,” June 10, 2002, Department of Justice. Available at www.usdoj .gov; and see “U.S. Authorities Capture 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect,” CNN, June 10, 2002.

2. “Traces of Terror: The Congressional Hearings; Whistle-Blower Recounts Faults Inside the F.B.I.,” by David Johnston and Neil A. Lewis, New York Times, June 7, 2002.

3. According to Gary Berntsen, who took part in the earliest CIA mission into Afghanistan, bin Laden escaped to Pakistan with 200 “Yemenis and Saudis” while 135 others took another less direct route into Pakistan. Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker (New York: Crown, 2005), p. 307.

4. Abu Zubaydah is thought to have been Al Qaeda's top military commander since late 2001, following the death of Mohammed Atef, and to have been behind plots to bomb Los Angeles International Airport, as well as plots to attack hotels in Jordan. He was sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan for his involvement in the foiled plot. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (p. 500) he helped run the Khaldan terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. He has been in U.S. custody since his arrest in Pakistan in March 2002.

5. Quoted in Memo from Matthew Rycroft to David Manning (Downing Street officials), July 23, 2002, and published as “The Secret Downing Street Memo,” Sunday Times of London, May 1, 2005.

6. “John Ashcroft, Minister of Fear,” CBSNews.com, June 12, 2002.

7. The front page of The New York Times carried the headline “Traces of Terror: The Investigation; U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb,” with a photograph of Padilla. He was Time magazine's Person of the Week, June 14, 2002: “For incarnating the sum of our fears, the former Chicago thug-turned-terror suspect is our person of the week.”

8. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

9. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

10. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

11. Information supplied by Binyam Mohamed's sister to Clive Stafford Smith, June 2005.

12. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

13. He obtained grades C, D, and E in physics, biology, and chemistry, respectively. Source: E-mail from Edexcel examining board, July 7, 2005.

14. CCS Memo, June 10, 2005.

15. Binyam Mohamed's sister to CSS, June 2005.

16. Tyrone Forbes interview in “Suspect's Tale of Travel and Torture,” by Stephen Grey and Ian Cobain, The Guardian, August 2, 2005.

17. Guardian interview with Abdulkarim Khalil. From “Suspect's Tale of Travel and Torture,” August 2, 2005.

18. E-mail from Abdul S., a friend of Mohamed's, to the author, July 23, 2005.

19. E-mail from Abdul S., July 23, 2005.

20. “As Justices Weigh Military Tribunals, A Guantánamo Tale,” by Jess Bravin, Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006: “He [Clive Stafford Smith] says Mr. Mo-hamed 'dabbled with the idea of going to Chechnya' to join Islamic rebels fighting Russian rule but denies any tie to a terrorist plot against the U.S.— or knowing Mr. Padilla.”

21. Michael Scheuer explained: “And so we are bedeviled again … by what too many individuals more intelligent and influential than I consider an inconsequential semantical difference between the terms 'terrorist' and 'insurgent.’” Imperial Hubris, by Anonymous (Michael Scheuer) (Brassey's, 2004), p. 221. Former senior MI6 officer Alastair Crooke also believes this point has hardly been grasped by anyone, least of all the interrogators and tribunals at Guantánamo. Interviewed in London, on April 4, 2006, he said: “I spoke to someone from Guantánamo who kept saying the interrogators kept saying to him, Oh, so you were at the Jamaat al-Qaeda camp, that's where you were trained at, Jamaat al-Qaeda camp? Jamaat was Massoud's group. And they didn't even understand that this was a separate party. And they kept calling it as if it was the name of al-Qaeda's camp. So I mean, how good is rendition if you haven't got the basic tools of understanding of the groups and the background to be able to distinguish and understand these sorts of complex areas?”

22. The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the case Rasul v. Bush No. 03-334 (524 U.S.), June 28, 2004, states that the district court “has jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base,” pp 15-16.

23. Interview with Benhur Mohamed, July 25, 2005.

24. Sufyian Barhoumi, Jabran Said bin al-Qahtani, and Ghassan al-Sharbi.

25. United States of America v. Binyam Ahmed Muhammad [sic], June 29, 2005.

26. United States of America v. Binyam Ahmed Muhammad [sic], conspiracy charge I4(j).

27. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005, p.l.

28. Top Secret with Yosri Fouda, aired on Al Jazeera September 12, 2002. The story of Fouda's visit was told in Masterminds of Terror by Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2003). Page 36 records: ” 'They say that you are terrorists.' Fouda surprised himself by throwing in this line so early as he took his place on the floor between them. … It was Khalid who answered: 'They are right. That is what we do for a living.'”

29. Remarks of U.S. Deputy Attorney General James Comey regarding José Padilla, Tuesday, June 1, 2004.

30. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

31. Reading a prepared statement, Straw told British members of parliament that Mr. Habashi (Binyam's tribal name; it literally means “the Ethiopian“) had indeed been “interviewed once in Karachi by the security services.” Straw continued: “The security services had no role in his capture or transfer from Pakistan. The security service officer did not observe any abuse and no incidents of abuse were reported to him by Mr. Habashi.” “Former UK Student Was Interrogated by MI6 in Pakistan,” by Colin Brown, The Independent, December 14, 2005.

32. Author's interview with Yosri Fouda, London, January 10, 2006.

33. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, interrogations of Abu Zubaydah are listed as having taken place on the following dates: July 10, 2002; August 29, 2002; October 29, 2002; November 7, 2002; May 16, 2003; June 24, 2003; December 13, 2003; February 18, 2004, and February 19, 2004 (pp. 466, 490, 491, 500, 507, 524, and 527).

34. See Chapter 11.

35. Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Comey regarding José Padilla, Tuesday, June 1, 2004.

36. “Ashcroft on Dirty Bomb,” CBSNews.com, June 10, 2002.

37. Interview with Abdullah Almalki, London, April 20, 2006, see Chapter 3.

38. Flightlogs of Gulfstream V Registration N379P.

39. “Spanish Armada Sounds Retreat,” by Matthew Campbell, Sunday Times of London, July 22, 2002.

40. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

41. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

42. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

43. Flightlog of Boeing Business Jet N313P, January 21, 2004, GMME (Rabat) to OAKB (Kabul).

44. Amnesty International report, “Torture in the 'Anti-Terrorism' campaign—The Case of Temara Detention Centre,” June 24, 2004, Amnesty International reference: MDE 29/004/2004, describes Temara as “located in a forested area … some 15 km south of the capital” (p. 6).

45. E-mail to author from Abderrahim Mouhtad, head of the organization Ennas- sir: Pour Le Soutien des Detenus Islamistes au Maroc (Association in Support of Islamist Detainees).

46. Flightlogs of plane N379P.

47. Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de I'Homme (International Federation for Human Rights) Report 379/2, “Morocco: Human Rights Abuse in the Fight Against Terrorism,” July 2004, p. 15; Referred hereafter as the “FIDH report (www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/maroc379-2.pdf).

48. Amnesty International report, “Torture in the 'Anti-Terrorism' campaign—The Case of Temara Detention Centre,” June 24, 2004, Amnesty International reference: MDE 29/004/2004, p. 5.

49. FIDH report, p. 11.

50. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

3. MAHER ARAR

1. Interview, with Maher Arar, Ottawa, December 10, 2003.

2. Maher Arar, December 10, 2003.

3. See below Abdullah Almalki and Ahmed al-Maati.

4. Interview with Maher, December 10, 2003; this was confirmed in a later public inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials. Established on February 4, 2004, it was headed by a judge, Dennis R. O'Connor (hereafter the “Arar inquiry“).

5. “His Year in Hell,” reporter Vicki Mabrey, 60 Minutes II, January 21, 2004.

6. Interview with Maher Arar in Brussels, March 23, 2006.

7. In February 1997.

8. “A Modified Constant Modulus Algorithm Enters the Scene,” by Maher Arar, Wireless Systems Design, April 2003 (www.wsdmag.com/Articles/ ArticleID/6540/6540.html).

9. Public statement of Maher Arar to a press conference in Ottawa, November 4, 2003.

10. A census taken in 2001 revealed that the total Syrian population in Canada was 22,065. Those resident in Ottawa represented 1,055 out of a total 827,854 inhabitants of that city. Source: Telephone interview with agent from Statistics Canada.

11. Transcript of Arar inquiry, p. 7768; available at: www.commissionarar.ca.

12. “Arrest at U.S Border Reverberates in France,” by John F. Burns, et al., New York Times, December 22, 1999.

13. Al-Maati's chronology prepared with his lawyer, Barbara Jackman. Available on Amnesty International Canada's Web site at: www.amnesty.ca/english/ main_article_home/elmaatichronology.pdf. Hereafter referred to as “Al-Maati's Chronology.”

14. Al-Maati's chronology.

15. Author's file.

16. “Who is Abdullah Almalki,” by Andrew Duffy, Ottawa Citizen, October 30, 2005.

17. Khadr was first identified and charged with aiding and financing terrorism in 1996. See: “Canadian Faces Charges of Terrorism,” by Rosemary Spiers, Toronto Star, January 16, 1996.

18. Interview with Abdullah Almalki, London, November 21, 2004; details of his observation emerged at the Arar inquiry.

19. Testimony of Michael Cabana, leading RCMP officer in the investigation into Arar, to the Arar inquiry. See: Transcript of Arar inquiry, p. 7757.

20. Interview with Maher Arar in Brussels, March 23, 2006.

21. The very same day the Los Angeles Times broke the news of the suspicions against Ahmed al-Maati, reporting how, in a reference to the map seized at the Buffalo checkpoint in August, U.S. agents had been briefed on a thirty-six-year-old Kuwaiti man in whose belongings were discovered “documents that identified specific buildings in an Ottawa government complex—notably the atomic energy building and the virus and disease control labs.” “Dragnet Yields the Chilling, Alarming,” by Patrick McDonnell and William Remple, Los Angeles Times, October 12, 2001.

22. Maher Arar's removal order, signed by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regional director J. Scott Blackman, October 7, 2002. According to Cabana, this was the day Arar first became “a person who was either an associate or a person of interest in respect of the investigation of A-OCANADA.” See transcript of Arar inquiry, p. 8236.

23. Interview with Maher Arar, March 23, 2006.

24. Interview with Maher Arar, December 10, 2003.

25. A letter from State Department official Nancy J. Powell, then-Acting Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, to Congressman Edward J. Markey, dated February 11, 2005, states: “Mr. Arar's name was placed on a United States terrorist lookout list based on information received as part of an ongoing general sharing of information between the Governments of the United States and Canada.”

26. “Supplemental Report on September 11th Detainees Allegations of Abuse at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York,” Office of the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Justice, December 2003.

27. Copy of Arar's removal order and “notice of inadmissibility,” both dated October 7, 2002, and signed by Blackman were obtained by the Center of Constitutional Rights in New York. Thompson's role was first reported in “His Year in Hell,” 60 Minutes II, CBS News, January 21, 2004: “60 Minutes II has learned that the decision to deport Arar was made at the highest levels of the U.S. Justice Department, with a special removal order signed by John Ashcroft's former deputy, Lary [sic] Thompson” (www.cbsnews.com/ stories/2004/01/21/48hours/main594974.shtml). This allegation that Arar was a member of Al Qaeda was reiterated by the DoJ in a written statement to the same television program: “We have information indicating that Mr. Arar is a member of al Qaeda and, therefore, remains a threat to U.S. national security.”

28. Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001, U.S. Department of State, March 4, 2002, Available at www.state.gov.

29. Interview, December 10, 2003.

30. Yale-Loehr teaches immigration law at Cornell Law School, and is the coauthor of the leading twenty-volume U.S. immigration law treatise “Immigration Law and Procedure.” O'Neill is a 2005 graduate of the School.

31. “The Legality of Maher Arar's Treatment Under U.S. Immigration Law,” by Stephen W. Yale-Loehr and Jeffrey C. O'Neill, p. 14. Submitted on May 16, 2005 to the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Yale-Loehr_mayl6. pdf).

32. Weather report from Weather Underground Web site: www.wunderground.com.

33. Records of Maher Arar's flight; first published by Stephen Grey and Scott Shane in The New York Times, “Detainee's Suit Gains Support from Jet's Log,” March 30, 2005.

34. As evidenced by the widespread use of another Gulfstream jet (then registration: N85VM) belonging to the owner of the Red Sox baseball team, for example, in the rendition of Abu Omar (see Chapter 9).

35. The International Directory of Civil Aircraft confirms that the Jet's maximum range with eight passengers and reserves is 4100 nautical miles (4718 miles).

36. Interview with Maher Arar, January 17, 2005.

37. Flightlogs of N829MG.

38. Report of Professor Stephen J. Toope, Fact Finder, to the Arar inquiry, October 14, 2005, pp. 13-14. Available at: www.commissionarar.ca/eng/Toope Report_final.pdf.

39. “Syria's Top Man in Lebanon to Head 'Political Security Agency,’” Agence France-Press (AFP), Beirut October 9, 2002.

40. Syria continues to support the Islamic militant group Hezb'allah. Peace talks with Israel reached deadlock in 1996.

41. William Buckley was CIA chief of station in Beirut when he was kidnapped in March 1984. After fifteen months of captivity, torture, and illness, Buckley died. His body was returned to U.S. officials in 1991, and he was buried in Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors.

42. Interview with former MI6 officer, summer 2004. “Syria has far more WMD than Iraq,” he told me.

43. The Independent reported at the time that the United States suspected Syrian Ahmed Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine of organizing the bombing. Jibril was a Damascus-based former Syrian Army captain, and would have needed Assad's approval for his activities. “The Lockerbie Disaster,” by John Bulloch, The Independent, January 7, 1989. See also Cofer Black's 2003 speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled “Syria and Terrorism” at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/ 2003/25778.htm.

44. Amnesty International, “Torture, Despair and Dehumanization in Tadmur Mil- itary Prison,” Amnesty International Reference: MDE 24/014/2001, September 19, 2001.

45. No official figure was ever disclosed. Robert Fisk recalls in Pity the Nation (Ox- ford: London, 1990). p. 186: “The Syrians would claim that fatalities were only in the hundreds. We later estimated them to be as high as 10,000.” A number of contemporary reports suggest the figure may be as high as 20,000. See BBC News, “Profile: Rifaat al-Assad,” June 12, 2000: news.bbc .co.uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/788021.stm.

46. William Burns of the U.S. State Department said in Congress: “It is true that the cooperation the Syrians have provided in their own self-interest on al-Qaeda has saved American lives, and that is a fact, but our agenda goes well beyond that.” William Burns, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department. Statement made on June 18, 2002, in hearings before the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia (commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa80287.000/hfa80287_0f.htm).

47. “UN Nears Agreement on Iraq as US Lawmakers Debate Force,” Agence France-Presse, October 10, 2002.

48. Interview with former CIA officer, 2003.

49. “Syria Denies Deadly Intelligence War Is Gripping Damascus,” An Nahar news agency, September 4, 2003. Syrian dissident sources: journalist Nizar Nayouf and Syrian Human Rights Committee both claim to have independent sources that Tajer was the key link between the CIA and the Syrian regime. He died mysteriously at the end of 2004. Nayouf claims Tajer had gotten too close to the CIA.

50. Interviews with Maher Arar, Brussels, March 23, 2006; Ottawa, December 10, 2003 and January 17, 2005.

51. White House press conference, April 28, 2005; see Chapter 10.

52. Interview with Maher Arar, December 10, 2003.

53. Evidence of Mr. Ward Elcock, former CSIS Director, to the Arar Inquiry. Original transcript of hearing, June 21, 2004, p. l6l.

54. Al-Maati's chronology states that “in the end Ahmed said what he thought they wanted him to—that he had seen them both in Afghanistan” (p. 9). Abdullah Almalki, in an interview on April 20, 2006, said it appeared al-Maati had seen him when he was working for an aid agency, and had visited Afghanistan; but Abdullah had not seen or recognized al-Maati there.

55. Arar's counsel, Marlys Edwardh, cited a Boston Globe article to the Arar inquiry that stated: “There was nothing secret about the map …. Moreover [the nuclear facilities] were gone from the location long before the map aroused the suspicions of U.S. customs agents” (Transcript of Arar inquiry, p. 12441: The original article, “It Was Hyped as a Terrorist Map, It Was Cited by Egyptian Torturers, It Is a Visitor's Guide to Ottawa,” is by Jeff Sallot and Colin Freeze, Canada Globe and Mail, September 6, 2005).

56. Arar inquiry, Exhibit P-257, quoted in “Evidence Grows That Canada Aided in Having Terrorism Suspects Interrogated in Syria,” by Clifford Krauss, New York Times, September 17, 2005.

57. Telephone Interview with Abdullah Almalki, April 20, 2006.

58. Interview with Maher Arar, January 17, 2005, for File on Four, BBC Radio 4, February 8, 2005.

59. Interview with Maher Arar, Ottawa, December 10, 2003.

60. Ambassador Pillarella's report of a conversation on October 22 between him- self and General Hassan Khalil, head of Syrian Military Intelligence, reads: “In a 45-minute meeting with General Hassan Khalil, Head of Military Intelligence, he confirmed the information I had received the night before from that Arar is now in Syria and he is being interrogated …. According to General Khalil, Arar has already admitted that he has connections with terrorist organizations.” Source: Transcript of Arar inquiry, pp. 6647-6653.

61. Pillarella's report of the meeting, which came out during the Inquiry hearings, recorded that “A meeting with to review the Arar case proved to be extremely positive …. When I asked whether I could get a resume of information obtained so far from Arar that I could take to Canada with me, he agreed to do so.” From the Testimony of Ambassador Pillarella to the Arar inquiry; transcript pp. 6842-6851.

62. Cabana's comments recounted by Jim Gould, deputy to Dan Livermore. Both citations from “Evidence Grows That Canada Aided in Having Terrorism Suspects Interrogated in Syria,” Krauss.

63. Abdullah Almalki speaking to Anna Maria Tremonti on The Current, Canadian Broadcasting Company, Radio 1, October 18, 2005.

4. MISTAKEN IDENTITY

1. Interview with Khaled el-Masri, January 22, 2005, on Frontal21 program, ZDF Television (Germany). Hereafter referred to as ZDF Interview, January 22, 2005.

2. Report to the Majorca prosecutor entitled, “Trial Court no.7, Summary Proceeding, Law 7/88, no. 2630 Incident of Illegal Detention,” hereafter referred to as the “Guardia Report.”

3. Interview with Francisco José, at Palma de Majorca, January 13, 2005.

4. It was too large, in fact, to land at the Johnston County Airport, the headquarters of the plane's operators, Aero Contractors, and the home base of much of the CIA aviation fleet. The 737's home base was nearby Kinston Airport, where in 2003 a special hangar was constructed to accommodate this larger plane. “TransPark Expects New Charter Plane Hangar,” Kinston Free Press, July 27, 2003.

5. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.

6. Brochure from Marriott Son Antem resort.

7. Author interview with bartender, January 12, 2005.

8. Interview published in “They Beat Me from All Sides,” by James Meek, The Guardian, January 14, 2005 (hereafter, Guardian interview).

9. Interview published in “German's Claim of Kidnapping Brings Investigation of U.S. Link,” by Don Van Natta, Jr., and Souad Mekhennet, New York Times, January 9, 2005 (hereafter, New York Times interview).

10. Interview published in “Man's Claims May Be a Look at Dark Side of War on Terror,” Los Angeles Times, by Jeffrey Fleishman, April 12, 2005 (hereafter, LA Times interview).

11. ZDF interview.

12. LA Times interview.

13. Cost: €120 (or $150) for the round-trip.

14. LA Times interview.

15. Witnesses on the bus confirmed el-Masri's story about the events on the Mace- donian border. The Macedonian authorities later asserted, in a diplomatic note given to German foreign minister Steinmeier in December 2005 during a NATO foreign ministers conference, that el-Masri had entered Macedonia from Serbia-Macedonia at the Tabanovce crossing on December 31, 2003, and that (incorrectly) he left the country via Blace (into Kosovo) on January 23, 2004.” See “Classified Report to German Parliament,” p. 113.

16. New York Times interview.

17. The hotel was located by ZDF; el-Masri confirmed the identification from photographs and videos of the place.

18. Interview with Khaled el-Masri, April 22, 2006 (JG).

19. Interview with Reda Seyam, April 19, 2006 (JG).

20. ZDF interview.

21. When applying for asylum in Germany in October 1985, he told the German authorities that he had been a member of the Al Tawhid Group. The group had fought against the Alawite minority in Lebanon, and was later repressed by the Syrian security forces. There was no connection between the Al Tawhid Group active in Lebanon in the mid-1980s and the Al Tawhid Group active in terrorist planning in Diisseldorf in 2001. “Classified Report to German Parliament,” p. 86.

22. ZDF interview.

23. “Classified report to German Parliament,” p. 89.

24. Interview with Reda Seyam, April 19, 2006 (JG).

25. Ibid.; and interview with el-Masri, April 22, 2006.

26. Abduh Ali Al Hajj Shaqawi. This is according to testimony he gave at Guanta- namo that was passed to the lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith, and declassified.

27. Table of transfers from Bagram Air Base disclosed in a FOIA request by the Associated Press.

28. Food and drink invoice from Sky Chefs Barcelona for aeroplane N313P, dated January 23, 2004. Reproduced in annex to Guardia report, p. 274.

29. LA Times interview.

30. Rasul v. Bush (524 U.S.), No. 03-334, June 28, 2004. See Chapter 2.

31. The first reference to the name Salt Pit appears in “CIA Avoids Scrutiny of De- tainee Treatment,” by Dana Priest, Washington Post, March 3, 2005. It is also referred to in an ACLU lawsuit. According to el-Masri (interview with Khaled el-Masri, May 1, 2006), the prisoners had no name for it, though they had heard that it was in the Sherika district of Kabul, close to the home of Afghan president Karzai, and which had been the scene of much fighting.

32. ZDF interview.

33. ZDF interview.

34. Khaled el-Masri video statement, May 30, 2004.

35. ZDF interview.

36. A section called “Prisons and Detention Centers” advises: “If an indictment is issued and the trial begins, the brother has to pay attention to the following: At the beginning of the trial, once more the brothers must insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by State Security [investigators] before the judge; Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.”

37. ZDF interview.

38. Interview with Khaled el-Masri, April 22, 2006 (JG).

39. ZDF interview.

40. “Rice Ordered Release of German Sent to Afghan Prison in Error,” by David Johnston, New York Times, April 22, 2005.

41. Guardian interview.

42. ZDF interview.

43. He even picked out a federal policeman from a police line-up in Munich whom he was convinced was the Sam in question. But the policeman provided a convincing alibi that he was not in Afghanistan. As reported in “Germany Weighs If It Played Role in Seizure by U.S.,” by Don Van Natta, Jr., Souad Mekhennet, and Nicholas Wood, New York Times, February 21, 2006.

44. “Classified report to German Parliament,” p. 97. The German government in- sists that no member of its intelligence services was Sam. The report said that there was no means of verifying whether one of the German-speaking Americans identified by the BND was Sam.

45. “SindSie Sam” (“Are you Sam?”) Stern magazine, April 19, 2006.

46. ZDF interview.

47. “Classified report to German Parliament,” p. 88.

48. ZDF interview.

49. Interview with Khaled el-Masri, April 22, 2006; Khaled el-Masri video statement, May 30, 2004.

50. Khaled el-Masri video statement, May 30, 2004; and further details from interview with Reda Seyam, April 19, 2006 (JG).

51. Khaled el-Masri video statement, May 30, 2004.

52. Interview with Reda Seyam, April 19, 2006 (JG).

53. “Classified report to German Parliament,” p. 90. The letters were sent June 8, 2004.

54. In 2005, a medical team at Munich University ran tests on Khaled el-Masri's hair, an analysis that can indicate through trace elements where someone has lived, and came to the conclusion that “it is very probable that the observed changes in the test isotope signatures correspond in fact with the testimony of K.E.M. [Khaled el-Masri],” according to the Classified Report to German Parliament, p. 100.

55. LA Times interview.

56. White House press release of a statement by President George W. Bush, on the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, June 26, 2003.

57. “Rice Ordered Release of German Sent to Afghanistan in Error,” by David Johnston, New York Times, April 23, 2005.

58. “Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake,” by Dana Priest, Wash- ington Post, December 4, 2005.

59. The 9/11 Commission Report contains a reference to one Khalid al-Masri. “The available evidence indicates that in 1999, Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah decided to fight in Chechnya against the Russians. According to Binalshibh, a chance meeting on a train in Germany caused the group to travel to Afghanistan instead. An individual named Khalid al-Masri ap-proached Binalshibh and Shehhi (because they were Arabs with beards, Binalshibh thinks) and struck up a conversation about jihad in Chechnya.” Section 5.3 (The Hamburg Contingent), 9/11 Commission Report, p. 165.

60. Interview with Scott Pelley for CBS Report: “CIA Use of Rendering to Get Information from Suspects,” March 6, 2005.

61. 2DF interview.

62. Interview with Khaled el-Masri, April 22, 2006 (JG).

63. “Classified Report to German Parliament,” p. 87.

64. Interview with Khaled el-Masri, May 1, 2006 (JG).

65. Interview with Khaled el-Masri, April 22, 2006 (JG).

66. Ibid.

67. Moreover, the “Classified report to the German Parliament” emphasizes how important the cooperation is between the German and American security services: The close cooperation of the international community is primarily focused on the the prevention of further attacks. A close and complete exchange of information between security authorities is essential in this context. It is a completely normal and essential thing that German security authorities exchange information and findings with US security authorities, (pp. 98-99)

68. Both the German television (ARD) news magazine program Panorama and The New York Times reported that the German foreign intelligence service provided vital military information to the U.S. Central Command in Doha in the months leading up to the war, and during the war. “Bombs on Baghdad—German Agents Involved in Iraq War,” by John Goetz, ARD-TV, January 12, 2006; “German Intelligence Gave U.S. Iraqi Defense Plan, Report Says,” by Michael R. Gordon, New York Times, February 26, 2006.

69. First reported in “Anatomy of a CIA Mistake,” Washington Post.

70. “Classified report to German Parliament,” p. 91.

71. Speaking to the German parliament on December 14, 2005, the interior minister, Wolfgang Schauble, also described how Coats had told Schily that the United States had both apologized to el-Masri and “paid him an amount of money.” But, after inquiries by el-Masri's lawyer, Manfred Gnjidic, the Ger-man government withdrew the allegation. Writing to Gnjidic on December 21 that year, an official confirmed that “The foreign ministry has no documentation to show that your client received money or payments from US authorities.”

72. Interview with Khaled el-Masri, May 1, 2006 (JG).

73. Interviews with former officials of the DIA (JG).

5. COVERT ACTION: UNMASKING THE NEW AIR AMERICA

1. Interviews by phone (May 2005) with journalists who were in the Panjshir in November 2001, including Stefan Smith (AFP, now in Teheran), Elizabeth Rubin {New Republic/New York Times Magazine), Tim Lambon (ITN cam-eraman), Chris Stephens (freelance British journalist, now in Moscow), and Peter Jouvenal (veteran BBC cameraman). The arrival of the plane was reported most notably in Agence France Press, November 4, 2001, “New Opposition Airstrip Opens Up Anti-Taliban Supply Link,” by Stefan Smith, from Gulbohar, Afghanistan; and “US Warms to Rebels, Slowly,” by Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, Bagram Front, November 4, 2001. References to use of airstrip in 1919 from Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 190-91.

2. Bush at War, by Bob Woodward, pp. 190-91, pp. 293-95; Gary Schroen describes the Jawbreaker mission in detail in First In (New York: Presidio Press, 2005) as does Gary Berntsen (with Ralph Peggullo) in Jawbreaker (Crown: New York, 2005)

3. Air Forces Monthly (January 2002), Afghanistan Diary, “Day 29—Sunday 4th November,” (p. 75). The registration was misread by the journalists in the Panjshir as N6l60, leading them on a false trail.

4. Flightlogs on N6l6lQ.

5. The actual budget is classified. In the most recent disclosure, the director of central intelligence revealed that the total intelligence budget for 1998 was $26.7 billion. Mary Margaret Graham, the deputy director of National Intelligence for Collection, revealed an overall post-9/11 figure of $44 billion in a speech given in November 2005. “Official Reveals Budget for U.S. Intelligence,” by Scott Shane, New York Times, November 8, 2005.

6. This is claim is made by Christopher Robbins, Air America (1979), as cited above.

7. “CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974,” by William M. Leary (www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter99-00/art7. html#rftO).

8. The involvement of the Meo in the opium trade was well documented by correspondents in Laos at the time, and most notably in Alfred McCoy's The Politics of Heroin in South East Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). But although the Meo were at the center of the opium trade, and the CIA knew this, no concrete evidence emerged that the CIA was deliberately involved in trafficking. One former pilot, Jim Parrish, was quoted by Robbins as saying: “We knew we hauled a lot of dope, although we didn't haul it intentionally.” The Senate's Church committee later endorsed the conclusion that “the CIA air proprietaries did not participate in illicit drug trafficking.” But as a later CIA inspector general's report noted, “Opium was as much part of the agricultural infrastructure of this area as rice.” More significantly, Robbins found that by supplying villagers with a regular supply of food, the CIA effectively freed them to use their fields to grow opium instead. As he summarized: “While the Meo fought the war for the CIA, the Agency turned a blind eye to their generals' profitable sideline in opium” {Air America, pp. 226, 233, 237).

9. The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, a.k.a the Church Committee, delivered its final report to Congress on April 26, 1976. (www.aarclibrary.org/ publib/church/reports/bookl/pdf/ChurchBl_l l_Proprietaries.pdf).

10. Ibid.

11. Interview with Brian Martin, May 26, 2005. For example, his flight on October 1, 1982, went from Basle to Berlin (Schonfeld Airport) to Lisbon, Portugal. The final destination was then switched from Angola to Washington, D.C.

12. “Airline 'Carrying CIA Guns to Unita,’” by Alan George, Independent, February 18, 1989.

13. “Angolan CIA Hercules Air Crash Killed Tepper Aviation Chief,” Flight International, December 13, 1989.

14. The CIA's direct role in the mining operation was first disclosed in the Wall Street Journal in “U.S. Role in Mining Nicaraguan Harbors Reportedly is Larger Than First Thought,” by Dana Rogers, April 6, 1984, and disclosed in Congress in remarks by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) the same month.

15. For how the trail developed, see for example, Miami Herald, June 13, 2004, “Iran Contra Scandal Marred Presidency” by Alfonso Chardy. Hasenfus's operation was traced back to Colonel Oliver North, who was running the Iran-Contra program from the National Security Council. Shortly after the crash a weekly magazine in Lebanon reported the Iran connection, disclosing a trip by Colonel North to Teheran in May 1986.

16. Journalists such as Dana Priest of the Washington Post and Jane Mayer of The New Yorker exposed stunning details of the rendition program. For example: “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,” by Dana Priest, Washington Post, November 2, 2005; and “Outsourcing Torture,” by Jane Mayer, Neiv Yorker, February 14, 2005. Mayer's articles are largely based on on-the-record interviews. The most notable early references to the rendition program were by Anthony Shadid in “US, Egypt Raids Caught Militants,” Boston Globe, October 7, 2001; the Wall Street Journal investigation into a case involving Albania (“Cloak and Dagger: A CIA-Backed Team LIsed Brutal Means to Crack Terror Cell,” by Andrew Higgins and Christopher Cooper, Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2001); and the Washington Post investigation into the road to 9/11 published in December 2001 (e.g., “Broad Effort Launched After '98 Attacks,” by Gellman, December 19, 2001).

17. “Mystery Man Handed Over to U.S. Troops in Karachi,” by Masood Anwar,The News International, October 26, 2001.

18. The suspect was reportedly from Tai'z, Yemen. His location remains unknown to me.

19. “U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects,” by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Finn, Washington Post, March 11, 2002.

20. Sources at Washington Post.

21. Transcript from Kalla Fakta, “The Broken Promise: Part 1” which aired on Swedish TV May 17, 2004.

22. Ibid.

23. Telephone interview with Joachim Dyfvermark, April 17, 2006.

24. “America's Gulag,” by Stephen Grey, New Statesman, May 14, 2004.

25. See for example www.acarsonline.co.uk. I have not used such a system.

26. Flightlogs of plane N379P; the date of the rendition is from ChandrasekaranFinn, March 11, 2002.

27. Flightlogs of plane P379P; also see “MI5 enabled UK pair's rendition”, author's report for BBC Newsnight, March 27, 2006.

28. Telephone interview with Jack M., Aero Contractors, October 2004.

29. “US Accused of 'Torture Flights,’” by Stephen Grey, Sunday Times of London, November 14, 2004.

30. The Gulfstream V (registration N379P, then N8068V) was sold to Bayard Foreign Marketing in Portland, Oregon; the Boeing 737 (registration N313P, then N4476S) was sold to Keeler and Tate Management in Reno, Nevada.

31. I have records of this plane's movements from November 22, 2002, with a flight from Andrews Air Force Base to Frankfurt, Germany.

32. Flightlogs of plane N313P, later renumbered N4476S.

33. “CIA Flying Suspects to Torture?” reported by Scott Pelley, 60 Minutes, CBS, March 6, 2005.

34. First reported in “German's Claim of Kidnapping Brings Investigation of U.S. Link,” by Don Van Natta, Jr., and Souad Mekhennet, New York Times, January 9, 2005.

35. “Aboard Air CIA,” by Michael Hirsh, Mark Hosenball, and John Barry; with Stephen Grey in London and Stefan Theil in Berlin, Newsweek, February 28, 2005.

36. Interview with The New York Times, January 2005 (“Bush says Iraqis will want G.I.s to stay to help,” by Elizabeth Bumiller, David E. Sanger, and Richard E. Stevenson, January 27, 2005); he later changed this to countries that “say they won't torture” (emphasis added). President George W. Bush, White House press conference, March 17, 2005. See also Chapter 10.

37. I later obtained further flightlogs that confirmed the plane's leg onward to Amman, Jordan, and then its return flight via Athens, Greece.

38. Interview by telephone with Maher Arar, March 25, 2005.

39. An official U.S. government Web site listed the names of aviation companies that had permits to land at U.S. air bases (www.usaasa.belvoir.army.mil/ CALP/CALPDec05.htm).

40. I was beaten to publication on this one by the Chicago Tribune (“Italy Probes Possible CIA Role in Abduction,” by John Crewdson, February 25, 2005).

41. “CIA Uses Jet, Red Sox Partner Confirms,” by Gordon Edes, Boston Globe, March 21, 2005.

42. “Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War,” by Dana Priest with Margot Williams, Julie Tate, Washington Post, December 27, 2004.

43. “CIA Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights,” by Scott Shane, Stephen Grey, and Margot Williams, New York Times, May 31, 2005.

44. Ibid.

45. Interviews with former CIA pilots, 2005-2006.

46. Dun and Bradstreet Business Information database, accessed May, 2005.

47. Interview with former CIA pilot, 2005-2006.

48. E-mail from U.S. embassy in Austria, May 4, 2005, from an embassy spokesperson.

49. Interview with a former senior officer, CIA directorate of operations.

50. I tracked many trips of planes to Venezuela: November 9, 2004 (N259SK); March 13, 2002 (N368CE); March 4, 2002; December 6, 2003; January 3, 2004 (N829MG); September 3, 2003; September 4, 2003 (N970SJ); November 19, 2002 (N982RK). These were all private charter jets, not planes we had identified as 100 percent used by the U.S. government, so it was not definitive proof of a CIA operation. The first appearance of the planes was on March 4, 2002. On March 5, 2002, opposition leader Carlos Ortega signed a pact to remove (peacefully) controversial president Chavez. Another plane came in March 13, to take whoever back to JFK.

51. “Let's Dare Call it Treason,” by Phil Brennan, NewsMax.com, June 1, 2005 (newsmax.eom/archives/articles/2005/5/31/224326.shtml).

52. “Why Would the Times Publish This Story?” by Frederick Turner, Tech Central Station, June 6, 2005 (www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=060605B).

53. “Shane, Grey and Williams: Are They Human?” Anticipatory Retaliation, posted by anonymous author “Demosophist” on June 7, 2005 (anticipatoryretalia tion. mu. nu/archives/086071. php).

54. See “The Public Editor: The Thinking Behind a Close Look at a CIA Operation,” by Byron Calame, New York Times, June 19, 2005.

55. Flightlogs of N379P and N313P.