1. Interview with Michael Sheehan, April 25, 2006.
2. He was a National Security Council (NSC) aide to both presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton until his retirement from the Army in 1997; he was appointed counterterrorism ambassador at the State Department after the embassy bombings of August 1998.
3. Interviews with former Clinton officials, September 2001-January 2002.
4. Ibid.; 9/11 Commission Report, (page 189-90) says there were fifteen total flights, beginning September 7, during which a “man in white” was spotted at Tarnak Farms. During another sighting, on September 28, analysts, “determined that he was probably Bin Ladin.”
5. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 221.
6. Interview with Michael Sheehan, April 25, 2006. Sheehan had had knowledge of other surveillance assets deployed in the Balkans as part of a program to capture wanted Serbian war criminals; he argued that they could be redeployed to Afghanistan.
7. O'Neill was chief of FBI counterterrorism section at FBI headquarters, 1995-1997, and then a director of national security and counterterrorism at the New York field office, 1997-August 2001. He then became director of security at the World Trade Center, where he died on September 11.
8. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 120, interviews with former Clinton officials, December 2001-January 2002.
9. “Road to Ground Zero” series, Sunday Times of London, “Clinton's Secret War,” by Stephen Grey, Jon Ungoed-Thomas, Nicholas Hellen, Gareth Walsh, and Joe Lauria, January 20, 2002.
10. Interviews with former senior Clinton officials, November-December 2001.
11. Quoted in “How the CIA Lost Its Bearings in the 'Scrub' of 1995,” by Stephen Grey, Jon Ungoed-Thomas, Nicholas Hellen, Gareth Walsh, and Joe Lauria, “Road to Ground Zero” series, Sunday Times, January 13, 2002.
12. Senior former Clinton official interview, December 2001; Berger's use of this phrase was first reported in “Broad Effort Launched After '98 Attacks,” by Barton Gellman, Washington Post, December 19, 2001.
13. Detailed in his book A Spy for All Seasons (New York: Scribner, 1997) pp. 349-59. Also interview with Duane “Dewey” Clarridge in Baghdad, February 25, 2004.
14. A Spy for All Seasons, p. 359.
15. “Foreign Policy Leads Us into an Odd Wordscape,” by William Safire, New York Times, June 20, 2004.
16. “Kidnapping or Extradition? Overseas Drug Arrests Prompt Debate,” by Henry Gottlieb, Associated Press, April 7, 1988.
17. “Larry King Live,” CNN, February 8, 2001.
18. A Spy for All Seasons, pp. 349-59.
19. “Administration Alters Assassination Ban,” by David B. Ottaway and Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, November 4, 1989.
20. Text at www.cia.gov/cia/information/eol2333.html#2.6.
21. A Spy for All Seasons, p. 351.
22. Interview with Duane “Dewey” Clarridge in Baghdad, February 25, 2004; also detailed in his book A Spy for All Seasons, pp. 334-35.
23. Association of the Bar of the City of New York and Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to Extraordinary Renditions, Section C (2) (New York: ABCNY and NYU School of Law, 2004), p. 31.
24. “This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.’” U.S. Supreme Court, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), Decided March 10, 1952.
25. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
26. Interview with Barbara Olshansky, New York, January 18, 2005.
27. Text of PDD-39 available at www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.
28. The 9/11 Commission Report, Staff Statement No. 5, p.2, March 23, 2004.(emphasis added).
29. A number of the suspects found guilty of the WTC bombing in 1993 were followers of Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, an Egyptian cleric living and preaching in New York and New Jersey. Abdul Rahman had previously been the spiritual leader of the “Arab Afghans,” Arabs who had joined the Mujehedin fight against the Soviets. Mahmud Abouhalima, a principal actor in that WTC attack, was an Egyptian member of Gama'a Is-lamiyya. Allegedly trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Mujehedin, he also raised money for the Afghan fighters while living in Brooklyn, N.Y. In the Philippines, Ramzi Youssef, probably the architect of that WTC attack, had been involved in recruiting volunteers to fight with the Mujehedin.
30. Interview with then congressman Porter Goss, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2001.
31. Interview with Jim Woolsey, December 10, 2001.
32. Interviews with former senior CIA officers.
33. Interview by author and Richard Miniter with Richard Shelby, December 2001. Figures from 9/11 Commission Report, page 90.
34. Interview with Michael Scheuer, March 14, 2006.
35. The term “extraordinary rendition” was wrongly ascribed to the agency, including by me. As described, it was previously used almost interchangeably with the simple term “rendition.” Since 9/11, the term “extraordinary rendition” has been subject to multiple definitions.
36. Interviews by author for File on Four BBC Radio 4, February 8, 2005; “A Fine Rendition,” by Michael Scheuer, New York Times, March 11, 2005.
37. Interview on March 13, 2006, with former ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr., U.S. ambassador to Egypt, 1994-97. (Hereafter called Walker interview.) He could not recall the date of his first briefing on the rendition program.
38. The Terrorism Knowledge Base at www.tkb.org.
39. Walker interview.
40. “Outsourcing Torture,” by Jane Mayer, The New Yorker, February 14, 2005.
41. Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-39, June 1995; see: 9/11 Commission Report, Staff Statement No. 5, p. 2 (www.9-llcommission.gov/staff_ statements/staff_statement_5. pdf ).
42. File on Four, BBC Radio 4, February 8, 2005. Interview with Michael Scheuer, January 21, 2005.
43. Ibid.
44. Walker interview.
45. Walker interview. El-Alfi was interior minister, 1993-97.
46. Walker interview.
47. Interview with senior Italian security source, Milan, May 2005. Italian authorities were informed of the operation.
48. “The CIA's Secret Army,” by Douglas Waller, Time, January 26, 2003; and “Inside the CIA's Covert Forces,” by Douglas Waller, Time, December 10, 2001.
49. 9/11 Commission Report, Staff Statement No. 5, p. 2.
50. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 173.
51. “Cloak and Dagger,” by Higgins and Cooper.
52. Ibid.; and “U.S., Egypt Raids Caught Militants,” by Anthony Shadid, Boston Globe, October 7, 2001.
53. Interviews in Cairo, September 26 to October 8, 2003; and “Cloak and Dagger,” by Higgins and Cooper; records of the trial examined at Egyptian Organization for Human Rights.
54. Montasser al-Zayat, Ayman al-Zawahiri kama Araftoh (Ayman al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him) (Cairo: Dar al-Mahroussa; 2002), p. 135.
55. Oral testimony before 9/11 Commission, Wednesday, March 24, 2004.
56. Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee an Intelligence (SSCI), “The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security” (February 2, 2000).
57. U.S. State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” 1998 and 1999 reports; FBI Report, “Terrorism in the United States, 1999,” p. 52 (www.fbi.gov/ publications/terror/terror99 • pdf).
58. “Two Yemenis Held Abroad Are to Face Trial in a U.S. Court on Conspiracy Charges,” by Eric Lichtblau, New York Times, November 17, 2003.
59. “Death Toll Rises in Blast That Tore into U.S. Destroyer,” by Jamie Mclntyre, Kelly Wallace, Gary Tuchmen, and Carl Rochelle, CNN.com, October 13, 2000.
60. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 214.
61. U.S. airspace was locked down to all but official and military planes—and to departing members of Osama bin Laden's family.
62. “Time to Think About Torture,” by Jonathan Alter, Newsweek, November 5, 2001.
63. “Torture Seeps into Discussion by News Media,” by Jim Rutenberg, New York Times, November 5, 2001.
64. “The Dark Art of Interrogation” by Mark Bowden, Atlantic Monthly, October 2003.
65. “Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?” by Alan Dershowitz, Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2001.
66.Dershowitz interview with Wolf Blitzer, CNN, March 4, 2003.
67. Interviews with former CIA officials. The date of the memorandum was reported first in Shaun Waterman, “Ex-CIA Lawyer Calls for Law on Rendition,” United Press International, March 8, 2005.
68. “Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails,” by Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, New York Times, March 6, 2005.
69. “Against Rendition,” by Reuel Marc Gerecht, The Weekly Standard, May 16, 2005.
70. Described in detail in Gary Bemtsen's Jawbreaker.
71. “The agency initially had few interrogators and no facilities to house the top detainees.” James Risen, David Johnston, and Neil A. Lewis reported in “Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations,” New York Times, May 13, 2004. The General Accounting Office published a report in January 2002 warning, “Lack of staff with foreign language skills has weakened the fight against international terrorism and drug trafficking and resulted in less effective representation of U.S. interests overseas”: “Foreign Language Report to Congressional Requesters,” GAO-02,375, January 2002. One CIA source remarked to Reuel Gerecht that the standard of living in the Middle East for an undercover agent put a lot of people off: “Operations That Include Diarrhea as a Way of Life Don't Happen,” “The Counter-terrorist Myth,” by Reuel Marc Gerecht, Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2001.
72. Interview with former case officers and senior former officials, CIA directorate of operations; with CIA contractor; with senior serving U.S. government official—all 2005/6.
73. Interview with Chris, Mackey, January 12, 2005, by the author for BBC radio. His book with Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against Al Qaeda (New York: Little, Brown, 2004), refers on page 221 to three options for the prisoners at Bagram: repatriation, release, or transfer to Guan-tánamo Bay. (Mackey uses a pseudonym.)
74. Michael Scheuer, January 21, 2005.
1. The autopsy was performed five days later—November 9, 2003, by the U.S. military, according to an account in “A Deadly Interrogation,” by Jane Mayer, New Yorker, November 14, 2005. Copy of the autopsy conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Baghdad, on November 9, 2003, and describing the cause of his death as “homicide” in author's file.
2. Photographs were first shown on CBS's 60Minutes II, April 28, 2004: “Abuse ofIraqi POWs by GIs Probed” (www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/ main6l4063.shtml). Other articles: “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” by Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, May 10, 2004; “The Struggle for Iraq: Treatment of Prisoners; G.I.'s Are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives,” New York Times, April 29, 2004; “Resign, Rumsfeld,” accompanied by one of the Abu Ghraib tor-ture photographs, was the front page of The Economist on May 8, 2004; “Blair 'Appalled' by Iraq Prison Torture,” The Guardian, April 30, 2004.
3. Transcript of President Bush's interview with Alhurra Television, May 5, 2004; available at www.whitehouse.gov.
4. “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Part One (Detainee Abuse), Findings, Section 6 (a) to (m) and Section 8 (a) to (h),” by U.S. Army Major General Antonio M. Taguba. Hereafter, Taguba Report.
5. As revealed at the court-martial hearings. A CIA official had insisted to the New York Times that abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was “not something to the best of our knowledge my agency has any involvement in.” The report continued: “Altogether, the official said, the agency was involved in the interrogation of no more than two dozen individuals at Abu Ghraib between September and December.” Quoted in: “Army Punishes 7 with Reprimands for Prison Abuse,” by Tom Shanker and Dexter Filkins, New York Times, May 4, 2004.
6. Larry King Live, CNN, February 3, 2005.
7. From transcript of interview for Charlie Rose, February 17, 2006 (released on www. defenselink. mil).
8. Pentagon operational update briefing, May 4, 2004; available at www.defense link.mil.
9. Taguba Report, Section 10.
10. “AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade,” by Major General George R. Fay, p. 87 (www4.army.mil/ ocpa/reports/arl5-6/AR15-6.pdf). Hereafter, Fay Report.
11. See “Who Should We Believe?” by Stephen Grey, New Statesman, May 10, 2004.
12. Clive Stafford Smith, from testimony collected from his clients in Guantánamo, identified a flight on September 20, 2004, that took fourteen prisoners from Afghanistan to Cuba. Among these were: Adel Hamlily, “Sanad,” Hassan bin Attash, Abduh Ali Shaqawi, Binyam Mohamed, Saifulla Paracha, and Abdul-salam al-Hela. Five were unidentified. (E-mail to author from Stafford Smith, February 13, 2006.)
13. Testimony of Secretary Rumsfeld to the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 7, 2004. “We've released 31,000 out of 43,000 that were detained” (www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040507-secdef0421.html). On November 28, 2005, over 14,000 detainees were still in custody in Iraq, according to figures released on the military's “Operation Iraqi Freedom” Web site (www. mnf-iraq. com/TF 134/Numbers.htm).
14. Task Force 121 combined CIA, Army Delta Force, and Navy SEALS troops and was the result of a merger between TF 5, a Special Forces unit hunting Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and TF 20, an Iraq-based Special Forces unit hunting Saddam Hussein. According to “In Secret Unit's Black Room,” by Eric Schmitt and Carolyn Marshall, New York Times, March 19, 2006, it was renamed TF 6-26, then TF 145.
15. Interview with Brigadier General (Army Reserve) Janis Karpinski, interviewed on August 5, 2005, for The Torture Question, by Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service, and also with a British officer attached to U.S. intelligence in Baghdad, interviewed late 2005.
16. As described in the Taguba Report.
17. Telephone interview with Karpinski, August 31, 2004.
18. Flightlogs of N379P and N313P.
19. “The Death of an Iraqi Prisoner,” reported by John McChesney, All Things Considered, NPR, October 27, 2005.
20. “Navy SEAL Officer Found Not Guilty in Iraqi Detainee Beating Death,” by William J. Brown, All Headline News wire agency, May 28, 2005 (available at www.allheadlinenews.com).
21. Account of al-Jamadi's interrogation from “Death of an Iraqi Prisoner,” NPR.
22. Swanner is not undercover, according to Mayer, November 14, 2005.
23. Mayer, November 14, 2005.
24. “Kenner told C.I.A. investigators, 'the prisoner did not appear to be in distress. He was walking fine, and his speech was normal.’” From: “A Deadly Interrogation,” Mayer.
25. “Iraqi Died While Hanging by His Wrists,” by Seth Hettena, Associated Press, February 18, 2005.
26. “A Deadly Interrogation,” Mayer.
27. Ibid., and in “Iraqi Died While Hanging by His Wrists,” Hettena.
28. “A Deadly Interrogation,” Mayer.
29. Telephone interview with Department of Justice spokeswoman, July 26, 2006.
30. Donald Rumsfeld told a Pentagon press conference on May 4, 2004, that “the actions of the soldiers in those photographs are totally unacceptable and un-American” and promised that “as the senior official responsible for this department, I intend to take any and all actions as may be needed to find out what happened and to see that appropriate steps are taken.” (Defense Department operational update briefing, Tuesday, May 4, 2004.)
31. The existence of the first memo was reported in “Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture,” by Dana Priest and R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, June 8, 2004.
32. The Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War covers POWs and defines the limits on interrogation in Articles 17 and 99. Afghan citizens, if not judged to be combatants in international armed conflict, were covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in time of war, which defined the ban on coercive treatment in Article 31.
33. “Memorandum for the President from Alberto R. Gonzales, re: Decision re application of the Geneva convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban,” January 25, 2002. In The Torture Papers, Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel, eds. (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005), p. 118.
34. “Memorandum from George Bush to the Vice President et al., re: Humane treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees,” February 7, 2002. In Ibid., p. 134.
35. First reported in “Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture,” by Dana Priest and R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, June 8, 2004.
36. Footnote 8 of memorandum from Daniel Levin, assistant attorney general, to James Comey, deputy attorney general, titled “Legal Standards Applicable under 18 USC 2340-2340A,” December 30, 2004, states: “While we have identified various disagreements with the August 2002 Memorandum, we have reviewed this Office's prior opinions addressing issues involving the treatment of detainees and do not believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this memorandum.” (Full text available at www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf.)
37. “Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Donald Rumsfeld, Subject: Status of the Taliban and Al Qaida,” January 19, 2002. Torture Papers, p. 80.
38. Fact sheet, Status of Detainees at Guantánamo, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, February 7, 2002 (available at www.whitehouse.gov).
39. As outlined in Appendix H of the U.S. Army's Field Manual 34-52, titled “Intelligence Interrogation,” and issued in May 1987, authorized techniques include such methods as those named Fear Up (Harsh), Fear Up (Mild), Pride and Ego Up, Futility Technique, and Rapid Fire. During Fear Up (Harsh), for example, “the interrogator behaves in an overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice. The interrogator may even feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the source's implanted feelings of fear” (www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/ army/fm/fm34-52/app-h.htm).
40. Ranging from “Incentive” and “Yelling at detainee” to “20-hour interrogations,” “forced grooming (e.g. shaving),” “removal of clothing,” and “inducing stress by use of detainee's fears (e.g. with dogs),” Torture Papers, p. 1239.
41. “Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense,” January 15, 2003. The provisions for inducing stress were limited to use of a female interrogator, and an allowance for “stress positions for a maximum of four hours” was rescinded. Torture Papers, p. 238.
42. Quoted in “The Bagram File—Revisiting the Case,” by Tim Golden, New York Times, February 13, 2006.
43. Ibid.
44. Report by Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III into Department of Defense(DoD) interrogation operations, unclassified executive summary, March 2, 2005, p. 7. There is more here on the “migration” of approved techniques, however the report insists that no detainee deaths can be linked to approved techniques (www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe .pdf).
45. From annex (titled “Status of Legal Discussions re Application of Geneva Conventions to Taliban and al Qaeda“) attached to memo from William H. Taft IV, a legal adviser to the State Department, to the Counsel to the President (Alberto Gonzales), dated February 2, 2002 (The Torture Papers, p. 133). Moreover, the CIA was not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) used to prosecute such abuses. In his confirmation hearing as attorney general on January 6, 2005, Gonzales confirmed that “the UCMJ, for example, would be—would be a limitation on military forces that may not be applicable—that would be not be applicable to the CIA.”
46. Reported in Mayer, “A Deadly Interrogation.”
47. “A list of 10 techniques authorized early in 2002 for use against terror suspects included one known as waterboarding, and went well beyond those authorized by the military for use on prisoners of war,” reported Douglas Jehl in, “Report Warned CIA on Tactics In Interrogation,” New York Times, November 9, 2005.
48. Mayer, “A Deadly Interrogation.”
49. Telephone interview with Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, August 31, 2004; interviews in Iraq with senior U.S. military and other coalition officers stationed in Baghdad, summer 2004.
50. “A Tortured Debate,” by Michael Hirsh, John Barry, and Daniel Klaidman, Newsweek, June 21, 2004.
51. For example, see “Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations,” by James Risen, David Johnston, and Neil A. Lewis, New York Times, May 13, 2004.
52. Memorandum to Commander Joint Task Force 170, titled “Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies,” by Lieutenant Colonel Diane E. Beaver, October 11, 2002. (Reproduced in The Torture Papers, pp. 229-235.)
53. Among those who came forward was Chris Mackey, who had worked in Bagram prison, and who described his experiences in The Interrogator's War (Little, Brown, 2004); see also Erik Saar (a Military Intelligence officer) and Viveca Novak's book, Inside the Wire: Describing Guantánamo Bay (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
54. The rulings were made in Rasul et al. v. Bush et al. and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Detailed in “Justices Back Detainee Access to U.S. Courts; President's Powers Are Limited,” by Charles Lane, Washington Post, June 29, 2004.
55. Interview with Clive Stafford Smith, who represented many prisoners at Guantánamo. He said this was the main effect of the ruling.
56. At Guantánamo, on September 20, 2004, Habib's case was heard by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal convened by the U.S. military. He was determined by the tribunal to be an enemy combatant as “a member or affiliated with Al Qaeda forces.” According to a summary of the hearing, declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act to the Associated Press, the tribunal was told he admitted, among other things, to training the September 11 hijackers in martial arts. Habib declined to appear at the hearing but, through a representative, declared that all his confessions had been obtained under torture.
1. Interview with Craig Murray, January 9, 2006.
2. James Bamford in his account of the National Security Agency, Body of Se- crets (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), describes how the United Kingdom-USA (UKUSA) Communications Intelligence Agreement signed on March 5, 1946, by the United States with Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand divided the world into spheres of interest, with signal intelligence pooled (pp. 40, 394). Other agreements, defined by a series of classified exchanged letters and memoranda, define broader intelligence cooperation between the UK and US. According to both British and U.S. security sources interviewed by the author, a key component of these agreements is the so-called “third party rule,” whereby intelligence received from a partner cannot under any circumstances be disclosed, without approval of the partner, to any third party.
3. Forty-nine flights into Tashkent, per flightlogs of N2189M, N8183J, N379P, and N313P.
4. “Unfortunately,” Karimov continued, “the British were never able to make any progress towards Central Asia, and their efforts to do so met with some very great historic defeats.” Quoted in Murder in Samarkand by Craig Murray (London: Mainstream, 2006), Chap. 4.
5. Agency operatives trained for the operation in San Antonio, Texas. Interview with former FBI agent Jack Cloonan, April 19, 2006.
6. Described in “Clinton's Secret War,” Sunday Times of London, January 20, 2002.
7. Described in Jawbreaker, by Berntsen and Pezzullo, and First In, by Schroen, pp. 73-78; and Bush at War, Woodward, pp. 141-42.
8. In “Crackdown Muddies US-Uzbek Relations,” Washington Post, June 4, 2005, Ann Scott Tyson and Robin Wright quoted Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman as saying: “Access to this airfield is undeniably critical in supporting our combat operations” as well as humanitarian deliveries. Whitman “said the United States has paid $15 million to Uzbek authorities for use of the airfield since 2001.” Official USAID figures, quoted in “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations” (also known as the “Greenbook” and available at qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html), show that in 2001 Uzbekistan received a total of $62.3 million in economic and military aid, rising to $ 167.3 million in 2002, $75 million in 2003, and $42.3 million in 2004. A further payment of $23 million in base-leasing fees was frozen in October 2005, as described below.
9. Interview with Craig Murray, January 9, 2006; also quoted in Murder in Samarkand.
10. Spelled differently by Murray as “Khuderbegainoy” in his book.
11. “Uzbekistan: Alleged Torture Victim Sentenced to Death,” Human Rights Watch report, December 4, 2002.
12. Interview with Craig Murray, January 9, 2006.
13. “Diplomatic Service Appointments,” The Times of London, April 26, 2002.
14. “President Karimov Wins Landslide Election Victory,” BBC news monitoring service translation of Uzbek Television, January 11, 2000.
15. Quoted in “Uzbekistan Shaken by Unrest, Violence and Uncertainty,” by C. J. Chivers, New York Times, May 16, 2005.
16. “Base Motives,” by Michael Andersen, The Spectator, May 26, 2005.
17. Quoted in report by Amnesty International, “Uzbekistan: Appeal Cases,” published November 18, 2003.
18. While falling short of designating Hizb-ut-Tahrir a terrorist organization, the U.S. State Department said the group's European headquarters, for example, “transmits a hateful, anti-Semitic and anti-American call for the overthrow, albeit nonviolent, of existing governments and the reestablish-ment of a single Islamist theocracy.” (Testimony of Daniel Fried, assistant secretary for European Affairs, to the subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006.)
19. “Uzbek Mother Who Publicised 'Boiling' Torture of Son Gets Hard Labour,” by Nick Paton Walsh, The Guardian, February 13, 2004.
20. Letter of findings to Mr. Alistair Walker, an official at the Foreign and Com- monwealth Office (FCO), from Dr. Peter Vanezis OBE, November 25, 2002.
21. U.S. Ambassador John Herbst, speaking at the opening of Freedom House in Tashkent, October 17, 2002. (Transcript provided by the U.S. Embassy, Tashkent.)
22. This remark was made by local human rights campaigner Talib Jakubov to BBC reporter Sanchia Berg in Tashkent on October 17, 2002, quoted on The Today Programme, BBC Radio 4, November 11, 2003.
23. Craig Murray's speech at Freedom House opening, October 17, 2002.
24. Letter from Simon Butt to Craig Murray, October 15, 2002. All correspondence referred to here and below was seen by the author.
25. E-mail from Simon Butt to Michael Jay, October 16, 2002.
26. Letter from Craig Murray to Simon Butt, October 17, 2002.
27. Letter from Charles Hill to Craig Murray, October 17, 2002.
28. Telegram (TELNO 285) from Jack Straw to Tashkent Embassy, “Reacation [sic] to Human Rights Speech,” dated October 25, 2002.
29. Murray's later July 2004 telegram wrongly stated that Moran had met the CIA chief of station, a meeting that was denied by the CIA to The New York Times. In Murder in Samarkand, Murray wrote that with Moran then back in the UK, he had misrecollected whom she had met with; he was later informed that it had been a U.S. embassy political officer.
30. Michael Wood memo to Linda Duffield, March 13, 2003.
31. Interview with Craig Murray, January 9, 2006.
32. Later appointed Uzbekistan's prime minister in December 2003.
33. Craig Murray's speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, London, November 8, 2004.
34. Open letter of January 2, 2006, Craig Murray to Brian Barder, weblog of Sir Brian Barder, a former UK diplomat (www.barder.com/ephems/2006/ 01/01/torture-and-the-diplomats-role/).
35. Source: Letter from Dominic Schroeder to Alan Charlton, re “British Embassy Tashkent,” August 6, 2003.
36. E-mail from Alan Charlton, FCO official in London, to unspecified recipient, August 7, 2003.
37. E-mail from Alan Charlton to Dominic Schroeder and Peter Collecott, all FCO officials in London, August 7, 2003.
38. E-mail from Peter Collecott to Alan Charlton, August 7, 2003.
39. Record of August 21, 2003, meeting—memorandum from Howard Drake, assistant director of personnel, August 27, 2003.
40. Interview with Craig Murray, January 9, 2006.
41. Statement by Yulia Usutova, economic officer at the Tashkent embassy, made to Tony Crombie, September 10, 2003, describing what Murray told staff on his return to the embassy.
42. Letter to Craig Murray from Diane Corner, FCO assistant director (personnel policy), August 28, 2003.
43. James McGrory to The Times, September 7, 2003 (238.pdf).
44. Edward Chaplin, director of Middle East and North Africa department at the FCO, to Diana Lees, personnel department, December 2, 2003.
45. Interview with Craig Murray, January 9, 2006.
46. E-mail and then letter from David Warren, FCO director of human resources, to Craig Murray, October 13, 2004, and October 15, 2004.
47. “Diplomat in Torture Claims to Sue Straw,” Scottish Daily Record, February 16, 2005.
48. Testimony of Galima Bukharbaeva to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on the Andijan massacre (available at www .csce.gov).
49. State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, said on May 16, 2005, the U.S. was “deeply disturbed by the reports that the Uzbek authorities fired on demonstrators last Friday. We certainly condemn the indiscriminate use of force against unarmed civilians and deeply regret any loss of life.” (Transcript of State Department daily press briefing.) A U.S. State Department profile of Uzbekistan released in July 2005 on the department's Web site (www.state.gov) stated, “in June 2005, Karimov refused U.S. demands for a formal investigation of the Andijan massacre, exacerbating the divide between the two nations.”
50. An Associated Press report by Liz Sodoti, October 5, 2005, reported: “In a move meant to send a message to Uzbekistan, the Senate voted Wednesday [September 30] to block the payment of $23 million for past use of an air base that the Uzbek government recently said will no longer host U.S. aircraft and troops.” The report quoted Senator John McCain, R-Arizona, as telling the Senate: “Paying our bills is important. But more important is America's standing up for itself, avoiding the misimpression that we overlook massacres and avoiding cash transfers to the treasury of a dictator.” A State Department fact sheet dated August 17, 2005, states that “funding for two components of security assistance, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), was cut off in 2004 and 2005, and remain so, due to Uzbekistan's failure to meet its framework commitments on human rights and democratization.” But the outstanding bill for the K2 base was eventually paid by the United States.
51. See “Uzbekistan's Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications,” Congressional Research Service report to Congress (www .opencrs.com/rpts/RS22295_20051007.pdf).
52. Steve Crawshaw, statement to the author, April 11, 2004.
1. Nabila was born in Egypt on June 25, 1968.
2. Born in early 1996, while Nasr sought asylum in Munich, as reported in “Wife Was Left Behind with the Children,” by Tom Hundley and John Crewdson, Chicago Tribune, July 3, 2005.
3. From intercepted conversation between Abu Omar's wife, Nabila Ghali, and his family in Egypt. Official English translation of the Italian warrant for the arrest of Monica Adler et al. n. 10838/05 R.G.N.R, including attached police report, issued on June 22, 2005, by Judge Dr. Chiara Nobili (hereafter referred to as “Italian first warrant“), p. 35.
4. Italian first warrant, p. 37.
5. According to Milan prosecution sources, the antiterrorism branch of the Carabinieri has a special office in via Lamarmora; DIGOS (Divisione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali) has a tapping center in via Fatebenefratelli.
6. Interview with Milan prosecution source, May 2005.
7. As described later in the chapter, Roberto Castelli, then justice minister, denounced Armando Spataro as a “left-wing militant” and declared: “The interests of the state are on the line.” See “Italian Resists Pressure on CIA Case,” by Frances D'Emilio, Associated Press, March 2, 2006.
8. Interview with Armando Spataro, March 6, 2006.
9. E-mail from Armando Spataro dated April 11, 2006.
10. Spataro, March 6, 2006.
11. DIGOS deals with terrorism and other serious crimes.
12. Italian first warrant, pp. 24-25.
13. Ibid., p. 4.
14. Castelli was named as a former CIA station chief under investigation for his potential role in the Milan kidnapping in an article by Carlo Bonini, entitled “The Chief of American 007s in Italy Behind the Kidnapping of Abu Omar,” in La Repubblica, June 8, 2006, as well as other Italian press reports. He was also named in public evidence to the European Parliament by Armando Spataro on February 23, 2006. An arrest warrant for him was issued on July 3, 2006. Another CIA officer involved in distributing the message, also passed to Italian intelligence agencies, was Ralph Russomando, according to Armando Spataro in an interview, May 4, 2006.
15. Central Directorate of Preventive Policing, headquarters in Rome of Italy's antiterrorist police.
16. Italian first warrant, p. 5.
17. “5 More Arrested in Spain for Bombings,” by Michael Martinez, Chicago Tri- bune, March 19, 2004; and “Italy Arrests Two as Terrorist Suspects,” by Al Baker, New York Times, June 9, 2004.
18. Italian first warrant, p. 66. According to prosecution sources he was born October 1, 1958, in Gharbia, Egypt.
19. On March 31, 2003, Abu Omar's successor as leader of the militant community in Milan, Radi Abd el-Samie Abu el-Yazid el-Ayashi, alias Mera'i, was jailed after confessing, according to the Italian press, to having recruited Mujehedin for the Iraq war, but “only to fight against the American soldiers [andl not to make terrorist attacks against the civilians.” (Source: E-mail from Paolo Biondani, journalist, Corriere delta Sera, April 11, 2006.) According to prosecution documents (author's file) dated December 9, 2005, both Mera'i and Abu Omar were under investigation for the “formation of an Islamic army” and the attempted reorganization of Al Qaeda cells in continental Europe after important cells in Italy and Germany had been broken up. Police operations began on March 31, 2003, when a number of alleged terrorists were arrested; the prosecution contended that those Islamic militants were responsible for the procurement of forged papers, fund-raising for jihad, and the recruitment of “brothers” to be sent to Iraq to fight in the fledgling guerrilla warfare waged by the insurgency. Abu Omar, it was alleged, was a key personality in this operation, and was in contact with other groups ready for jihad, including associates of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A prosecutor's warrant describes how wiretaps on cell phones belonging to Islamic radicals in Parma had picked up traffic with several telephone numbers belonging to a commercial satellite telephone network, Thuraya, and operating from a training camp for Islamic militants in Iraq belonging to al-Zarqawi's network. In the summer of 2002 the Parma-based radicals provided hospitality to Abu Omar when he visited Parma to consider whether to take a job at the local mosque, after more moderate members at Milan's via Quaranta mosque, where he presided, had urged him to step down. Although his voice was amply recorded, Abu Omar was never questioned on his involvement, as he had disappeared a month and a half before the start of the operation that led to the arrest and imprisonment of his associates. Police found that the same Thuraya satellite numbers of al-Zarqawi's network had been written in a notebook belonging to Omar's successor at the Milan mosque, el-Ayashi.
20. Meeting described in e-mail from Armando Spataro, April 11, 2006. Elbadry's statement is transcribed in the Italian first warrant, pp. 7-9.
21. “Madrid Suspect Arrested in Italy,” by Keith B. Richburg, Washington Post, June 9, 2004.
22. The operation had targeted links between Milan militants and Gama'a al'Islamiyya.
23. Italian police sources; interview with Yasser al-Sirri, London, April 14, 2006; interview with the former FBI agent, Jack Cloonan, New York, April 19, 2006.
24. Italian first warrant, p. 60. Expanded and explained by Spataro, March 6, 2006.
25. “During the First Kidnap in 1995 the Hostage Was Killed in Egypt,” Corriere delta Sera, July 2, 2005.
26. Italian first warrant, p. 26.
27. Interview with Michael Scheuer, March 14, 2006.
28. DIGOS report, July 19, 2004; cited in Italian first warrant, p. 60.
29. Profile of Lady and reference to bugging devices in report by Guido Olimpio, “Chi ha coperto Bob, 007 senza limiti?” Corriere della Sera, June 24, 2005. Confirmed by interviews with Italian police sources.
30. Interview with Milan police source, 2005.
31. Interviews with Milan police sources, 2005-2006.
32. Interview with Milan police source, 2006.
33. Interview with Armando Spataro, March 6, 2006.
34. E-mail from Armando Spataro, April 11, 2006.
35. Interview with Armando Spataro, March 6, 2006.
36. On July 3, 2006, a warrant was issued for Romano's arrest.
37. Nineteen were named in the Italian first warrant; of which thirteen were charged with the alleged kidnapping. A second warrant issued on July 20, 2005, charged the remaining six. A third warrant issued on September 27, 2005, charged a further three.
38. Italian first warrant, p. 103. Barbara was not accused by the Italians of involvement in any crime or wrongdoing.
39. Italian first warrant, p. 104.
40. The Italian first warrant also notes: “An additional element is that one of the telephone subscriptions implicated most in the operations, transfers, and communication exchanges related to the kidnapping was officially assigned to … a CIA agent appointed to the American Consulate in Milan: for his part, as pointed out before, Robert Seldon Lady was an intelligence attache to the American Consulate in Milan, operating as CIA superintendent” (p. 23). The CIA agent was not accused of doing anything wrong.
41. When he first disappeared, even the fact of his kidnapping was treated as unproven; for example, “Iman Disappears from Milan,” Corriere della Sera, March 1, 2003, reported that there was no concrete proof of his abduction, but did mention that there were accusations from the Islamic community that it might be the Egyptian secret service or even the Americans who were responsible.
42. Flightlogs of N379P.
43. Coverage included “Investigation in Milan into Missing Islamic Radicals,” by Paolo Biondani and Guido Olimpio, Corriere della Sera, December 2, 2004. The article suggested Abu Omar's disappearance might have been a rendition, and details of Abu Omar's reappearance, phone calls, and disappearance again are reported, along with his accusations of U.S. involvement. “The Missing Islamists: Covert Interrogations in a US Base in Italy,” Paolo Biondani and Guido Olimpio, Corriere della Sera, December 3, 2004, said phone intercepts convinced the investigators of the existence of a covert operation with “Italian and American secret agents.”
44. Czaska was a registered staff member at the U.S. consulate in Milan, according to prosecution sources. She was not charged with any offense.
45. The names “Maura” and “Torya” were not known to the Italian investigation; the “Sabrina” was assumed to be Sabrina De Sousa, registered as a second secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Rome but based in Milan. She was named but not charged in the Italian first warrant.
46. Interview with Armando Spataro, January 25, 2005, Milan.
47. “US Agents 'Kidnapped Militant' for Torture in Egypt,” by Stephen Grey, Sun- day Times of London, February 6, 2005, was followed by “CIA Under Investigation in Italy,” by Carlo Bonini, Giuseppe D'Avanzo, and Ferruccio Sansa, Corriere della Sera, February 17, 2005.
48. Duffin spent €7,591, Adler €6,540, totaling €14,131, or $18,000. Source: Italian first warrant, pp. 135-36. Duffin and Adler's cover, and that of the other alleged kidnappers named in this chapter, was blown with the issuing of the Italian first warrant and the publication of their names in major Italian newspapers, including La Repubblica of June 25, 2005, as well as in evidence submitted to the European Parliament and on numerous Internet sites.
49. Italian first warrant, p. 16.
50. From March 23, to June 22, 2005.
51. As mentioned in Chapter 5, I was “scooped” on the publication of this story by the Chicago Tribune on February 25, 2005.
52. According to Georg Nolte, a law professor at the University of Munich (in an interview on July 20, 2006), all U.S. personnel stationed in Germany were obligated to respect German laws, subject to certain exceptions. These laws included the crime of kidnapping. In addition, Article 2.2 together with Article 104 of the German constitution requires that no one should be deprived of their liberty except by a lawful arrest warrant and requires the German government to take all necessary steps to ensure this right is not violated.
53. Another vital piece of evidence found at the villa was flight bookings for a Zurich to Cairo round-trip (February 24, 2003, to March 7, 2003), according to prosecution sources. This appeared to confirm Robert Lady stayed in Egypt for almost two weeks. In her report, Judge Chiara Nobili said the cell-phone records showed, inaccurately, that Lady was in Egypt from February 22 to March 15, noting that those were likely the first days Omar was being tortured during interrogations.
54. Italian first warrant, p. 208.
55. This detail was first published by The Washington Post on June 25, 2005: “Italy Seeks Arrest of 13 in Alleged Rendition,” by Craig Whitlock and Dafna Linzer; research by Julie Tate.
56. “Italy Knew About Plan to Grab Suspect,” by Dana Priest, Washington Post, June 30, 2005.
57. “The Triangle of Anger,” by Yosri Fouda, first shown on Al Jazeera TV in January 5, 2006.
58. “Intelligence Source Alleges Initial Italian Involvement in Milan Kidnapping,” BBC news monitoring service, translation of La Stampa newspaper Web site, July 3, 2005.
59. D'Emilio, March 2, 2006, as cited above.
1. Transcript available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/2005 0428-9.html.
2. “The Conflict in Iraq: The President; Bush Says Iraqis Will Want G.I.'s to Stay to Help,” by Elisabeth Bumiller, David E. Sanger, and Richard W. Stevenson, New York Times, January 28, 2005.
3. Many of the legal references in this chapter are drawn from Katherine Hawkins, “The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic Assurances and the Legality of 'Rendition,’” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, vol. 20, issue 2 (winter 2006) p. 213.
4. There were over twenty thousand anti-Bolshevik partisans who had sided with Hitler in order to oppose Stalin. The British invited the Cossack officers to a “conference,” handed them over to the USSR, then sent on the women and children (Applebaum, Gulag, p. 395).
5. Source: Red Cross comments of April 28, 2006. The ICRC continued: “The person must be given the opportunity to make representations to the said body in this regard and should be granted the opportunity to appeal the decision of this body. Should a risk be determined to exist, s/he must not be transferred.”
6. Also referred to in Chapter 7: “Memorandum for the President from Alberto R. Gonzales, re: Decision re application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban,” January 25, 2002. In The Torture Papers, p. 118.
7. Bush's memorandum of February 7, 2002, states that Geneva “assumes the existence of 'regular' armed forces fighting on behalf of States. Also none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a high contracting party to Geneva.” In The Torture Papers, pp. 134-35.
8. The requirement to hold a “competent tribunal” was specified in Article 5 of the POW Convention. In the Red Cross's comments of April 28, 2006, the ICRC stated it never argued that all prisoners captured in a conflict such as in Afghanistan should be given POW status—that “contrary to some assertions, the ICRC has never stated that all persons who have taken part in hostilities in an international armed conflict are entitled to POW status.” The ICRC's position was simply that such a decision on status could not be decided in advance in Washington. It had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Foreign fighters in Afghanistan, such as alleged members of Al Qaeda, were unlikely to be covered by the POW Convention, it believed. However, the laws of war and basic humanitarian law continued to provide them with equivalent protection against abusive treatment, for example, in the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Although this was never ratified by the United States, it contained Article 75 listing “fundamental guarantees” that have been taken by the U.S. government to be a definition of customary international law. (For example, William Taft, then deputy legal adviser of the State Department wrote in the Yale Journal of International Law in the summer of 2003 that: “While the US has major objections to parts of First Additional Protocol, it does regard the provisions of article 75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.”) This Article 75 provides that anyone not protected by other conventions would, under the laws of war, be guaranteed, at minimum, to “be treated humanely in all circumstance” and not subject to “torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental … outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment … threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.” Anyone arrested and charged with an offense related to the armed conflict “shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.” In addition, “no sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure,” which were elaborated in detail.
9. Clothing issue referred to in Schroen, First In, pp. 129-32. Most of the military did wear uniforms.
10. “Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantánamo Bay,” by Lieutenant General Randall M. Schmidt, April 1, 2005. Executive summary was published on www.defenselink.mil; the full report was not released. Al-Qahtani's name emerged in media accounts.
11. “Gonzales Says Humane-Policy Order Doesn't Bind C.I.A.,” by Eric Lichtblau,New York Times, January 19, 2005.
12. The McCain amendment (attached to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006) stated that: “No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” This ban was to be applied without “any geographic limitation.” Although the term “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” was defined in the amendment as meaning the same treatments or punishments already prohibited within the United States by the U.S. Constitution (Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments) as further described by the U.S. reservations to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, none of the above provide a specific definition of the term “inhuman,” apart from making clear that the death penalty is not prohibited.
13. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee for Alberto R. Gonzales, August 1, 2002, Sec. II: “U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” in The Torture Papers, pp. 184-86.
14. “UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, December 10, 1984. It was finally ratified by the United States in 1994.
15. Senate Executive Report, No. 101-30 at Sections 13-14.
16. The Senate's reservations to the treaty can be found at www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm#Nl 1.
17. Memo, Bybee to Gonzales, p. 38.
18. Memorandum and Order from U.S. District Judge David G. Trager, February 16, 2006.
19. Interviews with former CIA officials 2005-2006, including those cited below.
20. Interview with Michael Scheuer, March 14, 2006.
21. Yoo was a former clerk for U.S. Supreme Court justice Clarences Thomas; he also served as general counsel of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1995-96. As deputy assistant attorney general in the office of legal counsel at the Department of Justice from 2001 to 2003, he worked on issues involving foreign affairs, national security, and the separation of powers. He is a professor of law at the University of California-Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law.
22. John Yoo, “Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After September 11?: Transferring Terrorists,” Notre Dame Law Review 1229 (2004).
23. J. Herman Burgers and Hans Danielius, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoft, 1988), pp. 125-26.
24. Foreign Affairs Reform and Reconstruction Act of 1998, Section 2242(a).
25. Hawkins, in the earlier cited article, quotes Burgers and Danielius as pointing out “that the original draft of Article 3 referred only to expulsion and ex-tradition, and that it was the addition of the prohibition on “return ( re-foulement')” that made Article 3 applicable to all transfers of persons.
26. 18 U.S.C. §2340 (2005).
27. 18 U.S.C. §2340-340A.
28. 18 U.S.C. §2340A (2005) (c) states: “A person who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”
29. United States v. Huynh, 246 F.3d at 745 (quoting United States v. Burns, 162 F.3d 840, 849 (5th Cir. 1998)).
30. Memo by anonymous FBI official titled “Legal Analysis of Interrogation Techniques” 1 (November 27, 2002); available at balkin.blogspot.com/rendition .fbi.memo.pdf. First reported in “Memo Probes U.S. Policy on Terror Suspects,” by Michael Isikoff, Newsweek, August 8, 2005.
31. FBI, “Legal Analysis.”
32. Responses of Alberto Gonzales, nominee to be attorney general, to the written supplemental questions of Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California), January 2005.
33. Responses of Alberto Gonzales, nominee to be attorney general, to the written supplemental questions of Senator Richard Durbin (D-Illinois), January 2005.
34. Interview with Edward S. Walker Jr., March 13, 2006.
35. Interview with Michael Scheuer, March 14, 2006. A report in The Washington Post also described the procedure for obtaining assurances as brief and informal: The CIA station chief of the country where the prisoner was being rendered requests a verbal assurance from the foreign intelligence service, and then cables the assurance back to CIA headquarters. “CIA's Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted,” by Dana Priest, Washington Post, March 17, 2005.
36. Interview with Edward S. Walker, Jr., March 13, 2006.
37. Interview with Burton Gerber, March 9, 2006.
38. “Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails,” by Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, New York Times, March 6, 2005.
39. Ibid.
40. “CIA's Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted,” by Dana Priest, Wash- ington Post March 17, 2005.
41. Interview with former senior official, CIA directorate of operations, 2005.
42. Alleged head of operations for Jemaah Islamiya in Asia.
43. “This memorandum supersedes the August 2002 Memorandum in its entirety,” stated the memorandum for James B. Comey, deputy attorney general, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, December 30, 2004 (www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf).
44. Interview with Burton Gerber, March 9, 2006.
45. Interviews with two former officials in the CIA's directorate of operations, 2006.
46. Yoo telephone interview with The New Yorker's Jane Mayer, cited in her piece “Outsourcing Torture,” February 14, 2005.
47. Senator John McCain press release entitled, “Senator John W. Warner and Senator John McCain. Statement on Presidential Signing Detainee Provisions,” January 4, 2006.
48. “Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails,” by Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, New York Times, March 5, 2005.
49. “A Fine Rendition,” by Michael Scheuer, New York Times, March 11, 2005.
50. “Secrets of the London Cage,” by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, November 14, 2005.
51. The case was Ireland v. The United Kingdom (ECHR1, 5310/71) and the then attorney general was Samuel Silkin, Q.C., M.P.
52. These new regulations emerged from a report presented to Parliament by Prime Minister Blair in April 2005, entitled: “Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report on the Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay and Iraq.” Blair accepted the recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee (the UK parliament's intelligence oversight body) that “prior to their deployment, UK intelligence personnel are clearly instructed as to their duties and responsibilities in respect of the treatment of detainees and of the reporting procedures in the event of concerns.” The precise scope of those “duties and responsibilities” was not disclosed although a Foreign Office official, speaking on terms of anonymity, told me they included instructions not to be involved in any U.S. rendition operations.
53. Jack Straw was speaking before the House of Commons' foreign affairs committee, December 13, 2005. Transcript from www.publications.parliament.
54. Interview with senior British security source, 2005.
55. These figures were quoted in “Reports of Secret U.S. Prisons in Europe Draw Ire and Otherwise Red Faces,” by Ian Fisher, New York Times, December 1, 2005, to which the author contributed reporting.
56. Telephone interview with Dr. Georg Nolte, April 2005; quoted in New York Times, “C.I.A. Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights,” by Scott Shane, Stephen Grey, and Margot Williams, May 31, 2005.
57. First reported in “Rendition: The Cover-up,” by Martin Bright, New States- man, January 23, 2006. Copy of memo at www.newstatesman.com/pdf/ rendition/rendition, pdf.
58. Flightlogs of N379P; British government telegrams, released in a High Courthearing in London, in author's file.
59. Condoleezza Rice, in a press briefing with German chancellor Angela Merkel, December 6, 2005. (Transcript at www.state.gov.)
60. Transcript of British prime minister's press conference, December 22, 2005; quoted on news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk_politics/4627360.stm.
61. “Rendition: The Cover-up,” New Statesman.
62. From interview by Porter Goss with USA Today, November 2005: “Lawmakers: Interrogators Not Using Techniques to Full Benefit,” by John Diamond, USA Today, November 21, 2005; “CIA Chief: Methods 'Unique' but Legal,” by John Diamond, USA Today, November 21, 2005.
63. Quoted in “Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush,” by Mike Allen and Dana Priest, Washington Post, June 9, 2004.
64. Walker interview.
65. Interview with former senior official in CIA directorate of operations, 2006.
1. The official budget of the U.S. government, financial year 2007, projects the spending of $2,770 billion (www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/ tables.html).
2. Interview with Danielle Pletka, January 21, 2005, for BBC Radio 4.
3. Interview with Michael Scheuer, January 21, 2005.
4. Interview with Edward Walker, Jr., March 13, 2006.
5. Ten thousand in Afghanistan, from Department of Defense news briefing, February 13, 2004 (www.defenselink.mil) and five hundred detained in Pakistan, immediately following 9/11, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, p. 368.
6. Detailed in the account of the Tora Bora episode in Jawbreaker (New York: Crown, 2005) by Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo.
7. One Al Qaeda Web site recorded that “when retreat followed retreat in Afghanistan … despair began to creep among many … and feelings of impending defeat and the end of the mujehedin there began to overtake them.” Quoted in The Next Attack by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon (New York: Times Books, 2005), p. 23.
8. Al-Nashiri, the presumed leader of Al Qaeda in the Gulf, was wanted in connection with the attack on the USS Cole; he was arrested in 2002. Ghailani (aka Ahmed the Tanzanian) was wanted in connection with the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa; he had been on the FBI's Most Wanted list since then; he was arrested in Pakistan in August 2004.
9. Interviews with CIA contractor, 2005-2006.
10. Interview with British security source, 2005.
11. Interview with Burton Gerber, March 9, 2006.
12. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, Vol. I, p. 101.
13. “Shift on Suspect Is Linked to Role of Qaeda Figures,” by Douglas Jehl and Eric Lichtblau, New York Times, November 24, 2005.
14. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 466, 490, 491, 500, 507, 524, 527), interrogations of Abu Zubaydah are listed as having taken place on the following dates: July 10, 2002; August 29, 2002; October 29, 2002; November 7, 2002; May 16, 2003; June 24, 2003; December 13, 2003; February 18, 2004, and February 19, 2004.
15. “Shift on Suspect Is Linked to Role of Qaeda Figures,” by Douglas Jehl and Eric Lichtblau, New York Times, November 24, 2005.
16. Interview with Craig Murray, January 9, 2006.
17. Known as the “Tipton Three” because they were all from Tipton, England, Shafiq Rasul, Ruhal Ahmed, and Asif Iqbal underwent over two hundred interrogations by both American and British military and security services. By checking police, employment, and passport records, British police finally proved that the three men were in the UK at the time they were accused of appearing in an Al Qaeda video. Reported in “Revealed: The Full Story of the Guantánamo Britons,” by David Rose, The Observer, March 14, 2004.
18. Interview with former official in CIA directorate of intelligence.
19. Ted Morgan, a draftee in Algeria in 1956-57, in a speech to the National Press Club Book Rap on March 14, 2006. As reported in the National Press Club newsletter, The Record, March 23, 2006. Morgan is the author of My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).
20. The tactic of inciting repression dates back to nineteenth-century anarchism. It was rejected by many early communists, including the Russian revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin, who argued that terrorism was only justified at the critical moment of revolution to help seize power. See also “The Nature of Modern Terrorism,” by Dr. John Gearson (Senior Lecturer in Terrorism Studies at King's College, London), The Political Quarterly (August 2002). Translation of the manual from Web site www.baader-meinhof.com/ students/resources/print/minimanual/manualtext.html.
21. “Torture's Terrible Toll,” by John McCain, Newsweek, November 21, 2005.
22. Interview with Alastair Crooke, April 4, 2006.
23. “Against Rendition,” by Reuel Marc Gerecht, The Weekly Standard, May 16, 2005.
1. Presidential nomination acceptance speech to the 2004 Republican National Convention, New York City, September 2, 2004 (www.whitehouse .gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902-2.html).
2. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, in The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right (New York: Times Books, 2005), cite senior analysts at the CIA, FBI, and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, who all poured scorn on the figure as a “White House number.” They conclude: “The claim is hard to comprehend. No intelligence agency is known to have fully mapped al Qaeda's leadership then or now, and many terrorism analysts would question whether that was even possible or meaningful given the fluidity of the group and its impressive ability to replace its losses by promoting from within” (p. 25).
3. Data from the National Counterterrorism Center, a multiagency organization that works closely with the CIA's Counter-Terrorist Center (CTC) and was established in 2004 as part of U.S. intelligence reforms following the 9/11 Commission. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) (www.nctc .gov and wits.nctc.gov/Incidents.do).
4. The “planes operation” was originally conceived by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in 1995. But it did not receive interest or approval from bin Laden until 1999. See: 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5, Section 5.2, pp. 153-54.
5. “There are some who feel like—that the conditions are such that they can attack us there. My answer is, bring them on. We've got the force necessary to deal with the security situation.” White House transcript, July 2, 2003 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030702-3.html).
6. Data from the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) (www.nctc.gov and wits.nctc.gov/Incidents.do).
7. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, by Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
8. Prime Minister Tony Blair said, in an Address to the Nation, March 20, 2003, “But this new world faces a new threat: of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction; or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our way of life, our freedom, our democracy” (www.numberlO.gov.uk/output/Page3322.asp). President George Bush said on September 13, 2001: “These people can't stand freedom; they hate our values; they hate what America stands for” (www .whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-4.html).
9. This point is also made by Scheuer in Imperial Hubris, p. 217.
10. Originally broadcast on Al Jazeera television on February 10, 2005; transcript from BBC news monitoring service.
11. Interview with senior U.S. counterterrorism officer, January 2005.
12. “The Ricin Ring That Never Was,” by Duncan Campbell, Guardian, April 14, 2005.
13. Interview with Alastair Crooke, April 4, 2006.
14. A Bright Shining lie, by Neil Sheehan (New York, 1988), p. 697.
15. All data from the CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html). Algeria: When the Islamic Salvation Front looked set to win the country's first round of elections in 1991, the army intervened and canceled the elections. In 1991, the military appointed Abdelaziz Bouteflika president, and he was reelected in 2004 with 85 percent of the vote.Egypt: The first multicandidate elections were held in 2005. Marred by violence and allegations of fraud, and with a low voter turnout (30 percent), President Mubarak was reelected with 88.6 percent of votes. The main opposition candidate, Ayman Nour, has since been sentenced to a five-year prison term for alleged forgery.Syria: It has had a secular authoritarian government since 1970. Despite holding parliamentary elections, there is a constitutional guarantee that 50 percent of the seats go to the ruling Ba'ath party President Bashar al-Assad was reelected with 67 percent of the vote in 2003.Tunisia: President Bourguiba ruled in a one-party system from 1956 to 1987. Since then the president has been Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who was re-elected in 2004 with 94.5 percent of the vote.Yemen: President Salih has ruled since the country was officially unified in 1990. He was last reelected in 1999 with 96.3 percent of the vote.
16. “How the United States Is Perceived in the Arab and Muslim Worlds,” Testimony of Andrew Kohut to the U.S. House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, November 10, 2005.
17. Since the 1980s, every U.S. budget has included a clause stipulating that Egypt should receive no less than $1.3 billion in foreign military aid, yet it took until 2005 for the country to hold semidemocratic elections, and in April 2006, Egypt approved an extension of its 1982 emergency law allowing the indefinite detention of suspects without charge. The United States continues to buy oil from and sell arms to countries like Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that they (and many Arab countries) boycott Israeli goods and ban Israelis from traveling to their country.
18. U.S. State Department, Report on Human Rights Practices, 2002, Uzbekistan (available at www.state.gov).
19. Figures from USAID, the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, known as the “Greenbook” (qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html).
20. The United States has since reduced the amount of aid to Uzbekistan because of the continued abuses there. In 2002, the LJnited States gave Uzbekistan $167.3 million in aid: in 2004 that figure was $42.3 million.
21. Interview with Michael Scheuer, January 21, 2005.
22. In 2002: $2.2 billion; 2003: $1.75 billion; 2004: $1.96 billion. Figures from USAID “Greenbook.”
23. In 2002: $1.3 billion; 2003: $1.29 billion; 2004: $1.29 billion. Ibid.
24. “Against Rendition,” by Reuel Marc Gerecht, The Weekly Standard, May 16, 2005.
25. Since 9/11, praise has been lavished on the progress made by dictatorial regimes. “I don't accept the fact that [Egypt] is stagnating, and I don't accept the fact that the government of Egypt doesn't want to change,” commented Ken Ellis, head of USAID Egypt in 2004 (as quoted in “$50 billion Later, Taking Stock of U.S. Aid to Egypt,” by Charles Levinson, Christian Science Monitor, April 12, 2004). Paul Wolfowitz, now former U.S. deputy defense secretary, said on January 16, 2005: “The real way ahead is through what I think is an impressive movement throughout the Arab world toward political reform. You read in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia about people talking openly about democracy in a way they never did before. In places like Morocco, they actually have made real political reforms” (interview in Tempo magazine, Indonesia). White House press statement announcing the visit of Uzbek president Karimov to Washington on February 21, 2002: “The President's discussion will reflect the new relationship that is evolving between the United States and Uzbekistan. The countries' unprecedented level of cooperation first became evident in the fight against terrorists in Afghanistan.” (Statement on www.whitehouse.gov.) President Bush's statement welcoming King Mohamed VI of Morocco to Washington declared: “Countries like Morocco are leaders in advancing the cause of peace and prosperity, and deserve our full support. America is lucky to have a friend such as Morocco, and thanks His Majesty King Mohamed VI for his leadership.” (July 8, 2004 statement on www.whitehouse.gov.)
26. “Iraq Terror Backlash in UK 'for Years,’” by David Leppard, Sunday Times of London, April 2, 2006.
27. ICM Research/Panorama Terrorist Poll, September 28-29, 2001 (www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2001/terrorist-poll-sept-2001.htm).
28. “Nous sommes tous Américains,”Le Monde, September 13, 2001.
29. Poll by Sofres/Nouvel Observateur, November 2-3, 2001, showed 65 percent with sympathy for the United States, compared with 41 percent in May 2000 (www.tns-sofres.com/etudes/pol/l4l201_usa_r.htm).
30. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 375.
31. “Global Outrage at Terror Attacks,” CBS News, September 12, 2001 (www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/ll/archive/main310763.shtml).
32. Various news sources, including CNN.com (archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/12/world. reaction/index. html).
33. Figures from White House press release: “President thanks world coalition for anti-terrorism efforts,” March 11, 2002.
34. Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz press conference in Brussels, September 26, 2001 (transcript available at www.defenselink.mil).
35. “Global Opinion, The Spread of Anti-Americanism,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, January 21, 2005 (pewglobal.org/commentary/pdf/104.pdf).
36. For example, in November 2002, a British citizen, Wahab al-Rawi, and twoBritish residents, Jamil al-Banna and Wahab's brother, Bisher al-Rawi, were arrested in the Gambia after the UK supplied intelligence indicating that they were close to the militant UK-based cleric Abu Qatada. The United States arranged for the arrest of all three. Wahab was released after a month, during which he was denied access to UK consular officials; the other two were rendered to a CIA jail in Afghanistan in the agency's Gulfstream V, and then subsequently to Guantánamo. Another UK citizen, Martin Mubanga, was also picked up in Zambia in 2002, and rendered to Guantánamo. In both cases, UK government sources insisted that they did not approve of the CIA's use of extralegal methods, though it was not clear if they were informed at the time or had made any protests.
37. The Next Attack, p. 201.
38. “Against Rendition,” by Reuel Marc Gerecht, The Weekly Standard, May 16, 2005.
39. Interview with Chris Mackey, January 12, 2005.
40. Interview with former case officer, CIA directorate of operations, 2006.
41. The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, by Gilles Kepel, translation by J. Rothschild (London: Al Saqi Books, 1985), pp. 28, 41-43.
42. From footage of the trial, described in “The Man Behind Bin Laden,” by Lawrence Wright, The New Yorker, September 16, 2002.
43. Interview with Jack Devine, New York, April 21, 2006.
1. Interview with Muhammad Bashmilah and his mother, May 6/7, 2006.
2. “German Spy Knew About el-Masri Kidnapping,” UPI wire report, June 1, 2006.
3. “Germany May Indict U.S. Agents in Abduction,” by Jeffrey Fleishman and John Goetz, Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2007; “Germany Seeks Arrest of U.S. Agents,” by Jeffrey Fleishman, Los Angeles Times, February 1, 2007.
4. “Opening Remarks at the U.S. Meeting with the UN Committee Against Torture, Geneva, Switzerland,” by John B. Bellinger III, May 5, 2006. Transcript from State Department Web site.
5. “U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Dismissal of Abuse Suit Against C.I.A., Saying Secrets Are at Risk,” by Adam Liptak, New York Times, March 3, 2007.
6. Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, Analysis and Recommendations, issued by Commissioner Dennis O'Connor and the Commission into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, September 18, 2006. Full report available at: www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English .pdf.
7. From the report (as above), Section 3.3, p. 59.
8. Giuliano Zaccardelli, Commissioner of the RCMP, resigned December 6, 2006. “Canada's Police Commissioner Resigns Over Deportation Case,” by Ian Austen, New York Times, December 7, 2006.
9. Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, issues letter of apology to Maher Arar and his family. Press release on the Web site of the Office of the Prime Minister: www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=l&id=1509; “Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured,” by Ian Austen, New York Times, January 27, 2007.
10. Stockwell Day, in a press conference, January 18, 2007, with Michael Chertoff at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, said: “Our officials recently have looked at all the U.S. information, and that does not change our position. We are still maintaining that he should not be on that no fly list.” Full transcript at Department of Homeland Security Web site: www.dhs .gov/xnews/releases/pr_l 169155498581.shtm.
11. “Blowback,” by Matthew Cole, GQ magazine, March 2007.
12. Interview with Michael Scheuer, March 14, 2006.
13. Fourth warrant issued in the investigation into the kidnapping of Abu Omar in Milan, signed July 3, 2006, by Judge Enrico Manzi. Also see “Inquiry in 2003 Abduction Rivets Italy,” by Stephen Grey and Elisabetta Povoledo, New York Times, July 8, 2006.
14. “First CIA rendition trial begins,” The Guardian, June 8, 2007 (www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,2098579,00.html).
15. Interviewed for “Kidnapped To Order,” Dispatches current affairs program, reported by Stephen Grey and directed by Dan Edge. First broadcast Channel 4 Television, June 11, 2007.
16. U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Egypt, 2006, published March 6, 2007, and available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ hrrpt/2006/78851 .htm.
17. “CIA ran secret prisons for detainees in Europe, says inquiry,” by Stephen Grey, The Guardian, June 8, 2007 (www.guardian.co.uk/international/ story/0,,2098130,00.html); Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report, presented to the Council of Europe by Rapporteur Dick Marty, June 7, 2007. Explanatory memorandum available at: assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/ 2007/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo.pdf. For all documents included in this report, see: assemblycoe.int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID=1924.
18. FAA records show the Gulf stream V that had the registration N379P and serial number 581 was exported on May 3, 2007, to Australia. The Australian aircraft registry records a plane with the same serial number registered on May 4, 2007, and owned by Crown Limited of 8 Whiteman Street, South-bank, Victoria, the address of the Crown casino, owned by the family of the late Kerry Packer.
19. FAA records, accessed May 30, 2007, showed the Boeing 737 business jet, serial number 33010, now owned by MGM Mirage Aircraft holdings of 3950 Las Vegas Blvd. S., Las Vegas, the address also of MGM's Mandalay Bay Re-sort and Casino. There's no reason to believe that either of the plane's new owners had any connection whatever with the U.S. government.
20. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, secretary of defense, et al., decided by the Supreme Court on June 29, 2006.
21. “Detainee says torture made him confess; The Saudi's allegations of duress are no surprise to a military law expert,” by Josh Meyer, Los Angeles Times, March 31, 2007. “Guantanamo Detainee Makes Torture Claims,” by Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press, March 30, 2007 (www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR2007033000903.html). Transcripts of High Value Detainee Combatant Status Review Tribunals available from the Department of Defense at: www.defenselink.mil/news/Combatant_ Tribunals.html.
22. Flight manifests of African Express Airlines flights to Mogadishu on January
20 and January 27, 2007; and Bluebird Aviation charter to Baidoa on February 10. Author's file.
23. Interviewed for “Kidnapped To Order,” Dispatches current affairs program, reported by Stephen Grey and directed by Dan Edge. First broadcast Channel 4 Television, June 11, 2007.
24. For example, CIA comments in “Detainee Alleges Abuse in CIA Prison,” by Josh White and Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post, March 31, 2007.
25. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 353.
26. Interviewed for “Kidnapped To Order,” as cited above.
27. Meet the Press with Tim Russert, June 10, 2007.
1. A Spy for All Seasons by Duane R. Clarridge, with Digby Diehl (New York: Scribner, 1997).
2. FBI Report, Terrorism in the United States 1999, published January 1999, p. 52.
3. Terrorism in the United States 1999, p. 52.
4. Described in chapter 6, first reported by Yasser al-Sirri and Islamic Observation Center in London. Al-Sirri is quoted, citing the date of the handover, in Anthony Shadid, “America Prepares the War on Terror; U.S., Egypt Raids Caught Militants,” Boston Globe, October 7, 2001.
5. Terrorism in the United States 1999, p. 52.
6. Terrorism in the United States 1999, p. 52.
7. U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, Appendix D, published April 2000.
8. Terrorism in the United States 1999, p. 52.
9. First reported by Islamic Observation Center, London, and described by Andrew Higgins and Christopher Cooper, in “CIA-Backed Team Used Brutal Means to Break Up Terrorist Cell in Albania,” Wall StreetJournal, November 20, 2001.
10. Terrorism in the United States 1999, p. 52.
11. Reported by Shadid, October 7, 2001.
12. Interview in December 2004 in Cairo with Mahfuz 'Azzam, an uncle of the alZawahiri brothers, cited in “Black Hole: The Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt,” by Tom Kellogg and Hossam el-Hamalawy, Human Rights Watch, May 2005; interview with a senior former CIA officer, 2006, confirming U.S. involvement.
13. Terrorism in the United States 1999, p. 52.
14. Press reports, including “Bomb Suspect Loses Bid for Deportation,” by Michael J. Sniffen, Chicago Sun-Times, October 8, 1999.
15. As note 12.
16. Yasser al-Sirri, Islamic Observation Center, London; Italian security sources in May 2006; interview with former FBI official, Jack Cloonan, April 19, 2006.
17. Source: FBI/State Department.
18. Statement from Ma'ri's brother to a Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantánamo, October 2004, declassified and released by the Pentagon. The statement disclosed a letter from Ma'ri, sent via the International Committee of the Red Cross, when he was held in Jordan.
19. “Mystery Man Handed Over to U.S. Troops in Karachi,” by Masood Anwar, The News International, Pakistan, October 26, 2001.
20. E-mail to author, December 7, 2004, from Habib's former lawyer, Stephen Hopper, based on testimony by Habib at Guantánamo.
21. Details of transfer from Sylvia Royce, a member of Slahi's legal team, in e-mails, July/August, 2005.
22. “Saudi Family to Sue U.S. for Kidnapping Its Member,” Pakistan News Service, January 17, 2002.
23. See chapter 1 for details of case.
24. Detailed in “Classified Report to German Parliament,” see prologue and chapter 4.
25. Amnesty International Action Sheet: “Walid Muhammad Shahir Muhammad al-Qadasi,” August 2005. Amnesty International index number AMR 51/127/ 2005.
26. Interview with Clive Stafford Smith, his lawyer at Guantánamo, May 2006.
27. “U.S. Takes Custody of a Qaeda Trainer Seized by Pakistan,” by Eric Schmitt with Erik Eckholm, New York Times, January 6, 2002.
28. Schmitt and Eckholm, January 6, 2002 (his initial capture); interview with Jack Cloonan, April 19, 2006; and interview, on condition of anonymity, in 2006 with a former prisoner held with him at Bagram (on his transfer to Egypt and return), hereafter “Bagram prisoner interview.”
29. In their “Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense Data,” published February 2006 as Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 46, Mark Denbeaux, a professor at Seton Hall University School of Law, and Joshua Denbeaux, an attorney, studied the profile of detainees at Guantánamo, using declassified documents, and found that: “Only 5% of the detainees were captured by United States forces. 86% of the detainees were arrested by either Pakistan or the Northern Alliance and turned over to United States custody.” Among those captured in Pakistan, and named in a detailed list published on www.cageprisoners.com, a British Web site that has monitored all the residents of Guantánamo Bay, were: Abdullah al-Noaimi from Bahrain, Ahmed Errachidi from Morocco, Karama Khamis of Yemen, Nizar Sassi of France, Mohammed al-Daihani of Kuwait, Omar Rajab Amin of Kuwait, Issa Ali Abdullah al-Murbati, Fawzi al-Odah of Kuwait, Adil Kamil Abdullah Haji of Bahrain, Abd al-Aziz Sayer Uwain, al-Shammari of Kuwait, Mehdi Muhammad Ghezali of Sweden, Abdullah Saleh Ali al-Ajmi of Kuwait, Abdullah Kamal al-Kandari of Kuwait, Adel al-Zamel of Kirwait, Abdul Hakeem Bukhari, and Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba of Uganda.
30. “U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects,” by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Finn, Washington Post, March 11, 2002.
31. Memo from Mark C. Fleming, attorney to the Bosnia rendition prisoners, to Claudio Fava, rapporteur of the European Parliament inquiry into CIA renditions, February 10, 2006.
32. Shaqawi's transfers reported in undated written testimony by him at Guantánamo obtained by author. The arrest of “Riyadh the facilitator” described, among other reports, in “U.S. Believes It Has Senior al-Qaida Leader in Custody,” by John J. Lumpkin, Associated Press, March 31, 2002.
33. Testimony of released detainees, see for example “At-a-Glance: Guantanamo Bay Britons,” BBC News Web site, January 27, 2005 (news.bbc .co.uk/l/hi/uk/4l63911.stm).
34. As note 33.
35. “Al-Qaeda Recruit Consented to Go to U.S,” by Stewart Bell, National Post, Canada, February 15, 2006.
36. Interview with Rahman in “Ex-Gitmo Jordanian Describes Hell in U.S. Prisons,” by Tareq Delawani, IslamOnline.net, July 5, 2004.
37. “5-Year Hunt Fails to Net Qaeda Suspect in Africa,” by Desmond Butler, New York Times, June 14, 2003, and “American Operation in Mogadishu,” Indian Ocean Newsletter, March 22, 2003.
38. Abu Zubaydah's interrogation in U.S. custody recorded in the 9/11 Commis- sion Report, pp. 466, 490, 491, 500, 507, 524, 527.
39. Testimony to Clive Stafford Smith at Guantánamo, described at www.reprieve. org. uk/ case work_omardeghayes. htm.
40. E-mail from Hopper, December 7, 2004, cited above. After his release, Habib told one reporter, who asked to remain anonymous, that he was on the same flight as Madni.
41. Interview with Martin Mubanga, November 20, 2005.
42. Interview with Abdullah Almalki, November 21, 2005; interview with Walid Saffour of the Syrian Human Rights Committee, London, April 6, 2006.
43. Almalki, November 21, 2005.
44. Britel was interviewed during a brief period of release by the International Federation for Human Rights, Paris, and cited in the organization's “Morocco: Human Rights Abuse in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Report 379/2, July 2004, p. 18.
45. Report of his transfer in “Terrorism: Indonesia Getting Its Act Together,” by Yang Razali Kassim, The Business Times, Singapore, October 22, 2002.
46. Interview with Tinawi, May 31, 2006.
47. Royce e-mails, July /August 2005.
48. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005, as cited in Chapter 2.
49. “Al Qaeda Threat Has Increased, Tenet Says,” by Dana Priest and Susan Schmidt, Washington Post, October 18, 2002, and “U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,” by Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, Washington Post, December 26, 2002.
50. Testimony cited in “Seven Detainees Report Transfer to Nations That Use Torture,” by Farah Stockman, Boston Globe, April 26, 2006. and other testimony to his lawyers at Guantánamo.
51. His arrest was announced publicly, and he is one of ten high-value detainees confirmed officially in the 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 146, 488) as in U.S. custody.
52. “Cairo to Kabul to Guantanamo: The Abd al-Salam Ali al-Hila case,” Human Rights Watch briefing paper, issued March 30, 2005, citing interviews with al-Hela's brother and reports by an Egyptian state-run news agency that confirmed his transfer to Azerbaijan. Also “Case Sheet 15: Abdulsalem al-Hela,” Amnesty International, January 11, 2005, also citing interview with his family. Some reports however suggest he was transferred from Egypt directly to Afghanistan. In a letter smuggled out of Afghanistan, where he was by June 2003, al-Hela appears to be unaware that he may have been held in Azerbaijan.
53. See multiple sources cited in chapter 3.
54. Interview with Tinawi, May 31, 2006.
55. One often high-value detainees confirmed officially in the 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 146, 488) as in U.S. custody.
56. Testimony to lawyer Clive Stafford Smith at Guantánamo, detailed in e-mail to author, March 22, 2006.
57. Al Hayat, December 8, 2004.
58. “Italian first warrant,” and other multiple sources cited in Chapter 9.
59. One often high-value detainees confirmed officially in the 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 146, 488) as in U.S. custody.
60. Al-Hawsawi's detention in U.S. custody was confirmed during the 2006 trial in Virginia of Zacarias Moussaoui, in which selected interrogation reports from al-Hawsawi were disclosed; reported in “Defense Tries to Undo Damage Moussaoui Did,” by Neil A. Lewis, New York Times, March 29, 2006.
61. “Terror Funding Hurt by Al Qaeda Arrest in Pakistan,” by Scott Baldauf, Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 2003.
62. “Algerian Tells of Dark Odyssey in U.S. Hands,” by Craig S. Smith and Souad Mekhennet, New York Times, July 7, 2006.
63. “Bagram prisoner interview.” Arrest described in “Al Qaeda Agent's 9/11 Role Comes into Focus,” by Richard A. Serrano, Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2006.
64. Their presence in U.S. detention was confirmed after a federal judge in the New York trial of Uzair Paracha allowed defense lawyers to introduce evidence from Ali and Khan's interrogations, described in Serrano, May 21, 2006.
65. “USA/Malawi: Another Unlawful Transfer to U.S. Custody?” Amnesty International press release (reference AMR 51/092/2003), June 25, 2003.
66. Source: “Alleged Qaeda Big Goes to Bagram,” CBS News, July 14, 2003.
67. Ibid.
68. Statement from Paracha dictated December 8, 2004, and admitted as evidence in his Combatant Status Revenue Tribunal held the same month at Guan-tánamo and declassified by the Pentagon. In the statement, Paracha says he was arrested at Bangkok airport on July 6 and held “for a few days” at an unknown place before being flown to Afghanistan.
69. Hambali is one of ten high-value detainees confirmed officially in the 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 146, 488) as in U.S. custody. Details of the arrest of bin Lep Amin in “Bali: Could It Happen Again?” by Simon Elegant and Andrew Perrin, Time magazine, October 13, 2003.
70. Testimony by prisoners to Amnesty International, described in “Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and 'Disappearance,’” Amnesty International, April 5, 2006; interview with Bashmilah by the author in Sanaa, May 6/7, 2006.
71. “Below the Radar,” April 5, 2006.
72. Bush's reference to Ghul in “President Bush Calls for Medical Liability Reform,” White House news release, January 26, 2004. Ghul was also one of ten high-value detainees confirmed officially in the 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 146, 488) as in U.S. custody.
73. Bin Attash's transfer reported in Stockman, April 26, 2006; Shaqawi's transfers reported in undated written testimony made by him at Guantánamo obtained by author.
74. CSS Memo, June 10, 2005.
75. His journey described in his testimony after release, detailed in “Classified Report to German Parliament,” see Chapter 4.
76. “Below the Radar,” April 5, 2006.
77. “Below the Radar,” April 5, 2006; Bashmilah interview, May 6/7, 2006.
78. “Al Qaeda Arrest in June Opened Valuable Leads,” by Kamran Khan, Wash- ington Post, August 3, 2004.
79. “Pakistan Hands Over 1998 Bomber to U.S.,” by Anwar Iqbal, United Press International, August 3, 2004, and other wire reports.
80. Multiple testimony of detainees at Guantánamo, described in memo to author from Clive Stafford Smith, January 13, 2006.
81. “U.S. Military Says al-Qaeda Suspect Taken to USA” (no byline), USA Today, June 8, 2005, reprinting an Associated Press report that quoted a U.S. military spokesman saying al-Libbi was flown directly into U.S. custody from Pakistan, and not to Afghanistan.
82. “Below the Radar,” April 5, 2006; Bashmilah interview, May 6/7, 2006.