After normandy, the weakened 2nd SS Panzer Corps withdrew to the Arnhem area in the netherlands to recuperate. By September 1944 walter Harzer, commanding the 9th SS Panzer division Hohenstaufen, had about 6,000 men and twenty tanks available.
After the defeat of the German Army and the waffen-SS in normandy in August 1944, Field Marshal von rundstedt, CinC west, reported:
At this time, about 100 tanks are combat ready in Army Group B. enemy air force dominates the battle area and the lines of communication deep into the rear echelon. … our task is to fight with available forces to gain time, to make the western positions and the westwall [Siegfried Line] completely capable for defence.
Despite the developing Allied threat to the German city of Aachen, Hitler’s intelligence judged that the Allies would strike towards Arnhem, which lay on the northern bank of the dutch rhine. A British 1st Airborne division’s intelligence summary noted, ‘It is reported that one of the broken panzer divisions has been sent back to the area north of Arnhem to rest and refit; this might produce some 50 tanks.’ SS-Obergruppenführer wilhelm ‘willi’ Bittrich and his exhausted 2nd SS Panzer Corps had indeed been withdrawn to the netherlands, having successfully escaped the envelopment at Falaise.
Bittrich did not know that his Hohenstaufen and the Frundsberg SS Panzer divisions were in the path of a major Allied airborne and ground attack, which was designed to ‘bounce’ the rhine and overrun the vital industrial region of the ruhr. He and his divisional commanders assumed that they were in a quiet sector to recuperate, so were not unduly alarmed at the poor condition of their units after the heavy fighting in France. Crucially they lacked both manpower and panzers.
Just four days before operation Market Garden was scheduled to start, General ‘Boy’ Browning, commanding the British Airborne Corps, issued the following intelligence assessment: ‘The total armoured strength is probably not more than 50–100 tanks … There is every sign of the enemy strengthening the river and canal lines through nijmegen and Arnhem … but the troops manning them are not numerous and many are of low category.’
It was at this stage that a fatal error of judgement occurred. In wartime, generals always have to make very difficult decisions, but on this occasion they grossly underestimated the capabilities of the waffen-SS. Browning’s intelligence was uncannily accurate. Bittrich’s command accounted for less than a third of the estimated total, but just across the German border about sixty Tiger I and II tanks were on call. The latter were almost impossible for the paras to deal with, armed as they were with 57mm (6-pounder) anti-tank guns, 75mm Pack Howitzers and PIAT man-portable anti-tank weapons. Their only hope was to lay down such a barrage of fire that it would be enough to persuade the alarmed Tiger crews to break off contact. Such action would require incredible courage. elements of an assault gun company were also to be made available for the waffen-SS defence of Arnhem. Altogether this would give Bittrich at least ninety tanks and assault guns.
In addition, although Bittrich’s divisions were in a poor condition, in normandy they had proved highly adept at putting together effective battle groups using battered front-line troops and rear echelon personnel such as clerks and cooks. So not only did the Allies underestimate the potential strength of the panzers that would oppose Market Garden, they also underestimated Bittrich’s response. A slow response would obviously allow them to steal a lead over the German defenders. A swift response would contest the Allied advance every inch of the way and jeopardise the success of the operation at Arnhem. To make matters worse, knowledge of Bittrich’s presence did not filter down to everyone. British glider pilot Alexander Morrison recalled ‘a brief summary of the known troops in northern Holland which, incidentally, made no reference to the two depleted divisions of German armour in the Arnhem area!’
Along the coast, once the British were in Antwerp, the German 15th Army fell back to a bridgehead blocking the mouth of the Scheldt estuary, thereby barring the sea approach to Antwerp. dogged German resistance resulted in the Allies wasting almost two months trying to secure the port and the Scheldt, and in the meantime much-needed supplies had to be driven across europe from the French ports by the trucks of the ‘red Ball express’. This meant that just to the south everything rested on the performance of Bittrich’s exhausted panzer divisions.
Under SS-obersturmbannführer walter Harzer, the 9th SS Panzer division Hohenstaufen had barely 6,000 men and around twenty tanks but not all these were operational. nonetheless, the division still had large numbers of other armoured fighting vehicles, such as armoured cars and self-propelled guns, along with forty armoured personnel carriers to transport its tough panzergrenadiers. This meant that Harzer’s division was still more than capable of undertaking mobile operations. Under SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Harmel, Hohenstaufen’s sister division, the 10th SS Frundsberg, was much weaker. It retained fewer than 3,500 men and hardly any tanks. However, Bittrich was soon to be reinforced by elements of a heavy tank battalion equipped with forty-five Tiger IIs, a company of fourteen Tiger Is and a company of ten assault guns.
Hohenstaufen was deployed in the triangle formed by Arnhem, Zutphen and Apeldoorn. It was due to return to Germany for a much-needed refit and had been ordered to hand over many of its vehicles to Frundsberg. Perhaps understandably, Harzer was not keen on surrendering his remaining resources and deliberately dragged the process out. The 9th SS had also despatched forces to support Kampfgruppe walther, part of Student’s 1st Parachute Army.
Allied intelligence confirmed the deployment of Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg to the nijmegen and Arnhem area. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance flights and intelligence from the dutch resistance. no one, though, seemed overly concerned. Major Tony Hibbert of the British 1st Parachute Brigade attended a meeting with Major Brian Urquhart, the chief intelligence officer of the 1st Airborne division, noting, ‘He went to General Browning, and said that in his view the operation could not succeed, because of the presence of these two divisions.’ Browning, with just a week to prepare, decided that the operation would go ahead.
on the ground, carrying out the Garden element, Lieutenant General Brian Horrock’s British 30th Corps with the Guards Armoured division was to drive up Highway 69, followed by the 43rd wessex and 50th northumbrian Infantry divisions. He was to reach eindhoven on the first day, nijmegen on the second day and Arnhem by day four. However, the British 1st Airborne division would end up on its own for ten gruelling days, thanks to Bittrich.
The bulk of the 1st Airborne division landed around Arnhem on 17 September 1944 in complete ignorance of the presence of the SS armour. Harzer was having lunch with Captain Paul Gräbner, commander of the divisional reconnaissance battalion, when Bittrich called. His instruction was for Hohenstaufen to ‘reconnoitre in the direction of Arnhem and nijmegen’. Harzer turned to Gräbner and said, ‘now what are we going to do? The vehicles are dismantled and on the train.’ These included forty vehicles from Gräbner’s unit. ‘How soon can you have the tracks and guns put back on?’ Harzer asked his subordinate, who was in the middle of consuming his soup. ‘we’ll be ready to move within three to five hours,’ replied Gräbner. ‘Get it done in three,’ ordered Harzer, as he headed for his HQ. Bittrich had swiftly set in motion the reconstitution of the very panzer divisions that Allied intelligence so readily dismissed.
After Bittrich was informed of the British airborne drop, he immediately called for the bridges at nijmegen and Arnhem to be brought down to stop them falling into enemy hands, but Field Marshal Model refused, claiming that they would be needed for the counter-attack. Following some initial confusion, Bittrich’s two divisions quickly cobbled together various battle groups.
At the same time, on 17 September the artillery of General Horrock’s 30th Corps opened fire to support the initial advance of the Irish Guards on a two-tankswide front with infantry from the 231st Brigade from the 50th northumbrian division. The Guards broke out of their Meuse-escaut canal bridgehead and rolled into the netherlands at 1500 hours, some 45 minutes after the opening barrage and air attacks. They then ran into elements of two battalions of the 9th SS and two German parachute battalions. These were pushed aside.
The 9th SS, although preparing to transit home, quickly sent its reconnaissance battalion south over the Arnhem highway bridge towards nijmegen. Another battle group sped westward towards oosterbeek, where most of the 1st Airborne division was located; this would prevent reinforcements reaching those British paratroops already in Arnhem. The following day Gräbner’s unit, leaving some self-propelled guns to guard the southern approaches of the nijmegen bridge, headed north to elst. A column of twenty-two vehicles then attempted to force a crossing of the Arnhem bridge, the northern end of which was by now firmly in British hands. Half of Gräbner’s vehicles were destroyed and the SS were driven off amidst a blaze of fire from the Paras’ strongpoints. The bridge was left strewn with debris and burnt-out vehicles.
The 10th SS was also despatched to nijmegen to hold the main bridges against Horrock’s advancing armour; this was key to isolating and destroying the paratroops at oosterbeek. However, with the Arnhem bridge in British hands, the bulk of the 10th SS forces were obliged to use the ferry at Pannerden, 8 miles southeast of Arnhem. ‘It was 1100 hours on the morning of Thursday, 21 September,’ according to Geoffrey Powell, a company commander with 4th Para Brigade, ‘before the Irish Guards received orders to break through to Arnhem Bridge … waiting for them were German infantry, by now well dug-in and supported by tanks and SP guns.’
‘For three days now,’ added Powell, ‘the dogged resistance of Brigadeführer Harmel’s SS troops, fighting in the Betuwe between nijmegen and Arnhem, had slowed the pace of the British advance.’
Major winrich Behr, serving General Krebs, Field Marshal Model’s Chief of Staff, recalled their counter-attacks at Arnhem on the 20th:
At dawn the heavy SS Frundsberg Mortar Section moved into position and blasted the Arnhem bridgehead. This was followed by a frontal attack by ten somewhat elderly tanks firing wildly but continuously, and supported by infantry keeping up a steady pounding of heavy machine-gun fire. The tanks were met by the very accurate fire of the British 6-pounder anti-tank guns; they slowed to a stop and then began to back away.
The Germans secured the bridge at Arnhem that day. In the oosterbeek pocket Glider Pilot Louis Hagen was grateful that the 9th SS was not up to full strength: ‘If there had not been a sprinkling of first-class and fanatical officers and nCos in this division, no fight would have been possible. But even with the present state of affairs, it was ridiculous that they did not wipe us out within a few hours.’ on the 24th Hohenstaufen, reinforced by Heavy Tank Battalion 506, consisting of some fortyfive powerful King IIs, set about eliminating the trapped defenders at oosterbeek. Luckily for the Paras these attacks were initially poorly coordinated, with the panzers often operating without adequate infantry support, which left them vulnerable.
Frundsberg was eventually forced back, so Bittrich sent Tiger IIs and a company of Panthers to reinforce it, following the landing of the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade at driel, south of oosterbeek. Geoffrey Powell recalled how, ‘defeated at nijmegen, the 10th SS Panzer division had retired towards Arnhem and was now waiting for 30th Corps’ next move.’ Horrocks’ continually delayed tanks simply could not get through and on the 26th the difficult decision was taken to evacuate the exhausted paratroops trapped at oosterbeek back across the rhine. The remains of the British 1st Airborne division escaped, leaving behind 1,485 dead and 6,414 captured. Bittrich’s waffen-SS panzer divisions suffered 3,300 casualties in stopping Market Garden from reaching its final objective.
The 9th SS and 10th SS divisions successfully helped thwart Montgomery’s attempt to end the war with a thrust into the ruhr and the Allies reverted to their broad-front strategy across the whole of western europe. Following its performance at Arnhem Hohenstaufen was sent to Paderborn for a well-earned break and to be re-equipped. Just after Arnhem Frundsberg was to cause yet more trouble. while trying to destroy the German salient at Geilenkirchen on 15 november 1944, elements of the British 43rd (wessex) Infantry division were trapped by the 10th SS around Hoven.
After normandy, the weakened 2nd SS Panzer Corps withdrew to the Arnhem area in the netherlands to recuperate. By September 1944 walter Harzer, commanding the 9th SS Panzer division Hohenstaufen, had about 6,000 men and twenty tanks available.
Members of the Hohenstaufen division stocktaking personal effects next to their SdKfz 251. They are wearing the short-waisted M44 field blouse that was similar to the British Army’s battle dress; the matching trousers were held up by a belt instead of braces. The blouse was made from Zeltbahn material with printed camouflage, which was originally designed as a wet weather poncho and pup tent.
Heinz Harmel’s 10th SS Frundsberg had just 3,500 troops and a handful of tanks. nonetheless the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps at Arnhem ensured the failure of operation Market Garden.
Möbelwagen self-propelled anti-aircraft guns belonging to Hohenstaufen at Arnhem; such armoured fighting vehicles were deadly against the lightly equipped British 1st Airborne division.
Men of the British 1st Airborne division landed at Arnhem little realising they would be facing German Tiger tanks and assault guns.
German debris on the northern ramp of Arnhem bridge following the counter-attack by the 9th SS on 18 September. It would take the Germans two days to recapture the bridge, cutting off the bulk of the 1st Airborne division to the west at oosterbeek.
Men from the 9th SS Panzer division Hohenstaufen under guard by paras of the British 1st Airborne division inside the Arnhem perimeter. They are wearing the four-pocket camouflage tunic modelled on the M1944 field uniform. Although it was forbidden to wear insignia on camouflage clothing, they have visible arm-eagles. The man second from the left wears a single button M1943 field cap with the standard woven death’shead insignia.
A StuG III from Sturmgeschütz Brigade 280 supporting troops from the 9th SS in Arnhem on 19 September 1944. note the Schürzen side-skirts and Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating.
Hohenstaufen troops and their supporting assault guns on the streets of Arnhem. Initially, coordination between the two units was poor, leaving the assault guns very vulnerable to attack by British paratroops.
Sturmgeschütz Brigade 280 was en route to Aachen when ten of its assault guns (seven StuG IIIs and three StuH42s) were redeployed to assist 2nd SS Panzer Corps’ operations.
Defiant-Looking British paratroops being rounded up by Hohenstaufen troops on 20 September 1944 under the watchful eye of a StuG III crew.
SS Panzer IV destroyed by the 1st Parachute Brigade near Arnhem Bridge.
A well camouflaged Sturmhaubitze 42 (StuG III armed with a 105mm howitzer) belonging to StuG Brigade 280, obscured by a British parachute in Arnhem.
Another shot of a Sturmhaubitze 42, possibly the same vehicle, in Arnhem. Three of these were made available to the Hohenstaufen division.
Schwere Panzer Kompanie ‘Hummel’ was sent to help the SS at Arnhem on 19 September. Although fourteen Tiger I tanks were despatched, part of the journey had to be completed by road and only two arrived in an operational condition. These two attacked Arnhem while the rest, once repaired, were sent over the bridge the following day to block Horrock’s 30th Corps.
Hohenstaufen SdKfz 250 half-track in action against the paras at oosterbeek.
Paras’ 75mm Pack Howitzer firing in defence of the shrinking oosterbeek perimeter. This weapon, plus the 6-pounder anti-tank gun and PIAT man-portable anti-tank weapon, provided the only defence against the panzers.
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506, which had been re-equipping with Tiger IIs in Germany, was despatched to Arnhem on 24 September 1944. one company was attached to Hohenstafen to assist in attacking those British paratroops still holding out in the oosterbeek pocket. A second company was sent to help the Frundsberg division south of the rhine at elst.
A Tiger II knocked out in oosterbeek on 25 September 1944; it took a 6-pounder anti-tank gun, a 75mm Pack Howitzer and a PIAT to finish it off. Fortunately this deterred the rest of the company from entering the pocket, otherwise a massacre could have occurred.
Another Tiger II destroyed during the fighting in the netherlands. Although well armed and well armoured, its bulk made it unwieldy.