After the failure of Hitler’s Autumn Mist offensive, it was widely assumed that the remaining tanks of ‘Sepp’ dietrich’s 6th SS Panzer Army would be withdrawn east to help fend off the red Army, which was encroaching over the Oder. Instead, much to his generals’ dismay, Hitler decided they would be sent to Hungary to spearhead an attack there.* The defence of Berlin fell to Himmler’s Army Group Vistula, which was cobbled together from the remains of two other army groups.
Deep down the Reichsführer-SS must have worried that the Waffen-SS’s glory days were behind them – the failure of his armoured divisions to gain victory in the Ardennes and Alsace had seen to that. Furthermore he must have been aware that he kept being sidelined and that his star within the Nazi hierarchy was waning.
The Soviet salient over the oder was to be pinched off by simultaneous attacks conducted by Himmler in Pomerania and General Schoerner in Silesia. rather optimistically, more than 1,200 panzers from the 3rd Panzer Army were earmarked for operation Solstice (Sonnenwende). even if such inflated numbers had been available, there were insufficient trains to move them and little or no fuel and ammunition. Also the 3rd Panzer Army was needed to hold the banks of the oder to the north of the strategic Seelow Heights, which dominated the approaches to Berlin.
Himmler’s attack was to be conducted by SS-obergruppenführer Felix Steiner’s newly created 11th SS Panzer Army, which consisted – on paper at least – of three corps. These included the Nordland, Nederland and Wallonien waffen-SS divisions that had originated in Scandinavia and the Low Countries. This operation was to be one of the last major German armoured offensives on the eastern Front and, like the attack in Hungary, was dominated by the SS.
Throughout January 1945 the 9th SS Panzer division conducted a fighting withdrawal to the German border. It was then sent to the Kaufenheim-Mayen area to be re-equipped before going on to Hungary. The 10th SS, which had also faithfully served the 2nd SS Panzer Corps throughout the normandy campaign, at Arnhem and the Ardennes offensive, was now detached from its sister division and sent to the Vistula sector. Its remaining thirty-eight Panzer IVs and fifty-three Panthers would not rejoin the 6th SS Panzer Army for Hitler’s forthcoming Hungarian offensive. Instead they would spearhead Himmler’s operation Solstice.
Other normandy SS veterans would also take part. Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 502 (formerly 102) was refitted at Sennelager, while the 503’s 1st Company moved to Bentfeld, the 2nd to eilsen and the 3rd to Hovelhof. The Panzer ersatz und Ausbildungs (training and replacement) Abteilung 500 at Paderborn provided muchneeded crews and between 19 and 22 September 1944 503 received forty-five new Tiger IIs. The following month it was shipped to Hungary and subordinated to the Feldhernhalle Panzer Corps and assisted in the futile defence of Budapest.
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 503 was back in Germany by January 1945. It was split in two, with one group sent to the Arnswalde-Pomerania area and the other to the Landsberg-Küstrin area. Arnswalde’s strategic position protecting Stargard and the sea port of Stettin meant that there was a strong German garrison defending the town. The first group under SS-obersturmbannführer Fritz Herzig, along with a panzer support battalion, 1,000 troops and 5,000 civilians, was trapped in Arnswalde on 4 February. Herzig’s Tiger II could have fought their way out but that would have meant abandoning everyone else to their fate. Three days later SS-Untersturmführer Fritz Kauerauf set out from Stargard with three Tiger IIs heading for Arnswalde via reetz. He then became involved with the 11th SS trying to stop the Soviet advance to the Baltic.
On 13 February Chief of the General Staff General Heinz Guderian, along with ‘Sepp’ dietrich, in conference with Hitler, advocated a pincer movement against the advancing Soviets in an attempt to keep open the German 2nd Army’s lines of communication between east Prussia and Pomerania. To the displeasure of Himmler, who also attended, the SS attack was to be directed by Army General walther wenck, Guderian’s second-in-command.
Guderian had great respect for the waffen-SS panzer divisions:
I fought with the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and with the SS division Das Reich: later as Inspector General of Armoured Troops, I visited numerous SS divisions. I can therefore assert that to my knowledge the SS divisions were always remarkable for a high standard of discipline, of esprit de corps, and conduct in the face of the enemy. They fought shoulder to shoulder with the panzer divisions of the Army, and the longer the war went on the less distinguishable they became from the Army.
Guderian felt that much of this professionalism was thanks to the work of former army general Paul Hausser. In contrast, he was not impressed by the reichsführer-SS, stating: ‘In military matters Himmler proved an immediate and total failure. His appreciation of our enemies was positively childish.’
Dietrich was aghast that his panzer army was being sent to Hungary; it made no sense in light of the imminent threat to Berlin. He also had a very personal reason to be against such a move, as his family were living near the oder. Later dietrich had them moved to safety at the nazi Ordensburg at Sonthofen but at the time he was very worried. Having said his piece, he remained sullen and hostile for the rest of the meeting, while Hitler and Guderian argued over appointing wenck as Himmler’s chief of staff.
Guderian had no confidence in Himmler’s own choice, General Heinz Lammerding, whom he considered merely a policeman and amateur divisional commander. Lammerding lasted as Himmler’s chief of staff for just two months. Before becoming a divisional commander at the age of 39, he had served as chief of staff of the 3rd SS Panzer division Totenkopf in russia. He now found himself packing, having been sacked.
Initially Hitler stated that Himmler was ‘man enough to carry out the attack on his own’, but after two hours of arguing turned to an embarrassed reichsführer-SS and said ‘Very well, Himmler, wenck is coming to you this evening and will take charge. The attack begins on the 15th.’
It was decided to relieve Arnswalde and attack in the Landsberg-Küstrin area. The 10th SS and half a dozen other waffen-SS divisions, serving with Steiner’s 39th Panzer, 3rd (Germanische) SS Panzer and 10th SS Army Corps, were to take part in the counter-attack on Marshal Georgi Zhukov’s advancing 1st Belorussian Front.
Himmler, regardless of the military situation, felt completely humiliated and retired to hospital at Hohenlychen. He knew that the waffen-SS had been taken away from him, and perhaps he also finally appreciated that he was not fit to command. From Hohenlychen he ‘bravely’ issued the order of the day exhorting the waffen-SS ‘Forward through the mud! Forward through the snow! Forward by day! Forward by night! Forward to the liberation of German soil!’ The truth was that Himmler had no actual military aptitude and had always been reliant on SS generals such as ‘willi’ Bittrich, ‘Sepp’ dietrich and Paul Hausser to secure his victories that impressed Hitler so much.
In the event, elements of just four weak SS ‘armoured’ divisions, comprising the 4th SS Polizei, the 11th SS Freiwilligen Panzergrenadier Nordland, the 23rd SS Panzergrenadier Nederland and the 10th SS Panzer, plus around four army divisions, were thrown into the short-lived attack on the 15th between Stargard and Arnswalde. The 4th SS had mainly been on security duties up to this point and the 10th SS was exhausted by the constant combat.
Nordland at the start of the year included a powerful armoured unit, the SS Panzer Battalion Herman von Salza, and was a well equipped full-strength division. After constant battles along the Baltic, it had been considerably weakened. Nederland was a paper division and only of brigade strength. Many of its men were lost when their transport ship Moira was sunk en route to danzig. Two SS grenadier divisions were also involved, including the 28th Wallonien. Between them these forces could muster fewer than 300 panzers and tank destroyers. Almost 10,000 infantry allocated to the operation were still en route from norway when Sonnenwende started.
Steiner’s so-called 11th SS Panzer Army, led by Nordland, initially made good progress on the first day, penetrating the Soviet envelopment of Arnswalde and rescuing the German garrison. The following day the rest of the 3rd (Germanische) SS Panzer Corps fought to enlarge the corridor. However, the panzers and the infantry were on their own as they had hardly any air cover from the Luftwaffe or artillery support. It was only a matter of time before the red Army and red Air Force recovered and responded.
Panzer Abteilung 503’s Tiger IIs were instrumental in holding the corridor open as the wounded and civilians were evacuated and fresh troops sent in. during the fighting in the danzig-Gotenhafen area Tigers of 503 destroyed sixty-four Soviet tanks, and Soviet troops were expelled from Brallentin and two villages. The Germans then cut into Marshal Bogdanov’s 2nd Tank Army to retake Pyritz. However, by this stage of the war the Tiger’s dominance of the battlefield was no longer assured.
The 11th SS Panzer Army’s short-lived success swiftly came to a halt in the face of the red Army’s superior firepower. Although the Tiger II was armed with an even more powerful 88mm gun than the Tiger I, the Joseph Stalin tank was more than a match for it. The IS-2 heavy tank carried a 122mm gun and the previous year had proved itself a worthy adversary for the Tiger. on one occasion the previous summer a force of eleven IS-2s mauled a force of fourteen Tiger IIs, destroying four and damaging another seven for the loss of three tanks and seven damaged.
The Tigers could do little once the 2nd Soviet Guards Tank Army brought up heavy Joseph Stalin tanks on 17 February. In addition, as the frost thawed, the ground began to turn to mud, which the wide tracks of the Soviet tanks were better able to cope with. on the same day wenck, returning from Hitler’s evening briefing, was injured in a car crash and the momentum of the operation was completely lost.
Steiner called off the assault, pulling his 3rd (Germanische) SS Panzer Corps back to the Stargard and Stettin area on the northern oder river. The few remaining panzers were moved to the oder front. The least damaged unit, the 4th SS Polizei Panzergrenadier division, was shipped by sea to help in the defence of danzig before being sent to Berlin.
By the 19th the red Army had recaptured Arnswalde, surrounded Graudenze and destroyed the German base at Stargard. The ill-conceived operation Sonnenwende cost Himmler’s Army Group Vistula considerable casualties among the few SS divisions that could still be relied on to conduct organised counter-attacks. In reality this attack was little more than a nuisance to the red Army. Hitler and Himmler achieved nothing save grinding down those few units still capable of conducting offensive operations on the eastern Front. For the forthcoming battle of Berlin the discredited reichsführer-SS found himself replaced by Colonel-General Gotthard Heinrici as the commander of Army Group Vistula.
Nonetheless, the Stargard operation caused enough alarm in the red Army for them to halt the main offensive towards Berlin, and they lost some six valuable weeks while they cleared Pomerania of enemy forces. Steiner’s actions at Arnswalde also convinced Hitler that he was the man to rescue Berlin in late April 1945 – but Steiner, with just 11,000 men, refused to obey orders, much to Hitler’s fury. After the failure of dietrich’s 6th SS Panzer Army in the Ardennes and Hungary, in Hitler’s mind Steiner’s insubordination was the final betrayal by the waffen-SS. The Führer even threatened Steiner with death but it did no good: Steiner’s loyalty was to his surviving men.
At the end of 1944 Himmler found himself CinC Army Group Upper rhine. This appointment was designed to stop him meddling with the Ardennes offensive. Instead he conducted operation northwind in Alsace, using the 10th SS Panzer division Frundsberg and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier division Götz von Berlichingen.
Frundsberg Panther Ausf Gs in winter camouflage in Alsace. These tanks seem to have a very dark base colour, and there is some indication that dunkel grau was reintroduced in late 1944 for front-line armour. Himmler’s attack in mid-January 1945 achieved limited success before losing momentum, and had no impact on the Battle of the Bulge.
Another Panther moving through concrete dragon’s teeth forming part of the Siegfried Line or westwall for the attack in Alsace. It has the same zig-zag whitewash winter camouflage.
A burning SdKfz 251 lost in the fighting during the winter of 1944/45. It still has its summer/autumn camouflage scheme. Most of the waffen-SS vehicles used in the Ardennes and Alsace operations were not whitewashed.
Whitewashed StuG III assault guns belonging to the Wiking division on their way from warsaw to Budapest to take part in Hitler’s Hungarian offensive in early 1945. After the Ardennes, it was anticipated that dietrich’s 6th SS Panzer Army would be sent to hold the oder but instead it was deployed to Hungary.
Totenkopf SS panzergrenadiers in winter parkas, with an SdKfz 251 and amphibious Schimmwagen, photographed in January 1945 during the fighting in Hungary to relieve the trapped Budapest garrison.
Late in the war SdKfz 251/22 consisted of the 251 half-track armed with the PaK40 75mm anti-tank gun. These were built on Hitler’s orders in a desperate attempt to provide as many self-propelled anti-tank guns as possible. They were issued to the panzer divisions in 1945 with nine sent to the panzerjäger detachments, three to the reconnaissance detachments and six to the gun platoons. This example has an army prefaced number plate.
In mid-February 1945 Felix Steiner’s so-called 11th SS Panzer Army, consisting of half a dozen waffen-SS divisions, was thrown into a counterattack (operation Solstice) against the red Army to relieve German forces trapped at Arnswalde.
Another Panther Ausf G in winter camouflage very similar to that used by the Frundsberg division. It has the late war gun mantlet with the flat lower edge shot deflector. Steiner’s attack involved four SS armoured divisions including the Frundsberg.
Heinz Harmel, commander of the Frundsberg division, photographed in February 1945. To his left is otto Paesh, commander of SS Panzer regiment 10, and on his right Karl-Heinz euling, one of his SS panzergrenadier regimental commanders.
Panthers and tank riders moving up for the attack. Steiner’s six SS divisions could muster fewer than 300 panzers on 15 February 1945 but they managed to reach Arnswalde.
Tiger IIs from Schwere Panzer Abteilung 503 were instrumental in holding open the corridor to Arnswalde, but not many were available.
Three days after operation Solstice commenced, the red Army committed its powerful IS-2 heavy tanks. Armed with a massive 122mm gun, these were able to combat the Tiger II. Steiner had no option but to pull back his 11th SS Panzer Army, and Arnswalde and Stargard were lost.
Leibstandarte half-tracks in Hungary during Hitler’s ill-fated operation Spring Awakening, conducted in March 1945. This was the final defeat for the waffen-SS.
A pair of wrecked Panzer IVs that seem to have been cannibalised for spare parts, including road wheels and drive sprockets. operation Solstice, like the attacks in the Ardennes and in Hungary, achieved little other than to weaken the waffen-SS even further and hasten the end of the war.
* For more on this operation, see the author’s The Battle for Budapest 1944-45, also published by Pen & Sword Military.