However, despite Ludendorff ’s optimism and weight of resources, the Fifth Army line did not break. It may have fractured occasionally and been twisted beyond recognition in others, but the patchy defence of 21 March, bolstered by the French in the south and an influx of reserves from the north, increasingly held firm and at Rosières on 27 March the German assault suffered its first major setback. Ludendorff ’s indistinct strategic priorities and the lightening success of the first two days saw the initial objectives of rolling up the British line to the north redirected into a drive on Amiens to separate the French and British armies. In creating a huge salient which incorporated much of the ground his armies had laid to waste in 1917, he in fact laid the foundations for the successful Allied attack which came five moths later.

On paper the March offensive should have crushed the British. It did not and ran out of steam as more and more men were pushed into the south at the expense of those in the centre and north. This betrayal of the original battle plan was the Achilles heel that ultimately broke the back of German aspirations; Ludendorff had expected to break clean through the British defences on the first day, an objective that was only really achieved in the III Corps sector where the line of the Crozat Canal was used as a fall back position. Elsewhere the Battle Zone had largely held – albeit rather tenuously in places – and the expected encirclement of the Flesquières salient had not taken place. The Fifth Army may have fallen back in some disarray but the disappointing first day for the Germans had already made huge inroads into men and resources that could not be replaced, circumstances that were set to continue over the coming weeks. It may have been a period of great uncertainty for the British but in reality the March offensive was doomed from the start.