Chapter 6

The Forlorn Hope

Lance Corporal Sayer showed throughout the utmost contempt for danger and the enemy – he inspired everyone by his conduct, and by his actions undoubtedly enabled my post to hold out as long as it did for nearly two hours, that is until just before the mist rose about 12 noon.

Lieutenant Claude Piesse at Shepherd’s Copse

The XIX Corps sector was contained by the two river valleys, the Omignon in the south and that of the Cologne to the north which joined the Somme at Péronne. To defend the five miles of front line Lieutenant General Herbert Watts had two infantry divisions; Major General Arthur Daly commanded the 24th Division and Major General Neil Malcolm the 66th. The undulating nature of the XIX sector was both suited for defensive action and, as it turned out, offensive action, the same valleys on which the British had constructed their defences served to provide cover for the assaulting German infantry under the cloak of dense fog.

The British defences in the south of the sector, where no man’s land was at its widest, were less well developed than that of the north. In the southern two thirds the Forward Zone took the form of isolated posts which were designed to be supported by machine-gun nests. This differed from the north of the sector where the narrower no man’s land was faced by a more substantial three-line trench system. The Battle Zone took the form of a front line with four strongly defended areas: Vadancourt, Le Verguier, Jeancourt and Templeux le Guérard.

Bordering the 61st Division on the right flank were the swampy reaches of the River Omignon, a wide river valley which neatly divided the two battalions in the Forward Zone. Battalion rotation on 18 March had placed the 8th Battalion Royal West Kents (8/RWK) north of the river and the 1st Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment (1/North Staffs) to the south. A trestle bridge between Vadancourt and Maissemy – where the North Staffs had their headquarters – and another similar construction at Bihecourt were the only crossing points across the river valley. The Omignon valley was also the boundary between two German Armies – von Hutier’s Eighteenth and von der Marwitz’s Second; thus north of the river the first waves of the German 208th and 4th Guard Divisions were poised to attack the left of the British 24th Division, while to the south, the 113th Division’s objectives would bring them up against the North Staffs and Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell McTaggart’s 1/5 Gordon Highlanders around Fresnoy-le-Petit.

The Staffs established their HQ at the Essling Redoubt which was dug into a slope on the D735 running south from Maissemy towards the St Quentin road. Arriving in the line three days previously the battalion was dismayed to be told they were to defend a sector from Gricourt to Pontruet. Alarm bells began ringing when the forward defences were found to be in a poor state as most of the work had been concentrated on the Essling Redoubt. Although Major General Daly felt the battalion had done all it could to improve the defences, he was ‘not at all happy about them’. The French had done little to strengthen the position and the defence depended on interlocking machine-gun fire. ‘I remember telling the OC [Lieutenant Colonel Vyvyan Pope] that it looked as if his battalion were liable to be overrun at an early stage.’ Presumably Pope kept the divisional commander’s opinion to himself!

Fortunately progress across the river, where 8/RWK had established its headquarters on a ridge of high ground amongst the ruins of Vadancourt Château, was further advanced. In command of the battalion was Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Wenyon, a former private soldier whose leadership qualities were recognised with his promotion to second lieutenant in October 1915. Command of a company soon followed as did the award of the DSO in 1917. Promotion to lieutenant colonel and command of the West Kents came a mere three months later. In addition to Headquarters Company and Colonel Wenyon, the redoubt defences held the men of A and C Companies who manned the numerous posts around the ruins of the château. It was unquestionably a strongly fortified position, commanding good fields of fire and with wide views across the valley that formed no man’s land.

From Vadancourt the old Roman road – known as Watling Street – ran northeast towards Riqueval and the St Quentin Canal. Approximately half-a-mile along Watling Street – now the D33 – lies Cooker’s Quarry, which formed part of the sector held by the 3rd Rifle Brigade (3/RB), running from Ascension Farm in the north to the line of Watling Street in the south. Commanding the Rifle Brigade was Lieutenant Colonel Edward Kewley who, after deploying B Company to the outpost line, established battalion headquarters in Caubrières Wood. A and D Companies were in reserve at Vadancourt and C Company were at Cooker’s Quarry.

The opening bombardment on XIX Corps was as devastating and continuous as it was further south and, as Lieutenant Colonel Pope, commanding the North Staffs, had expected, all communication with his forward companies was immediately severed leaving him little option but to employ runners to reach his outpost line. Pope’s personal account unfortunately sheds no light on the action in the redoubt itself:

‘The visibility was now about twenty yards but provided my flanks were secure, I thought we could give a good account of ourselves. On the left flank there was a gap between headquarters and C Company, but I had posted a machine gun to cover that and the ground between was open. On the right was a dangerous re-entrant, but the Argylls would see to that. I walked round the line and told the men what to expect. All the shelling of our trench had now ceased and the men were generally cool and confident. When I reached our right, however, I found nobody had seen anything of the Argylls.’¹

Pope’s concern was the re-entrant on his right flank which, if compromised would result in the battalion being outflanked and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were an essential part of this defence:

‘ I told [Captain William Stamer, Battalion Adjutant] I was going to find the Argylls … Stamer did not view this suggestion with any great favour and asked me whether they were to hold on to the last if attacked. ‘I shall be back long before that can happen,’ I replied, ‘but if things do go wrong I don’t want you to uselessly throw away the men’s lives.’²

Pope did not get far before he heard firing coming from the direction of the redoubt. In trying to regain his headquarters he blundered into a small group of German infantry; opening fire with his rifle he hit the leading soldier but was wounded himself by the second man whose shot shattered his elbow. Pope was now out of the frame as far as the fighting was concerned but fortunately managed to reach a dressing station before he passed out. As for the Staffs they did hold out until they were overrun and we are told as few as thirty NCOs and men managed to escape.

German infantry were now advancing up the road from Maissemy towards Vadancourt and Wenyon gave the order for the bridges over the Omignon to be blown. Lieutenant Arthur Fairbourn and his section of 103/Field Company Sappers duly obliged, blowing both bridges before heading to Vermand where three more crossing points had been prepared for demolition. Fairbourn’s work had provided some protection to the West Kent’s right flank but as visibility improved German infantry were seen in occupation of the ridge in front of Vadancourt. Confirmation that Mareval and Pontru Trenches had been taken arrived with several wounded men from B Company who came into the battalion dressing station. An account written after the war by the company commander, Captain Charles Allworth provided a little more detail:

‘During the bombardment … I decided to go up and visit the forward platoons; my runner accompanied me. We had left the trench and proceeded about 200 yards, when two Germans appeared out of the mist, one was a wounded man and the other a medical orderly or a stretcher bearer … this was our first indication that the enemy had attacked. The enemy had occupied Pontru village and all the foremost positions. About 8.30am they attacked our line (Pontru and Mareval Trench). The wire in front of the trench had been untouched by the bombardment and owing to our Lewis gun and rifle fire they failed to get through it. The enemy then brought up a machine gun on the flank bridge across the Omignon, this was put out of action at once by our right Lewis gun. They then brought up another gun and owing to a jam in our Lewis gun, put our team out of action. A number of the enemy came down the banks of the stream and occupied the right of Pontru Trench. We attempted to bomb them out, but they got round in the rear of the trench, and we had a rather exciting retreat down the trench to Company Headquarters, where we established a block.’³

German infantry were also advancing down the road from Bellenglise which provided Allworth and his men with plenty of targets to shoot at, at the same moment a machine gun from Cooker’s Quarry also opened up on the advancing infantry which, had the West Kent’s not run out of ammunition, would have caused even greater damage than it did. At this, with discretion being the greater part of valour, Allworth ordered what was left of B Company to retire. ‘We then, with fixed bayonets, got out of the trench and attempted to get back to the battalion’s main positions, but we ran into large numbers of Germans and were overpowered.’ Taken prisoner with his men, Allworth had the opportunity to take a little more notice of what was going on around him. ‘The effrontery of the enemy was astounding. He was marking out the line of his advance with white flags, and far in the rear the forward movement of battalions with full transport could be seen in all directions.’ But with the swampy ground of the Omignon forcing the assaulting infantry to use Watling Street, C Company of the 3/Rifle Brigade at Cooker’s Quarry now stood in their way.

The situation was now critical. Units of the German 113th Division were advancing through Maissemy towards Vermand and in the process had outflanked the West Kents who were holding on at Vadancourt on the north bank of the Omignon. Unless the Rifle Brigade could remain intact on the left flank, Vadencourt would become untenable and the West Kents would be in serious trouble. Even so it was a situation that could have only one outcome, the question facing Major General Daly was straightforward: just how long could these two battalions hold back the two German Guard Divisions facing them? With the inevitability of retreat in mind he ordered Lieutenant Fairbourn and his sappers to blow the bridges at Vermand and Captain Archibald Thorburn of 259/Field Company to destroy the two trestle bridges at Caulaincourt.

The Rifle Brigade positions had suffered considerably from enemy shellfire, particularly as the forward posts had not been completed and many of the trenches were too shallow. Lieutenant Colonel Kewley’s account pulled no punches. ‘This line was a peculiarly bad line consisting of a system of carriage drives (ie very broad trenches only a few feet deep which were no protection from any sort of fire.’ Kewley’s thinking was along the same lines as his divisional commander:

‘On our northern or left flank the Queen’s [Royal West Surrey Regiment] were putting up a great fight and were holding their own. On our southern flank the enemy appeared to be gaining ground. Our artillery had by now brought a fire on the portion of trench by Dean Copse which the enemy were holding … At the same time the situation was black; there was that nasty gap in the centre, reinforcements did not arrive, the right flank had a very unpleasant appearance and it was doubtful how long Cooker’s Quarry could hold out. It became a race for time, if we could stick it till dark something might be done.’⁴

Despite a truly magnificent defence the Cooker’s garrison fell just before dark but by holding out as long as they did enemy movement along Watling Street was severely disrupted. An earlier message from the quarry saying they were completely surrounded had made Colonel Kewley very much aware of the precarious nature of C Company’s position and it was no surprise when, at 7.00pm, a runner arrived with a message from Captain Thomas Fenner to the effect that the quarry had fallen and Fenner and his garrison had retired to Vadancourt. Thus, as darkness fell it was touch and go as to who would arrive first, the Germans or reinforcements. Fortunately it was the latter and new positions were organised on a line running from Bihecourt to just west of Caubrières Wood to Le Verguier.

Now in danger of being completely outflanked and surrounded himself, Lieutenant Colonel Wenyon gave orders for his battalion to retire:

‘At 8.30pm it was decided that we would make an attempt to withdraw under the cover of darkness to the Brown Line at Bihecourt, some 600 yards behind. This was no easy matter … a strong rearguard was organised, and took up positions on the threatened flank [right flank]. Lieutenant [Ernest] Goulden, Second Lieutenant Pfeuffar and Second Lieutenant Tiley, with a number of men with four Lewis guns formed the guard, and they set up a powerful demonstration of fire for nearly an hour … Four Vickers guns and teams also remained behind under the command of Second Lieutenant Peachy of the 24th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion. The rearguard got back about 10.00pm and thanks to their work, we achieved almost a miracle in getting back without a single casualty.’⁵

Senior officer casualties in the division had been relatively high on 21 March. Apart from Colonel Pope of the Staffs, 38-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence, commanding the 9th Battalion East Surrey Regiment (9/East Surreys) had been killed in the afternoon near Villecholles. Moving swiftly to restore some resemblance of order to the line, Daly placed Lieutenant Colonel Wenyon in command of forces north of the Omignon and Colonel Rowland Anderson, who had arrived with units of the 1st Cavalry Division as reinforcements, found himself commanding forces south of the river.

Anderson established his headquarters first at Villecholles and then on the mound in the centre of Vermand. Under no illusion as to the seriousness of his position he gave orders for the line which ran in front of Villecholes to Mount Houette Wood to be strengthened. Beyond the wood the line was continued by the 61st Division. The wood was held by C Squadron, 11th Hussars and some of the 9/East Surreys, a little to the west of the wood B Squadron 11th Hussars linked up with the East Surreys on the Villecholles-Maissemy road. To the south of the wood and running up a slope, lay the defences of Spooner Redoubt which was held by a collection of units which included some East Surreys, Hussars and the 1/8th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from 183 Brigade, one company of whom occupied a forward position on front of the redoubt. It may well have been from this position that Second Lieutenant John Buchan won his Victoria Cross: refusing calls for surrender he was last seen surrounded by the enemy but still fighting. Sadly the award was posthumous as Buchan died of his wounds the next day.⁶ Although the redoubt was protected by wire on all sides, the trenches were by no means completed and at two feet deep offered little protection from shell and bullet.

The morning of 22 March was similar to the previous day; a dense mist covered the ground concealing any movements the enemy might be making. The first indication of the impending attack came as German gunners began searching for the position with high explosive, during which time a company of the 19th Entrenching Battalion arrived to reinforce the line with Lieutenant Eugene Rivière. The shelling, which continued for an hour or so, fortunately lacked accuracy and very few landed in the trenches. But Spooner Redoubt soon came under attack:

‘Looking up I saw in the fog a small group of men, about six in number, come up to the wire and lie down in front of it. ‘Don’t shoot!’ I yelled, thinking that it might be the company of Argylls trying to come back. At that moment one of the group stood up and I saw it was a Boche; he was an enormous man wearing a steel helmet; from his belt he drew out a bomb, pulled the string, flung it into the wire and fell back dead. Our men, without waiting for further orders had opened fire, the bomber and his section were riddled with bullets and lay writhing on the ground. And then rising up from the earth, they had crawled up unobserved in the long grass, appeared hundreds upon hundreds of Boches, all making for the wire, some throwing bombs, and others trying to cut it with nippers. With a roar our machine guns and Hotchkiss guns opened fire, and the men yelling, cursing and swearing jumped onto the parapet and shot for their lives. The enemy were swept down like grass under a scythe, but there were always more to take their places and they too met the same fate. Nothing that moved was allowed to live.’⁷

Three attacks were dealt with in a similar fashion by the men at Spooner Redoubt during which Major Robert Moir, commanding the Argylls was reported to have walked up and down the redoubt encouraging his men, ‘his magnificent leadership was an inspiring example to all the troops in this part of the line’ wrote Lumley. The situation was not improved by an all round shortage of ammunition and a classic situation of friendly fire. British gunners, perhaps alarmed at the reports from stragglers that the Germans had overrun Spooner Redoubt, opened fire on the redoubt with considerably more accuracy than the German barrage had managed. Lawrence Lumley was horrified, ‘I came upon a trench only about two foot deep: it was full of men from every kind of unit and many were wounded.’ In one of those awful accidents of war the position was under artillery fire from both sides, one shell actually passed underneath Captain Luke White’s arm as he was leaning against the entrance to a dug-out, fortunately it was a dud! Lumley was wounded soon after, although he is loyal enough not to blame the British gunners.

At 11.40pm the hand of fate dealt the men at Spooner Redoubt and Mount Houette Wood a lifeline. Under the impression they were going to have to fight it out until the last man they now received orders from Anderson to retire. Retirement under fire is always a hazardous operation but in this case it was doubly so. German infantry were closing in on both flanks and although they had been largely beaten off on the eastern side they were still within 200 yards of the line. It was a recipe for chaos. Given that the line was manned by remnants of units which included East Surreys, Sherwood Foresters, Argylls and 11/ Hussars, some of which were without their officers and senior NCOs, it was little wonder that once retirement was seen to be taking place, everyone wanted to go at the same time. Lumley is convinced that ‘the order to retire had reached the left of the 61st Division about the same time as that of the 24th Division’, which he felt was partly responsible for the confusion.

Fortunately good sense prevailed. Captain White ordered the Hussars to stand fast and engage the enemy who were by this time bringing up machine guns and pouring a deadly fire down on the crowd of men who were heading for the gap in the Spooner Redoubt wire. Discipline had vanished in the panic to reach safety and escape the German machine guns. But then, as Lawrence Lumley watched, order was restored:

‘Whether one man or several were responsible, is not known. What is certain is that as he came calmly through the gap in the wire, the hoarse voice of Major Moir of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was heard shouting, ‘Stand fast – the Argylls’. Other officers took up the cry. In a moment the scene changed. Instead of a crown of disorganised fugitives, the slope became dotted with small groups of men who had collected round their officers; they formed into ranks and even when shells ploughed through them they took extended order as if on parade and lay down and fired at the enemy … For the few who witnessed this scene it was a sight so dramatic in its sudden change and so reassuring as to remain one of the most striking memories of the war.’⁸

Despite being wounded, Lawrence Lumley managed to escape capture, thanks to the efforts of Sergeant William Turner. Captain White and the 11th Hussars retired along the southern bank of the river to Villeveque where they joined 183 Brigade.

* * *

When the 8/Queen’s relieved the 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers in the Le Verguier sector on 18 March 1918, their commanding officer was 32-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Peirs. A graduate of New College, Oxford and a solicitor in civilian life, Peirs was typical of the professional class who in 1914 answered the call of duty, placed their former lives on hold and took up the mantle of soldiering. By the end of 1917 his courage and leadership on the battlefield had been rewarded with promotion to major and the award of a DSO and bar, further acknowledgment came on 3 March with the long overdue command of a battalion. The 8/Queen’s were at Montecourt when Peirs took command which left precious little time for training before the inevitable move back to the front line. Fortune dictated the Queen’s were to occupy the Forward Zone.

The Queen’s positions were dictated to a large extent by the shallow valley which ran from Le Verguier to Villeret, command of the valley would severely disrupt any potential threat by attacking infantry. Accordingly C Company took up commanding positions in and around Shepherd’s Copse and A Company held the posts around Graham Post. These posts would be directly in the path of any attack. Shepherd’s Copse stands on a bend of the D57, just east of the Bois du Roi and on the eastern edge of the Vallée à Facon. It was here at Shepherd’s Post that Lieutenant Claude Piesse was in command of C Company headquarters. A little further to the east the remainder of C Company occupied the forward posts which went under the names of Goat, Sheep, Lamb and Ewe Posts. Each of these posts was connected by a communication trench which formed a junction at Shepherd’s Post.

On the opposite flank and holding the more isolated posts around and south of Grand Priel Farm was A Company. These posts, some of which assumed names such as Ding, Dong, Dick and Jim, were unconnected and in the swirling fog of the morning of 21 March those A Company men occupying these posts must have felt as if they were on another planet altogether.

Although shelling of Le Verguier had commenced before the attacks on the outposts began, the German assault on the village defences did not begin until well after midday. The only possible explanation for such a delay is the hold-up at Shepherd’s Copse. Hugh Peirs was not slow to recognise the tactical importance of his forward companies and the effect their action had on his own positions around Le Verguier:

‘I think our ability to defend the place [Le Verguier] during the 21st March was very largely due to the officers and men in the forward posts who, though surrounded, were undefeated for many hours, by which time we could see to shoot.’⁹

The defence of Shepherd’s Copse and the subsequent award of the Victoria Cross to 38-year-old Lance Corporal John Sayer have only recently received the recognition it deserved. Incredibly the history of the regiment fails to mention the action and it was only through the tireless efforts of Claude Piesse and Hugh Peirs that Sayer’s bravery was eventually recognised. There is little doubt that the action of the men in the Queen’s two forward companies significantly delayed the German assault from the northeast and it is only through Claude Piesse’s account of the fight at Shepherd’s Copse that we are able to grasp the precarious and desperate nature of the action as the main thrust of the enemy assault came along the Vallée à Facon. Clearly unhappy with the physical positioning of his post, Piesse was in command of the C Company advanced outposts:

‘At 4.30am the enemy started a very severe bombardment with high explosive and shrapnel, which lasted until 10.00am. At this hour L/C Sayer in charge of a small party was returning to Coy [Company] HQ and had just reached the post when the enemy attacked simultaneously from both sides. Thick mist prevented visibility at more than thirty yards. L/C Sayer at once seized the junction of two communication trenches about 20 yards southeast from my post: a position which commanded the approach from the east – this position had been previously noted by me, but having a permanent garrison of only 4 men and 1 NCO, I was unable to make arrangements to occupy it. L/C Sayer held this position for nearly two hours against all attacks of the much stronger enemy, defending it by bayonet and rifle with almost incredible bravery. One German was bayoneted in the trench and died at his feet. Later, on several occasions, by his constant resolute attitude and ability to use his rifle and bayonet, he single handed caused the breakdown of several attacks on the trench. I personally saw him kill several of the enemy and when the fight was over and I was being taken back as a wounded prisoner, I made note that about this place there were six dead Germans, who I most certainly believe were killed by L/C Sayer.’¹⁰

John Sayer was a married man with six children when he enlisted in July 1916 and by the time he fought his last battle at Shepherd’s Copse he was, by the standards of the day, a relatively experienced soldier, having been in France since December 1916. He would of course have had no idea that his actions and those around him would have such a marked effect on the defence of Le Verguier. Even Hugh Peirs would not be in possession of the full facts until after the war when he and Claude Piesse were able to piece the whole story of the day together, a story that Piesse tells us ended not with surrender but with his tiny garrison being overpowered:

‘Three quarters of the garrison were killed, the enemy finally rushed the post, 5 wounded men being made prisoner, one of whom was L/C Sayer; at the time unconscious from a bad wound which necessitated the amputation of a leg and a short time after caused his death at Le Cateau.’¹¹

Piesse later wrote that he ‘was out before the end, but the Red Cross stretcher bearer told me he was the only man standing when the enemy finally got into the trench.’

With the forward companies gone, the attack focused on Le Verguier which by now had become a salient projecting into enemy-held territory as the battalions on either side retired in the face of heavy attacks. Peirs estimated that the enemy was ‘well past Villeret and well towards Jeancourt by 2.00pm’. Late in the afternoon the village again came under a sustained attack, this time from three sides which the beleaguered Queen’s held off very successfully with rifle and Lewis gun fire. At 7.00pm, having failed to enter the village, the enemy infantry deferred to the artillery which kept up a bombardment through most of the night. At 9.30am on 22 March, with the village under a determined assault, Peirs, this time using the fog to his own advantage, ordered a retirement. It was a decision that he had grappled with since the previous day:

‘Speaking for myself I had considerable doubts at Le Verguier in ordering a retirement. We were in a fog and nearly surrounded and incidentally, quite defenceless and it weighed considerably with me whether I might get out with the two companies I still had and save them for another day or wait and chance my luck. I chose the former alternative, but I very much doubt whether I should have done so had I been a regular soldier with my career dependent on my obeying orders.’¹²

Piers had made the correct choice and only one man was wounded in the hand as the remnants of the battalion withdrew.

On the 66th Division frontage the first waves of the German 25th and 208th Divisions soon broke through the Forward Zone from Grand Priel Woods in the south to Templeux le Guérard in the Cologne valley. The initial German attack quickly cut through the Forward Zone posts, the 4th Battalion East Lancashires – dug in in front of Hargicourt – were dealt with swiftly by an attack which took them in both flanks while the 2/8th Lancashire Fusiliers, to the north of Hargicourt, received similar treatment. By 10.30am, with the fog lifting, the German infantry were on the forward edge of the Battle Zone. Half-an-hour later they broke into the Battle Zone at Brosse Wood – the junction of the 24th and 66th Divisions. Here the advance was checked temporarily by a company of 2/7 Manchesters. Interestingly, Captain Richard Bond, the 199 Brigade Major, recalls a conversation that took place on 20 March between Brigadier General Guy Williams and divisional headquarters that highlighted the difficulties experienced by commanders in the front line in communicating with divisional staff. The brigadier – in the light of the warning of an imminent enemy attack – apparently wanted to bring the 2/7 Manchesters forward to their battle positions; his request was refused. In the event the battalion was faced with ‘a five-hour move in gas masks under an intense bombardment before reaching its position in the line’. Bond remains convinced that had the reserve battalions been brought up the night before the attack ‘we should have put up a better show … and given more support to the 17th Brigade in Le Verguier’.¹³

Major Neil Baillie-Hamilton of the 2/7th recalled it was necessary to leave the roads and valleys and move along the spurs using a map and compass. Gas masks had to be worn during the whole march except for a rest of a minute now and again when the Medical Officer said they could be removed for a breather. Baillie-Hamilton established Headquarters Company with one rifle company under the command of Captain John Brown just north of Brosse Woods:

‘About 1.00pm the attack dwindled and aeroplanes showed our position by dropping lights over it, this was followed by 10 minutes intense shelling and the attack was renewed. Communication with Brigade and Division could not be obtained so at 3.00pm the Fuller Phone was broken up. At 4.00pm pigeons were dispatched to say we hoped to hang on till night and then withdraw under cover of darkness. At 5.00pm Captain Brown who had been keeping the enemy off with bombs for hours was killed. Shortly afterwards the supply of bombs was finished. Soon after 5.00pm the only Lewis gun still working jammed.’¹⁴

With stocks of ammunition practically exhausted and 70 per cent casualties amongst the garrison, Baillie-Hamilton surrendered: ‘I walked out and informed the enemy that we surrendered.’ As to the fate of the other companies, we can only assume they were overwhelmed in the fog, as no survivors’ reports have come to light to date.

Holding on a little to the north around Fervague Farm, the 2/6 Manchesters remained in position for several hours until forced back at 1.00pm by Flammenwerfer attacks. Fighting with the Manchesters, Private Charles Martin recalled the final moments before he was taken prisoner:

‘I saw, a little distance away, a sergeant and some men climb out of the trench with their hands up. I tried to escape along the trench but the way through was blocked by dead bodies … when I turned in the opposite direction, I saw two German soldiers approaching, spraying the trench ahead with liquid fire. One held the nozzle and the other had the cylinder on his back.’¹⁵

Twelve officers and 150 other ranks was all that remained of the battalion as they fell back to Carpeza Copse. Here, under the command of Major John Whitworth, they held on doggedly until 2.00pm on 22 March before finally falling back to Hebescourt. Captain Gilbert Fox, the battalion adjutant, remembered the enemy machine-gun fire at Carpeza Copse being particularly heavy:

‘And under cover of this he [the Germans] made several attacks on the copse, but we eventually managed to hold the same until reinforced by a detachment of dismounted cavalry, about 6.00pm. Throughout the day touch was lost with the unit on our right and repeated efforts failed to connect up. However, by means of B Company (in reserve at Hervilly Wood) being sent up to fill a gap, our left flank was secured. Casualties were heavy, but after dusk, with our reinforcements, we consolidated the position. Contact with troops on our right flank was found impossible, though several efforts were made. During the early morning [22 March] touch was lost with B Company and a gap was created on the frontage occupied by this company, thus leaving us as an isolated post.’¹⁶

The retirement was made under cover of the fog, Gilbert Fox’s reference to bouts of hand-to-hand fighting with groups of Germans ‘who had come through the gap on our right and also on our left’ providing the only clue to the desperate nature of the withdrawal. John Whitworth received the DSO for his command of the battalion at Carpeza Copse.

It was not quite a disaster along this front as the Battle Zone was still for the most part intact but it was only a matter of time before sustained pressure, between Hargicourt and the left-hand divisional boundary along the Cologne valley, broke the front defences of the Battle Zone. The quarries northeast of Templeux le Guérard had been isolated early on in the morning with German infantry apparently satisfied with keeping the garrison under a heavy barrage of machine-gun fire while passing on either side, intent on taking the more important Templeux le Guérard village itself. The quarries stood on the southern edge of the Cologne valley and were held by two-and-a-half companies of 2/7 Lancashire Fusiliers and two companies of 1/5 Border Regiment. Machine-gun fire from the Lempire ridge at 10.45am was the first indication Captain Oswin Feetham had that the Forward Zone had been pierced:

‘Apart from desultory shelling and sniping afterwards we were left alone until later in the day, although we could see German troops passing down the valley opposite Ronssoy Woods and the valley running from Hargicourt. About 1 o’clock from the top of the slag heap we watched the Germans attack Fervaque Farm … Our battalion dressing station in Templeux le Guérard was taken about 1pm and the MO compelled to attend German wounded.’¹⁷

Feetham was in command of the two companies of 5/Borderers and although they kept up a rapid fire on the advancing German infantry which he notes was ‘most excellent shooting’, they were conscious that the hoards of enemy now pouring over the crest from Hargicourt on the way to Templeux village had practically cut off any chance of escape:

‘At 3pm the Germans brought up some heavy minenwerfers which completely destroyed our battle positions, and at the same time, they effected an entrance in the north end of the quarry tunnels. About five o’clock we surrendered. Approximately 60 men being available out of a total garrison of 450’.¹⁸

Oswin Feetham may well have been the officer mentioned by Karl Goes as Leutnant öller and the men of 7th Kompanie from IR 31 finally overcame British resistance in the Hargicourt quarries:

‘Out of nowhere 30 English and their officer stand right in front of them. A short conversation in the face of imminent captivity ends with an urgent remark by the Leutnant: ‘The quarry’s garrison is doomed. The Germans are already in Templeux, way behind your back sir!’ The English officer pulls a wry face, he and his men lay down their weapons, other parties following the example, the resistance in the quarry fades away.’¹⁹

The attack now centred on Templeux le Guérard. The battle positions allocated to the 2/6 Lancashire Fusiliers were a line of trenches to the north of the Roisel-Templeux road, a position they immediately moved to when the bombardment began. ‘The fog began to thicken and get worse as we neared the ridge,’ recalled the battalion adjutant, Captain Leslie Robinson, a situation which was not improved by the occasional German shell that burst along the road. The fog was so dense in places that one of the Headquarters Company runners, Private William Harrop, felt it necessary to grope his way to the line maintaining touch by ‘each man holding onto the bayonet scabbard of the man in front’. It was not the best of circumstances in which to go into battle. But despite the adverse weather conditions and being on the receiving end of enemy shelling, three companies of the battalion were in position at 6.00am. The German bombardment would have been less effective had the German gunners not had their exact co-ordinates and the trenches themselves been dug a little deeper. One direct hit took out most of the headquarters signallers and blew the signalling officer and the commanding officer ‘a considerable distance.’