Once the fog began to lift, the steady stream of casualties coming down the road from Templeux and the sight of German infantry and gunners on the ridge beyond the quarries meant one thing only: the Forward Zone had ‘gone’ and the 2/6th would soon be joining the fight. But as Robinson pointed out, what was more worrying was the obvious enemy advance taking place on the left flank. ‘We could see the enemy advancing in quite large numbers, almost between ourselves and Épehy; the division on our left [16th Irish Division] had gone too.’ If Major William Cuncliffe’s observation of enemy troops at Grand Priel Wood at 10.30am was at all accurate they were already outflanked.

Cuncliffe’s observation point was the top of the Templeux Quarry ridge where he and his gunners had managed to get B Battery, 330 Artillery Brigade (B/330) to new positions. In full view of the enemy, the B/330 gunners maintained a steady shrapnel fire on the advancing troops of the 113th Reserve Division who continued to ‘work away to our left all morning’. Cuncliffe sited four of his 18-pounders in the bank at a position known as Brosse II and detached one section 200 yards to his left. Despite the fact that this allowed a very effective crossfire to be maintained Cuncliffe must have realized he had very little chance of getting away once the German attack focused on his battery :

‘The position was 400 to 600 yards behind the Red Line [Battle Zone] and it is difficult to for me to see how the position could have been maintained even if the Red Line had held. As to the Red Line itself, despite what has been written to the contrary, this was not dug to more than 12 inches in depth on my front and in some places only the sods were removed.’²⁰

That their fire was effective is evident from the testimony of Major William Wike who watched in admiration from the Fusiliers’ trenches as ‘a complete German battalion was annihilated by its fire’. Cuncliffe merely noting the battery ‘shelled a battalion passing through Hargicourt and did enormous damage’. The battery fought to the last, keeping the enemy at bay with Lewis gun fire before their gun pits were rushed at 6.00pm and the survivors taken prisoner. Cuncliffe was later awarded the Military Cross but in the opinion of Major Wike, ‘the fight he put up was worthy of a greater honour’.²¹

The Fusiliers’ counter-attack got underway shortly after midday on the 21st with B and D Companies advancing under the command of Major Wike to the western edge of Templeux. Robinson’s account makes it ominously clear that, in his opinion, the battalion was unlikely to survive in the face of the oncoming assault:

‘The attack was across a perfectly open plain, and had the enemy machine guns been properly sited we should have suffered very heavily. By 2.00pm we were established in the village of Templeux, but in a very bad position, as our communications from the front line were overlooked by the enemy on the high ground beyond the village, and both our flanks were in the air … we tried to get in touch with our flanks, but all efforts failed: there was no one on our flanks to get in touch with. It became very obvious that in the event of any further advance on the part of the Boche our position, or that of our forward companies, would be untenable.’²²

In actual fact the counter-attack did not clear the whole of the village and the Fusiliers were gradually forced out of the village buildings until they took up a line on the outskirts. The brunt of the fighting in Templeux village was carried out by a battalion of IR 31, Karl Goes reporting that ‘at certain times the artilleries of both sides fire right into the heavily disputed village. Rifle fire cracks out of caves and whole clusters of houses become the focal point of severe combat.’ Not that the Fusiliers gave ground willingly, the men of IR 116 reported vicious fighting on the southern edge of Templeux and a counter attack by the British that isolated and ‘annihilated’ one of their companies.

The Fusiliers’ advance had been watched by the men of A Company from their trench line east of the road running into the village. The company was on detached duty and under the orders of the officer commanding the village defences and at the time had no idea the attack they were witnessing was being carried forward by their own battalion. Small parties of enemy troops were still making use of the high ground and passing through Georges Copse on the right flank, and despite the best endeavours of the battalion, the enemy drove a wedge down through the centre of the village, preventing A Company from getting in touch with the remainder of the battalion and forcing D Company to take up positions close to the crucifix at the crossroads 200 yards south of the village. Here they linked up with A Company who had also retired in the face of heavy flanking fire whilst B and C Companies were on the western side of the Roisel-Templeux road. The battalion was now together again, albeit along a wide front and in very trying circumstances.

Just before dark, aware of the precarious position of the two forward companies, Robinson requested permission from brigade headquarters to withdraw to their previous battle positions. This was refused, the reply making it quite clear they were not to withdraw ‘one inch but do the best we could where we were’. Robinson was unimpressed, remarking that ‘if there were any divisional reserves they failed to put in an appearance, except a few cyclists, cavalry and other stout fellows’.

During the night of 21/22 March Captain Lyell Lee, who was in command of A Company, reported attacks by strong enemy fighting patrols which did not deter the more important task of bringing up much needed rations and replenishing the depleted stocks of ammunition with that collected from the dead and wounded. Nightfall had in effect rendered the village as a temporary no-man’s-land as patrols from both sides probed each other’s defences. As dawn broke – with a similar fog that had cloaked the German advance the previous day – the Fusiliers were greeted by heavy gas shelling after which the first German infantry units began putting in an appearance. Those that blundered up against the wire were quickly dealt with but it soon became obvious that the Germans, aided no doubt by the dense fog, were streaming past them on both flanks. A momentary lifting of the fog confirmed they were surrounded and although they could maintain their position while stocks of ammunition lasted, it was obvious to Robinson that they ‘could do no good by remaining where we were’.

Eventually German infantry, possibly from the 6th Division, moved in to take the position. The last moments of the 2/6th came as battalion headquarters was surrounded and captured. In the confusion of battle only two officers managed to avoid capture, the battalion medical officer Captain John Dingley and Second Lieutenant John Sutherland. ‘Doc’ Dingley’s recollection of ghostly figures looming around the entrance to his dug-out prompted him to make a hasty exit through the other entrance as a fusillade of shots followed him up the steps; fortunately the fog provided enough cover for his rapid retreat to the defensive post that Sutherland had set up east of Roisel. Sadly, John Sutherland was killed shortly afterwards. The 27-year-old from Tarves in Aberdeenshire who arrived in France just before Christmas 1916 as a private soldier in the Gordon Highlanders, was posted missing believed killed. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Biddolph was taken prisoner along with Lee, Robinson, Wike and the surviving ranks of the battalion. Lee was shot through the leg and brought down, a mishap he feels resulted in his capture ‘by the Germans who appeared to be countless’.

Definite casualty numbers are difficult to ascertain but at Templeux le Guérard Communal Cemetery five other ranks and Second Lieutenant James Bell from A Company can be found, while eight more other ranks have been laid to rest at the nearby Templeux le Guérard British Cemetery. Commemorated on the Pozières Memorial are thirty-three other ranks and three officers, including John Sutherland and Captain James Cameron who commanded D Company, all of whom were killed on 21/22 March or died of wounds over the next day or so. As for the number of wounded we can only assume it must have been high. Captain Lee noted that of the nine officers in A and D companies on the morning of 21 March only three were left by dusk and by 7.00am the next day this had been reduced to a single officer. Of those who managed to get away, Private William Harrop remembered the brigade commander, Brigadier General Oswald Borrett, being present at roll call and visibly upset by so few men of the battalion answering to their names.