‘[We held them] down along our horses’ shoulders, so that the enemy would not catch the glint of steel, and we were told to lean down over our horses’ manes. A moment later we were wheeling into line. I can’t remember if I was scared, but I know that we were all of us very excited and so were the horses.’¹²

The 3/Dragoons almost immediately came under fire which was maintained until the horsemen were some 200 yards from the edge of the copse, but as their swords came down for the final rush the German infantry bolted, many being shot down at point blank range as they were pursued through the trees:

‘We had of course been taught that a cavalry charge should be carried out in line six inches from knee to knee, but it didn’t work out like that in practice and we were soon a pretty ragged line of horsemen at full gallop. We took the Germans quite by surprise and they faced us as best they could, for there can’t be anything more frightening to an infantryman than the sight of a line of cavalry charging at full gallop with drawn swords.’¹³

It was a similar story on the left flank, as the two troops galloped straight towards the copse with swords ‘in line’ the German infantry either put up their hands or bolted. But for the unfortunate infantrymen it was too late, they were ridden down and sabred ruthlessly. It was an opportunity seized upon by the cavalrymen to strike a blow against an enemy who up until this point had looked almost unbeatable. Albert Turp certainly had no qualms at running the enemy down:

‘As our line overrode the Germans I made a regulation point at a man on my offside and my sword went through his neck and out the other side. The pace of my horse carried my sword clear and then I took a German on my nearside, and I remember the jar as my point took him in the collarbone and knocked him over. As we galloped on the enemy broke and ran.’¹⁴

Although largely insignificant to the wider strategic picture it was a demonstration of just what a good cavalry action could achieve using the element of surprise and the stability it could bring to a dangerously porous line. The cavalry casualties – 73 were reported wounded, mostly non-serious wounds – had been surprisingly light given the strength of the German infantry. Amongst those killed was 22-year-old Lieutenant the Hon William Cubitt of the Royal Dragoons who was one of six children of the Second Baron Ashcombe. It was another sad day for the Ashcombe family as one of his older brothers, Lieutenant the Hon Alick Cubitt, had been killed serving with 15/Hussars in November 1917 during the Battle of Cambrai.¹⁵

Had the British infantry attempted to cross the ground over which the cavalry charged they would have been all but wiped-out by the four or five machine guns positioned in the two copses. As it was, between 70 and 100 German infantry were sabred and 107 prisoners handed over to the infantry who were following close behind. Williams’ charge provided a much needed tonic for the troops on the ground who held onto their positions with a little more vigour until the unavoidable retirement abandoned Villeselve to the enemy. Shortly before the Germans arrived, the advanced dressing station run by 62/Field Ambulance had been packed up and sent on its way to Guiscard, but a small party under Lieutenant Colonel Stack remained behind attending the British and French wounded. Even when shells began bombarding the house where Stack and his party were based he refused to move until all the casualties had been evacuated.

There had, in fact, been another mounted cavalry action on 22 March – two days earlier – at Roisel, some twenty miles further north of Villeselve, that had involved A Squadron of 15/Hussars. Late on 21 March the regiment had been bivouacked at Roisel although on this occasion the squadron’s horses had remained saddled up all night in case an immediate call for reinforcements was required. The call came at 7.45am the next morning when the regiment was ordered to retake the Brown Line to the east of the village. At the time Roisel was under a heavy artillery attack and the enemy could be seen advancing in large numbers on both flanks. The orders given then appeared to have had a certain inevitability about them – a point the regimental historian does not fail to make:

‘Owing to the very unfavourable situation in other parts of the line, it did not seem likely that the attack, even if successful, could effect any material change, as it appeared the party making it would become quite isolated. Nevertheless, the situation was desperate, the counter-attack was ordered to take place, in spite of the hopeless conditions under which it had to be carried out.’¹⁶

A Squadron under 32-year-old Captain John Godman, led the attack with the intention of securing the high ground north of Hesbécourt before turning east to attack the Brown Line. In spite of the heavy fire the sheer audacity of the squadron’s attack succeeded and Godman and the men of A Squadron had occupied the shallow trenches of the Brown Line somewhere east of Haut Woods. Once in place the squadron had seen German infantry to the north and south advancing in huge numbers while to the northeast Templeux-le-Guérard where 2/6 Lancashire Fusiliers had counter-attacked the previous day, was clearly visible. Godman must have realized that his position was totally isolated and any attempt to hold the line would be doomed to failure, particularly as the Germans were well-established to the north beyond the railway line and Roisel had already come under a heavy artillery bombardment.

At 1.30pm Roisel had been abandoned and the regiment had moved to the marshy ground west of the village near Marquaix. Unable to establish any form of communication with A Squadron, Godman and his men were left to their fate. The regimental historian tells the rest of the story:

‘Although soon surrounded on all sides, the squadron continued to fight on alone and unaided, and manfully upheld the traditions of the regiment. The enemy attempted time after time to rush and annihilate this small handful of men, whose determined resistance was causing them so much loss. Our own artillery, quite unaware that there was a part of men still holding out, so far behind the advance of the enemy, shelled the area thoroughly, and the plight of the squadron soon became desperate in the extreme. But the men refused to surrender, and accounted for very large numbers of the enemy.’¹⁷

Towards evening, with ammunition virtually expended and exhaustion setting in, the Germans brought up a trench mortar battery to surround the position before finally rushing the trench and overwhelming the surviving cavalrymen. The CWGC database lists twelve 15/Hussars killed on 22 March, eleven of which are commemorated on the Pozières Memorial and one, Private G McFarelend – who had been with the regiment since it landed in France in August 1914 – buried at Roisel Communal Cemetery Extension. This number concurs with those listed in the regimental history and we can assume that these men died with A Squadron that day. Godman had been taken prisoner along with Lieutenants Lowe and Pickering and no survivors were reported to have returned to the regiment.

* * *

Reinforcements in the form of the 50th Division were placed on stand-by as early as 4.30am on 21 March but no move was made until the evening when the three brigades marched to Guillancourt having been ordered to provide immediate support for Major General Neill Malcolm’s 66th Division by assembling along the Rear Zone Defences. This was accomplished by 8.00am on 22 March after a march through Brie that left the majority of the men tired and hungry; hot food we are told did not arrive until 8.40am by which time orders had been received to man the defences immediately. The hurried deployment of the division drew criticism from the divisional staff which was somewhat dismayed over the length of the line the division was expected to hold. One staff officer in particular felt they had been placed in an impossible position:

‘It would have required seasoned troops with the very highest morale to have offered any effective resistance on a line which existed more on the map than on the ground; more especially seeing since daybreak the men were subjected to the trying ordeal of a constant stream of men passing through their ranks, spreading tales of alarm and despondency.’¹⁸

The Green Line – or Rear Zone – was five miles east of the River Somme and ran from the crossroads one mile southwest of Villévèque on the southern bank of the Omigon River to Boucly on the banks of the Cologne River in the north – as far as the 50th Division was concerned the line they now occupied would very shortly become the front line.

It had been Watts’ intention for the 24th and 66th Divisions to retire from the Battle Zone through the Green Line and reorganize under the protection of the 50th Division and their artillery. The reader will recall that the Rear Zone had only been partially dug and there was very little wire in place, thus any improvements that might have been made by the three brigades of the 50th Division before troops began passing through their lines on the afternoon of 22 March were negligible. The 150 Brigade commander, Brigadier General Hubert Rees – having carried out an inspection of his sector – was so concerned as to the state of the Green Line that he felt it necessary to inform his divisional commander of the poor state of the defences immediately. His assessment was blunt and to the point. ‘The single uncompleted trench was impossible to hold and [I] urged the necessity of withdrawal of 1,000 yards so that the division could avoid annihilation to no purpose the next morning.’¹⁹ Rees had scant evidence to suggest the defences were any better elsewhere along the line. Gough’s view on the deployment of the 50th Division – albeit written in 1930 – was strikingly similar to that of the divisional staff:

‘If they had been moved up when I asked, their men would not have had to enter on a terrific fight without rest after long and harassing marches, their officers could have reconnoitred their positions, and a little more time would have been available to strengthen them … To move them up was not to commit them.’²⁰

But there was little or no time to make much of a difference, less than two hours later at 4.30pm 149 Brigade on the right flank was under heavy attack, the enemy advancing in eight waves down the Omigon valley.

Commanding the 5th Battalion Durham Light Infantry (5/DLI) was Major Alwyn Raimes. On arrival at Brie the battalion had been ‘lent’ to the 66th Division and was sent up to prevent the enemy from advancing out of Roisel – by this time already abandoned – in a rather pointless exercise which left the DLI tired even before they arrived back on the Green Line and took up their position on the right flank of 151 Brigade:

‘After considerable trouble caused by the constant stream of men, horses, tanks, guns and limbers retiring through us, the companies found the positions allotted to them and eagerly awaited the coming of the enemy. They had not long to wait as the German infantry in great numbers soon became visible, and, between 4.00pm and 5.00pm, could be seen forming up for attack. We telephoned for artillery support. It quickly came, but unfortunately the barrage was right on our own line instead of on the Germans, and we had a number of casualties. To make things worse telephone communication broke down, and we were unable to get word through to the batteries.’²¹

It had not been a good start but there was little time to curse the gunners before the German infantry attack was unleashed on the line; a protracted defence against such a heavy attack was practically impossible in such poorly-constructed defences. On the right Caulaincourt was lost and in the centre 150 Brigade was pushed back near Bernes and from the high ground east of Nobescourt Farm. Second Lieutenant John Fleming-Bernard was with U Battery, RHA near St Quentin Copse and fortunately his 13-pounder gun crews had little difficulty in finding the correct target:

‘At 5.00pm our attention was rudely drawn to our own front and we were soon firing in good earnest to cover Nobescourt Farm. The Huns seemed to come on, despite our efforts, and about 5.45pm we spotted masses of men on the Vraignes-Nobescourt road … and gave the Huns 15 rounds per gun over open sights, the range being about 1,500 yards. The shooting must have told frightfully on the mass of men on the road, our shrapnel seeming to burst right amongst them.’²²

It didn’t stop their advance but as Fleming says, ‘each shell left a gap as if a tooth had been drawn’. However the wire in front of the DLI was good and as the enemy strained to force their way through they were cut down by the Lewis gunners. The attack was held by A and C Companies but on the right, D Company and part of B Company, were forced to give ground, retiring to the outskirts of Nobescourt Farm where battalion headquarters had been established amongst the ruins of the farm buildings:

‘Owing to the enemy’s success at this point, battalion headquarters found themselves practically in the firing line, and for a time there was great excitement as it looked as if the Germans were coming right through. Every available officer and man – commanding officer and adjutant, signallers, runners, pioneers, batmen, cooks – quickly turned out, and manned the ruined walls and buildings ready for a last stand.’²³

The expected assault never came, for whatever reason the Germans appeared content with the capture of the ridge which, with the onset of darkness, provided a very welcome opportunity to reorganize. On the Durham’s right the 4th Battalion Yorkshire Regiment (4/Yorkshire) had suffered badly. Having lost its forward trenches the battalion gave ground some 800 yards to the west of the line and it was there that the commanding officer, 32-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Charleton and his adjutant, Captain James Bainbridge, were killed leading a counter-attack.²⁴

With Caulaincourt and the high ground near Nobescourt Farm now in German hands the Green Line was in great danger of being overwhelmed when the German attacks resumed the next morning. Maxse’s XVIII Corps was already retiring towards the Somme and there was little the units of the 50th Division could achieve by remaining in situ, consequently at 10.40pm Brigadier General Arthur Stockley – who was temporarily in command of the 50th Division – issued orders for the division to retire to the line of the Somme.²⁵ For Raimes and his men this meant a 2.00am retirement on 23 March to new positions near Catelet Wood. For once the fog worked in favour of the British:

‘This was not an easy matter as the fog was so thick that they could not see more than five yards in front of them, and it was difficult getting the scattered companies together and on the road in column of route. It was only by frequent references to their compasses that they succeeded in their object … we cursed the fog at the time, but there is no doubt that if it had been a clear morning we should have had many casualties as our position and the road would have been in full view.’²⁶

The 5/DLI had got away lightly but for the 4/East Yorkshires and the 6/ Northumberland Fusiliers there were heavy casualties, the Northumberland Fusiliers losing two companies who were unable to withdraw after being surrounded. At Le Catelet the DLI fell back again along the line of the D88 road to the wooded area northwest of Mesnil-Bruntel where orders finally arrived at midday to retire across the Somme using the bridge at Eterpigny; the 6th and 8th DLI were to lead off with Raimes and his battalion providing the rearguard:

‘We at once took up a covering position astride the main road at the west end of Le Mesnil. [Mesnil-Bruntel] The 8th soon came along and passed through us, but we waited in vain for the 6th. Time passed. The enemy were by this time in the east end of the village and their machine guns were making themselves extremely unpleasant. At last we were forced to the conclusion that the 6th must have retired by another route.’²⁷

They had indeed taken another route and one that resulted in the battalion unintentionally walking into an ambush. Captain Ralph Ainsworth, the battalion adjutant, takes up the story:

‘After about two hours, however, orders came to cross the river by the Eterpigny footbridge. A route was taken across country towards this bridge, but there being no gap through the marshes and undergrowth, the Battalion was forced to turn aside through Le Mesnil [Mesnil-Bruntel] village and, incidentally, to pass under a light shrapnel barrage. It was not known that the village was in the enemy’s hands, but as soon as Z Company, who were leading, had reached the far side, the remaining Companies were attacked. Again Y Company distinguished itself, as did W and X Companies. They at once deployed, and though driven towards the marshes, successfully checked the enemy and eventually followed Z Company over the partially destroyed footbridge, about 300 yards long.’²⁸

It had been a close run thing but thanks to the quick thinking of Captain John Aubin, he and his company deployed into a firing line and with rifle and Lewis gun fire fought a rearguard action across the marshes to the bridge, enabling the battalion to escape across the river relatively intact. John Aubin received the DSO for his part in the action, adding to the Military Cross and bar he had already received since his arrival on the Western Front in July 1915. The two remaining brigades of the 50th Division were also engaged as they fell back to the canal. 150 Brigade crossed the canal at Brie, Brigadier General Hubert Rees described the confusion that met the men of his brigade on their arrival:

‘23 Brigade had arrived and took up a position on the west bank of the Somme, sending one battalion across the river into Brie village. When the 5th Yorks and 4th E Yorks retired this battalion also retired. This mob of men crossing the bridge was covered by Lieutenant Ginger and the 4th Yorks. Before the 4th Yorks could retire somebody blew up the bridge and Lieutenant Ginger had to construct a footbridge to get his party and wounded across the river under fairly heavy fire.’²⁹

According to Buckland the officer responsible for blowing the numerous Brie bridges and marooning the young officer on the east bank was Lieutenant George Begg from 239/Field Company. Faced with a stream of infantry crossing the bridge and a German aeroplane flying low along the river, Begg waited until the bridge was clear – or so he thought – and charged the electrical exploder. Nothing happened – the silence that followed must have been deafening! A second attempt failed – German infantry were now visible on the opposite bank – he tried again for a third time. This time the resulting explosion announced a successful detonation, the fleeting look of relief on the young RE officer’s face shattered only by the realization that Lieutenant Thomas Ginger and his rearguard were still on the other side of the canal! But as Rees says, the party managed to escape and get across the river. Thomas Ginger was the signals officer with 4/Yorkshire and his reward for his part in the action on the canal came in July when his award of the Military Cross was announced in the London Gazette.

* * *

In Chapter 7 we left the 16th Division after it had abandoned the Battle Zone on 22 March and was retiring on Villers-Faucon. The retirement was covered by 11/ Hampshires who, despite being designated divisional pioneers, now demonstrated they could fight as well as they could dig. The rearguard action at St Emilie and Doingt by the Hampshires was another of those almost forgotten actions where a small unit was able to delay the German advance quite significantly, unfortunately we have very little detail apart from the battalion war diary and regimental histories to provide much more than an outline of what took place.

At Villers-Faucon the initial attack fell largely upon D Company of the Hampshires which was commanded by Major Thomas Thyne. The company occupied the line of trenches to the east of the village where they remained until their right flank had been turned, withdrawing through A and B Company’s lines near the station. The attack then focused on Captain George Howson and B Company who, in their turn, were forced back after a desperate fight during which Second Lieutenant Walter Elkington was killed. With the St Emilie flank now completely turned, the battalion began to fall back to Villers-Faucon making another stand along the railway line which ran south from Épehy and again on the high ground just to the north of Villers-Faucon.

At 3.00pm the 16th Division was on the Green Line with the right flank just to the east of Tincourt-Boucly and the left near Tincourt Wood – Bois de Boucly on present day maps – where it was in touch with the 39th Division.³⁰ The Hampshire’s headquarters were now established in a small quarry on the northern outskirts of Tincourt – close to the junction of the D184 and D6. That night the quarry headquarters sheltered Lieutenant Colonel Basil Crockett, commanding 11/ Hampshires, Captain Harry Molyneux, the adjutant, Captain William Tyndall, the battalion medical officer and Major Cecil Hazard. The war diary reported a quiet night with the exception of occasional shelling and machine-gun fire. Nonetheless, it was a lull that came to an end sharply at 6.00am on 23 March 1918 as German infantry attacked again under cover of the morning fog.

Inevitably a further withdrawal was on the cards; confusion, lack of communication and the fog all contributing to the battalion’s movement back to the high ground covering the approach to Doingt and Péronne. At 1.00pm the battalion again came under heavy attack and ‘after severe fighting orders were received from 48 Brigade to withdraw’. The war diary continues: ‘A and B Companies then retired to a position half way down the slope in some rear trenches, A Company employing covering fire from outlying houses and huts in Doingt.’

Also at Doingt was Lieutenant Colonel Rowland Fielding with his remaining Connaught Rangers, now part of a composite battalion with two companies of Leinsters and one made up of the numerous 48 Brigade units retiring towards the Somme. From Fielding’s account it appears that his men must have first retired through the Hampshires near Carnival Copse and, along with the sappers of 157/Field Company, successfully held off the advancing German infantry just east of Doingt before retiring through the village towards Péronne:

‘I formed up the few men of the Connaught Rangers at the foot of the hill on the edge of the village of Doingt – the same village where I had taken tea so short a time before, and, in conjunction with Colonel Crockett and his men, and Major Whittall’s sappers, fire was brought to bear upon the enemy, who were already descending the near side, and whose machine guns were already shooting from the slopes of the ridge we had just occupied.’³¹

Remaining in the village were two companies of the Hampshires under Major Hazard and the sappers of 157/Field Company with their commanding officer Major Perceval Whittall. By employing classic street fighting tactics amongst houses and garden enclosures they fought a delaying rearguard action against the enemy allowing the 49 Brigade units to cross the Somme. During the fighting Captain George Howson was captured after holding on too long to a building which was eventually surrounded by the Germans. He later managed to escape, rejoining the battalion in Péronne.

It was this stand at Doingt that drew such admiration from Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, the senior staff officer (GSO1) with the 16th Division; in his opinion the Hampshires were responsible for holding the enemy in check at a most critical time and allowing 48 Brigade to withdraw relatively unscathed. Jackson’s praise also credits the Hampshires gritty stand – in which Cecil Hazard played such a vital part – with facilitating the retirement of 47 and 49 Brigades on the left. Perceval Whittall was awarded a bar to his DSO and Cecil Hazard – despite Jackson’s personal recommendation – received no official recognition whatsoever! If ever there was an unjust allocation of awards, the exclusion of Cecil Hazard must rank highly amongst them.

But it was not quite over yet. From Doingt the Hampshires retired to what the war diary describes as a light railway cutting on the outskirts of Péronne where they again held off several violent attacks before all three companies withdrew across the Somme, Cecil Hazard reported as being the last man to cross the bridge before it was destroyed. The bridge that Hazard crossed was in fact the Bristol Bridge which was held by men of the 5th and 6th Manchesters until 24 March when Péronne fell to the Germans after a furious bombardment which fortunately fell on an almost deserted town. The Bristol Bridge was the last structure over the Somme at Péronne to be demolished, a task which was carried out by 180/Tunnelling Company at 6.00pm – this time there was no possibility of the bridge being used again by German infantry – the explosion blew a gap of 150 feet in the span.

The Bristol Bridge is not the last we shall hear of the Hampshires as they were involved in another testing rearguard action near Morcourt on 27 March. The Hampshires’ casualties over the two days of 22/23 March were remarkably light given the intensity of the fighting the battalion was involved in. By far the greater number were killed on 22 March at St Emilie – one officer and twenty-one other ranks – while on 23 March the battalion only suffered eight other ranks killed. The number of wounded went unrecorded.