‘[They] succeeded in getting into the wood and engaging the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. Many of the enemy were killed, all refusing to surrender, but a large party, estimated at about 300, retired from the wood south of the point where the squadron had entered it.’¹⁰

Entrenched in the wood at this point was a company of II/IR 101, many of whom were taking part in their first serious action of the offensive. Taken almost completely by surprise by this unexpected cavalry intervention they were unable to prevent the Canadians penetrating their defences. The second squadron, led by Captain ‘Newky’ Newcomen entered the wood about halfway down its southwest side with the objective of gaining touch with Major Reginald Timmis’ squadron which had been ordered to gallop around the north eastern corner towards Moreuil village. At the northeast corner of the wood, Major Timmis and B Squadron suffered a number of casualties from heavy fire and were forced to wheel to the left. They too then entered the wood. According to Reginald Timmis, B Squadron was very much under-strength, although his estimate of the number of machine guns operating against him is probably incorrect:

‘My own squadron…. instead of being 160 strong was about 98…. The Boche had here over 40 machine guns, the lighter ones of which were up the trees. After we had gone past all these machine guns I turned around in the saddle and saw only two men out of 90 down. After we got into the wood we had to practically walk because it was very thick and many of our horses were shot and killed.’¹¹

Meanwhile Lord Strathcona’s Horse were now ordered to send one squadron round the north-east corner of the wood to support Nordheimer’s squadron of dragoons while the remaining two squadrons of the regiment were to follow up the main attack south-eastwards through the wood. Seely tells us that as he saw the dragoons and Lord Strathcona’s Horse approach him he galloped up to Lieutenant Gordon Flowerdew who was in command of C Squadron:

‘As we rode together I told him that his was the most adventurous task of all, but that I was confident that he would succeed. With his gentle smile he turned to me and said: ‘I know sir. I know it is a splendid moment. I will try not to fail you.’¹²

Flowerdew’s task was to make a mounted attack in support of Nordheimer’s squadron, disperse the German reinforcements entering the wood from the south and kill or capture those attempting to leave the wood by its eastern edge. As his men began their charge up to the edge of the wood the horsemen rose out of a dip in the ground and took the full force of the enemy’s fire:

‘Just as they reached the high ground, they found a large group of the Germans, perhaps 300 strong, retiring from the wood. They were from the 101st Grenadier Battalion that were withdrawing and other troops that were approaching. There was one howitzer and several heavy machine guns with them. In a split second, Flowerdew gave the order: ‘It’s a charge boys, it’s a charge!’ The trumpeter, Reg Longley, riding behind Flowerdew raised his trumpet to blow the call, it never sounded. Longley was the first casualty of the charge. In the excitement, many of the horses simply bolted. Private Dale of 4th Troop, riding behind Longley, had to jump over the trumpeter. He recalled that everything seemed unreal, ‘the shouting of men, the moans of the wounded, the pitiful crying of the wounded and dying horses’. It was difficult to recall what happened and when. C Squadron approached the Germans with sabres raised; sabres against rifles and machine guns. They rode into two lines of Germans. Steel cut into flesh; bayonets and bullets answered. Casualties were high on both sides. Once the two lines were passed, the surviving horsemen turned back toward the wood. There, through the smoke and enemy was Harvey and his men. The survivors fought furiously to get back to them. Sergeant Tom MacKay, MM, the Troop Sergeant of 1st Troop was acting troop leader since Lieutenant Harrower was on patrol. The flesh was practically stripped between the knees and thighs of both his legs. The doctors later counted some 59 wounds in one leg alone. Sergeant Wooster also of 1st Troop, survived charging through both lines of Germans but at the second line forgot his sabre drill, and tried to club a German soldier to death. After bypassing another group of Germans, he moved back to the woods. While doing so, he found a wounded member of 4th Troop, Private Harry Hooker and tried unsuccessfully to assist him. He then made his way to where Seely had spoken to Flowerdew and reported to the General that the squadron had been destroyed in a charge.’¹³

The German account testifies to the savage cost of the charge:

‘An artillerist cries out: ‘Enemy in our backs, Help!’ ‘Kavallerie attacks’ shouts another. The Saxon Kaisergrenadiere [GR 101] are attacked by the 1st Canadian Cavalry Brigade with full force, but rapid rifle fire holds them off, supported by mines. In several places sabres fight against pistols, a 15cm gun of FAR 93 rips terrible gaps into the squadrons of Lord Strathcona’s Horses. It is a massacre, horses are wallowing in blood and mud, their riders shot off their backs. Not many Canadians manage to escape.’¹⁴

Sadly, the German version of events is the correct one and contrary to opinion, and no doubt the popular press of the day, Flowerdew’s charge – however gallant it may have been – did not secure the wood. By 11.00am the two brigades of cavalry had only established themselves on three sides of the wood – the centre and southern sectors were still in enemy hands. Gordon Flowerdew’s posthumous award of the Victoria Cross appeared in the London Gazette in April 1918. The 32-year-old former Framlingham College schoolboy who immigrated to Canada in 1902, is buried at Namps-au-Val British Cemetery. C Squadron probably had fewer than 100 men available on 30 March, with Lieutenant Harvey’s troop detached it would seem likely that the charge took place with seventy-five officers and men. With twenty-four killed in the charge and subsequent action and another fifteen dying from wounds over the next few weeks, Flowerdew’s squadron had been reduced to little more than a troop. Promoted to captain in the field by Seely, Gordon Flowerdew was hit almost immediately in the chest and legs and, after the battle, was moved to Number 41 Casualty Clearing Station. He died on Monday 31 March 1918. Reflecting on the Moreuil action forty-two years later, Major General James Lunt felt Seely’s attack on the wood was hopeless from the start:

‘He was pitting men on horseback, armed with swords, against men in trenches, armed with machine guns. But the theory of war is often a very different thing from its practice because the human factor, which plays such a dominant part in battle, is an uncertain and ever-varying quantity. The Seelys and Flowerdews of this world have proved time after time that we should honour them for having done so.’¹⁵

In the meantime, 3 Cavalry Brigade, which had crossed the Avre behind the Canadians, had arrived and Seely ordered Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Brooke and 16/Lancers to drive the remaining 200 Germans out of the wood. Brooke was no stranger to Seely, having recently been the brigade major of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade. He had begun his war as a subaltern in August 1914 and, like so many of the successful regular officers who had survived the war to date, he had profited from rapid promotion and now commanded his regiment. Using the wide ride that runs north-south, Brooke’s Lancers – in an action reminiscent of a pheasant shoot – cleared the rest of the wood leaving only the fringes of the southern and eastern edges in enemy hands. While Brooke and his men were engaged in the wood, the remaining units of 3rd Cavalry Brigade, the 4th (Queen’s Own) Hussars (4/Hussars) and 5/Lancers, moved into the western extremities.

The only remaining threat was artillery fire. Both German and British guns were firing into the wood and although the British guns were eventually silenced, German artillery fire continued throughout the day. One casualty of this desultory shelling was Lieutenant Colonel MacDonald, commanding Strathcona’s Horse, who was slightly wounded. Despite his loud objections, he was evacuated and Lieutenant Colonel van Straubenzie of the Royal Canadian Dragoons took command of the squadrons in the wood. Other casualties of the day included the loss of Lieutenant Colonel John Darley, commanding 4/Hussars, together with two other officers and fourteen other ranks killed and forty-four wounded.¹⁶ The Queen’s Bays lost one officer killed, two wounded and twenty-five men wounded or missing, while 8/Hussars lost eleven killed and twenty-two wounded.

With the wood practically cleared of hostile troops, Seely sent messages to Pitman, Diebold and the 8th Division confirming the wood was now largely in British hands. By 2.30am on 31 March three composite battalions of the battered 8th Division had relieved the cavalry. The 2/West Yorkshires, who by this stage of the offensive could only field 100 men, had already been sent up to Moreuil Wood where they were joined by units from 23 and 24 Brigade under the command of Brigadier General George Grogan. Grogan found the Germans were in possession of Moreuil village and the British line to the north running along the western edge of the wood. It was still an extremely delicate position and daybreak brought the first of a series of heavy German counter-attacks.

In the face of the supporting fire from British gunners the German infantry broke through on the left of the divisional front shortly after 1.00pm, driving 2/Devons out of the wood. On the right 1/Worcesters held on until 2/East Lancashires and 2/Royal Berks were in a position to counter-attack. Fierce fighting saw the line temporarily restored but by the evening most of Moreuil Wood and all of Rifle Wood – which lay a mile to the northeast – were in German hands again. Pitman’s account sums up the situation south of the River Luce on the evening of 31 March:

‘Both the 8th and 20th Divisions had been driven back off the line which we had re-established for them on the previous day. They [German infantry] had been dribbling back in twos and threes throughout the day, and by the evening the Germans had taken out the whole of Moreuil Wood and Rifle Wood, except the north-western corner of the former, in front of which the 3rd Cavalry Brigade line was established through the neck which joins the corner with the main wood. On the left the 20th Division had been driven back to Hourges village and to Hangard, which was held by a company of French.’¹⁷

By this time the 3rd Cavalry Division had arrived in the Avre valley and Pitman was ordered to retake Rifle Wood – Bois de Hourges on modern day maps – with a dismounted attack on 1 April. The wood was held by II and III/IR 74 from the German 19th Division with I/IR 74 in reserve. It was not going to be a particularly easy task.

Pitman’s plan was to attack the wood from the north in three waves. The first – comprising of a 4 Cavalry Brigade Composite Regiment – was to attack towards the north eastern corner; the second wave – a dismounted company of 20/ Hussars – was to follow and form strong points on the north eastern edge of the wood, while the third wave – a dismounted battalion of Canadian Cavalry – was to go through the wood, clear it of the enemy and consolidate its positions along the eastern and southern edges where it was planned they would be relieved by 6/Dragoon Guards. With the attack to be preceded by an artillery and machine-gun bombardment, tactical command on the ground was again given to Jack Seely.

At 9.00am the men of 4 Cavalry Brigade dumped their British warms at the assembly points along the River Luce and worked their way south of the river towards the wood. As the first line came into view a German artillery SOS burst above them and a heavy machine-gun fire opened up. Major the Hon Arthur Child-Villiers was commanding the Oxfordshire Hussars:

‘Our regiment advanced on a front of less than 150 yards. For the first 40 yards or so we were not shot at, but then we were fired at, as we expected, from the wood. Batches of Germans could be seen running to their positions on the edge of the wood, and we did a good deal of firing at them with rifles. Three of the Hotchkiss rifles also fired at them during this advance, though it was difficult to reform the teams, which had all suffered casualties, during the actual advance. When we got near the corner of the wood, the Germans could be seen running away from some of their machine guns, and we entered the wood from the crossroads.’¹⁸

The first wave reached its objective at 9.10am and the cavalrymen were able to bring more of their Hotchkiss rifles into action. The 20/Hussars, which made up the second wave, began their attack from the sunken lane which ran along the edge of the wood and here they took several casualties from enfilade fire before Captain Walter Hall collected together his three dismounted squadrons and rushed the objective. Hall had only recently returned from leave and on his return had taken command of the dismounted detachment. In his haste to find his regiment he mislaid his revolver and had bought another in Amiens. ‘The only one he could get was of Spanish make’, wrote a fellow officer, ‘however, he armed himself with this and rushed into the fray.’ As the Hussars consolidated their positions in Rifle Wood the Spanish revolver is said to have accounted for more than one of the enemy.

Following on behind the Hussars came the Canadians, who pushed on to take the remaining portion of the wood. It was all over remarkably quickly and by 11.00am the wood was secured. Of the 138 officers and men of Hall’s command 3 men were killed and 3 officers and 39 men wounded. The Oxfordshire Hussars who had attacked with the first wave, took thirteen machine guns and twenty-three prisoners but suffered twelve men killed and forty-seven wounded. Three officers, including Major Child-Villiers were wounded. As for the Canadians, the fighting in Moreuil and Rifle Wood had cost the brigade 488 casualties and many of their horses were dead; their casualties accounting for nearly half of the 1,079 casualties suffered by the whole of the 2nd Cavalry Division.

The Rifle Wood operation had been very successful, all objectives had been achieved and any further German counter-attacks were largely broken up by the artillery. Pitman was delighted; both actions had vindicated his belief that the cavalry, when used correctly, could be exceptionally successful. Like Pitman, many of the officers and NCOs serving with the cavalry were pre-war soldiers and had been largely spared from the Allied offensives that cut through the ranks of the infantry. These professional soldiers had shown their worth during the March offensive and would do so again in the coming months. Although von Hutier’s units regained Moreuil and Rifle Woods they had almost reached the limit of their advance. Moreuil Wood was retaken some four months later, on 8 August 1918 – the opening day of the Battle of Amiens – by the French and Canadians and the 43rd Battalion of the 3rd Canadian Division recaptured Rifle Wood on the same day. However, it must be said that the battle for the woods north of Moreuil did not – as some writers have stated – win the war! What it did in fact was to blunt the German advance long enough to enable Foch to move up vital reinforcements and provided the vital breathing space which allowed the first of the Australians to arrive in time to fight at Villers-Bretonneux – a town shortly destined to become a shrine to the Australian soldier and nation. The war still had seven-and-a-half bloody and destructive months left to run but the failure of the March offensive was the beginning of the end.