13///THE WINTER WAR, FINLAND, 1939–40

On 30 November 1939, Soviet troops with a numerical advantage of more than five to one poured across the remote and wintry border of Finland. The ominous low hum of Soviet aircraft, wave after wave, was matched on the ground by the roaring and clanking of hundreds of advancing tanks. Waiting deep in the forest were Finnish troops and mobilized citizen soldiers, dressed in white winter camouflage but equipped with precious few anti-tank weapons. Their forward scouts watched the Soviets lumbering up the handful of roads, then flitted away on skis. Coordinating their movements, the outnumbered Finnish ski troops took up positions on either side of the Soviet columns, and initiated a series of ambushes with mines and small-arms fire. The Soviets were thrown into confusion, and their regiments blundered in different directions only to be ambushed afresh. As darkness fell, individual Soviet units tried to form defensive positions, and were raided, harried and attacked again and again. The Finns called these isolated enemy formations mottis, and while some Soviet garrisons fought bravely, others collapsed or were overrun. The mighty Soviet offensive was in trouble from the outset, and although the attackers could bring to bear massive resources, the Finns were to prove a formidable adversary against these incredible odds.

The Soviet Union had inherited much of the old Russian empire but it had not regained possession of Finland. This independent country had been conquered by the tsar in 1809, but wrested back some autonomy in 1905. In 1917, during the Russian Revolution, Finland reasserted its independence, throwing Bolshevik forces out of the country. In 1921, the Finns assisted anti-Bolshevik rebels across the border, and in retaliation the Russians orchestrated a raid called the Pork Mutiny in 1922. Unable to crush the Finns militarily, the Bolsheviks had concentrated on trying to subvert the Finnish constitution by backing communist activists. The Finnish communist party proved unpopular, however, and by the 1930s the threat of political violence or a coup appeared to have been contained. A non-aggression pact, concluded by Stalin, marked the end of the period of rivalry in foreign relations, although the Soviet government continued to press for territorial concessions that would give greater security to Leningrad, positioned as it was so close to the border with Finland.

The most significant change in Soviet policy came in August 1939 when a deal was struck with Adolf Hitler’s Germany. While ostensibly a settlement of differences and a mutual promise not to wage war on the other, secret clauses allowed Germany the freedom to crush Poland, and gave Stalin a free hand further east. The Nazis invaded Poland in September, and Soviet forces annexed the remaining territory in November. The Baltic states were threatened and ordered to permit the construction of Soviet military or naval bases on their soil. But Finland, sensing it was next, began a secret and gradual mobilization. As expected, the Soviets increased the pressure on Finland for territorial concessions, deploying more troops along the border throughout October and November 1939. On 26 November, the Soviet border post at Mainila was inexplicably shelled, and the Soviet government was quick to condemn Finland as the aggressor. In fact, the attack may have been carried out by Soviet secret police to provide the necessary casus belli for an invasion.

Four days after the bombardment of Mainila, 21 Soviet divisions – totalling 450,000 men – rolled across the Finnish border, and the capital, Helsinki, was subjected to an intense air raid. The Soviets were organized into four armies. Starting on the southern border, the Seventh Army was positioned to strike north against the city of Viipuri and to destroy Finnish forces on the Karelian Isthmus. The start line of Eighth Army was north of Lake Ladoga, and its mission was to advance northwards and then to cut in behind the Finnish defences. The Ninth Army was deployed on the eastern border of Finland, and its purpose was to drive deep into Finland and cut the country in two. The Fourteenth Army was positioned in the far north, and its objective was the port of Petsamo in northern Finland. These armies were supported by an air armada of nearly 4,000 bombers and fighter planes. There was confidence in the Soviet high command that the campaign would be concluded swiftly. Poland had fallen in three weeks, and they believed that Finland would be overrun and defeated in a fortnight.

But Finland was not Poland. The open landscape of eastern Poland was perfect tank country, whereas Finland was covered in dense forests and lakes. There were few roads and large areas were marshy, although in winter the frozen ground presented less of a problem. Perhaps more importantly, the Polish army had been largely defeated by the Nazis before the Soviets had attacked, and so the easy victory had not tested the Soviet military. When confronted by more significant resistance, the inefficiencies of the Soviet armed forces would be exposed. Stalin had purged the officer corps of most of its brightest and most talented members, favouring loyalty and obedience above all else. As a result, more than 36,000 officers had been imprisoned, worked to exhaustion in labour camps or executed, and the remainder dared not exercise too much initiative for fear of arousing the suspicions of the omnipresent political commissars. These agents of Stalin were likely to denounce anyone who did not use the correct rhetoric or toe the party line, and a denunciation could be deadly. The effect on the battlefield was to curb risk-taking and manoeuvring, giving the Finns the opportunity to hit and run, or to isolate and destroy static formations.

The Finns knew it would be impossible to guard the entire 600-mile (1,000-km) frontier, and so they opted for a system of defence in depth. By drawing the Soviets into the forested interior, they could force them to push along a small number of tracks and avenues. Such predictable routes made it possible to make their attacks, using surprise and precision to nullify the Soviet advantage in numbers. The most vulnerable part of the Finnish border was the Karelian Isthmus, where the landscape was more rolling. Six divisions were deployed there, and a defensive belt, the Mannerheim Line, was constructed. While Soviet propagandists later tried to exaggerate the strength of this line, the fact was that it consisted of little more than a ribbon of trenches and some bunkers revetted with logs. Every effort had been made to take advantage of the terrain, with fields of fire that enfiladed the Soviets’ likely lines of approach. The chief problem was a lack of manpower. Regular Finnish forces were concentrated in the most vulnerable southern and eastern sectors (three corps and one corps respectively), and this left the north in the hands of border guards, militia and some reservists.

As the Soviets advanced towards the Mannerheim Line on 30 November 1939, Finnish ski troops fought delaying actions. Courageously, they got as close to the Soviet tanks as possible and thrust logs or iron bars into the tracks and running gear to immobilize them. A few tanks would then block the entire Soviet column. Petrol bombs – the famous Molotov cocktail, named after the Soviet Foreign Minister who coveted their country – were also hurled onto the rear decks of Soviet tanks or dropped into the open hatches of vehicles that had been halted. When the Soviets tried to employ the full weight of their supporting fire, the Finns would melt away. It was a successful tactic. North of Lake Ladoga, at Tolvajärvi, the Soviet 139th Motor Rifle Division was defeated by a much smaller force of Finnish troops.

Soon, however, things were to swing back in the Soviets’ favour, and by 4 December, a crisis was occurring north of Lake Ladoga. The Soviets had hammered the Finnish defences with devastating volumes of artillery fire and troops there had begun to fall back. The retreat was in danger of becoming a rout when, after three exhausting days and nights, the survivors reached a line parallel with the stream of Kollaa. Behind the stream lay a series of small ridges that gave a clear view of the approaching enemy and some protection from gunfire. Communicating that a new line had been temporarily established, the phrase ‘Kollaa Kestää’ (‘Kollaa Holds’) was quickly adopted as the slogan of the war. The stubborn defence of this line stalled the Soviet juggernaut and allowed more mobile ski teams to seek out and ambush the static Soviet units. Only the sheer exhaustion of the Finnish troops caused the attacks to be suspended in late December.

Further south, the Finns could only hope to postpone the inevitable advance, and by 6 December all Finnish forces on the Karelian Isthmus were in or behind the Mannerheim Line in readiness for a major Soviet offensive. The attack opened with a 40-hour bombardment of the Finnish defences around Taipale. The Finns’ defences were excavated on rising ground, affording them some protection within dugouts, but there were too few guns and not enough ammunition to indulge in counter-battery fire. Instead, as the Soviet infantry came on, Finnish artillery fired onto previously designated areas. As the Soviets continued their advance, intense small-arms fire cut down significant numbers. Astonished by the weight of fire, the Soviets fell back to their start line. For six days the Soviets attempted to get forward, but they were unable to penetrate the Mannerheim Line at any point. On 14 December, a fresh Soviet division fortified with more tanks attempted to break the Finnish defences, but it too was forced back with heavy losses. A third Soviet division renewed the assault later that same month, but the outcome was the same.

The defeat of Finland seemed to be a foregone conclusion when the Soviets invaded in 1939, but careful exploitation of the terrain, the climate, defence in depth and highly mobile troops stalled Stalin’s offensives.

On the approach to the town of Suomussalmi on the central front, two roads could be covered by the relatively small numbers of Finnish troops. Unexpectedly, the Soviets had committed two divisions to cross the area on their way to reach Oulu, in an attempt to divide the country in half. On the Raate Road, no fewer than 14,000 Soviet troops of the 44th and 163rd Motor Rifle Divisions were strung out on the line of march when they were ambushed by the Finns. A small blocking force attacked the head of the column, while elements of the Finnish 9th Division sped around the flanks. The Finns struck at different points, forcing the Soviets into small pockets that lacked mutual support. When the Soviets tried to extract and withdraw, they were attacked over and over, causing chaos. Their regiments eventually limped out of the forests having suffered almost 9,000 casualties, while the Finns had lost no more than 400 men. Even more significant was the equipment that the Soviets had abandoned to the Fins: tanks, artillery, trucks, horses, rifles, ammunition, medical equipment and much-needed anti-tank weapons.

On the northern fronts the situation was rather different. Eight Soviet divisions had crossed the border and Petsamo had been bombarded with naval gunfire. On other coasts, however, after inflicting severe damage on the cruiser Kirov, Finnish shore batteries had persuaded Soviet ships to keep a safe distance. The only ally the Finns possessed here was the weather. North of the Arctic Circle, and in an exceptionally cold winter, the Finns could take advantage of perpetual darkness to conceal their movements, even in the far north where the forests gave way to tundra and open snowfields. Here the Finnish guerrilla tactics were useful in slowing, or rendering immobile, much larger Soviet formations. They tended to be well equipped for this cold weather – in contrast to the Soviet soldiers, who often had to make do with improvised shelters, inadequate clothing and indifferent leadership. To make matters worse, Soviet troops found their supply vehicles were being intercepted and attacked, and so rations were in short supply. Isolated units were sometimes deprived of food altogether. At Salla, to the northwest, a Soviet brigade was attacked on the flank by a Finnish battalion, and the Soviets retreated precipitously, leaving behind their guns and many vehicles. A Finnish counter-attack pushed the Soviets back still further and in late December 1939 the Soviets decided to abandon the northern theatre altogether because progress had been so slow.

In the southwest, where the Soviets were attempting to reach Viipuri, the Finnish defences around Summa were in danger of being breached. Despite a greater density of defensive concrete emplacements and trenches, the Soviets had located a small gap alongside the Munaso Marshes, which they exploited on 19 December. Despite this breakthrough, the Soviets had failed to support their armour, so that, as their infantry advanced, the Finns could machine gun them as before. The Soviet tanks remained isolated behind the Finnish lines and could be picked off individually. Not one armed vehicle returned to the starting point. Demoralized by the setbacks and heavy losses, some Soviet troops refused to make further futile attacks. At this point, General Harald Öhquist, the Finnish sector commander for the Karelian Isthmus, attempted to drive the Soviets back, but his counter-attack of 23 December failed. For the time being the Finns were nevertheless holding on, denying the Soviets their easy victory. In the League of Nations there was condemnation of the invasion, and Britain and France made attempts to supply the Finns with war materiel.

In January 1940, the Finns took up their encircling and ambushing raids again. The Soviets, obligingly, remained static and did not use the advantage they possessed in numbers and firepower. They were content to sit it out rather than attempt more costly attacks. The Soviets dug in their infantry and armour, using the abundance of timber to construct bunkers and reinforced trenches. The Finns quickly adapted, avoiding the strongest positions and concentrating against weaker or more demoralized formations. They also attempted to intercept airdrops intended for these static Soviet positions, further weakening the dug-in forces.

The Soviets used this pause in operations to review and make changes to their tactics and force structures. A more detailed intelligence picture was built up of the Mannerheim defences, and it was decided that all forces on the Karelian front would be organized into two armies, the 7th and 13th. Rehearsals for a major offensive were carried out against mock-up versions of the defences behind the front line. More artillery was brought up and tank formations were broken down into smaller units that could provide close support for the infantry. The original ten divisions were reinforced to 25 divisions so that 600,000 men could be brought to bear against the Finnish army. The new offensive began on 1 February 1940 with a massive concentration of artillery, stepping up a bombardment that had been continuous since December. Aerial bombing added to the devastating fire that was saturating the Finnish lines. It became impossible to move in daylight, and the Finnish troops were forced to dig deeper to escape the pulverizing effects of the Soviet guns. At night, they did what they could to repair their battered trenches. After enduring this tremendous cannonade for ten days, the Finns heard Soviet ground forces rolling forwards. Smoke screens covered their advance and the infantry and tanks this time came on together, each supporting the other. Finnish positions were being overrun, the defenders doing what they could to resist the overwhelming numbers. Astonishingly, the Finns actually managed to hold and repel the Soviets at Taipale, but in the centre a general withdrawal to the so-called Intermediate Line was ordered.

The attack had not been an outright success. Soviet casualties had been high, there was increasing pressure from the League of Nations to end the war and if the spring thaw arrived before all the military objectives were secure then the marshy terrain would add to the Soviets’ difficulties. Negotiations were therefore opened, however the Soviets continued their advance, entering the ruined suburbs of Viipuri in early March. Finnish troops kept up their resistance, but ammunition supplies were limited and it seemed only a matter of time before the south was captured entirely. Despite volunteers arriving from Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries, and some military assistance from France and Britain, there was little hope of widespread foreign intervention.

To obtain peace the government of Finland agreed to the terms imposed by Moscow. Finland lost some territory, was compelled to give up about 30 per cent of its pre-war industrial resources, and almost half a million Finns were forced to evacuate the south. In addition, a Soviet military base was established at Hanko on the Gulf of Finland. The Soviets had stopped short of a full annexation. The Finns had shown every sign of fighting on, demonstrating their potential to wage an indefinite guerrilla war. The sheer determination of their troops had been enough to convince Stalin that such a war would prove too costly and humiliating. Against all odds, the Finns had taken on, and often checked, the vast Soviet steamroller, providing textbook examples of how small numbers of highly mobile and well-camouflaged forces could defeat seemingly more powerful foes.