When we talk about ‘project failure’ we first need to clarify just what that means, keeping in mind that ‘failure’ is likely to have a different meaning for different people, depending on their perspective. It can relate to one of the objectives of any party involved in a project not being met. This may include cost, time, client expectation, shareholder or boardroom expectation, safety targets, functionality or fit for purpose, public or political expectations and perceptions, etc.
While this chapter is essentially about individual projects, it should be kept in mind that large projects that are not efficiently managed can have the potential to put a contractor out of business. Signing the contract for a high profile construction project can be dangerous if all of the planning, design, specifications and contract terms are not properly in place and still have lots of grey areas or black holes.
In the following pages we have identified 35 common causes of project failure: 20 arising from actions taken during the creation of a project, the tendering, bidding and pre‐contract phase of projects; and 15 post‐contract ones arising during detailed design, construction, commissioning and transition to operations. All these causes of failure are related to shortcomings in management in one way or another and always involve human input. These shortcomings are mostly at senior level: the principle stakeholders, including the client, the Bid team, design consultants, project and construction managers and services contractors. The common element is invariably the human input and not the technical processes.
Generally though, failure is referred to in terms of cost over‐runs and programme blow‐outs for various reasons and these causes of failure are analysed and explained to clients, owners and shareholders ad nauseam.
But why do project failures keep happening? Why can't major international companies and government authorities develop risk management and bidding processes that prevent project failures, or at least establish realistic parameters that minimise the extent of failure if things start to go wrong?
If control and reporting is efficient and up to scratch all the time then properly informed decisions and mitigation should substantially reduce the risk of major failure. However, this only applies if the project has been commissioned on ‘solid foundations’ and unfortunately many are not.
Projects that fail generally do so for a combination of reasons and in this chapter we analyse these different reasons in depth. However, the one common denominator amongst all these reasons is human error at some stage or other in the process, as shown in the following examples.
The global construction and civil engineering industry is notorious for its slim margins, typically in the 2–3% range, which are brought about by the competitive bidding process; this leaves no room for mismanagement, but fine margins are not a prime cause of failed projects.
So, our interest is in finding out why some projects are very successful and why others have catastrophic programme overruns and financial losses; losses that can vastly exceed the original contract price.
The ‘35 common causes’ form the second part of this chapter, but first we will review some high profile projects from the last two decades that have run into serious trouble.
The following projects are large‐scale examples in four countries, but there are many more well‐known examples around the world of projects of all sizes. Also refer to Chapter 15 for similar examples of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) that were poorly planned and vastly over budget and programme.
With the following projects we are talking about large cost and time overruns, not the marginal losses that often occur in projects but which do not put the existence of the head contractor at risk.
Politically motivated, poorly planned, vastly over budget, behind programme.
In this section we review and make brief comments on the key issues associated with the following international projects that ran into serious trouble. These issues show the commonality of problems that can occur with the implementation of major projects. All of these projects were government sponsored, and all of them were big enough to attract media attention and necessitate rigorous post‐mortems, so the information we use is all publicly available on the internet.
Followed by a special comment on two iconic buildings:
With such large projects there are a number of risk areas that can potentially be a problem, such as with the planning, financial feasibility, cost estimating and with the construction process, etc. However, there are people driving all these areas, so it is more than likely that our old friend ‘erroneous human error or behaviour’ is behind any serious problem with any of these components. The scope of responsibility can extend over a broad range of participants, from the boardroom and government departments; to design and environmental consultants; to cost planners and programmers; and at the coalface on the construction site. We will encounter all sorts of people from these areas as we progress through the following pages.
The key issues involved with these projects remain the same for all size projects and there are numerous smaller ones in every country that have incurred the same problems.
Comment: this project is an extraordinary example of incompetent planning and implementation, on an ongoing basis. Industry professionals cannot understand why the authorities have not been able to address the identified problems and expedite the completion. ‘After almost 15 years of planning, construction began in 2006. Originally planned to open in October 2011, the airport has encountered a series of delays and cost overruns. These were due to poor construction planning, execution, management and corruption. Autumn 2020 became the new target for the official opening date as 2019 became too improbable. A new TÜV report published in November 2017 suggested that the opening could even be delayed until 2021’. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin_Brandenburg_Airport
With a projected delay in opening of nine years or more, the anticipated total cost in early 2018 was €10 billion compared to the original budget of €3 billion including construction re‐work costs and compensation to services operators and retailers. The primary cause was originally the failure of the project management to comply with fire regulations, plus a large number of functional design deficiencies that were unearthed late in the day. As the years have passed it has become quite apparent that incompetent management of the project has been the principal problem.
Comment: the $12 billion cost increase and nine year program overrun was the result of very poor execution.
‘Planning began in 1982; the construction work was carried out between 1991 and 2006; and the project concluded on December 31, 2007 when the partnership between the program manager and the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority ended. The Big Dig was the most expensive highway project in the US, and was plagued by cost overruns, delays, leaks, design flaws, charges of poor execution and use of substandard materials, criminal arrests and one death. The project was originally scheduled to be completed in 1998 at an estimated cost of $2.8 billion (in 1982 dollars, US$6.0 billion adjusted for inflation as of 2006).However, the project was completed only in December 2007, at a cost of over $14.6 billion ($8.08 billion in 1982 dollars, meaning a cost overrun of about 190%) as of 2006. The Boston Globe estimated that the project will ultimately cost $22 billion, including interest, and that it would not be paid off until 2038’. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Dig
Comment: this is one of the worst examples of a PPP motorway that was ill‐conceived on the basis of extremely over‐optimistic traffic projections.
‘The big toll road operator Transurban has bought Brisbane's troubled Airportlink roadway for $2 billion – almost 60% less than the original $4.8 billion construction cost. The 6.7 km AirportlinkM7 tunnel connecting Brisbane Airport with the CBD was completed in July 2012. Initial forecasts from the failed project operator – the BrisConnections consortium – that the Airportlink would attract 170 000 vehicles a day within months of opening proved wildly optimistic.
Fewer than 50 000 vehicles a day were using the tollway by the time it went into receivership in early 2013’. www.abc.net.au/news/2015‐11‐24/brisbanes‐troubled‐airportlink‐sold‐at‐almost‐60pc‐loss/6968586
‘February 20, 2013 – The Australian Shareholders Association (ASA) has described Brisbane's Airport Link as the “biggest construction project disaster” in recent history, local media reported on Wednesday. Queensland toll road operator BrisConnections was placed in administration on Tuesday seven months after opening, with debts totalling more than 3 billion AU dollars (3.1 billion US dollars) according to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). The receivership came after traffic flows only reached less than half of what was projected’.
Comment: this project was a fiasco; a perfect example of political bungling
‘From the outset, the building and its construction have been controversial. The choices of location, architect, design, and the construction company were all criticised by politicians, the media and the Scottish public. Scheduled to open in 2001, it did so in 2004, more than three years late with an estimated final cost of £414 million, many times higher than initial estimates of between £10 m and £40 m. A major public enquiry into the handling of the construction, chaired by the former Lord Advocate, Peter Fraser, was established in 2003. The inquiry concluded in September 2004 and criticised the management of the whole project from the realisation of cost increases down to the way in which major design changes were implemented’. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_Parliament_Building
Also refer to Chapter for a summary and further perspective.
Comment: as of early 2018 the expected completion date and final costs are anyone's guess, with the project history inspiring no confidence in its overall management.
‘Stuttgart 21 is a railway and urban development project…. Its core is a renewed Stuttgart Hauptbahnhof, amongst some 57 km of new railways, including some 30 km of tunnels and 25 km of high‐speed lines….
The project was officially announced in April 1994. Construction work began on 2 February 2010
On 19 July 2007 it was announced…. Identified funding sources… also made provision for possible increases over the €2.8 billion estimate of up to €1 billion…. As of March 2013, total costs are officially estimated at 6.5 billion euros.
Heated debate ensued on a broad range of issues, including the relative costs and benefits, geological and environmental concerns, as well as performance issues. On 1 October 2010, the biggest protest so far took place with an estimated 100 000 people taking part in the demonstration against the project.
As of 2017, the start of operation is expected in 2021’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuttgart_21
Comment –: the lessons learnt out of this failed project are very important, even though several years have passed. Essentially, the contractors signed up to deliver a specification that it was technically not possible to build. The heavy losses from this project, before the contract was terminated, and those sustained on the Cardiff Millennium Stadium, contributed to the 2001 disposal of John Laing's construction division to O'Rourke for £1.
‘Firms ran up £100 m loss on PFI laboratory scheme’
Wednesday 10 May 2006 09.20 BST
Private companies and banks lost more than £100 m on a Whitehall Private Finance Initiative that went wrong, a National Audit Office report reveals today. Builders John Laing and the Serco Group had to abandon a £130 m project to build a new headquarters for the National Physical Laboratory – a world‐class facility to measure time, length and mass – in Teddington, Surrey.
The Teddington scheme went wrong when the contractors failed to take account of specifications needed for scientists and engineers to carry out delicate measurement work. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/may/10/highereducation.businessofresearch
The Termination of the PFI Contract for the National Physical Laboratory
‘The Department for Trade and Industry handled the termination of the contract well. But different handling of the project by all parties at the early stages might well have avoided the problems which led to the termination’
Sir John Bourn, the head of the National Audit Office, 10 May 2006"'
www.nao.org.uk/publications/0506/the_termination_of_the_pfi_con.aspx
Comment: Metronet went into administration in July 2007, predominantly because its poor corporate governance and leadership meant that it could not manage its shareholder‐dominated supply chain.
‘The Metronet PPP contracts to upgrade the Tube left the DfT without effective means of protecting the taxpayer. Metronet's failure led to a direct loss to the taxpayer of between £170 million and £410 million. The DfT's work with the Mayor of London, TfL and London Underground on a long term solution will need to improve governance and risk management in the new arrangements they are intending to put in place to protect the taxpayer.
The Comptroller and Auditor General, 5 June 2009’
Transport for London (TfL) guaranteed 95% of Metro net's borrowing …….When Metronet failed, the DfT made a £1.7 billion payment to meet the guarantee so that the running of the Underground would not be compromised.
www.nao.org.uk/report/the‐department‐for‐transport‐the‐failure‐of‐metronet
Comment: these two world renowned buildings deserve a mention because they have quite a lot in common, even though they opened 40 years apart in 1973 and 2017.
There has been much written about the substantial issues encountered during the creation of these two majestic buildings, including the resignation mid‐stream of the Opera House's Danish architect Jørn Utzon after clashes with the State government:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sydney_Opera_House
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elbe_Philharmonic_Hall
Were any lessons from Sydney applied in Hamburg?
The simple answer is that there would have been no reason for lessons from Sydney to have been applied in Hamburg. These two landmark buildings had their own individual issues with planning, design, construction, cost and programme over‐runs, and management by government and city authorities. There is no reason why the Hamburg authorities would have reflected on the Sydney experience. Similar mistakes may have been made, but they had no connection.
Given the above outcomes you would think that far more research, thought and practical effort would be dedicated to implementing more effective commercial risk management systems in order to reduce the probability of failure. Invariably the fault does lie with senior management, be it corporate or government. One clarification that I would like to make is that the primary causes of project problems that we discuss are principally related to commercial and site risk management as distinct from health and safety risk, which is vitally important but rarely causes major project failure.
In all cases it is actually a failure in the project management of one stakeholder or another that is the cause of the problems. Risk management systems should be able to anticipate and provide early warning or expose the problems as the project progresses through planning and into construction, and rectify or mitigate them to an acceptable extent, but clearly this did not work effectively in the above projects.
With government‐backed projects some commentators say that it is not surprising they get out of hand because politicians interfere too much for their own political purposes, don't understand the processes or the risks and don't let the professional public servants run the projects unhindered (shades of Yes Minister!) 1
To an extent this is correct, but as a generalisation it is unfair, because there are many government projects around the world that have been successfully implemented by very professional government authorities, with complex projects completed on time, on budget and to a high standard of quality, with these projects covering civil engineering (roads and bridges, etc.) as well as general construction works. These projects include both traditional design and construction (D&C) and PPPs.
The most common criticism of government projects is that government authorities have a perennial habit of underestimating the total cost and the programme, with figures being bandied about of approximately 20–30% for each. Such underestimating is a sure sign of inexperience or incompetence, or even ‘good’ politics – i.e. if you knew the ‘real’ out‐turn cost, then projects wouldn't get off the ground. There would not have been a Sydney Opera House!
‘Optimism bias’ in public sector projects is not uncommon and creates unrealistic expectations by under‐estimating time and cost and over‐estimating the benefits. Therefore, when governments are looking at taking on innovative projects or ones with a higher risk profile, they should ensure that their investment decisions are based on realistic estimates and assumptions and that they have identified the potential risks as far as possible, with appropriate cost contingencies and mitigation plans.
Many government authorities rely heavily on industry professionals to advise them and sometimes this advice has been found wanting in major projects that have run into trouble. Then the blame game starts, with the politicians and bureaucrats saying they were badly advised and the industry professionals saying that their advice wasn't heeded.
While it is easy to criticise government sponsored projects for wasting taxpayer's money due to poor planning and execution, it should not be forgotten that there have been many major projects that have been fully within the control of the contractor, that have been won on a lump sum Bid submitted after all the checks and balances have been applied at all corporate levels, and they still incur huge losses. There are too many examples that show how this can and does happen.
The following is the detailed list of the 35 common causes of project failure that we have identified.
The most crucial of these causes mostly occur during the initial planning stages when the project is being structured, the concept and feasibility, planning approvals, bidding, design and cost planning, construction, commissioning and transition to operations, and rarely after the facilities have commenced commercial operations.
We have only provided explanations and examples for the items that we consider most critical and generally the most common causes of failure. Examples of all the items listed would fill a book on their own, but they are not necessary because they are either well understood by readers involved in the industry or they are self‐explanatory.
This is an inherent and significant risk in the construction industry's fragmented and non‐integrated way of working. On every project, the team faces the eternal question that keeps everyone awake at night, ‘How do you know that the costing is keeping up to date with the progress of the design and that the design being put forward will be competitive in price, and that everything has been included in the costs and that the estimators know that they been told everything?’
It is fundamental that D&C design development and cost planning run in close parallel so that different design options can be priced immediately and that there is ample opportunity for value engineering, all in the context of the targeted total Bid price that the Bid director will be aiming at. With large projects and tight Bid programmes it is a real trap if the design team gets too far ahead of the cost planners, because if it is found that the total Bid price is looking too high and the submission deadline is rapidly closing then there is no time left for the design team to consider other options and remedy the situation. This is where tight Bid programme management becomes so important.
After commencing the contract there is not as much urgency, but a lot of time can still be wasted if the detailed design development is not closely monitored for cost against the contract price. With PPPs, client user groups often see this phase of the design development as an opportunity to get more for their money and the design and cost managers have to be careful to stick to the specifications they offered in the Bid.
The most common cause of problems in this area is not involving the facilities manager early enough and fully enough. When this happens:
The facilities manager therefore needs to be fully involved from the Bid stage, right through D&C and in the completion, commissioning and transition when they take over responsibility.
This is such an important area of risk management that we list the following indicative areas in which the facilities manager should be involved.
Bid phase:
D &C phase:
Commissioning and transition to operations:
The above lists are by no means comprehensive, but are intended to alert managers to the areas to be covered generally, and the potential risks that will arise if any key areas are overlooked.
A risk management check in sufficient time before the bidding process is complete should pick this up.
There are a number of areas where both employers and contractors have been badly caught out on a regular basis over the years.
More often than not bidding is a stressful process and many items are left to be finalised at the last moment, out of necessity. One of the risks arising from this for contractors is that qualifications to the Bid will be overlooked in the final rush to the line. This can cause disputes down the track when the contractor says ‘but I didn't allow for this’ and the client responds ‘sorry but you did not qualify that in your Bid’.
With large Bids it is important that there is a designated risk manager who takes responsibility for collating all the risk management items and checks with the team leaders of all the other segments of the Bid. (Refer to Chapter , team structure organisation chart for risk management.)
Qualifications can also work against the client's interest and budget if they are included by the contractor, but the client doesn't readily pick them up.
It is such an important topic that we have devoted Chapter 24 entirely to it.
People in authority interfere and over‐ride risk management ‘stop’ signs for a variety of reasons:
In these situations two things invariably happen:
Sometimes, but not often, senior management do have some cards up their sleeve that will make the project profitable, but if so they should take the operational team into their confidence as soon as possible, e.g. on almost all projects the programme has a direct bearing on profitability and if it can be substantially shortened for some reason then the project might be financially successful, but it can also work the other way.
Risk management check points are put in Bid programmes for prudent reasons, so ignore them and over‐ride them at your peril. More than one small or medium building company has been brought down by just one or two projects.
With this in mind they cut margins, preliminaries and contingency allowances to the bone and chase turnover (revenue) as their primary objective, bidding and winning projects on little or no profit margin. They also justify this approach by convincing themselves that they will at least get some overheads for the head office even if the project only breaks even.
Now this may work sometimes, but the construction industry is notorious for how many projects end up being unprofitable even when healthy allowances and margins are built into the winning price. So if you are chasing revenue and winning projects on an effective nil‐margin basis then you are ultimately playing with fire. If anything goes wrong with time, cost and quality control then those slim margins or a break‐even price will rapidly turn into a loss that will not be covered by variation claims and squeezing the subcontractors. Generally, when this happens it is really bad news for the subcontractors.
On top of this the company balance sheet has to accommodate performance bonds, bank guarantees and retentions on the progress claims, so it is likely that the project cash flow will be negative overall if there is the slightest hiccup. If this situation occurs for a company with several projects running concurrently then it will only be a matter of time until their bankers run out of patience.
Chasing revenue without profit is therefore a dangerous game for a construction company that does it often.
It is interesting to note how often construction companies make press releases announcing a new project they have won and its value. It would be of far greater interest to shareholders if they also announced their projected bottom line for that project as well, albeit with some cautionary qualifications. This is a good form of risk management in itself.
In one large PPP investment a new finance director joined the concession company and six weeks after he arrived he advised the board that he had found a $15 m tax credit that could be claimed from three years previously. This had been missed by internal accounting, the external financial advisors and the auditors. Now that was worth an early bonus!
The Squaire Building, Frankfurt Airport, Germany
Comment: it is a recipe for disaster when ‘clever clients’ think they can do it better themselves by managing subcontractors directly instead of wrapping the project into a lump sum contract with the primary risk and interface issues being taken on by the head contractor. The final cost of the project was reported as approximately EUR 1.3 billion, double the original estimate of €660 m. As a property investment, this was a disastrous result.
‘The Squaire is an office building in Frankfurt, Germany, built between 2006 and 2011 on top of Frankfurt Airport long‐distance rail station. The building is 660 m long, 65 m wide, 45 m high, and has nine floors. With a total floor area of 140 000 m2 (1 506 900 sq. ft.) it is one of the largest office buildings in Germany. Its dimensions and design make it a ‘groundscraper’’. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Squaire
Projects are launched fairly regularly that have extremely high technical demands that are ‘ground breaking’ and when successfully completed will also have a high profile. If the specifications for which the contractor has to guarantee performance delivery require new and unproven technology then all the danger signals should be flashing.
However, the enthusiasm of senior management to win such projects and gain the high profile kudos on completion can sometimes overshadow and outweigh their pre‐Bid investigations into how advanced and proven this new technology is.
This is not always a simple situation and depends heavily on the technical people being entirely open and frank about the status of the technological development, because it is likely that the contractor's senior management will not have an in‐depth understanding of the new technology. The technical people might be over‐optimistic because this is their ‘big opportunity’, or they may have only proven the technology in laboratory testing and be taking a leap of faith that it will work in a commercial situation.
The obvious answer is that the risks are carried by those directly responsible for the technical delivery and performance, and the contracts and subcontracts should be drawn up carefully to reflect this, with appropriate guarantees and indemnities.
Clients will take the view that ‘if you promise to deliver the contract and you do, you will get paid, but if you don't deliver then it is going to cost you’.
There is a wide range of industries in which this situation can apply in today's world of fast moving technical development, from prison security systems to ‘clean room’ chip manufacturing factories.
Two highly expensive and publicly known examples in recent years have been the Siemens Particle Therapy Oncology Hospital, Kiel, Germany (http://www.marketwatch.com/story/siemens‐ends‐particle‐therapy‐project‐in‐kiel‐2011‐09‐14; http://www.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/?press=/en/pressrelease/2011/corporate_communication/axx20110983.htm) and the National Physics Laboratory, UK – refer to the start of this chapter.
Sometimes client specifications and expectations are unrealistic and sometimes suppliers and contractors offer more than they prudently should.
The remaining causes of project failure are in this stage.
The construction industry unfortunately has an inherent culture of breeding a proportion of dominating ‘sledge hammer’ site managers who are also nearly always bad communicators, and yell and scream at everyone. This type of manager invariably ends up with poor relationships with clients and subcontractors, more than a reasonable number of disputes, poor team spirit and a lack of respect from their own staff.
Compare this to the real leader who communicates well with everyone, mentors and motivates, has all the skills to show the way, commands respect from all stakeholders, and does not need to raise their voice.
Some head contractors do the same with their subcontractors, but they overlook the fact that subcontractors and suppliers generally respond in direct proportion to the way they are treated and if it is really unreasonable then the bad payer will pay more in the long run, one way or another. This sort of practice can be really damaging to relationships, but conversely if payments are made promptly then the subcontractors will often go the extra mile for their client and work harder to meet the programme, and possibly not bother to claim for some unexpected costs they have encountered. It is a two way street and it takes only a small amount of goodwill to generate significant performance improvements.
Contractors do not have a problem with claims that are challenged for valid reasons provided there is an open and honest debate about the situation, but clients that short‐change and are late with every payment as a matter of course are infuriating and are of course in breach of good faith as well as breach of contract.
Of course contractors are not angels either and often put in grossly inflated claims or claims for work that is not completed or where the milestone has not been reached.
Note: for legal reasons the identity of the following project cannot be disclosed, but the facts described are an accurate description of events.
The following story describes a project that ran off the rails well and truly and how it was brought back on track. It all went wrong because the project director was completely out of his depth and also had the wrong personal skills to be leading the project. It demonstrates the need for robust risk management processes at all stages in a contract to protect the client, the contractor, subcontractors, and suppliers. This factual account shows how project leadership is vital to success.
This was an industrial D&C with a contract value of $140 million and a 3 1/2 year programme. It was not a large project in itself but a vitally important one because it was a critical component in a much larger complex, with the rest of the industrial complex having activities that fed off this facility. The scope of works was very detailed in respect of the deliverables and the contract was tight, especially in regard to the programme, with heavy liquidated damages to a cap of 40% of the contract value, recoverable after five months of delay subject to other extenuating circumstances.
The contractor was a subsidiary of an international company who were recognised leaders in this field. They had no other involvement with the rest of the industrial complex, but were engaged because of the criticality of this particular facility. The contractor hired an outside construction director rather than appointing someone from inside the company and they commenced on site with a suitably experienced team of 14 personnel.
Three months before the due completion date the client raised urgent concerns about the progress whereupon the contractor advised they would be four months late and subsequently produced an updated programme. Two months before the new completion date the client concluded that this date was clearly not possible. The contractor then advised that they would require another seven months, i.e. completion would be 11 months later than the original contract completion date.
The client demanded urgent expediting action, so the parent company of the contractor appointed an external audit team to review the entire project and make recommendations. For the parent company, this contract value was actually quite small in the context of their annual global revenue, so they had not been keeping a close eye on the project. For the client, the liquidated damages that would likely apply were far less important than the serious flow‐on effect to the overall industrial complex.
The independent audit team appointed consisted of a project manager, quantity surveyor and planner. Whilst all were very experienced and had been involved in many difficult projects internationally, they were taken aback by the problems on this particular project.
The construction director was obsessed with ‘squashing’ subcontractors. He had completely lost sight of delivering the project. He admitted in interview that he had only read the scope of works and had not read the contract thoroughly at any time in the past three years, and stated that it was unimportant because he knew what was required technically. Clearly he had no idea of the obligations under the contract and did not seem to comprehend the significance to the overall complex.
It turned out that whilst the construction director was an experienced and capable design engineer he had never actually undertaken project management and had no idea about efficient methods and processes.
He camouflaged his lack of experience by heavily bullying his team, the suppliers and subcontractors, and would not tolerate any other opinions, constructive or dissenting. His arrogance and rudeness had to be seen to be believed.
He was relieved of his duties a few days after the initial report from the audit team and replaced by a properly experienced construction manager.
The independent audit team rapidly made several other expediting recommendations, with the priorities being:
When you really examine the common causes of project failure you might conclude that it really should not be too hard to reduce or eliminate these causes and that all we have to do is pass on the lessons learnt to the next generation of managers.
However, this has not been the case to a sufficient degree. With most of these common causes the underlying problem is the human input at either the corporate or the project level, or both, and some sectors of the industry continue to have difficulty in coming to grips with this fact of life.