Enemy positions burned out by Capt. Tony Niemeyer's team.
An ammunition-carrying party took supplies to the forward companies that night, enabling the men to defend their gain successfully against a counterattack that came early the next morning. Just before dawn on 11 June the remainder of the battalion joined the two advance companies. The 381st Infantry made no attempt to extend its holdings on 11 June but conducted heavy tank and artillery fire against the cave openings on the Big Apple Peak. The next important thrust against the Japanese line was to occur in the sector of the 17th Infantry where Col. Francis Pachler was planning a night attack against his portion of the Yaeju-Dake.
Colonel Pachler had good reasons for favoring a night move. The advantages of observation belonged almost completely to the defending force, and this had seriously interfered when the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, seized the southeast end of the escarpment. The coral wall of the escarpment in front of the 1st Battalion was higher at this end; at the same time the two suitable routes leading to the high ground were narrow and could be easily controlled by Japanese fire. The troops had held positions at the base of the 170-foot cliff for several days and were familiar with the terrain. They had, in fact, been looking at the escarpment so long that, as their commander, Maj. Maynard Weaver, said, they were anxious to get on top so that they could look at something else.{513}
Although the night attack was planned principally for the 1st Battalion, Colonel Pachler also decided on a coordinated move to enlarge the area held by the 3d Battalion. The final plan included three assault companies: Company A was to occupy a cluster of coral about a hundred yards beyond the edge of the escarpment and next to the boundary between the 7th and 96th Divisions; Company B had a similar objective about 200 yards to the southeast; and Company L was directed against the small hill between the 1st Battalion's objectives and the positions occupied by the 3d Battalion on 11 June. Each company was to take a separate route. Company A's path led directly up the face of the cliff to its objective. Company B had to travel south to a break in the escarpment face and then, once on the high ground, turn right toward its objective. The objective of Company L was near the edge of the escarpment and easily approached.
Movement was to begin at 0400 on 12 June. Since the attack was based on stealth, no artillery preparation was used. However, 2 battalions of 105-mm artillery, 1 battery of 155-mm. howitzers, and an 8-inch howitzer battalion were scheduled to deliver heavy harassing fires during the early part of the night. Also a total of 21 batteries registered their fires on the afternoon of 11 June and were prepared to surround the objectives with protective artillery fire if trouble developed after they were reached. One section of heavy machine guns was attached to each assault company.
Colonel Pachler had planned the attack carefully and insisted that every man participating know all details of the movement. Reconnaissance patrols had examined the trails leading to the high ground, and demolition teams had satchel-charged known cave positions in the face of the cliff. Nevertheless, everyone concerned with the attack dreaded the possibility of confusion that might result from the unknown conditions during darkness. This apprehension increased at 2000 on the night of 11 June when the 7th Division G-2 Section reported interception of an enemy radio message that evening which said, "Prepare to support the attack at 2300." A little later another intercepted message read: "If there are any volunteers for the suicide penetration, report them before the contact which is to be made one hour from now."{514} At the same time, from dusk until nearly 2300, the Japanese fired an extremely heavy concentration of artillery which front-line troops fully expected to be followed by a counterattack. The counterattack came but was aimed against the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, which had reached the top of Hill 95 that afternoon, and against the 96th Division. There was no enemy activity in the 17th Infantry's sector.
Night illumination and harassing shell fire ceased shortly before 0400, and thereafter the execution of the attack followed the plan almost without variation. The attacking companies moved out in single file. As promptly as if it had been scheduled, a heavy fog settled over southern Okinawa. It was of the right density-allowing visibility up to ten feet-to provide concealment but still allow the men to follow their paths without confusion. On the high ground Company A found a few civilians wandering about, and the leading platoon of Company B met three Japanese soldiers just after it reached the shelf of the escarpment. The men ignored them and walked quietly on. Nor did the enemy open fire. By 0530, a few minutes after dawn, Companies A and B were in place and no one had fired a shot. (See Map No. 53.)
Map No. 53: Breaching Yaeju-Dake
Without incident Company L reached its objective and then, anxious to take advantage of the fog and the absence of enemy fire, its commander sent his support platoon to another small hill fifty yards beyond. This objective was secured within a few minutes, after two enemy soldiers were killed. The platoon leader called his company commander to report progress and then frantically called for mortar fire. Walking toward his position in a column of twos were about fifty Japanese. The Americans opened fire with rifles and BAR's, broke up the column formation, and counted thirty-seven enemy soldiers killed; the others escaped.
Men in the 1st Battalion were pleased no less with the success of the night attack. A few minutes after Company A was in place, four enemy soldiers came trudging up toward them. They were killed with as many shots. Four others followed these at a short interval and were killed in the same way. Company B was not molested until about 0530, when some Japanese tried to come out of several caves in the center of the company's position. Since the cave openings were reinforced with concrete they could not be closed with demolition charges, but the men guarded the entrances and shot the Japanese as they emerged. Soon after daylight Company C began mopping up caves in the face of the escarpment, and later it joined the rest of the battalion on the high ground. By 0800 the situation was settled and the 17th Infantry held strong positions on the Yaeju-Dake. The Japanese had withdrawn their front-line troops from Yaeju-Dake during the night in order to escape harassing artillery, but they had expected to reoccupy it before "the expected 0700 attack." Fifteen hours after the 32d Infantry burned its way to the top of Hill 95, the 17th Infantry had seized its portion of the Yaeju-Dake in a masterfully executed night attack.
The 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, relieved Companies I and K during the day, and, with Company L attached and supported by medium and flame tanks, continued the attack. The 1st Battalion held its ground and fired at enemy soldiers who, slow to realize that their defensive terrain had been stolen during the night, tried to creep back to their posts. Company B alone killed sixty-three during the day.
At 0600 on the same day, 12 June, Colonel Holloran's 381st Infantry delivered the next blow against the Japanese main line of resistance. Since 10 June, when the 381st launched its attack against the escarpment, the 1st Battalion had gained a toe hold on the intermediate level in the saddle between the Yaeju-Dake and the Yuza-Dake Peaks. The 3d Battalion had cleaned the enemy troops out of Tomui but was unable to proceed against the blunt and steep segment of the escarpment that lay in its zone. For 12 June Colonel Halloran committed his reserve battalion, the 2d, on the west end of his flank to fight abreast of the center salient and, at the same time, close a gap between his regiment and the 383d. Then, depending upon the success of the 17th Infantry's night attack, the 3d Battalion was to press its attack against the adjoining portion of the escarpment.{515}
NIGHT ATTACK ON YAEJU-DAKE by the 17th Infantry, 7th Division, on 12 June resulted in capture of the section shown in picture above. Company A went up the path shown near center and occupied the coral ridges appearing in center. Company B moved up the slope at left and swung back to right on top of the escarpment. Below are infantrymen on Yaeju-Dake the morning of 13 June. Litter team evacuating wounded can be seen on the road.