16. On the Nature of Reality, from Adornment for Nāgārjuna’s Thought, Gendun Chopel

Gendun Chopel’s most controversial work is his posthumously published Adornment for Nāgārjuna’s Thought, a work on Madhyamaka philosophy that is generally extolled by Nyingmas and Kagyus and excoriated by Geluks. Those who wish to praise Gendun Chopel but condemn this work claim that he did not write it, that it is instead the work of his Nyingma disciple Dawa Sangpo. However, there is clear evidence that it represents Gendun Chopel’s thought.

Many of the positions set forth in the text, especially on the question the nature of the ultimate and the conventional, resonate with those of earlier authors, including the renowned Sakya scholar Gorampa (1429–1489). However, Gendun Chopel presents his positions in his own inimitable way, writing in a conversational style, often inflected with irony. His knowledge of the world beyond Tibetan letters is also evident. The first text he mentions is the Koran; among the Buddhist authors that he cites is Buddhaghoṣa. Still, he clearly sees his work as participating in, rather than departing from, the venerable tradition of Tibetan explorations of emptiness.

Adornment is divided into two parts. According to his friend and student Lachung Apo, Gendun Chopel wrote the first part in his own hand and gave it to him to cheer him up when he was sick. The second part is likely a compilation of notes made by Dawa Sangpo after Gendun Chopel’s release from prison. The first part, ending with a long poem with the famous refrain “I am uncomfortable about positing conventional validity,” is included here.¹⁸⁵

When the enraged Devadatta pushed down a boulder [to kill you], you practiced silence.

What intelligent person would honor you as a friend for protection from the great enemy, fearful saṃsāra?

Through your aspiration to the path of liberation, the source of the ambrosia of excellent virtue and soothing peace.

[Grows] the glory of the smiling stamen of eloquent explanation, surrounded a thousandfold by the rays of reasoning.

May the bees of scholars of the three realms enjoy the sweet honey of the true transmission.

All of our decisions about what is and is not are just decisions made in accordance with how it appears to our minds; they have no other basis whatsoever. Therefore, when we ask, “Does it exist or not?” and the other person answers, “It exists,” in fact we are asking, “Does this appear to your mind to exist or not exist?” and the answer is simply, “It appears to my mind to exist.” In the same way, everything that one asks about—better or worse, good or bad, beautiful or ugly—is in fact merely asked about for the sake of understanding how the other person thinks. That the other person makes a decision and answers is in fact just a decision made in accordance with how it appears to his or her own mind; there is no other reason whatsoever. Therefore, as long as the ideas of two people are in disagreement with each other, they will argue. When they agree, the very thing that they agree upon will be placed in the class of what is, what exists, what can be known, and what is valid, and so on. Thus, the more people there are who agree, the more the point they agree upon becomes of great significance and importance. Contrary views are taken to be wrong views, mistaken perceptions, and so on.

Regarding the mode of agreement furthermore, occasionally agreement is based just on some scripture. For example, two Muslims argued about whether or not it is permissible to eat camel meat. Finally, when they saw that the Koran grants permission to eat camel meat, they agreed that it is permissible to eat it. Occasionally, the agreement of two people is based on the reasoning of the two disputants. For example, if there is an argument about whether or not there is a fire beyond a mountain pass, they agree when they see smoke at the summit of the pass. Whatever it may be, if they both see it directly, they agree without argument. This is the case for all common beings. Now someone may wonder whether it is infallible to accept a presentation of what can be known that is based on some universal agreement. It is not. For example, if one arrives in a place in which the eyes of all of the people in the land are afflicted by bile disease, all the people of that land will agree that a white conch is yellow, that there is no white. However, one cannot hold that a white conch is yellow due merely to that. Thus, the existence of that object is not decided by the mere agreement of some hundred people. It is not decided by the agreement of a thousand or ten thousand. It is not decided if all humans agree. It is not decided even by the agreement of all the common beings of the three realms. Therefore, all of our decisions about what exists and does not exist, what is and is not, are merely decisions in accordance with how it appears to our respective minds. When many hundreds of thousands of common beings to whose minds [things] appear similarly gather together, then the thing that they decide upon becomes firmly grounded and unchangeable, and those who speak in disagreement are proclaimed to be denigrators, nihilists, and so on.

Therefore, our statements about what does and does not exist are in fact classifications of what appears before our mind. Our statements that something does not exist or is impossible are classifications of what cannot appear before our mind. The reality (dharmatā) that is neither existent nor nonexistent does not belong to the former class, it belongs to the latter.

An amazing example of a majority in agreement dismissing the minority as false is set forth by the master Candrakīrti. Āryadeva’s Four Hundred (Catuḥśataka) says, “Therefore, why is it incorrect to say that the whole world is insane?” The commentary on that [by Candrakīrti] says, “Once, in a country, there was an astrologer who went before the king and said, ‘Seven days from now a rain will fall. All those whose mouths the water enters will go insane.’ When the king heard that he carefully covered the mouth of his well of drinking water and none of the rain fell into it. His subjects were unable to do the same and so the water went into all of their mouths and they all went insane. The king was the only one whose mind remained normal. In that country the way of thinking and the way of speaking of all the people did not agree with the way of thinking and the way of speaking of the king. Therefore, they all said, ‘The king is insane.’ In the end, not knowing what else to do, the king drank the water, whereby he came to agree with everyone else.”

Thus, due to the single great insanity from our having continually drunk the crazing waters of ignorance from time immemorial, there is no confidence whatsoever in our decisions concerning what exists and does not exist, what is and is not. Even though a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, or a hundred thousand of such insane people agree, it in no way becomes more credible.

One may think, “We concede that our decisions are unreliable, but when we follow the decisions of the Buddha, we are infallible.” Then who decided that the Buddha is infallible? If you say, “The great scholars and adepts like Nāgārjuna decided that he is infallible.” Then who decided that Nāgārjuna is infallible? If you say, “The Foremost Lama [Tsong kha pa] decided it.” then who knows that the Foremost Lama is infallible? If you say, “Our kind and peerless lama, the excellent and great so and so decided,” then infallibility, which depends upon your excellent lama, is decided by your own mind. In fact, therefore, it is a tiger who vouches for a lion, it is a yak who vouches for a tiger, it is a dog who vouches for a yak, it is a mouse who vouches for a dog, it is an insect who vouches for a mouse. Thus, an insect is made the final voucher for them all. Therefore, when one analyzes in detail the final basis for any decision, apart from coming back to one’s own mind, nothing else whatsoever is perceived.

But is it not appropriate to place one’s confidence in that very decision which has been made by one’s own mind? It is not the case. Sometimes this mind of ours seems mistaken, sometimes it seems correct. It is established by experience that it is always deceptive, like the divination of a bad soothsayer. Who can trust it? Many things that are decided to be in the morning are decided not to be in the evening. Things that are decided to be early in life are decided not to be later in life. Things that one hundred thousand Muslims decide are true are decided to be false by one hundred thousand Buddhists. Each is firmly based in their own scripture and reasoning, which are as immutable as a diamond. Each of them asserts that their teacher is the infallible final refuge.

But then who should decide what is true? Someone may say, “Since the mere agreement of the majority is not sufficient, it must be decided from the point of view of valid knowledge (pramāṇa).” Then what sort of thing is this so-called valid knowledge? Is this pillar that one vividly sees with the eyes established by valid knowledge and is the awareness that sees it in such a way a valid consciousness? If it is, how should one decide that this awareness is infallible? Until one decides whether or not the pillar exists, one does not know whether or not this awareness is a valid consciousness. Until one decides whether or not this awareness is a valid consciousness, one does not know whether or not the pillar exists. Therefore, when does one decide?

Someone may think, “The reason the pillar exists is that it can be seen by the eyes, touched by the hands, and can also be seen when looked at by a friend.” As was said before, it is decided because the eye and the hand agree and, in addition, the friend agrees. What confidence is there in something like that? If it is possible for the eye to be mistaken, what is the reason it would be impossible for the hand and the friend to be mistaken as well? For two people with bile disease, a yellow conch can be seen with their eyes and touched with their hands, and they both agree that it is yellow. In fact, are they not all in error?

Therefore, having made hundreds of presentations of what exists and does not exist, what is and is not, you go on to make various grandiloquent statements that the person who decides these things is not me, it is the Buddha, it is Nāgārjuna, it is the Great Charioteers, and so on. However, in the final analysis the Buddha, Nāgārjuna, the Great Charioteers, and so on are decided by just this mind of ours, and no scholar asserts that our own mind is unmistaken. Hence, is not the root of everything now rotten?

Therefore, as long as we remain in this land of saṃsāra, it is true that there is no other method than simply making decisions, having placed one’s confidence in this mind in which one can have no confidence in any of the decisions that it makes. However, is it not going too far by virtue of merely this to concoct a system of thought for the nature of the final reality (dharmatā) and for each and every one of all the inconceivable and unnameable supramundane qualities and, having given a name to each and every one of them, to then make decisions?

Therefore, regarding these conventional phenomena that have the nature of fictions, it comes down to the fact that there is nothing suitable other than a mere decision by this mind of ours, which is itself a source of fictions. However, those who strive wholeheartedly in search of the ultimate truth must understand at the outset that this fiction-making mind does not take you very far.

In brief, if a final reason for the unmistakenness and infallibility of this mind of ours could be demonstrated, then it would be possible to posit many other unmistaken and infallible things. However, the reason one’s mind is unmistaken is nothing other than mere stubbornness and arrogance. Candrakīrti’s Commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya) says, “Saying simply, ‘It is true because it is true’ does not make it true.” In the same way, even if one would exert the greatest stubbornness in saying, “It is unmistaken because it is unmistaken,” how could that make it unmistaken?

What is there to say about the mistaken mind of a vulgar fool? The venerable Buddhaghoṣa decided that external objects are truly established, but the master Asaṅga took them to be fictions. And Asaṅga himself decided that the imaginary lacks truth and that the dependent is truly established. The Madhyamaka masters, however, placed it in the category of fictions. Therefore, if there can be no confidence even in the minds of those scholars, in whose mind can there be confidence? Even in the case of someone like us, I would say:

But if there is no confidence in anything at all, what should one do? As stated before, as long as one abides in this world, there is nothing to do other than to remain believing in fictions, placing one’s trust in fictions, making various presentations on the basis of fictions.

However, to think that the earth, stones, mountains, and rocks that we see now are still to be seen vividly when we are buddhas is very much in error. As long as consciousness remains in the body of a donkey, one is able to experience the delicious flavor of grass, but when it has left [the body of the donkey], the flavor is also completely lost. The knowledge of the rooster that the night has passed is completely lost when consciousness departs from the rooster’s body. In our case as well, if we had some additional sense organs other than these present five, all external objects of knowledge also would increase. If these two eyes were stacked one on top of the other rather than on the right and left, it is certain that the shapes and colors of all external forms would be different. In whatever we decide, we have no means whatsoever other than deciding in dependence on these five sense organs. If it is not seen within these two eyes on the forehead, there is no other method to see forms. It is impossible to hear any sound that does not fit within this small hole of the ear. And so on. Therefore, to decide that all objects of knowledge are included within just this measure, based on these five weak senses, with the mistaken mind summoned to assist, and to remain content, saying that the mode of being which does not appear before our mind is nonexistent and impossible, is the door to all trouble.

That our sensory valid consciousnesses cannot be the criteria was also stated clearly by the Bhagavan himself. As it says in the King of Meditations [Sūtra]: “The eye, the ear, the nose are not valid; the tongue, the body, the mind are not valid. If these senses were valid, what could the noble path do for anyone?”¹⁸⁶

Therefore, the ultimate purpose for cultivating the noble path is in order to newly understand what the mind did not perceive and the eyes did not see before. When we carefully examine all of these assumptions that we hold about supramundane qualities, they are merely fabrications from examples taken from the world and, within that, from the human realm alone. For example, due to the fact that we like jewels, the ground, houses, and so on in Akaniṣṭha are made of jewels. Similarly, the auspicious marks of a saṃbhogakāya are in fact things that are pleasing to our human eye.

It is known through detailed analysis that the attire of the saṃbhogakāya and of the gods is the attire of ancient Indian kings. These are not merely our concoctions but are stated in the sūtras. Indeed, they are merely set forth with skillful methods so that the qualities of the buddha level, which in reality cannot appear to our mind, can appear to our mind in order to create admiration and delight within us. For example, if the Buddha had been born in China, it would certainly be the case that the saṃbhogakāya of Akaniṣṭha would have a long shiny beard and would wear a golden dragon robe. Similarly, if he had been born in Tibet, there is no doubt that in Akaniṣṭha there would be fresh butter from wish-granting cows in a golden tea churn five hundred yojanas high, and there would be tea made from the leaves of the wish-granting tree. Therefore, all of this is merely the way that we common beings think. Regarding the actual domains of the Buddha himself, the master Candrakīrti said, “However, this secret of yours cannot be told.”¹⁸⁷ It is certain that it is not suitable to be spoken in our presence or that, even though it were spoken, it is something that we could not understand. If one has just a little faith toward the inconceivable secret of the Buddha, then one should have some slight belief in all these deeds by the Buddha of making an aeon equal to an instant and an atom equal to a world.

But if this mind of ours is a valid consciousness, we conclude that an atom is the smallest material form and we conclude that a world is extremely vast. We conclude that the great does not fit inside the small. Therefore, no matter how great the magical powers and abilities of the Buddha may be, how is he able to destroy principles that are established by valid knowledge? If he is able to do so, is the power of the Buddha able to make all phenomena become truly established and capable of making all sentient beings into buddhas? If there is no reason why he cannot, other than because sentient beings are not buddhas and because all phenomena are not truly existent, then why can’t they be transformed? If, when we say that an atom and a world do not differ in size, we denigrate the conventional and fall into nihilism, then could there be a sin more heavy than the Buddha’s putting that very nihilism into practice when he actually makes them the same size? To decide that in general an atom and a world differ in size, but then to have to make many exceptions, such as saying that the Buddha’s doing so is a special case, is in fact proof that the bag of our valid knowledge is leaking in all directions.

If this is understood well, the Buddha’s making an atom and a world equal in size is not a case of making the unequal equal by reason of the immense power of the Buddha. Is it not because the mind of the Buddha, which has the nature of nondual wisdom, cannot be bound by this decision based on a conception that sees large and small to be contradictory for our minds? The Buddha sees large and small as of the same taste; large and small are in fact of the same taste. Therefore, it is an act of making what is, is. How could it be a magical display of turning what is not into what is?

To our conceptions, existence and nonexistence, is and is not, large and small, good and bad, and so on are all simply mutually exclusive. Therefore, a world not fitting into an atom is a great feat of magic conjured by this very conception of ours, which we choose to call valid knowledge. Thus, one must understand that we, and not the Buddha, are the real magicians.

In the colophon to the Entrance to the Middle Way it says that the master Candrakīrti “reversed attachment to things as being true by milking a picture of a cow…” If this appearance is established by valid knowledge, then because it is impossible for a picture of a cow to have intestines, lungs, udders, and so on, if he could milk some real milk from something like that, Candrakīrti would have greatly denigrated dependent origination. How would that reverse [attachment to] true establishment?

In the Book of the Kadam,¹⁸⁸ it says that Atiśa displayed various miracles, such as placing his entire body inside a small tsha tsha mold after which he said, “Everything we did today is counted as a contradiction by reason-advocating logicians. But if they count it [as such], let them count. I am ready to roam through India and Tibet, swearing that: ‘The mode of being of phenomena is certainly not like that.’ ”

Therefore, we proclaim with a great roar such things as if something is not nonexistent it must be existent, if it is not existent, it must be nonexistent, that those two are explicitly contradictory and that something that is neither of those two is impossible. Similarly, [we proclaim that] if something is small it must not be large, if something is large it must not be small, and if there is no difference between them, then all categories of dependent origination will be destroyed. Statements like “The view that reality is free from the eight extremes of elaboration is great nihilism” are made because nothing can appear to our mind other than existence and nonexistence and because our mind does not recognize anything other than existence and nonexistence. But how can the inability of something to appear to our mind prove that it is impossible and does not exist?

For example, if you arrived in a region of the Northern Plain where the people had no familiarity with anything sweet other than milk, they would be stubbornly certain that “if something is sweet it must be milk; if it is not milk it is not sweet.” To the sight of the people from that region, not being milk and being sweet is an ultimate explicit contradiction, and those who said something [to the contrary] are great nihilists who denigrate the conventional. Similarly, for example, if someone does not know anyone other than Namgyel and Tsering, then, in deciding that there is someone in a house, when he decides that Namgyel is absent, he decides that the person is Tsering. Because of not recognizing people other than those two, he would insist, “If it is not one, it must be the other.”

It is true that, in the same way, our mind continually oscillates between existence and nonexistence. There is no method for abiding in something that is other than those two.

However, referring to the middle path as that which is in the center of existence and nonexistence is very clearly set forth by the Buddha himself. For example, in the Kāśyapa Chapter there are such statements as, “Kāśyapa, ‘existence’ is one extreme; ‘nonexistence’ is the second extreme. That which is in the center of those two is the inexpressible and inconceivable middle path.” And it is stated very clearly in the Pile of Jewels [Sūtra]: “Existence and nonexistence are disputed. Pure and impure are also disputed. Suffering is not pacified by disputes. Being without dispute is the end of suffering.” However, when scholars these days hear a scripture that refers to neither existence nor nonexistence, they first seek out the identity of the speaker of the scripture. If the scripture is a statement of an earlier Tibetan scholar, they dismiss it [saying]: “One who says something like that is a nihilistic fool.” If the scripture is identified as a statement of the Buddha, Nāgārjuna, and so on, they patch it with words like “The statement ‘does not exist’ means ‘does not truly exist,’ ” and “ ‘Is not nonexistent’ means ‘is not conventionally nonexistent,’ ” so that it fits with their own desires. In fact, the only difference is that if they direct refutations at the Buddha, they fear being labeled evil persons with evil views, [whereas] if they are able to refute earlier Tibetans, they are labeled heroic scholars. Apart from that, there is no difference in the frequency of occurrence of expressions like “does not exist,” “does not not exist,” “inexpressible,” and “free from elaboration” in the sūtras and Nāgārjuna’s Collections of Reasoning [on the one hand] and the scriptures of the earlier Tibetan scholars [on the other]. Therefore, some refute the statements of the earlier Tibetan scholars that the mode of being is inexpressible and inconceivable, saying that they are fools and nihilists, and some show some slight respect, saying that there are no great errors in the thinking of those earlier Tibetan scholars and adepts—it is just that at the time that they spoke the fine points of someone like the Foremost Lama [Tsong kha pa] had not yet appeared. If that is true, there are no errors in the thinking of the Bhagavan himself, yet when he spoke he simply said such things as, “the perfection of wisdom, inexpressible by words or thoughts” and “When you use ‘it is,’ you use signs; when you use ‘it is not,’ you use signs.” Those beautiful patches of the system of those of us from Ganden Mountain, such as, “When you use that which is truly established, you use signs,” and “When you use what does not exist, you use signs,” do not appear. [The Buddha] left them out. Thus, the way that the Buddha himself taught the doctrine is something that lacks fine points.

Therefore, if the earlier Tibetans and the Buddha are to be refuted, refute them equally. If they are to be affirmed, affirm them equally. Please do not be deceitful, turning your tongue in various ways and worrying about whether or not people will criticize you.

Thus, if one takes pains in analyzing the ultimate, one must accept that all our decisions are mere fabrications of the mind, with no basis whatsoever. When one thinks about things like this, a great fear is created, and this is the onset of the arising of fear of the view of emptiness. Otherwise, we leave our ideas of existence and nonexistence, is and is not, purity and filth, good and bad, buddha and sentient being, heaven and hell, and so on just as they are, saying that they are all infallible dependent arisings, and it would not be proper to refute those. If they are refuted, it is decided that one falls to such things as nihilism. Saying that one must refute some so-called true establishment which is not that is just the talk of some scholars who are skilled in dry words.

According to their system, this mind of ours that ordinarily thinks “I” is not the conception of self and therefore is not to be refuted. Therefore, this is how they identify the innate conception of “I”: For example, when someone says, “You are a thief,” you say, “How am I a thief?” The appearance of a freestanding “I” is the innate conception of “I”. That is what they say.

If this ordinary mind that thinks “I” is valid, then the mind thinking “I” that is produced when someone says “You are a thief” would simply be more valid. How could this mean that it becomes the conception of true existence? If it is the conception of true existence, then when someone says [something equally false, such as], “The Buddha is not a refuge,” then why is the mind which thinks, “How can he not be a refuge?” not the conception of true existence? Similarly, when someone says, “This is not a pot,” then the mind that decides, “If it is not a pot, what else is it? It is a pot,” is also a conception of the true existence of the pot. How is it valid? Therefore, according to their system, it seems that weak thoughts are valid, and when that very mind becomes stronger, like a shift in the wind, it turns into a conception of true existence. How strange!

“In order to understand the view, it is very important to identify the object of negation” is as well known in the mouths of everyone as their breath. If this is true, how is it possible to identify true establishment separately before understanding the view? For the Foremost Lama himself said, “Until one has understood emptiness, it is impossible to ever distinguish mere existence from true existence and, similarly, one cannot distinguish non-true existence from mere nonexistence,” and, “That is the final reason why there is no commonly appearing subject for Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika.” Thus, how can one rely on that pretense of the identification of the object of negation?

Moreover, some say that when a valid form of awareness is produced that thinks, “A pot exists,” a conception of true existence is simultaneously produced which thinks, “The pot exists as truly established,” but that it is difficult to identify them separately.

Now, the so-called valid knowledge is the primary cause of attaining buddhahood, and the so-called conception of true existence is the root of all faults. It is very strange that they cannot be identified separately by reason of their being so similar to each other. If one is certain to arrive whenever the other arrives, then when they are refuted, they should be refuted equally. How is it possible to distinguish between them?

The mind that thinks, “It is dawn” is valid. The mind that thinks, “I am tying my belt” is valid. In the same way, if all the thoughts like “I am drinking tea” and “I am eating tsampa” are simply valid, then among all the thoughts that fill a day, there is not even one thing to refute. Thus, when is this object of negation, the so-called conception of true existence, produced? If it is the case that the mind which is the conception of true existence, grown accustomed to from time immemorial, does not occur more than a couple of times a day, then it is most amazing.

Thoughts of whatever you are most accustomed to are produced first. For example, as stated in the treatises on valid knowledge, when you see your father coming, who is also a Brahmin and a teacher, the first thought produced is, “My father is coming.” Such thoughts as, “The teacher is coming” or “A Brahmin is coming,” do not appear to the mind. Because we have become accustomed from time immemorial to this mind which is the conception of true existence, we must decide that when we see a pot, the mind that is produced first is the conception of the true existence of the pot. Therefore, no matter how much one verbally specifies the object of negation by reasoning, in fact, what is to be negated is that the pot must be negated, the pillar must be negated, existence must be negated, nonexistence must be negated. Leaving the pot aside, how could there be something to negate separately called a “truly established pot”? This approach is not simply that of the scholars of old. It was also clearly understood by scholars and adepts on the Geluk side who had [meditative] experience. There are unpleasant statements, like that of Jangkya Rinpoche: “Leaving this vivid appearance where it is, they search for something protruding to refute.” Gungthang Tenpé Dronmé and Paṇchen Losang Chogyen also said the same thing.

Some fear that if pots and pillars are refuted by reasoning, it will create nihilism, the view that nothing exists. This is a pointless worry. How is it possible that the nihilistic view that this pot that he sees in front of him is utterly nonexistent will be produced in an ordinary common being?

Even if such an idea were produced, because he knows explicitly that the pot is something to be seen and something to be touched, the thought is spontaneously produced that “This pot is something that appears to me. However, it does not exist at all in the way that it appears.” Such a thought is the Madhyamaka view of the composite of appearance and emptiness, which understands that although things appear, they do not exist in the way that they appear. How is this nihilism?

In brief, when one thinks that a pot is utterly nonexistent and sees it directly with the eyes, the illusion-like awareness is produced automatically. Thus, what danger is there of falling into nihilism? Thus, I would say:

For example, if gold, earth and stones, plants, and so on are simultaneously and without differentiation burned in a fire, the flammable things will burn and the nonflammable things will remain. In the same way, even though all appearances are refuted by reasoning without differentiation, the illusory things are what is left. Being left, they are certain to remain. What need is there to separate out the illusion-like dependent arisings right from the very beginning, placing them where harm will not be inflicted upon them by reasoning?

“Without asserting that conventions are validly established, how is it that you do not lack confidence in dependent origination?” In general, this so-called “establishment by valid knowledge” is synonymous with what scholars call “establishment by the reasoning of the three modes,” with their great need to construe coarse conventional appearances subtly and minutely. In fact, for the sake of the great need for there to be some distinction among the objects of the artificial ignorance, the logical reasoning of scholars construes [the conventional] with exceeding clarity. In general, apart from the difference of merely adding or not adding through logical reasoning expressions such as “validly established,” “trustworthy,” “infallible,” “undeniable,” and so on, there is nothing other than what merely appears through the changing orientations of this conventional consciousness, which occurs instinctively in the minds of all six types of transmigrators. We assert that it is infallible and undeniable that a child says, “Ouch!” when its hand meets fire. To give a reprimand that uses reasons, like the father saying, “Fire is hot. The hand is flesh. Therefore, if it touches the fire, why would it not be hot?” is the system of proving it with the valid knowledge of scripture and reasoning. Therefore, as long as these appearances of earth, stones, mountains, rocks, and so on do not vanish, there is no purpose in appearances such as the three jewels, cause and effect, and dependent origination also vanishing. If the necessary appearances vanish first and the unnecessary appearances remain behind, how could it be appropriate for anyone other than common beings of base nature who lack religion?

When one has arrived at the level which the tantric masters of the past described in their vocabulary as, “Phenomena have ceased, the mind has been transcended,” these conventionalities of good, bad, and everything in between—like earth and stones, dependent origination, and the three jewels—completely vanish, and I wonder whether many things—like the union of body and mind, the union of the two truths, the union of good and bad, the union of virtue and sin—will not come in their place. At that time, I think that those billions of parts of the knowledge that sees the multiplicities all become the nature of the single knowledge that sees the mode of being.

In general, for us common beings, there are many beliefs, things that we believe willingly, things we believe unwillingly, and things that we believe with no choice, but their basis is nothing other than merely our own belief in our own perceptions. What is meant by “belief” is the mind being required to engage in a particular object involuntarily through the force of habit.

No one would assert that what appears in a dream is a validly established truth. However, we must believe involuntarily in the appearances and feelings of things like happiness, suffering, and fear that occur in a dream. For example, when dreaming that you are falling from the peak of a great rocky mountain down into an abyss, if you analyze with the reasoning of the three modes, there is no possibility other than death. But you fall into the abyss and then return. Again, with regard to all those appearances that are not proved by reasoning, such as flying in the sky, it is undeniable that a variety of experiences occur, such as fear when you fall into an abyss and joy when you are flying through the sky. In brief, a fish is carefree in water and a human dreads sinking in water. In both cases, the fish and the human must undeniably and involuntarily believe [this about water].

Therefore, regarding the difference in what is asserted for oneself and for others in the unique system of the Prāsaṅgikas, these things that must be asserted involuntarily by common beings who have not turned away from dualistic appearances are assertions for others. The fact that a yogin who understands reality does not assert as his own system even one among all objects in the way that they are perceived and conceived by a common being is the meaning of the Prāsaṅgikas not taking their own position. When one opponent who has assertions debates using scripture and reasoning with an opponent without assertions who abides in a state of meditative equipoise, free from verbalization, whatever answers the latter gives all become mere assertions. Thus, there is no place to fit this view of having no assertions within words, sounds, and, particularly, the reasoning of logicians.

In summary, if one asserts from the depths of the heart that earth exists, it is an assertion of one’s own system. If one is compelled to assert, “Earth exists,” it is an assertion for others. That the Tathāgata remained under the Bodhi tree for a week without closing his eyes is his own system, which is without assertions. His turning of the wheel of doctrine of the four truths so that this very view [of reality] could be understood is a presentation of assertions for others, which he entered into through the power of compassion. This way of understanding is not limited to the Prāsaṅgikas. It is not different in the other tenet systems that assert a presentation of the provisional and definitive and the two truths. [Dharmakīrti’s] Commentary on Valid Knowledge says, “Thus, [the buddhas], endowed with equanimity on the meaning of reality, having gazed like elephants, posited external deeds.”¹⁸⁹ It seems to be clear in the Indian commentaries that this is how the Bhagavan asserted how external objects exist when he explained the doctrine.

Each human has two ways of thinking, two ways of asserting, two ways of explaining—for oneself and for others. Who would believe in something like all the ways of perception and the ways of explanation of buddhas and sentient beings being wrapped up in one intention and one voice?

If one is frightened merely of being injured in the ordinary debates of today’s debating courtyards, then one does not need any other answer [than “I have no assertion”] to whatever consequence that is presented. This mere answer of “I have no assertion, I have no assertion,” can turn into a joke.

Logical reasoning of the three modes that takes as its foundation the misconceptions of common beings, when used simply as a method to destroy itself by itself, is good. But when it is used as a tool to damage the view of having no assertion, then there is no method for entering the dharmadhātu. This is very clearly stated by the master Dignāga in his Compendium on Valid Knowledge (Pramāṇasamuccaya). So I would say:

The nonobservation of what is suitable to appear negates the extreme of existence;

The nonobservation of what does not appear abandons the extreme of nonexistence;

If one does not understand with reasoning, how does one find the definitive meaning?

Because of this way in which the views and tenets of Madhyamaka and Cittamātra abbots contradict each other,

CHAPTER 16

On the Nature of Reality, from Adornment for Nāgārjuna’s Thought