CHAPTER FIVE
A month before schedule, Field Marshal Harding relinquished his duties as CIGS to Field Marshal Templer, and on 3 October he and his wife Mary flew to Nicosia. During the Swearing-In Ceremony, he stated that he had three missions: restoring law and order with strong policing and military power, implementing social and economic reforms and developing the constitution using strong civil administration. Critically, his powers and financial resources were greater than those available to Sir Robert Armitage.
Born in 1896 and educated at Ilminster Grammar School in Somerset, Harding joined the Territorial Army in 1914 and was commissioned into the Somerset Light Infantry when war broke out in August, serving mainly in Palestine. During the Second World War, he commanded the 7th Armoured Division in North Africa and VIII and XIII Corps in Italy. In 1946, he commanded Middle East Command until in 1948 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief Land Forces, Far East. In 1951 he commanded the British Army of the Rhine before becoming CIGS.
Harding knew that he must negotiate, but with whom? Yannis Clerides was the Greek-Cypriot leader on the Legislative Council and recognized to be the elected representative by the British Government. His son, Glafkos, had been shot down while serving as an RAF bomber tail-gunner and had escaped three times from German prison camps. Or should it be Archbishop Makarios and his Ethnarchy Council of Cypriot Orthodox priests? Although he knew that he would risk undermining Clerides, the power of the Ethnarchy was significant and it was to Makarios that he turned. On 4 October, the same day that Field Marshal Papagos of Greece died, who had been a significant supporter of enosis, Harding and Makarios met in the Ledra Palace Hotel card room, where Harding suggested to Makarios that since communism was the main threat to regional stability, he could make a major contribution toward gradual self-determination since it was likely that the strategic importance of Cyprus would change. He also emphasized that with or without Makarios he would tackle EOKA. Over several meetings during the next week, Makarios insisted that once London recognized Cypriot self-determination, then he would draft a constitution to put to the electorate. When they discussed the content of the Lancaster Gate Agreement, Harding detected that although it was obvious that he was prepared to compromise, Makarios was under increasing pressure from Ethnarchy hardliners not prepared to budge from self-determination, in particular from Bishop Kyriakides of Kyrenia, whose brother, Renos, was the EOKA commander leading the attacks on police stations. Sending Makarios a draft constitution, Harding wrote, ‘It is not therefore the position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus’ – a double negative leaving the door open because of the perceived importance of Cyprus to NATO. Makarios replied that while the demand for self-determination was non-negotiable, the timing was, and once agreed he would help the British Government frame a constitution. Harding referred the offer to London and was told the British position remained as at the Lancaster Gate Conference, in particular that guarantees were required for the minority Turkish-Cypriots. But Makarios was unable to give any, and a stalemate emerged. By 8 October the talks had collapsed and a £38 million development package announced by Harding to raise the prosperity of the island, on the proviso that the internal security situation improved, was rejected by the nationalists.
The failure of Greek diplomacy at the UN and the arrival of Harding led to Grivas opening his next offensive, his aim being to paralyse the police into inaction and thereby draw the Army into ground of his choosing. Lefkoniko Police Station was identified as a soft target and was recced by the son of a village mayor who was part of the EOKA Group led by Gregoris Afxentiou. On the same day that Harding first met Makarios, Afxentiou led six EOKA to the high school where they donned masks and then walked down the main street to the Police Station. The duty constable fled and the remaining police were locked in a cell without resistance. Afxentiou’s men broke into the armoury and left carrying nine .303-inch rifles, two Greener shotguns, ammunition and a radio set. The raid replicated the attack on Akhana Police Station and again shattered the Cyprus Police’s morale. Elsewhere, the Sabotage Groups in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol escalated their operations.
By the autumn, the pressure on the RAOC led to 625 Ordnance Depot, which had been in Cyprus since 1949, being expanded with the addition of 146 Vehicle and 238 Vehicle Depots. The specialist 4 Mobile Laundry and Bath Unit supported camps that lacked heavy duty laundries and showers and set up showers near rivers and reservoirs. When 9 Base Ammunition Depot transferred 11,000 tons of ammunition from Egypt to 310 Ammunition Depot at the former RAF Lakatamia, however, security was tested when light civil aircraft still used the runway. The Corps also provided local employment, which proved treacherous on several occasions with the result falling on the shoulders of soldiers. When the Famagusta EOKA Pavlos Pavlakis was tipped off by a shipping agent that weapons arriving from Egypt were being stored in a 625 Ordnance Depot warehouse at Four Mile Point, George Matsis and eight men raided the store, tied up the Turkish-Cypriot night watchman and loaded Sten guns, .303-inch rifles, ammunition and other war stores that had just been unloaded from the cargo ship, the Halcyon Med, into a lorry and left leaving a receipt signed by ‘Digenes’ and an undertaking that they would be paid for when Cyprus was freed. An investigation focused on the weakness of the security of the warehouse. Another group successfully raided the Mitsero mine for explosives and detonators.
As Harding reviewed his bailiwick, he found that so long as EOKA continued to operate unopposed, internal security was likely to deteriorate. Although intent on catching ‘Digenes’, he noted that the Cyprus Police morale was very low and bolstered their performance by instructing that all police stations were be reinforced with a permenent military presence. He replaced failing Colonial Police officers and obtained authority from the Colonial Office for Commissioner of Police Robbins to second British police officers into the self-contained UK Police Unit being raised to provide a model of modern policing to the Cyprus Police and also to target EOKA cells in towns. Despite manpower shortages in British constabularies, advertisements were circulated in the Constabularies of Kent, Lancashire, Staffordshire, Yorkshire West Riding and Scotland, seeking 150 officers for two-year secondments divided into twenty-one months’ service in Cypus followed by three months’ leave. Although young unmarried officers were needed, they did not come forward, and Robbins had no alternative but accept older men close to retirement seeking to enhance their pensions. But very few had been to Cyprus and they therefore had little knowledge of its history, culture and people. The advance guard of thirty policemen that arrived on 28 November was accompanied by RAF Police reinforcements and six police dog handlers and their German Shepherds. Although the Cypriot Judiciary largely resisted intimidation, EOKA raised the tension against them, resulting in additional judges being sent from the United Kingdom on three-month postings to hear cases in four new Courts.
Realizing that he was now facing a popular soldier with a formidable reputation already adopting a ‘strong hand’ by hardening the defences of government and military installations, police stations and key points, Grivas took the opportunity of the collapse of the talks between Harding and Makarios to order Operation Forward to Victory. Needing to prop up Greek-Cypriot morale, among his objectives was to create favourable conditions for the offensive by absorbing ‘the enemy’s blows’ and retaliating with shootings, ambushes, bombings and unrest in quick succession. The demoralization of the Cyprus Police, dislocation of security forces’ intelligence and drawing the Army into the open remained high on his target list. The execution of his plan depended on the youth provoking the security forces by displaying Greek flags and daubing EOKA slogans. At his disposal and largely intact after a summer of inactivity, were the motivated mountain Guerrilla Groups, the two strongest being the one based at Pitsillia commanded by Afxentiou and the one at Kykko formed from the Kyrenia Castle escapers by Markos Drakos. In November he instructed the twenty-strong Kyriakides Group to construct a network of seven hideouts on a massive ridge overlooking Spilia and Kourdhai in the Adelphi Forest about five miles south-east of Kakopetria in the Troodos. Collectively known as the Castle, the dugouts were burrowed into rocks and earth, reinforced by corrugated iron taken to the site by donkey and expertly camouflaged with earth, bushes and boulders. Each hideout was capable of accommodating about five men, and they were connected by passageways. Outside there was even a weapon training range. When Kyriakides had finished, Grivas moved to the Castle and assembled a force of about thirty guerrillas consisting of his headquarters and the groups led by Afxentiou, Kyriakides and Christos Chartas. Afxentiou was back in favour after stealing weapons from the Amiandos mine security guards. If there was one weakness of the Castle, indeed of the hideouts, it was that locals knew about them and not all were supporters of EOKA.
Deciding to take direct control of internal security, Harding created an operational HQ under his command and independent of Middle East Command and Cyprus District. To organize civil affairs as Deputy Governor, he appointed the experienced colonial administrator George Sinclair, fresh from several West African postings. In early November, Brigadier Geoffrey Baker arrived as Chief of Staff to Harding. Baker was a Royal Artillery officer who had recently instructed at the Imperial Defence College. Wounded fighting the Italians in the East African campaign and also while commanding 127 Field Regiment RA in Sicily, he had commanded 3 Royal Horse Artillery and had held a staff appointment at the War Office. Brigadier Ricketts was promoted to Major General and reverted to Cyprus District with administrative responsibility for the Brigades. He was also appointed Director of Security. Lieutenant General Keightley remained in command of Middle East Command but was not directly involved in the management of operations in Cyprus. Fortunately, the amicable relationship between Baker and Major General Benson, who was Keightley’s Chief of Staff, soothed any difficulties. Harding formalized the existing brigades’ areas of operations by forming 3 Commando Brigade District centred on Limassol, 50 Infantry Brigade District at Nicosia and 51 Infantry Brigade District at Famagusta, each supported by an infantry and armoured car reserve and under command of Baker, who was also Director of Operations.
Harding quickly found that the intelligence structure was weak and that the Cyprus Secretariat and District internal security organizations were inadequately structured to meet the crisis. Part of the problem was that the expatriate Colonial Service officials and Colonial Police officers were largely divorced from the indigenous community and therefore few spoke Greek or Turkish; indeed, the paucity of Greek speakers was a hindrance throughout the Emergency. Using internal security structures being developed in Malaya as templates, Harding divided Cyprus into eight operational sectors each supervised by a senior Army officer, with the Police superintendent and the District Commissioner providing the civil and political input. The hub of internal security centred on joint military and police HQs known as MILPOLs. To improve the understanding and co-ordination of counter-insurgency, army, navy and air force officers and police officers attended a joint staff academy; within the year this became known as the Internal Security Training School. Harding also invited Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey White, who was the Chief Constable of Warwickshire and had been his Provost Marshal in XIII Corps in Trieste, to advise Robbins on policing.
After transferring from Egypt, Middle East Air Force reorganized in July 1955 to HQ Air Levant at RAF Nicosia, controlling operations in the Eastern Mediterranean region, including Cyprus; RAF Aden took care of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean operations. Complementing the Shackletons flying from Malta, in April 1956 Gannet anti-submarine aircraft from 847 Naval Air Squadron began coastal surveillance and anti-smuggling operations from RAF Nicosia and directed RAF Venom fighter bombers of No. 6 Squadron and 208 Squadron Hawker Hunters to suspect vessels. Although gliders were no longer used by the Army, the provision of air observation and co-ordination with the ground forces was retained by the officers and sergeants of the Glider Pilot Regiment flying Austers. With an aircrew of a pilot and observer, the Austers had won an enviable reputation during the war as reliable communication platforms and spotters. In April 1956, 1915 Light Liaison Flight was formed at Middle Wallop and, moving to Cyprus as the Independent Light Liaison Flight, joined 1910 Flight from 651 Air Observation Post Squadron at RAF Lakatamia. However, its three Austers did not arrive for several months and the Flight shared the aircraft of 1910 Flight. The Austers operated from eight airstrips, including a golf course at Xeros, a soccer pitch at Famagusta and the road near Episkopi. At least one aircraft was designated as the Voice Aircraft and had loudspeakers fitted under each wing that enabled announcements and messages to be broadcast. The Austers could also be fitted with four 20lb bomb racks, and while the release mechanism inside the cockpit was simple, it was not always reliable. When the Army Air Corps was formed in 1957, the two Flights were renamed 10 and 15 Independent Flights respectively until in May 1958 they were amalgamated into 653 Squadron. In December 1958 the Army pilots suffered their only fatality when an Auster flown by Captain Terence Mulady struck overhead electricity cables near Nicosia. Two members of the Royal Horse Guards and a Lancashire Fusilier at a roadblock attempted unsuccessfully to save the pilot from the burning wreckage.
Each Brigade was supported by a Signals Troop of about thirty Royal Signals responsible for all aspects of communication. The Brigade Command was operated through the VHF Wireless Set B44 manpack transceivers, which had been introduced as part of the Larkspur range of military radios in about 1948 and, with a well-sited antenna, had a range of up to fifteen miles. The No 62 HF set and Canadian Wireless Set No 19, which incorporated High Frequency and Very High Frequency (VHF) frequencies in the same chassis, remained in service in Cyprus. A major advantage of the B44 was that its VHF function meant it did not suffer the increased ‘mush’ static and interference when the ionosphere descended earthwards at night. The Troop also maintained the field telephones lines laid to the units, which could number at least thirty substations, and provided technicians to repair equipment. When 50 Infantry Brigade established a Brigade Tactical HQ at the Central Police Station, its 214 Signal Troop erected antennae on police stations and laid line to the extent that the headquarters could be operational within half an hour. Its fellow 215 Signal Troop supported 51 Infantry Brigade. The three brigades and those that arrived later in the campaign also brought their own RMP Provost Companies, Ordnance Field Parks to administer its logistic support, Medical Groups and REME Workshops.
In the third week of October, reinforcements sought by Field Marshal Harding began flooding into Cyprus. The 1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders (1 Gordons) arrived in Transport Command Hastings aircraft from RAF Lyneham and, joining 3 Commando Brigade District, moved to the largely tented Aberdeen Camp, which had been built by 30 Field Squadron next to a mine near Xeros in the middle of an area of largely Turkish-owned citrus groves. D Company, 1st Battalion, The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (1 KOYLI) deployed from Aden and, joining 1 Royal Scots at Paphos, first took over Limni Camp before moving to East End Camp near Ktima. Joining 50 Infantry Brigade from the United Kingdom was 1st Battalion, The Royal Norfolk Regiment (1 Norfolks), which moved into Britannia Camp near the Cyprus Broadcasting Service as the Island Reserve. It also provided platoons to guard Government House and Wolseley Barracks and a Guard Force for Camp K detention camp. Two more battalions were taken under command by 51 Infantry Brigade District to join 2 Royal Inniskillings at Famagusta and 40 Field Regiment RA at Larnaca. The 1st Battalion, The Royal Leicestershire Regiment (1 Leicesters) disembarked at Famagusta from the troopship HMT Charlton Star, having travelled from Sudan with their families, and moved into the Golden Sands Leave Camp. The 1st Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment (1 Middlesex) also disembarked at Famagusta on 28 October from HMT Empire Clyde and, replacing 2 Green Howards, moved into the tented Alma Camp at Dhekelia. Rioters had to be cleared from the streets of Larnaca before the families could move into married quarters. The Green Howards returned to Strensall and disbandment to meet reductions in defence spending, by which infantry regiments were to reduce their establishments to one Regular battalion.
Although the organization of battalions depended on their locations, commanding officers adapted their orders of battle to meet the requirements of their sector. Lieutenant Colonel Brinkley, who commanded the Norfolks, merged the heavy weapons platoons of Support Company into rifle platoons, giving him four companies. When the Battalion took over as the Duty Internal Security Battalion in Nicosia in December, it remained in its lines at the Cyprus Broadcasting Service Camp with Brinkley appointed Operational Commander, Nicosia reporting directly to Field Marshal Harding and frequently meeting with the District Officer and Police District Superintendent. An officer at Nicosia Central Police Station provided military/police liaison and was the interface should Battalion Tactical HQ be required. The Standby Company, which was accommodated in tents in Wolseley Barracks on immediate readiness, was plagued with call-outs to incidents and false alarms. The Reserve Company remained in the Battalion lines ready to move when required. Brinkley placed a ‘troubleshooter’ platoon in the old Post Office overlooking Metaxas Square opposite the gateway leading to Ledra Street in Old Nicosia. The remaining two companies guarded the camps, provided patrols and helped administer the running of the camp. The Signals Platoon found that the distances between detached sub-units meant that the signallers needed to learn Morse.
By 1956, the standard infantry section of eight soldiers had been grouped into two ‘flat foot’ patrols, the concept allowing a platoon to swamp an urban area with a large number of patrols. In Northern Ireland this formation became known as a ‘brick’. The Royal Military Police in Nicosia, Famagusta and Limassol soon developed mobile Anti-Assassin Patrols consisting of three military police and one Cyprus Police in largely unprotected Land Rovers from early morning to midnight; however, these were targets for bombers and gunmen lurking in side streets, gardens and on balconies. Ambush Patrols were essentially counter-ambush operations in which military patrols lurked in or near places from which ambushes had previously been sprung. Although Harding insisted on courtesy and firmness, many troops found dealing with the youth of both sexes by removing Greek flags and EOKA slogans to be humiliating and frustrating, particularly in the knowledge that one false move would inevitably result in controversy.
In September 1955, 11 (Field) Squadron, RAF Regiment arrived to protect RAF assets. Having protected RAF stations in the deserts of the Middle East and North Africa for thirty-three years, it was initially tasked to lift minefields laid to defend Cyprus during the Second World War. In November the Squadron supported military operations and added to its vehicle pool by recovering several undamaged Humber armoured cars from a bombing range. It also trained RAF technicians in weapons and anti-ambush drills. One regular event was to escort a convoy ferrying stores from Famagusta to RAF Ayios Nikolaos, where a unit provided radar coverage from a hut and a few Bedford radio trucks in a tented camp at Cape Greco. In February 1957, the convoy, which usually included a Humber, was attacked several times. On the 5th a device seen 6ft up a tree was defused. Three days later a similar device damaged a lorry. Later, when a second convoy taking men from 751 Signals Unit to Cape Greco ran into an electonically controlled mine, the Unit commander, Squadron Leader R Street and the RAF Regiment escort captured a terrorist. Three weeks later, in a fourth ambush, three grenades that damaged a lorry also badly wounded an RAF officer. A search by 11 Field Squadron, again with a Humber, resulted in one EOKA being shot and another being captured.
As troops began arriving in Cyprus, camps and their associated employment opportunities sprung up all over the island. Since married quarters had originally been established to the requirements of Cyprus District, the increased need led to RASC Barracks Services being enlarged to manage the accommodation of long suffering families, some of whom had been posted overseas for several years. Since the building of the garrisons and the married quarter ‘patches’ at Episkopi and Dhekelia were months behind schedule, a large number of families were accommodated in hirings rented from local landlords. This proved unpopular, and when some families of the Middle East Command rearguard arrived from Egypt, screaming Greek-Cypriot mobs stoned their buses as they were being driven to their bungalows at Berengaria on the outskirts of Limassol. Such was the hostility in the town that families were largely confined inside the married quarter perimeter and could only shop when the streets were patrolled by soldiers. As the hostility gathered pace, there was clear evidence that the vetting of locally employed employees was weak. Some were terrorists willing to lob grenades into married quarters.
As part of his strategy to intimidate the Army, Grivas escalated attacks on soldiers and airmen – anywhere. On 21 October, Private Sidney Ingram of 1 South Staffords was the first soldier to be killed when he died from wounds after a grenade was thrown into a Nicosia bar. A teenage gunman shot an RAF officer in the face. A week later, the Royal Scots Lance Corporal Angus Milne was the first soldier to be killed in action when his convoy was ambushed at Kissonerga, a few miles north-west of Paphos. In the same incident, a young Greek-Cypriot was mortally wounded. The banning by Harding of the annual 28 October Oxi Day celebrating the refusal of Greece to surrender to Italy in 1940 and the confirmation of the death sentencing of Michael Karaolis, who, in spite of a clemency plea from the French author Albert Camus, had his appeal refused for the murder of the Special Branch Constable Poullis in August, led to the escalation of violence, much of it egged on by Colonel Grivas and Radio Athens, and led by hundreds of students. Several schools were closed. Karaolis had been educated in British schools in Cyprus but resented colonial rule. Three days of violent disturbances were experienced by 40 Commando in Limassol in which several military vehicles were destroyed and a NAAFI grocery burnt. Although the Royal Marines had imposed a curfew on the 28th, such was the disruption that they had difficulty imposing it. When a patrol armed with truncheons and commanded by Sergeant Harry James came under fire from two curfew-breakers in a hut, who also threw a grenade, Marines James Coughtney and Kenneth Goodey barged through the door and captured them. Coughtney received the British Empire Medal. Rioters in Famagusta were drenched in green dye from an Ack Pack spraying vehicle operated by Fusilier Swain of 2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers.
By mid-October, the internal security had deteriorated to such an extent that the Cyprus Police were unable to maintain law and order, even with the troops in support, and the Colonial Office agreed with Harding that the Army should formally aid the civil authorities. On 28 October Harding issued a Royal Instruction granting HM Forces the same legal status as police officers, meaning that soldiers could provide riot squads, patrol, search and mount operations with or without the police. To some extent, Harding had been convinced after Commissioner of Police Robbins had submitted a report on the same day expressing the opinion of several observers that the 1,838-strong Cyprus Police was ineffective. Field Marshal Harding knew that Cyprus would only return to stability after ‘Digenes’ had been neutralized. By November, MI5 and Special Branch had discovered from Greek communists that he was none other than Colonel George Grivas, the right-wing leader of X Group; however, the enosis leaders in Cyprus and Greece were reluctant to accept the fact and accused the British of malicious propaganda, a line they stuck to almost to the end in 1959.
Since most of the troops had been tied up in the endless drudgery of guarding barracks, courts and government buildings, patrolling the streets, enforcing curfews and providing cordons after an incident, manning roadblocks and escorting officials, the collection of intelligence on EOKA was limited. Indeed, not for the only time since 1945 had the Armed Forces been sent on operations by the British Government with little or no intelligence. The collection of intelligence was limited because of the EOKA cell structure and use of couriers, and consequently optimistic assessments were suggesting that EOKA was slow, demoralized, lacked discipline and its lines of communication had been disrupted by police activity after the April Fool’s Day bombings. However, interrogations and informant information were producing results, as they would until 1959. Within days of his arrival, Brigadier Baker placed parts of the Troodos and Pentadactylos Mountains out of bounds and launched two cordon-and-search and intelligence collection operations against the EOKA Guerrilla Groups. They were supported by 214 Signals Troop detachments commanded by corporals providing radio detachments from box-body radio lorries and using Land Rovers to lay miles of line in the forest between the tactical HQs. The drivers found negotiating the roads and tracks of the Troodos decidedly more nerve-wracking than EOKA ambushes.
In Operation Turkey Trot, 45 Commando supported by companies from the Norfolks and Leicesters began searching for the Afxentiou Group in the Lefkoniko area of the Pentadactylos Mountains. When on 6 November, information was received that a shepherd turned butcher had grown tired of living as a guerrilla, Captain Derek Pounds, the Adjutant, and a patrol from Commando HQ removed him from his house in Lapithos. The butcher then guided patrols to several hideouts, including Afxentiou’s lair near Kalogeria where several police weapons and uniforms were found, including some stolen from Lefkoniko Police Station. One hideout that produced forged coins could only be accessed by abseiling fifteen feet to its entrance on a small ledge. Afxentiou and his group escaped because disloyal police officers had compromised the operation; nevertheless, for the second time, a furious Grivas sacked him because he had recruited the butcher and appointed Tassos Sofocleus to command the Pitsillia Group. During the operation, Lance Corporal Gordon Hill of B Company, 1 Leicesters left camp armed with a Sten and two grenades claiming that he was going ‘to sort out EOKA’. When he did not return, he was posted absent without leave.
Meanwhile, the longer term Operation Fox Hunter was underway in the Troodos. On 10 November, after handing over its sector to the Leicesters, 45 Commando joined the 800-strong battle group at Platres that included C and D Companies, 1 Gordon Highlanders, A Squadron, the Life Guards with their Second World War-era Daimler armoured cars that had been left in Cyprus in 1945, the remainder of 1st Leicesters, elements from 40 Field Regiment and 6 Army Dog Unit. The remaining two Gordon companies were guarding police stations, patrolling roads and carrying out searches along the coastal strip to the north. In support were Sycamore helicopters and Auster aircraft, and in Platres the formidable prison was being as an interrogation centre. Within three days the Commando won a trial of strength in a riot in Vouni, and after rounding up about 300 villagers, thirty men and nine women were charged with incitement to riot.
One major problem experienced throughout the Emergency was long convoys of vehicles heading toward a particular area and thus broadcasting to EOKA that an operation was imminent. This, combined with disloyal police officers supporting Grivas, led to Army commanders finding it difficult to prevent guerrillas slipping through cordons using the innumerable rural tracks. Searching wooded areas was also difficult. Nevertheless, both operations gave troops valuable experience, particularly when HQ RAF Levant agreed that since the Search and Rescue Flight was generally under-employed, it should be reformed as the Internal Security Flight and its Sycamores used to deploy troops on high ground. Patrolling helicopters also forced the guerrillas to go to ground while Army lorries were driven as fast as possible along roads and tracks to them cut off. Although Grivas dismissed such operations as nothing more than theatrical displays of military muscle designed to terrorize the population, he responded by taking the pressure off the Guerrilla Groups with a counter-attack in the towns against the Army. It became a predictable tactic.
On 18 November Cyprus reeled as a blitz of about thirty grenades and bombs were thrown at patrols and tossed into bars. RASC Staff Sergeant Gilbert Cripps, posted to HQ Cyprus District, was killed and a warrant officer was seriously wounded when a time bomb concealed in a bicycle blew the roof of the HQ 51 Infantry Brigade Sergeants Mess at Kykko Camp, about three miles east Nicosia at 3 am. This and a device exploding at the Golden Sands Leave Camp near Famagusta, injuring a soldier, underlined the vulnerability of barracks from disloyal Greek-Cypriots at a time when the Armed Forces were becoming a major employer in a period when investment to Cyprus was on the downward slope. A bomb dropped into a Nicosia Post Office post box destroyed most of the building. In Larnaca, a British police officer was knocked unconscious by young rioters firing stones from catapaults and then as the phalanx of the Middlesex Riot Platoon advanced through the narrow street, a swarm of youths bolted into the sanctuary of St Lazarus Church. Anxious parents extracted the less defiant ones, but when food was delivered to the troops, it was too much for the sixty trapped diehards and they meekly surrendered. In an attempt to contain the unrest, and in spite of EOKA intimidation, some parents were persuaded by teachers to send their children back to school, but several schools were forced to close.
Next day in Famagusta, a 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers patrol ambushed near the Cable and Wireless Building had an officer and soldier wounded as it fought a running battle with gunmen through the streets. On the same day, three soldiers were evacuated to hospital by a Sycamore following an ambush near Episkopi. On the 21st, Sergeant Andrew Steel, of 42 Company RASC, died in Limassol Hospital after being wounded in an ambush near Dhekelia. In one of several attempts by EOKA to acquire explosives, the Kyriakides Group ran into determined opposition while raiding Mitsero mine. Next day, when EOKA ambushed a 45 Commando convoy transferring explosive from the asbestos mine at Amiandos to Xeros near Morphou, they had not counted on the inspirational gallantry of Marine William Stevenson. Although badly wounded, he stopped his lorry, allowing Sergeant Hodges, also in the front, to give covering fire while the escorting Royal Marines led by Lance Corporal Maghee leapt from the back and counterattacked, during which Maghee was seriously wounded. Several more Royal Marines vehicles were ambushed over the next week, including a marked ambulance attacked by EOKA armed with automatic weapons, including a Bren gun. Next day, a Greek-Cypriot woman died from injuries when a bomb destroyed the Maple Leaf Bar, which was frequently used by soldiers, near Metaxos Square. In Famagusta, the homes of Lieutenant Colonel Cowan, who commanded 625 Ordnance Company RAOC, and Major Reverend Benyon, an Army chaplain, were attacked with grenades.
Grivas led the Kyriakides Group in two ambushes near Khandria on the road between Kyperounda and Agros. Early on 23 November, he posted two groups of five men on high ground astride a sharp bend while he remained with five others in positions overlooking the killing zone. In mid-afternoon, the group shot up a military police Land Rover, killing Lance Corporal Frederick Todd and wounding two others, one of whom would later die of his wounds. Two days later, a 45 Commando cordon guarding the scene of this attack shot dead an elderly Greek-Cypriot believed to be acting suspiciously and failing to halt when challenged. Next day at about 3 pm, it was getting dark and snow was falling when a Ferret Scout Car and Land Rover were spotted, and the guerrillas in the first blocking position opened fire without orders. The Ferret sped through the killing zone, missing mines laid in the road, but the Land Rover skidded into a deep ravine killing Sapper Robert Melson of 37 Field Squadron. The Squadron was part of 25 Engineer Regiment and had had arrived from Maidstone to improve the facilities in the tented camps springing up across Cyprus. The attacks continued with Royal Engineer Sergeant James Shipman of HQ Cyprus District murdered near his married quarter in Nicosia and Craftsman Kenneth Heyes dying in an ambush at Petra, both on the 25th. Next day, Sapper Peter Percivale, also of 37 Field Squadron, was killed and another soldier from Northern Ireland seriously wounded when a large boulder was rolled down an embankment into the path of his vehicle.
During the fortnight, Royal Engineers lost six killed. Among other deaths were Colonel Philip Hatch RE OBE, then posted to HQ Middle Eastern Command, who had died from a heart attack in early June, and three other non-battle deaths since 1 April. Royal Engineer casualties were heavy. Although the success of EOKA attacks was largely sporadic and often not pressed home, the overall intelligence assessment on their capability changed significantly to clear indicators that EOKA was well organized, well armed and widely supported. Of growing concern were the disloyalty of Greek-Cypriot employees in military bases and the network of gunmen and bombers in the urban areas.