Beaulieu, January 21, 1944
ON JANUARY 21st, partly cloudy conditions were predicted for the Pas de Calais coast and the Cherbourg Peninsula, providing the Eighth’s planners with reasonable prospects for successful strikes on some of the V-1 buzz bomb sites the Germans were still building in these areas. By now these targets had acquired enough importance to merit a code name all their own, “No Ball,” and the day was to see a major effort mounted against them. No fewer than 795 heavy bombers, escorted by 628 fighters, were to hit 25 different sites camouflaged in fields and hidden in forests.
The mission plans called for the same type of tactics the Eighth had employed on December 24th and January 14th: The groups would go in at altitudes ranging from 11 to 25 thousand feet in autonomous nine-ship “squadron” formations. All bomb divisions would take part, with the First Division in the lead.
Excerpts from the Division’s field order show how the job was supposed to be done: “Target support will be provided by 11 Groups of P-47s, one Group of P-51s, and two Groups of P-38s from Zero Hour minus 5 minutes to Zero Hour plus 55 minutes…2nd Bomb Division will attack targets in same general area from Zero plus 20 minutes [to] Zero plus 35 minutes at 12,000 feet. 3rd Bomb Division will attack targets in same general area from Zero plus 35 minutes to Zero plus 55 minutes…As many runs on targets may be made as necessary, giving consideration to the fact that 2nd Division attacks in the same general area at Zero plus 20 minutes. 1st Division units are responsible for avoiding interference.”
The 41st CBW’s field order emphasized that “bombs will be salvoed on Squadron Leader’s release. Lead Bombardiers will pay particular attention to pinpointing as assurance of locating the immediate target area. Since several runs are authorized, leaders will make sure of accurate sighting operation before actual release.”
“Zero Hour,” when the 303rd’s bombs were supposed to go, was 1400 hours. The first 303rd Fortress actually got aloft at 1151, and 23 ships later at 1203 Vicious Virgin climbed into the sky carrying Elmer Brown on his 23rd raid. Brown’s diary carries the narrative from this point, capturing him exactly as he was at the time: a confident, seasoned veteran operating at the peak of combat efficiency. His entry shows very clearly how much Brown was responsible for the raid’s success:
“January 21, 1944, Friday—a ‘No Ball’ target in France about 40 degrees 52 minutes N, 01 degrees 40 minutes E. We put up two groups of two nine-plane squadrons. Our group was to hit one target [Beaulieu] and the other group was assigned to another target [Bois Coquerel]. I was in the lead ship of a low squadron, flying with McCormick, Bob Sheets, pilot, and Dubell, copilot. [“Dubell” was Captain Richard P. Dubell, the 427th Squadron Operations Officer.]
303rd Bomb Group Mission Route(s): Beaulieu, January 21, 1944. (Map courtesy waters Design Associates, Inc.)
“We were supposed to take intervals crossing the Channel and fly in trail of our lead squadron. We did this, but about 10 miles off the French coast the lead squadron turned into France at the wrong place. We left them and I took my squadron into France at Lecamp, which is where we were supposed to make landfall. I had determined a wind when we crossed the Channel by means of Gee fixes and air plot. Up to the IP I had been doing pilotage, but after the IP we had from 6/10 to 8/10 cloud cover so I had to depend mostly on DR. We turned and came across the IP (Fauville) just as we should have.
“The bomb run was 85 degrees but the pilot started flying about 115 degrees. I caught the error immediately and had him fly off to the left to compensate for it. The bombardier and I had memorized maps and photographs of the target area, as the target was just a tiny woods and required pinpoint precision to pick it up.
“A few minutes before the target there was a break in the clouds and I climbed up in the nose, looking over Mac’s shoulder, and pointed out the woods and things leading up to the target. Mac swung his sight on the target but there was a big cloud in the line of sight, so we had to go around.
“I really had to spin that computer in a hurry to figure a rectangular course to the right that would miss all flak-defended areas and that would put us on the same bomb run and give us at least a five-minute run. I used strictly DR and it worked just fine.
“While we were making the rectangular course the copilot, who was the air commander, was complaining because we were taking so long as we were allowed only 20 minutes in the target area. But I was determined to give us a good, long bomb run.
“Mac had taken a few dry runs and had everything preset in his sight. The clouds had cleared a little and we could see the target. I pointed it out to the bombardier and he started working on his sight. We started turning a little to the left, so I hollered, ‘Mac, the target is to your right more.’ He saw his mistake, unclutched, swung his sight on the target, and as he had things preset, he did a swell job of synchronizing and dropped the bombs right on the target.
“We were not able to get pictures of where the bombs hit, as the clouds closed in. We did get pictures of the approach and some of the ball turret gunners saw the bombs hit. We were carrying 12 500-pound bombs and bombing from 12,000 feet. We were not troubled by flak or fighters. Our fighters had the area completely covered. We had to clear the area in 20 minutes to make room for the other task forces following us. There were probably 700 heavy bombers and almost that many fighters used.”
The Group landed between 1533 and 1612, with Vicious Virgin touching down at 1547. No aircraft were lost, and Elmer Brown had reason to be pleased.
At interrogation, Lt. Sheets’s crew commented that Brown “did excellent work in picking out the target,” and the bombing was officially assessed as being “good with a good pattern in a wooded area believed to be the target.”
In his diary, Brown noted how the other 303rd formations fared: “Of the other three squadrons in our Group—one made four passes but never could see his target—clouds, I suppose. Another dropped his bombs on what he thought was the target, but it was really 10 miles off. They are not really sure where the other squadron dropped theirs.” The Group’s mission file confirms his conclusions.
The 303rd’s results typified all the bombing missions of this day. Of the 795 B-17s and B-24s dispatched, 394 managed to drop their loads on target. All told, 1070 tons of 500-pound general purpose bombs were dropped on 20 of the 25 assigned objectives, with excellent results on two, good on 11, fair on two, and poor on five. Seventy-two more tons of bombs were unloaded on targets of opportunity with unobserved results.
But the Luftwaffe showed that it still could strike. German fighter pilots were quick to exploit any hole in the fighter escort shield, and one occurred when the Second Division’s 44th Group tarried too long in its target area.
The Group’s P-47 escort was forced to turn back early due to lack of fuel, and 15 FW-190s and Me-109s rose to intercept the B-24s near Abbeville. They made repeated tail attacks on the bomber formation all the way out to the French coast, shooting down five bombers in exchange for four fighters. Three more Liberators were classified Category E, including one that was abandoned in the air over England.
The Eighth also lost a B-17 to flak, and its fighters and bombers claimed a total of 13 enemy aircraft, but the day’s operations really underscored the impact that seasoned combat veterans could have on the outcome of a mission. The skill and determination that Brown and McCormick showed was what made the difference between a successful strike and a failed one on mission after mission that the Eighth flew throughout the air war. These were the kind of men the Eighth’s leaders needed to make sure this war would be won.