AFTER THE CROSSING OF THE SEINE, the diverging thrust lines of the Canadian and British armies brought a vast increase in the size of the battlefield and in the problems of supply, transport, communications and control. The tasks allotted to him by Montgomery involved Crerar in objectives spread over a distance of 200 miles and for which his resources were far from adequate. To the physical and mental strain which these imposed on him were added those of a nagging, debilitating illness. At a time when all his resources of mind and energy were demanded by the complex military situation, a relatively minor incident arising from his position as a national commander further eroded his relations with Montgomery.
On 1 September the 2nd Division returned to Dieppe where they had suffered so many casualties in their disastrous raid two years earlier. There they were to reorganize and be prepared to pass through the 3rd Division when ordered. When he learned what was proposed, Montgomery signalled to Crerar that he did not consider that this was the time for any division to stop for maintenance. Crerar replied that there was no point in them moving until a crossing had been secured over the Somme and that he considered it essential that this much depleted division, whose infantry had lost a third of their strength, should stop at Dieppe long enough to absorb one thousand reinforcements who were arriving later that day.
Crerar was not a little annoyed. On 31 August Second Army had burst across the Somme at Amiens. Montgomery told him that General Dempsey would send the 11th Armoured Division down the river to Pont Rémy and Abbeville and that he should move immediately to take over the crossings there. In a hair-raising night move, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division drove forward to Abbeville only to find the opposite bank of the river held by the enemy. There was no sign of the 11th Armoured, no possibility of crossing in strength before 3 September and consequently no immediate need to move the 2nd Division.
On the 3rd the 2nd Division held services at the cemetery above Dieppe where 800 of their dead were buried, followed by a marchpast in the town. Crerar took the salute. In the eyes of the Canadian people, Dieppe had become a symbol of gallantry and sacrifice tinged with bitterness. The shock of the casualty figures was fresh in their minds. In their eyes it would have been callous, indeed unthinkable, for the Division not to have remembered their comrades in the way they did. Only an urgent operational reason could have prevented Harry Crerar taking part.
During the afternoon of 2 September a message arrived from Montgomery asking Crerar to meet him at Tactical Headquarters, Second British Army, at 1 p.m. next day. The wording suggested that it would be a personal meeting. Since there had been no unforeseen developments on his front since he last saw the Commander-in-Chief, he replied by outlining what was planned for Dieppe next day and asked that their meeting be postponed until 5 p.m. He added that he would, of course, conform to Montgomery’s wishes.
Next day in Dieppe, he received two messages. The first, from the Prime Minister of Canada read, ‘I would like you to know I am sharing your joy upon the entry of Canadian troops into Dieppe today. Nothing has so stirred Canada as the rapid series of victories achieved by our forces in recent weeks. My warmest congratulations to you all.’1
The second message from his Chief of Staff was handed to him at 2:40 p.m. just as the parade was about to begin. That it had been delayed in transmission was obvious — Montgomery insisted that he should attend the meeting at 1 p.m. It was by now impossible to comply so he completed his part in the ceremonies then flew to Second Army where he learned that, far from a personal meeting, he had missed a formal conference between Montgomery, Bradley and their army commanders. Dempsey told him that its purpose was to discuss the future cooperation of the Second British and First U.S. Armies, and that in his view, it mattered little that Crerar had not been present. Crerar then drove to make his peace with Field-Marshal Montgomery.
Crerar recorded their interview as follows:
On reaching the caravan, the Field-Marshal addressed me abruptly, asking me why I had not turned up at the meeting in accordance with his instructions. I kept myself under control and briefly, with occasional interruptions, gave him the explanation which I have recorded in more detail above. The C-in-C intimated that he was not interested in my explanation — that the Canadian aspect of the Dieppe ceremonial was of no importance compared to getting on with the war, that he had checked through his signals and determined that my Tac HQ had received a message from him at 0615 hrs that morning, instructing me to keep the appointment and that, even if I had not received it, then in default of other arrangements, I should have made it my business to be present.
I replied to the C-in-C that I could not accept this attitude and judgement on his part. I had carried out my responsibilities as one of his two Army Comds, and as the Cdn Army Comd, in what I considered to be a reasonable and intelligent way, in the light of the situation as I knew it, or appreciated it. I had found him, in the past, reasonable in his treatment of me and I had assumed that this situation would continue to prevail. The request in my message, for postponement of the hour of our meeting, had been fully explanatory and, I thought, tactful. I had thought it would have been acceptable to him. I had, as previously explained, a definite responsibility to my Government and country which, at times, might run counter to his own wishes. There was a powerful Canadian reason why I should have been present with 2 Cdn Inf Div at Dieppe that day. In fact, there were eight hundred reasons — the Canadian dead buried at Dieppe cemetery. I went on to say that he should realize, by our considerable association, that I was neither self-opinionated, nor unreasonable, but that, also, I would never consent to be ‘pushed about’ by anyone, in a manner, or direction which I knew to be wrong.
The Field-Marshal reiterated that I had failed to comply with an instruction issued by him and that such situation could only result in his decision that our ways must part. I replied that I assumed he would at once take this up through higher channels and that, I, in turn, would at once report the situation to my Government.
At once, Montgomery backed down and said that the incident was now closed. Crerar said that he did not wish it to be closed and wanted it aired through proper channels. Further discussion followed. Montgomery gave Crerar a resumé of what transpired at the conference and repeated that as far as he was concerned the matter was closed. General Crerar ended his summary of the affair:
In conclusion, I must state that I received the impression, at the commencement of the interview, that the C-in-C was out to eliminate, forcefully, from my mind that I had any other responsibilities than to him. The Canadian ceremony at Dieppe was not of his ordering, nor to his liking. It had been the cause of an interference with an instruction which he had separately issued to me — to meet him at a certain time and place. As the interview proceeded, and he found that I would not retreat from the stand I had taken — that I had a responsibility to Canada as well as to the C-in-C — he decided to ‘consider the matter closed.’ It was not a willing decision, nor one that I can assume will be maintained. However, though our relations have obviously been strained, I trust that the situation is temporary and I shall do what I can to ease them, though without departing from what I consider it my duty to do, or not to do, in my capacity as a Canadian.
In a report to the CIGS that day, Montgomery indicated his displeasure with Crerar by saying that, since crossing the Seine, First Canadian Army’s operations had been ‘badly handled and very slow.’
A few days later Crerar sent him a detailed explanation of the delays which had occurred in handling the message which had confirmed that he should attend the conference. Montgomery replied: “ I am sorry that I was a bit rude the other day and somewhat outspoken. I was annoyed that no one came to an important conference. But forget about it — and let us get on with the war. It was my fault.”2
In early September intercepted German messages, deciphered at Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire and distributed under the codeword ULTRA, made fascinating reading — but not many saw them. They were distributed only to the most senior commanders who were under instructions to take the greatest care in passing on the informaton which they contained. It would be disastrous if the enemy were to discover that their most sensitive signals traffic was being read by the Allies. Within 21st Army Group’s two armies, only their commanders were privy to ULTRA, except for Lt-General Guy Simonds. He had been ‘indoctrinated’ as Crerar’s replacement in order that he would be fully ready to assume command of the Army should his commander become a casualty.3
A similar arrangement for Second Army was not thought necessary. In the welter of situation reports by retreating German formations and orders from Hitler’s headquarters, he saw two related facts which offered both an opportunity for encircling a retreating army and a compelling reason for doing so. The first was that six divisions, nearly one hundred thousand men of the 15th German Army, with their equipment, were falling back on the Scheldt where they intended to cross to Walcheren Island and then eastward, north of Antwerp. The second fact was that Hitler had ordered them to block the seaward approaches to Antwerp, to defend Walcheren, the banks of the Scheldt, the northern outskirts of the city and the Albert Canal as far as Maastricht.
The bulk of 15th Army was still south of the Scheldt. To Simonds the opportunity was obvious. Ignoring the Channel ports for the moment, his Corps should drive with all possible speed to Breskens, the port on the Scheldt opposite Walcheren, then turn to sweep along the south bank to Antwerp. The garrisons of the Channel ports would be masked until they could be dealt with later. Only a few days delay would be involved in opening them, a small price to pay for destroying six undefeated enemy divisions.
After the war he wrote that he had urged his plan on Crerar who declined either to seek Montgomery’s approval or to change his own plan to capture the Channel ports. He said that he would have given anything to have had ten minutes with Monty who would have seen the possibilities which it offered.
Relations were not very good between Monty and Crerar at the time, and though I protested the order to give priority to the capture of the Channel ports, Crerar refused to raise the issue with Monty.4
On the face of it Crerar’s reaction indicated a lack of imagination, of that instinct to go for the enemy’s jugular which is characteristic of a great field commander. No doubt Simonds believed that what he wrote was true but anything he said about Crerar after the war was bound to be influenced by personal bitterness.
What Simonds did not say was that Crerar knew that Montgomery at the time was little interested in Antwerp. On 6 September his Chief of Staff had warned Crerar’s headquarters that the Germans probably intended to hold the Channel ports as long as possible and that the immediate opening of one of the ports north of Dieppe, preferably Boulogne, was essential to the Field-Marshal’s plans. Montgomery passionately believed that every possible resource should be thrown into a thrust deep into Germany with the object of finishing the War in 1944. He calculated that with the ports of Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk he could support a thrust to the Ruhr and even to Berlin without the use of Antwerp. A note on his intentions recorded by his operations staff on 9 September show his calculations which gave the task of clearing the islands blocking Antwerp ‘last priority’ among the tasks of First Canadian Army.5
Montgomery was aware of 15th Army’s withdrawal through Walcheren. Not only did he receive ULTRA, but air reconnaissance reported daily what was going on. Eisenhower, too, was aware of the situation. They decided to leave destruction of the retreating Germans to the Tactical Air Force which, though able to cause damage and casualties would, they knew, be incapable of stopping the movement over the Scheldt. Inevitably many would escape, a matter which at the time seemed of little consequence with the collapse of Germany expected to follow the drive across the Rhine.
To Crerar the Commander-in-Chiefs intentions were perfectly clear. First Canadian Army was to take Boulogne and the rest of the Channel ports as a matter of utmost urgency to support his drive into Germany. Simonds’ proposed ‘hook around the Scheldt,’ attractive though it seemed, might well take longer than the few days he predicted and would, in any case, delay Montgomery’s main operation. Already the Commander-in-Chief had made clear his displeasure at the Army’s apparently slow progress after crossing the Seine. He would be unlikely to consent to any further delay for what in the grand scale might be considered as ‘mopping-up,’ particularly since he had shown that he was aware of the escape of the Germans and was deliberately leaving their destruction to the Air Force.
In refusing to put forward Simonds’ plan to Montgomery, Crerar showed, not a reluctance to argue after the Dieppe episode, but that he knew Montgomery’s mind and was following the spirit of his orders.
Yet though the Canadian Army could do nothing to block the escape of the 15th Army, there was a man in position to do so if he were but told that it was taking place.
On 4 September Antwerp fell to the 11th Armoured Division. When its commander, Major-General ‘Pip’ Roberts, was ordered to capture it, he asked his corps commander, Sir Brian Horrocks, for a specific objective. An armoured division could not be expected to clear an entire city the size of Antwerp. Horrocks well remembered how the Germans’ systematic destruction of port facilities along the North African coast had delayed the advance of the Eighth Army. Without hesitation he answered, ‘The docks.’ Incredibly, Roberts found them undamaged. With the assistance of the Belgian resistance, the Armée Blanche, his 159th Infantry Brigade cleared the area and ensured its protection. The Division’s success was duly reported and they waited for further orders.
Later Horrocks, who knew nothing of ULTRA, was horrified to learn of the escape of the 15th German Army. He never discovered the reason why their move across the Scheldt, which was observed from the air, was not reported to his headquarters. He later concluded that 4 September was not only the day they captured Antwerp, it was the day they lost the Battle of Arnhem.
If I had ordered Roberts to bypass Antwerp and advance only fifteen miles north-west, in order to cut off the Beveland isthmus, the whole of this force which played such a prominent part in the subsequent fighting, might have been destroyed or forced to surrender…. My eyes were fixed on the Rhine …6
Horrocks was not the only one whose eyes were so fixed. Eisenhower, Montgomery and almost every other senior commander in the Allied Expeditionary Force believed that if they could cross that river into Germany the war should be finished in 1944.
Since 23 August Montgomery had been pressing his concept of a single massive thrust into Germany on the Supreme Commander. Eisenhower did not agree, considering that the advance into Germany should take place on a broad front. On 1 September a crucial change took place in their relations. Until then Montgomery had been in charge of all operations on the ground. On that day, as planned beforehand, Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, took direct charge of Allied land operations. On 4 September, as British tanks were entering Antwerp, he directed Montgomery to ‘secure Antwerp, breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.’7
During the next few days the British and Americans advanced toward the Rhine while Montgomery and Eisenhower exchanged letters on their conflicting views on strategy. On the 10th they met in Eisenhower’s plane at Brussels airport and argued the ‘broad front’ versus the ‘single thrust’ concepts, in an atmosphere of increasing acrimony. Eisenhower emphasized the importance of opening Antwerp but authorized Montgomery to defer this until after an attempt to seize a bridgehead over the Rhine.
Montgomery believed that the enemy might collapse before Antwerp could be opened. Eisenhower was doubtful of that but was prepared to defer operations to clear the port until after the airborne operation to seize the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges. Plainly he expected much from it. Both seemed oblivious to the danger developing along their long left flank.
Among Allied generals, only Guy Simonds seems to have recognized at the time the threat posed by those six divisions of the 15th Army. And it was he who eventually had to deal with the consequences of their survival.
When it became obvious to the German High Command that at best only a delaying action could be fought on the Seine, they ordered Field-Marshal Model, the commander of Army Group ‘B’, to prepare a stop line along the River Somme. Their immediate problem was to save their forces south of that river from encirclement and destruction. On 28 August General Gustav von Zangen, commanding the 15th Army, ordered his two divisions holding the coast south of the river to withdraw to it and prepare it for defence. This they did, blowing all the bridges over which First Canadian Army would have to advance. But early in the morning of the 31st the 11th British Armoured Division caused consternation by overrunning the headquarters of the 5th Panzer Army south-west of Amiens, capturing there the commander of the 7th Army, then bursting across the Somme on a still-intact bridge at Amiens. The defensive line was breached leaving von Zangen’s men outflanked and liable once more to being surrounded. They began to withdraw but their rearguards were still holding the north bank when the 4th Canadian Armoured Division reached the river at Abbeville in the early hours of 2 September.
In January, 1944, Hitler had designated certain French ports as ‘fortresses’ which were to be defended to the last. Among them were Le Havre, Boulogne and Dunkirk. On 4 September, he issued a new directive:
Because of the breakthrough of enemy tank forces toward Antwerp, it has become very important for the further progress of the war to hold the fortresses of Boulogne and Dunkirk, the Calais defence area, Walcheren Island with Flushing harbour, the bridgehead at Antwerp, and the Albert Canal position as far as Maastricht.
a. For this purpose the 15th Army is to bring the garrisons of Boulogne and Dunkirk and the Calais defence area up to strength by means of full units.
The defensive strength of the fortresses is to be increased by means of additional ammunition supplies from the supplies of 15th Army, especially anti-tank ammunition, by bringing up provisions of all kinds from the country, and by evacuating the entire population.
The commanders of the Calais defence area and of Walcheren Island receive the same authority as a fortress commander.
As Hitler was issuing this order, disaster overtook him at Antwerp. Meeting ‘negligible opposition,’ the 11th Armoured Division reached the city and by that evening the greatest port in north-west Europe was in Allied hands, its docks and their machinery practically undamaged. To compound the catastrophe, the three corps of 15th Army — 67th, 86th and 89th — were south of the estuary of the Scheldt, west of the city. A note in Field-Marshal Model’s diary for that day reads: ‘This advance to Antwerp has closed the ring around Fifteenth Army. A thrust to Breda must be expected.’8
As we have seen, no such thrust took place and 15th Army began to make its way across the Scheldt. From Terneuzen and Breskens its units were ferried to Flushing on Walcheren Island and to South Beveland. In spite of air attacks, the movement went on until 23 September when it was complete. In its final report on the operation made next day, the 89th Corps which had directed it said that 86,100 men, 616 guns, 6,200 horses and 6,200 vehicles had escaped to continue the war.
Von Zangen had followed Hitler’s instructions to the letter. The coastal ‘fortresses’ were manned and provisioned, and strong forces lay astride the Scheldt to the west of Antwerp.
The consequences of the British failure to mount the ‘thrust to Breda’ will become obvious later. For the moment First Canadian Army were occupied elsewhere but, in time, they would pay a heavy price to redeem it.
