BEFORE THE FIRST CANADIAN ARMY had reached the Seine Montgomery had ordered Crerar to use one corps to clear the Havre peninsula and take the port. No more forces than were necessary were to be used for that task as ‘the main business lies to the north, and in the Pas de Calais.’ There seemed little doubt that two divisions would be needed. The situation at each of the other Channel ports was so uncertain that no such comfortable allocation of troops could be made.
On 25 August Crerar ordered 1st British Corps to prepare for the task. Since March he and his staff had studied the problems of capturing the port and had concluded that, if the Germans decided to defend it, they would be faced with a major operation. There were formidable defences to be neutralized or destroyed by naval and air bombardment and a large artillery programme and special armour would be needed to support an infantry assault. When, on 2 September, 49th Division advanced on the port and were met by heavy fire, it was obvious that at least a week would be needed to take the city.
Sir John Crocker, the Corps Commander, soon confirmed that he would indeed need considerable support. Crerar provided him with four medium and two heavy regiments of artillery, two armoured brigades including conventional gun tanks, Flails, Crocodiles and Kangaroos, as well as air and naval support. He authorized him to deal directly with Bomber Command and the Navy.
While he and Crocker had had a blazing argument in Normandy a few weeks earlier and he had tried to have him removed from his command, tempers had cooled and Crerar was happy enough to leave the operation in such experienced hands.
In the meantime, whilst the 49th Divisions was moving directly toward Le Havre, the 51st (Highland) Division advanced to St Valéry-en-Caux where its remnants had surrendered to Rommel in 1940. They found it undefended and on 4 September circled back to join the 49th on the outskirts of the city.
The great ocean port, surrounded by water on three sides, was heavily defended by coast artillery batteries, most of which could only fire to seaward. Though the land defences were incomplete, Colonel Eberhard Wildermuth, the fortress commander, had a garrison of more than 11,000 troops supported by 76 field and medium and anti-aircraft guns.
The systematic softening of the enemy’s defences began on 5 September with a heavy bomber attack and a bombardment from H.M. Monitor Erebus. Her 15-inch shells were landing on the German defences when she herself was hit by a 14.8-inch gun of the Grand Clos battery. Her port after-hold flooded and she withdrew to Portsmouth for repairs.1 She returned to the attack on the 8th but again was hit and retired. On separate days, Bomber Command struck at three areas of the port’s defences dropping some 4,000 tons of bombs. Then on the 10th the naval and air bombardments intensified. Sixty aircraft attacked the Grand Clos battery and later, in two major attacks by nearly 1,000 bombers, the RAF dropped a further 4,900 tons of explosives. Following it, Erebus and the battleship Warspite engaged casemated guns on the perimeter defences of Le Havre. The Grand Clos battery replied but finally was silenced by Warspite’s guns.
All day on the 10th 1st Corps’ gunners had been working on the destruction of German artillery and mortars. Then, at 5.45 that afternoon, the infantry and armour attacked.
Crocker’s plan was to use both his divisions to take the fortified areas on the northern and eastern outskirts of the city, then, while the 51st Division cleared the coastal fortifications north of the port, the 49th would take the harbour itself.
On the left the 56th Brigade (2 South Wales Borderers, 2 Gloucesters, 2 Essex), preceded by Flails of the 22nd Dragoons which opened a path through a minefield west of Montivilliers, seized the Northern Plateau and crossings over the Fontaine River.
At midnight the 51st Division, on the right, aided by ‘artificial moonlight’ (searchlight beams reflected off low clouds), began clearing the northern edge of the Fôret de Montgeon. Despite an anti-tank ditch, which caused delays, and several strong points, the Highlanders were through it by morning and began to eliminate the gun areas to the west of the Forêt.
On the 11th, 49 Division took the Southern Plateau on the eastern outskirts of the city while its 146th Brigade (4 Lincolns; 1/4 KOYLI; Hallamshire Bn, Yorks and Lancs) cleared a heavily defended zone at Harfleur which covered the main road into the city. They suffered heavy casualties from mines before tanks and Flails were brought to their assistance. By nightfall the Division reached Fort de Tourneville. Meanwhile the 51st had driven in from the north and had taken the high ground at La Hève overlooking the Channel.
Next morning it was obvious to Colonel Wildermuth, lying wounded in a dugout at his battle headquarters, that the end was near. Fort de Tourneville had fallen to the 49th Division, there was no lessening of the devastating artillery fire, British infantry and armour were closing in and his last anti-tank gun had been lost. When, shortly before noon, a squadron of the 7th Royal Tanks approached, their menace was convincing. Wildermuth surrendered, properly dressed in medals and pyjamas.
The battle continued until late in the day. The 51st Division took Fort Ste Addresse, Octeville and La Hève, the 49th cleared the docks and the Schneider works. The last of the enemy to surrender was a small group on one of the quays.
The battle had taken 48 hours and had cost fewer than 500 casualties; conversely, 11,302 German prisoners were now out of the war. Because they were so well protected, unlike the unfortunate civilian population of Le Havre, the number of Germans killed and wounded was not high.
While more determination on the part of the garrison would have made 1st Corps’ task more difficult, they had so systematically destroyed the facilities of the port that it could not be used until 9 October. SHAEF had allotted it to the support of the American armies. It would have offered no immediate help to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group for it was little, if any, closer to their front in eastern Belgium than the Rear Maintenance Area at the Normandy beaches.2
