UNLIKE THE PREPARATIONS for capturing Le Havre, which were begun before the Army crossed the Seine, Crerar could make no plans beforehand for capturing the lesser Channel ports. There were too many unknown factors — which would be defended? Which needed? What would his resources and other commitments be? In the event Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk were each held by garrisons of about the same size as Le Havre. With his two armoured divisions clearing the coastal belt toward Bruges and Ghent and with 1st Corps committed to Le Havre, he had available only the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions. He could expect no help from Montgomery.
Second Army in Belgium and Holland were already overstretched in preparing for the Arnhem operation and for the subsequent hoped-for crossing of the Rhine. Some units were grounded for lack of transport. Practically all of First Canadian Army’s heavy and medium artillery and specialized armoured units were committed to the attack on Le Havre.
On 6 September Montgomery gave top priority after Le Havre to the capture of Boulogne. With so few resources Crerar had no option but to allot Boulogne and Calais to the 3rd Division while the 2nd dealt with Dunkirk and the rest of the coast from Calais to the Dutch border.
The 3rd Division’s attack could not begin until after the capture of Le Havre and the heavy supporting arms had been moved 160 kilometres north to Boulogne.
As one of Hitler’s original list of fortresses, the landward defences of the port had been heavily fortified. On a series of hills running south-east from Fort de la Crèche through St Martin to Mont Lambert, thence south to Herquelingue and from there south-west to St Etienne and Nocquet were the main German defences. Minefields and wire protected well-prepared entrenchments and concrete pillboxes from which machine guns could lay down interlocking belts of fire. At least twenty-two 88mm guns provided the framework of the anti-tank and antiaircraft defence. Few of the heavy coast defence guns could fire to landward but the garrison was supported by about nine 15cm howitzers. Behind the main defences were strong points on smaller hills, while, well to the north, were further outlying defences around La Trésorerie.
Apart from artillery and engineers from the 64th Division, the 10,000 men of the garrison were mainly low-category fortress troops. It was as well that they were not such experienced veterans as their commander, Lt-General Ferdinand Heim, who had been Guderian’s Chief of Staff in Poland and, later, had commanded a corps on the Russian Front. Unfortunately for him, the Russians had chosen his two Roumanian divisions as their target for a major tank thrust. Its success resulted in von Paulus’ Sixth Army being surrounded at Stalingrad and in Heim being the scapegoat, imprisoned, then pensioned.
In August 1944, Heim’s peaceful life at Ulm ended with orders to take command of the fortress at Boulogne. As a professional officer, he would do his best to defend the fortress but, after his treatment by Hitler, no longer did he feel that this necessarily meant ‘unto death.’1
Faced with the problem of capturing Boulogne whilst, at the same time, containing the batteries at Cap Gris Nez and the garrison at Calais, General Spry could only allot two of his three under strength brigades to the task. The key to the enemy’s defences was Mont Lambert which would have to be taken at the outset. He decided to attack from the east with the 8th and 9th Brigades north and south respectively of the main road from Boulogne to St Omer (N42).
Both brigades would advance to the River Liane, which runs through the city from the south, whereupon the 8th would turn north to Wimereux, some two miles up the coast. The 9th would cross the river and secure that portion of the town lying to the west, including Outreau and Le Portel.
Immediately before the attack, Mont Lambert and the other main enemy-defended areas on the east side of the port would be struck by RAF heavy bombers, while artillery neutralized his guns and positions on the flanks.
To deceive the enemy as to the strength and direction of his attack, Spry formed a ‘dummy brigade’ from his machine-gun battalion, the headquarters of his anti-tank and anti-aircraft regiments, and an engineers’ unit and instructed them to threaten the enemy from the south.2
Brigadier John Rockingham of 9th Brigade was dubious about heavy bomber support. It was he who had torn the covers from shell-dressings and had bound Major-General Rod Keller’s wounds, suffered when the 3rd Division had been supported by them on the Caen-Falaise road. He had seen the craters of their bombs make ground impassable for armour. But the fortifications on Mont Lambert were so deep and well-constructed that nothing else could penetrate them. With their support there was a chance that Mont Lambert could be taken quickly.
He told General Simonds that if the RAF could not guarantee that they would not bomb his men, he would rather do without their support.
‘There’s one other thing,’ said Rockingham. ‘We have to stay 2,000 yards from the objective until the last bomb has fallen. Even moving in Kangaroos it will take ten minutes at best to cover the ground, plenty of time for the enemy to come out and start firing. We could get closer with just artillery support.’
Simonds, who had only obtained approval for bomber support by appealing directly to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, said nothing for a moment as he fixed the brigadier with his cold blue eyes. It was well known that a man had to be very sure of his ground before disagreeing with Simonds, particularly if, in doing so, he implied that an operation might be too risky.
Rockingham was not noted for caution. Large, strong and self-confident, he was the picture of a fighting commander and his face wore the scars of war. In Normandy, while commanding the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, his headquarters had been practically wiped out. A sniper’s bullet killed his signaller, then a second creased the bridge of his nose. Rockingham, who had seen a whiff of smoke from a barn, seized a Sten gun, dived for cover then stalked the sniper and shot him, not the conventional way for a battalion commander to behave. When asked why he had not sent someone to deal with the problem, he replied that there wasn’t anyone else and, besides, he knew where the bastard was.
Simonds thought for a moment. ‘The enemy goes to ground when the bombers come over, comes up when they go away. After they have dropped their last bombs, we’ll have them circle around and do another run over Mont Lambert with their bomb bay doors open while you move forward.
‘And if you’re nervous about being bombed, I’ll give you an RAF group captain to stay with you during the operation. He’ll make sure no bombs fall short.’
Later Rockingham recalled,
Believe me, that fellow stayed with me! I held his hand all the time. Wherever I went, I dragged this poor guy along. When the bombers started to come over he was right beside me and I knew that if they dropped any of those big bombs around us, he’d know what to do.
They had a master bomber controlling the others in the air. First they put down a few marker bombs which were bang on the target and I told the Group Captain to go ahead. He radioed the master bomber. The system which Guy [Simonds] set up certainly worked, as did the trick of the dummy run. The Krauts stayed under cover and we had very few casualties until our troops de-bussed from the Kangaroos.
The shortage of infantry for the attack on Boulogne resulted in plans of some audacity. Rockingham well knew that his primary objective, the crest of Mont Lambert, was a formidable objective for one of his understrength battalions, no matter how heavily it might be supported. Yet it was vital to get into the city to the banks of the Liane River as quickly as possible — another battalion would be required for that. A third would be needed for operations beyond the river.3
Early in the morning of 17 September, nearly a hundred spectators — naval, military, air force and press — on the hilltop viewing stand south of Mont Lambert, raised their binoculars as the first Lancasters appeared.4 Simultaneously air-burst shells fired by the artillery began exploding low over the enemy flak batteries. Ahead a lone Auster slowly circled — the Army Commander himself was watching the attack.
Suddenly fountains of earth and smoke erupted from the broad slopes of Mont Lambert as the first of 692 aircraft dropped their bombs. As they roared overhead, white smoke from a Pathfinder’s marker plumed from the peak which minutes later disappeared in a volcano of explosives.
At 9:55 the last bomb fell. Moments later, as another wave of bombers appeared overhead, tanks of the Fort Garry Horse followed by the North Nova Scotia Highlanders in Kangaroos and the AVREs of 87th Assault Squadron, Royal Engineers, advanced on Mont Lambert.
Halfway up the slope, mines and bomb craters brought them to a halt and from then on the infantry had to fight their way forward on foot through a labyrinth of trenches, pillboxes and casemated gun positions, interlaced with wire, mines and booby traps. Most opposition came from machine guns in concrete emplacements which were covered by anti-tank fire. Flail tanks could not be brought into action to clear paths through the mines because of cratering. Before armoured flame throwers of any sort could be used against the machine-gun positions, the infantry had to deal with the enemy’s anti-tank guns using ‘Lifebuoys,’ a man-pack flame gun, to support their assaults. In reaching the crest of the hill, the North Novas overcame 20 separate little fortresses.
Toward evening Crocodiles — flame-throwing tanks — were able to get forward. They proved to be the most effective weapon against pillboxes — their appearance usually being enough to completely demoralize the enemy, who would give up before they could be fired. There were no recorded instances of enemy soldiers being burned. By nightfall most of Mont Lambert had been cleared.5
Meanwhile, on the right, the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders, riding in armoured vehicles, had driven forward behind a terrific artillery concentration until forced to debus by mines. Within 45 minutes they had captured their objectives on the northern slopes of Mont Lambert between St Martin and La Cauchèrie and were looking down across Boulogne. Unfortunately they could also be seen by the enemy beyond the Liane, from the peak of Mont Lambert and the high ground north of the road in the 8th Brigade’s sector. Artillery and mortar fire now poured into the battalion’s position. From whatever cover they could find, the Glengarrians watched with admiration as sappers of the 18th Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers, cleared a route through the minefields by hand for armoured vehicles to come forward for the next phase of the attack.
With fighting still continuing on Mont Lambert, this was now to begin. Two columns of specialized armour — bulldozers, flame thrower tanks, engineer assault vehicles and Flails, each supported by a platoon of infantry in Kangaroos — would drive with all possible speed to seize two bridges over the Liane which were reported to be undamaged. Because of difficulty in clearing routes, only one column could move initially. By 8 p.m. it had battered its way through the débris-filled streets to the river while the other had come to a halt within the town.
So heavy was the enemy artillery fire that it was dusk before the SDG could move toward the river.
Realizing how vulnerable tanks were in a built-up area at night, Lt-Colonel Roger Rowley sent one of his companies to find them and give them protection.
The city was burning and, with German patrols in the area, the company felt uncomfortably silhouetted as they moved through the unfamiliar streets. After losing their way several times they found the tanks in time to beat off the first enemy tank-hunting teams. The Germans had decided that the tanks must be eliminated before morning.
They came in on the Glens in hair-raising fashion, their boots covered with cloth so as to be noiseless and their faces and hands blackened. They were familiar with the paths and alleys of the neighbourhood and were able to close in to the attack quickly. The Glens beat them off without losing a tank, though not without a few casualties.
Throughout the night the stillness was broken by shots and the explosion of grenades as Canadians working forward toward the river clashed with enemy patrols.
Early the following morning D Company and the battalion command group headed for the Citadel which was entirely surrounded, like a castle, by a high wall, and at once got into position before the bastion under cover of smoke. Then there appeared, with as nice a sense of timing as an author slipping a character into the plot of a historical romance, a Frenchman who had been living for this hour. He wished to show the officer the entrance to a secret tunnel that led into the heart of the Citadel; would the officer be pleased to follow him? The Company Commander (Major Stothart), who was by this time the only officer in his Company who had not been wounded, took a platoon with him and disappeared at the heels of the patriot. No sooner had he done so than the Churchill tanks rumbled up, raking the ramparts with fire and the Engineers in their armoured vehicles began to place petards against the portcullis. As the gate was blown in, the Company Commander and his platoon dealt the coup de grâce to the morale of the defenders by suddenly appearing in their midst out of the tunnel. Scores of dirty white things immediately were seen fluttering from the walls in token of surrender.
Words was sent back to the Commanding Officer, asking him to come and take over the Citadel. About 200 prisoners, including sixteen officers, were captured, all of them delighted to be out of the war.6
On the right of the Division, all three battalions of the 8th Brigade were attacking. While the Queen’s Own Rifles and Le Régiment de la Chaudière battled their way into the northern outskirts of Boulogne, the North Shore Regiment attacked the heavily fortified positions around La Trésorerie from which the enemy otherwise would have been able to fire into the rear of their sister battalions. Opposition was heavy and it was not until the evening of the next day, the 18th, that the Queen’s Own fought their way to the harbour and the mouth of the Liane. The Chaudière had taken the fortified area about the Colonne de la Grande Armée, the monument commemorating Napoleon’s preparations to invade England in 1805, and were patrolling towards Fort de la Crèche. The North Shore had taken the pillboxes at La Trésorerie and were mopping up and preparing to deal with the nearby coastal batteries.
Next day they continued to clear the area around Wimereux and Wimille while the Queen’s Own and Chaudière mounted an attack toward Fort de la Crèche. It made little progress. ‘The enemy was fighting very hard and for the first time was really contesting every yard of ground. There appeared to be no foreign element and the opposition was entirely German.’7 Next day an attack which was to be supported by medium bombers did not take place when the RAF support was cancelled at the last moment with no explanation.
On the 21st the two battalions succeeded in working forward to the outer defences. Late in the afternoon 77 medium bombers made a very effective attack on the Fort and the infantry were able to move closer to it. After dark the Queen’s Own brought forward tanks and anti-tank guns into positions covering the Fort while their riflemen closed up to its protective wire. At first light the armour opened a heavy sustained fire on every visible aperture of the Fort. Taken completely by surprise, the garrison of 500 Germans surrendered, ending resistance in the 8th Brigade’s area.
The 9th, which reached the Liane River during the first night of the battle, found all bridges over the river destroyed. The next day for them was spent in mopping up Mont Lambert and the area near the river, while they prepared for an assault crossing that night.
The opposite bank was lined with buildings from which alert enemy machine-gun crews fired at anything which moved on the Canadian side. It would be difficult to cross in darkness, well-nigh impossible by day. And the night was needed for bridging. Rockingham decided to smother the opposition before sending his reserve battalion, the Highland Light Infantry of Canada, over the Liane.
Under cover of darkness he brought every tank and anti-tank gun, every machine gun and PIAT available to him forward to the river line and concealed them in houses and behind garden walls. Their orders were to open fire at H-Hour and ‘plaster’ the enemy opposite while the artillery fired at targets beyond. While they were moving into position the engineers improvised a footbridge across which the infantry would cross, closed up, at the run.8
The supporting weapons were placed under the direct control of the battalion commander who could stop the firing immediately he saw his men moving into a danger zone.
Soon after the bridge was completed, the deceptive quiet of early morning exploded into ear-shattering noise as a sheet of flame flashed across the waters of the Liane. Dust and shards of brick and stone erupted from the buildings opposite as the first HLI platoon dashed across the bridge, their company sergeant-major encouraging them to ‘MOVE!’
By 10 a.m. the entire battalion and its supporting arms were over the river and fighting their way through the town toward the sea. ‘Murderous fire came from all directions,’ costing them 64 casualties and the loss of four Flail tanks. As soon as the HLI were clear of their bridgehead, the SDG crossed and both battalions, under shelling by heavy artillery, 88mm airbursts and 20 and 40mm AA guns, turned south.
During the afternoon the SDG fought their way into the suburb of Outreau, among the prisoners captured being ‘thirty black Sengalese complete with fez.’9
Between there and the sea was a particularly dangerous and well-protected German battery position on a 250-foot hill which gave them good observation in all directions. On it were 15 artillery pieces including six 88s. Fortunately for the Highlanders, they were so busy shelling the North Novas that they did not see D Company of the Glengarrians forming up in the woods below their position.
As the first shells of their artillery support began to burst on the objective, the infantry swarmed up and over the hill, throwing grenades and bayoneting the defenders. In minutes the first position with three 88s was overrun. A platoon dashed for the next three but the Germans managed to spike them before they were captured. By the time darkness began to fall, the company had rounded up another 185 prisoners.
Next morning their irrepressible commanding officer, Roger Rowley, visited the position with two artillery officers. Together they swung one of the 88s toward one of the strongpoints at Le Portel and opened fire. With the third shot they knocked out one of its 88s. Promptly the enemy opened up with machine guns and 88s from every position from which they could be brought to bear, sending the ad hoc gun crew to cover.10
The next two days saw the 9th Brigade involved in clearing the dock area and the outlying defences preparatory to reducing the immensely strong fortifications at Le Portel where it was now known that Heim had moved his headquarters. Like Fort de la Crèche, these were manned by all-German garrisons.
At 2 p.m. on 22 September the attack on the forts began. Within half an hour the northern strongpoint had fallen and its commander was despatched to General Heim with an ultimatum. Just before it expired, a white flag was seen hoisted over the southern fort and Heim emerged to surrender to Brigadier Rockingham. The last fighting ended when the German commander sent a cease-fire order to a lone 88mm gun detachment, isolated on the harbour mole, who seemed determined to fight to the bitter end.
That evening two Canadians stopped at the entrance to one of the docks, arrested by a weather-beaten sign in English. After years of German occupation and in spite of countless raids by RAF bombers and the terrible shelling of the past few days, it stood as a reminder of peaceful ways that surely one day would return — ‘All vehicles for embarkation to Folkestone report here.’11
Impatient as they were for supplies, the staffs at Montgomery’s and Eisenhower’s headquarters were critical of the length of time taken to capture Boulogne, contending that, from Crerar down, the Canadians had been too deliberate and methodical in their reduction of the fortress, particularly when compared with 1st British Corps’ businesslike seizure of Le Havre.12 It was an emotional rather than a rational complaint, for Crerar simply did not have the resources at Boulogne which were available at Le Havre — fewer bombers, no naval gunfire, far less artillery ammunition, two infantry brigades as opposed to six, against enemy garrisons of almost equal strength.
The Allies were fortunate that Boulogne was taken as quickly as it was. Given the strength of their defences, if the 9,500 prisoners who far outnumbered the Canadian infantry had all fought as well as the Germans had in Normandy, or, indeed, as the garrisons of Fort de la Crèche and Le Portel, the battle would have lasted longer and cost the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division far more than its 634 casualties, a figure larger than the British losses at Le Havre.
The fall of Boulogne on 22 September brought no immediate relief to the supply situation for so badly were the port facilities damaged that it was not until 12 October that they could receive the first ship. In the meantime none could approach the harbour until the German guns at Cap Gris Nez and Calais were silenced.
