ON 3 SEPTEMBER, 1944, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Eisenhower’s Naval Commander-in-Chief, studied the advance of armoured divisions with as much fascination as did any soldier or airman. Arrows on the situation map marked the thrusts developing toward the Rhine, while reports of demoralized enemy forces suggested that there was little to stop the Allied armies. But, as a sailor, his main concern was the future of naval operations along the coast of North-West Europe. It was this that drew his attention to a long arrow pointing toward Antwerp. It marked the axis of advance of the 11th Armoured Division.
Early in the planning of the invasion the need to capture Antwerp and Rotterdam had been recognized. Now the first seemed likely to fall. With a capacity of 40,000 tons per day, it was the largest port in western Europe and was far closer to the armies advancing into Germany than Cherbourg, Le Havre and the Channel ports. But there was a difficulty — it was sixty miles from the sea. No ship could enter it until its approaches were cleared. Lest others be under any illusion that its capture alone would solve their supply problems, Ramsay sent a telegram to Eisenhower, Montgomery and the Admiralty:
It is essential that if Antwerp and Rotterdam are to be opened quickly enemy must be prevented from:
1. i) Carrying out demolitions and blocking in ports
ii) Mining and blocking Scheldt …
2. Both Antwerp and Rotterdam are highly vulnerable to mining and blocking. If enemy succeeds in these operations, the time it will take to open ports cannot be estimated.
3. It will be necessary for coastal batteries to be captured before approach channels to the river routes can be established.1
Next day the 11th Armoured Division seized the vital dock area of Antwerp and there they stopped. Nothing was done on the ground, either to block the escape of the 15th German Army, or to secure the banks of the Scheldt from Antwerp to the sea. The explanation for this failure was simple. Montgomery saw a gap developing between the 15th German Army retiring north-eastwards and the survivors of the 7th Army moving east to the Siegfried Line. He ordered Dempsey’s Second Army to drive forward with all strength and speed to seize the bridges over the Rhine between Wesel and Arnhem before the enemy could establish a defensive line. Airborne divisions would open the way over the main rivers which intervened.
Dempsey’s forces would be entirely committed to the main thrust and to protecting its flanks. Crerar’s Army was to clear the coastal belt, then remain in the area of Bruges-Calais until there were enough supplies for it to be employed further forward. Montgomery gave neither of his army commanders the task of opening Antwerp.
While Eisenhower, in his discussions with Montgomery, placed somewhat more store on the urgency of opening the port, both appeared to believe that if they made a crossing over the Rhine the problem might solve itself. Such a mortal threat to homeland Germany might bring Hitler’s legions scurrying home from Holland. Unlikely though this may seem in retrospect, the disorganization of the German Army at the time appeared so complete, its morale so shattered, that such a withdrawal seemed probable.
On 9 September, the day after the 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Divisions came up against stiff German resistance on the Ghent Canal, General Crerar reiterated Montgomery’s directive that first priority would be given to opening the Channel ports — the destruction of the enemy north-east of the Ghent Canal was of secondary importance, and no important forces were to be committed to offensive action there. At the same time, First Canadian Army’s area of responsibility was enlarged to include Ghent and the south shore of the Scheldt to within a few miles of Antwerp.2
On 10 September Eisenhower again spoke to Montgomery of the importance of opening Antwerp, but agreed to a delay until the Arnhem operation could take place. Two days later another more potent influence was brought to bear. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, meeting at Quebec, sent Eisenhower a telegram which stressed the importance of opening up Antwerp ‘before bad weather sets in.’ That same day Montgomery asked Crerar when he thought he would be able to tackle the problem.3
At last someone had been given the job. A growing sense of urgency was reflected in a letter from Montgomery on 13 September. Now he stressed the need for speed both in capturing Boulogne, Dunkirk and Calais and in clearing the Antwerp approaches. He hoped that Crerar could carry out all these tasks simultaneously. Given their nature and the size of First Canadian Army, the Field Marshal was being unrealistic.
The day the British captured Antwerp saw Hitler designate Walcheren Island a fortress and issue orders for the defence of the south bank of the Scheldt, the island itself and the land communications to it. As a result, the task facing First Canadian Army bore a resemblance, if on a very large scale, to the reduction of a mediaeval fortress, a comparison which could be extended to the defence problems of the Germans. Like so many, ‘Fortress Walcheren’ was sited to defend a waterway at a vital crossing. South of the river, its outer defences were protected by a moat — the Leopold Canal. Its central ‘keep’ was Walcheren itself. The landward approach was a long defended way, the south Beveland Peninsula, with a series of gates, Woensdrecht at the base of the peninsula, the Beveland Canal, and finally the 1,000-metre causeway which joins the island to the mainland. All that was lacking in the latter was a drawbridge and the Germans were to find a substitute for that.
On the face of it Crerar’s task was straightforward — cut the fortress’s communications, invest it closely, destroy its garrison’s mobility and morale by bombardment and flooding, destroy its outer defences, then reduce the keep itself.
At the same time, General von Zangen, commanding the 15th German Army, had two major problems — the defence of the Antwerp approaches and the extrication of the bulk of his forces still south of the river. Undoubtedly the second was the greater source of anxiety. To his great relief it was completed on 23 September, before First Canadian Army could move to stop him. With them out of the way, the defence of the fortress became much simpler. One well-led infantry division would hold the south bank of the Scheldt, another the Beveland Peninsula and the island itself. Supporting them and protecting the seaward approaches was a very large number of long-range, heavy guns in strong concrete emplacements. There was ammunition, food and stores enough for an indefinite siege.
Following a conference with his Army Commanders on the 14th, Montgomery issued a directive for the forthcoming operations of 21 Army Group. It covered both the Second Army operation directed on Arnhem which would take place on 17 September and clarified the tasks of the Canadians. In the preamble he indicated that their first priority was to clear the mouth of the Scheldt but emphasized that ‘our real objective, therefore, is the Ruhr. But on the way to it we want the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, since the capture of the Ruhr is merely the first step on the northern route of advance into Germany.’
His detailed instructions to Crerar required him to complete the capture of Boulogne and Calais; then –
10. The whole energies of the Army will be directed toward operations designed to enable full use to be made of the port of Antwerp. Airborne troops are available to cooperate. Air operations against the island of Walcheren have already commenced and these include:
a) the isolation of the island by taking out road and rail bridges
b) attacks on coast defence guns
c) attacks on other artillery, including flak.
11. HQ 1 Corps and 49 Div. will be brought up from the Havre area as early as possible, to the Antwerp area. 51 Div will be grounded completely in the Havre peninsula, and its transport used to enable the above move to take place; the Division will remain grounded as long as its transport is required by Canadian Army for maintenance or movement purposes.
12. Canadian Army will take over the Antwerp area from Second Army beginning on 17 September …
13. Having completed the operations for the opening of Antwerp, vide para 10, Canadian Army will operate northwards on the general axis Breda-Utrecht-Amsterdam…. Task: to destroy all enemy west of the Army boundary, and open up the port of Rotterdam.
14. Subsequently Canadian Army will be brought up on the left (or northern flank) of Second Army, and will be directed on Bremen and Hamburg.
No longer was Crerar required to take Dunkirk. The 2nd Canadian Division would be free to move to the Scheldt area at once but it would be some time before the 3rd Division would be available because of their involvement at Boulogne and Calais.4
South of the Scheldt three major canals intersected the area held by the Germans. Dividing it roughly into two equal parts was the Terneuzen Ship Canal running north from Ghent to the Scheldt. From Zeebruge on the coast, the Leopold Canal and the Canal de Dérivation de la Lys run parallel to each other south-eastwards for some 22 kilometres. There they diverge, the Leopold veering eastwards almost to the base of the Braakman inlet from the Scheldt.
On 12 September Simonds, acting on an instruction by Crerar three days earlier, ordered the 1st Polish Armoured Division to clear the area south of the Scheldt between the Terneuzen Ship Canal and the boundary with Second Army which coincided with the Dutch-Belgian border north-west of Antwerp. The 4th Canadian Armoured Division was to sweep the area west of the canal to the sea, its main thrust being from Moerbrugge to Maldegem and Breskens. No one knew better than Simonds that armoured divisions were less than ideal for operating in country so inhospitable to tanks. Any fighting would fall to the infantry, of which each division had only one brigade. He reckoned the task as being about right for two infantry divisions, six brigades, but none was available. Much would depend on the enemy’s will to fight. The Intelligence staff opined that the Germans were weak and demoralized with little equipment and no stomach for a fight. After their experience on the Ghent Canal three days earlier, the infantry of 4th Division were not that optimistic.
For the 10th Infantry Brigade the operation began on the 13th with an assault crossing of the Canal de Dérivation de la Lys and the Leopold Canal at Moerkerke by the Algonquin Regiment. Newly arrived reinforcements had raised the average strength of its four rifle companies to 90 men each, about 25 percent short of their official establishment. The crossing itself was physically exhausting. Each company had 10 heavy wood and canvas assault boats which had to be manhandled forward to the Lys Canal, heaved up the steep near bank, launched, then paddled across 90 feet of water to the wide dyke which separates the twin canals, hauled up its near-vertical bank, then dragged across to the Leopold Canal, which in turn had to be crossed.
Though under fire, the four companies succeeded in securing a narrow bridgehead and in beating off several German attempts to dislodge them, while the engineers began to build a bridge. Early in the morning of the 14th, General Gilsa, commanding 89th German Corps, ordered Lt-General Erwin Sander of the 245th Division to eliminate the bridgehead ‘at all costs’ and placed the corps reserve at his disposal.5
A ‘storm of fire,’ mortars and artillery, rained upon the Algonquins in the bridgehead, on their headquarters and on the engineers bridging the canal. Enemy infantry infiltrated between the rifle companies and their attacks were noticeably well co-ordinated. More than once battalion headquarters moved to escape the heavy and accurate fire which interfered with their control of the battle, but to no avail. Later they learned that a civilian traitor was directing the enemy guns by radio.
As day broke, work on the bridge had to stop. Many of the assault boats had been destroyed and every attempt to ferry ammunition across to replace the dwindling supplies in the bridgehead was halted by intense and accurate fire. By 11 a.m. there was no mortar or PIAT ammunition left and very little for rifles and Brens. The order now was ‘One round, one German.’
To Major-General Harry Foster, the 4th Division’s commander, it was obvious that, without reinforcement, the depleted Algonquins could not hold the bridgehead much longer. Despite heavy support by his artillery, the German fire was, if anything intensifying. To send more infantry across would be suicidal. He ordered the Algonquins to withdraw.
For the regiment, the operation was a disaster. There were insufficient boats and many of the survivors had to swim the two canals. In the fourteen hours since the assault began they had lost 148 casualties.
The outcome confirmed Simonds’ fears that his armoured divisions would be unable to cope with a determined enemy in polder country. He ordered them to ‘maintain contact and exert some pressure without sacrificing our forces in driving out an enemy who may be retreating.’ Next day troops of the 4th Division probing across the Lys Canal east of where it diverges from the Leopold found that the enemy were retiring. Though they met considerable opposition south-west of Terneuzen, within three days they were able to close up to the heavily defended Leopold Canal. With the Braakman inlet, it formed the outer boundary of what the Germans called ‘Scheldt Fortress South’ and the Allies the ‘Breskens Pocket.’
To the east, the Poles, after clearing the suburbs of Ghent, drove north-east toward Antwerp. Half-way between the two cities, Major-General Stanislaw Maczek, their redoubtable commander, concentrated his division north-west of St Nicolas preparatory to a systematic sweep of the area between there and the Scheldt. He directed his first probe north-west across the Hulst Canal in the direction of Terneuzen.
On 16 September the 10th Dragoons, his armoured brigade’s motor battalion, seized a small bridgehead over the Hulst Canal. The German reaction was as swift and violent as it had been against the Algonquins. A furious counter-attack, supported by armour, overwhelmed the outnumbered Dragoons. Next day the Poles’ 3rd Infantry Brigade attacked farther to the west and succeeded in bridging the Canal. On the 20th they captured Terneuzen, where, with Breskens, the enemy had embarked their retreating forces for the crossing of the Scheldt. By nightfall next day all resistance in their area had ceased. In twelve days, they had captured 1,173 prisoners at a cost of 329 casualties, a price they could ill afford.
South of the Scheldt the enemy’s outposts had been driven in to the line of the Leopold Canal, the moat to the fortress. In Antwerp and to the east of the city, the next phase of the operation had begun — the cutting of the land approaches to Walcheren.
