ON 19 SEPTEMBER Crerar ordered 2nd Corps to ‘thrust northwards to Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom, in order to establish a firm base on the mainland to the east of Zuid Beveland, and from which a landward thrust along the island from the east can be developed.’ Both the Canadian and Polish Armoured Divisions were to take part. 1st British Corps would move up to the right flank of the army by the 24th, to form a link with Dempsey. It was to ‘keep its main strength on the left in order to assist the 2nd Corps.’
Three days earlier, when the 2nd Division relieved the 53rd Welsh in Antwerp, they found that the Germans were holding the line of the Albert Canal from its outlet in the northern outskirts of the port, south-eastwards to Herenthals. In the dock area itself an air of unreality hung over the war. For the soldiers of the 4th Brigade every day brought vicious skirmishes with the enemy. The villages of Wilmarsdonck and Oorderen were taken and lost several times. The Germans could and did shell the harbour locks and on the 20th attacked with the intention of destroying a railway bridge in the Merxem area but were beaten back. Yet, though that suburb was in German hands, civilians regularly came through it to the Canal by tram, alighted, crossed on foot, then caught another south of the bridge and continued into Antwerp.
Every day a few men from the Canadian battalions were given leave and would catch a tram close to the front line for a few hours in downtown Antwerp. The transition from the dangers of the bullet-swept streets of the dock area to the bright lights of a city, apparently untouched by war, was so dramatic as to be almost beyond belief. Beer and wine flowed in the many bars and cafés, pretty girls were happy to dance with the soldiers, there were English-language movies showing in modern cinemas. Department stores were well stocked and the barrows in the open-air markets were heaped high with vegetables and fruit which many of the men had not seen for years. There was none of the austerity of wartime Britain. Remembering that, some resented the affluence but could not harbour it long in the face of the open-hearted hospitality of the Belgians. It was difficult for most Canadian soldiers to pay for a drink and even more difficult to tear themselves away and catch the last tram back to the front.
Desirable though it would have been for the Division to gain more elbow room around the Antwerp docks and clear up the security problems of ‘line crossers’ in the city, it did not have the strength. The cost of an attack across the Albert Canal followed by a house-to-house battle to clear the other side would be high. Major-General Foulkes, its commander, decided to outflank the German defences in the city and open the way for an advance to the north by sending the 5th Brigade across the Canal beyond the eastern suburbs.
Early in the morning of the 21st scouts of the Canadian Black Watch attempted to cross to the north bank but found every likely crossing-point closely guarded by the enemy. There was no obvious alternative to a full-scale assault. But such an operation would demand overwhelming fire support and the artillery was almost out of ammunition. There was plenty in dumps in the Normandy beachead but no transport to move it forward. The odds against a successful crossing were all too obvious to Brigadier W.J. Megill of the 5th Brigade, but cross they must. He ordered the Calgary Highlanders to take the lead.
The Algonquin Regiment’s disaster on the Leopold Canal was well known and the Highlanders approached their task with care and no little trepidation. Their company commanders were unanimous in preferring stealth and speed to a storm crossing. Every foot of the Canal in the Brigade’s area had been examined for possibilities. Only at one point did the operation seem even remotely possible — a partially intact lock gate just east of the village of Wyneghem.
The plan which evolved was simple and appallingly hazardous. A fighting patrol would steal across and take out the sentries covering the lock gate. Immediately a rifle company would follow to form a small bridgehead. Hot on their heels, two more companies would race across and the Engineers would begin building a bridge. The risks were obvious, but at least the weather favoured it. ‘Black as the inside of a cow’s belly’ muttered the signal sergeant to the Intelligence Officer as he prepared for an anxious vigil by a radio set.1
At 1:30 a.m. on 22 September Sergeant Clarence Crockett of C Company led the eight volunteers of his patrol across a semi-demolished footbridge to an island in the centre of the canal. With darkened faces and carrying only weapons, ammunition and grenades, they moved in complete silence across the narrow strip of land to the lock gate.
With infinite care the patrol inched their way along the narrow top of the 90-foot-wide gates, knowing that at the least sound machine-gun fire would sweep them from their path. As they drew close to the far bank Crockett was appalled to discover that the last eight feet of the gate was missing. The only connection to the shore was a six-inch pipe above which the Germans had strung a single taut strand of wire as a hand grip. Moving sideways, Crockett edged his way along it to the bank. Then with every sense alert, he began to crawl forward.
‘Halt!’
Crockett saw the German sentry almost as he spoke. In an instant he had him on the ground and despatched him with his knife. As his men moved up on either side of him, two enemy machine guns began lacing the south end of the lock gate and the island in the centre of the Canal. Crockett could see that any delay in dealing with them would be fatal to the battalion’s crossing. Without hesitation he and his men stormed the first gun in its concrete emplacement, killed its crew then destroyed the second with one round from a PIAT. Moments later the leading platoon of C Company arrived to help.
All day the Highlanders fought to expand their bridgehead, beating off German counter-attacks which were supported by accurate shell fire, which their frustrated artillery observers could do nothing to suppress.
By 7 p.m. the Engineers had completed a bridge and crossed to fight alongside the Highlanders. During that night the Germans attacked again, but by morning Le Régiment de Maisonneuve were also over the Canal and the bridgehead was secure.
Their failure to stop the Canadians crossing convinced General Otto Sponheimer of the 67th Corps that he must pull back without delay to the next main obstacle, the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal. When the newly arrived 49th Division crossed the Albert Canal at Herenthals, they were unopposed.
Sergeant Crockett’s gallantry was the key to the success of an operation which enabled two divisions to advance up to 16 kilometres. The Regiment recommended him for a Victoria Cross but Montgomery turned it down, commenting that it was a ‘very good Distinguished Conduct Medal.’2
On the right the 49th Division’s reconnaissance regiment found a place where the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal could easily be bridged. Major-General E.H. Barker, the Divisional Commander, ordered a diversionary attack some two kilometres away from the site which absorbed the enemy’s attention while a bridge was being built. Next day six of his battalions were across the Canal and were enlarging the bridgehead in spite of heavy enemy counter-attacks in which some 800 prisoners were taken.
To the west, the 2nd Division had not fared so well. Two attempts by the 6th Brigade to cross the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal in the area of Lochtenberg were unsuccessful. 2 Corps Headquarters could do nothing to help. Indeed, with its four divisions fighting at separate places as far apart as Boulogne and Antwerp, it was well-nigh impossible for them to influence all their operations.
On 26 September, at Simonds’ suggestion, Crerar made 1st British Corps responsible for operations in the Antwerp area and placed the 2nd Canadian and Polish Armoured Divisions under their command. With the 49th, Crocker now would have three divisions to drive the last of the enemy from Antwerp and to cut the base of the South Beveland Peninsula.
Like most of his troops, Crerar had been attacked by dysentery — ‘the Normandy Glide’ — but his had not responded to the usual drugs. After weeks of fighting this debilitating affliction, the Army Commander bowed to the advice of the Medical Corps and agreed to return to England for diagnosis and treatment. He left on 27 September, having appointed General Guy Simonds to replace him during his absence. Charles Foulkes took command of 2nd Corps while Brigadier Holley Keefler, in turn, became the acting commander of the 2nd Division. These changes had no small influence on the subsequent operations on the Scheldt.
The day that Crerar left, Montgomery issued new orders to his army commanders. ‘The major task of the (Second) Army will be to operate strongly with all available strength from the general area Nijmegen-Gennep against the N.W. corner of the Ruhr.’ Of First Canadian Army he wrote, ‘The right wing of the Army will thrust strongly northwards on the general axis Tilburg-Hertogenbosch and so free the Second Army from its present commitment to a long left flank facing west. This thrust should be on a comparatively narrow front and it is important that it should reach Hertogenbosch as early as possible.’
The British Official History commented:
Gen Crerar had intended to seal off South Beveland by pushing two divisions of I Corps up to Bergen op Zoom and to Roosendaal, a short distance east of Bergen. But as ’s-Hertogenbosch was some forty miles east of Roosendaal, Montgomery’s new orders would result in the I Corps divisions being sent off at a tangent and, as will be seen, the operations due north from Antwerp suffered accordingly.3
Simonds had no alternative but to order Crocker to direct the Poles and the 49th Division to the north-east. Montgomery was still giving the operations to open Antwerp a low priority in 21st Army Group. Even First Canadian Army could not bring all its resources to bear on the task for now one of its corps was directed from the scene. The Poles would not take Bergen op Zoom — the 2nd Division alone would seal off the South Beveland Peninsula.
To understand what happened next, it is necessary to look outside the boundaries of First Canadian Army.
When Antwerp fell to the British on 4 September, Hitler ordered his forces in the West to hold ‘Walcheren Island … the bridgehead at Antwerp and the Albert Canal position as far as Maastricht.’ East of Antwerp there was no organized force ready to respond to the Führer’s call, only the remnants of defeated units in full retreat toward the Fatherland. It is doubtful that General Kurt Chill knew of the order to hold the Albert Canal when he made up his mind to defend it but he recognized its strategic importance. Of more immediate significance, it offered an easily recognizable obstacle along which retreating units could be halted to regain their cohesion and to delay the Allied advance. At bridges over the Canal, he posted staff officers backed by military police to sort the weary and bewildered survivors of the Normandy battles into units which then were turned to face their advancing enemy. So was born ‘Battle Group Chill.’4
On 6 September Second Army resumed its advance north-east from Brussels and Louvain toward Arnhem and immediately ran into stiff resistance along the Albert Canal. In the days which followed, the Guards Armoured Division, leading the advance, was slowed by stubborn rearguards and counter-attacks as they forced their way forward to cross the next main obstacle, the Escaut Canal. It was soon evident that Chill’s improvised battle group had won enough time for units of the 15th and 1st Parachute Armies to organize a shaky defensive line running east from Antwerp to the Maas. Their headlong retreat had ended.
On 17 September the German front was shattered. American and British airborne divisions landed behind it at Eindhoven, Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem whilst Horrocks’s 30th Corps drove north-eastwards through them, bound for a crossing over the Rhine. Ten days later this bold thrust was brought to a halt just short of complete success when the gallant remnants of the British 1st Airborne Division were overwhelmed by German tanks at Arnhem.
By then the bulk of Second Army had moved forward to give weight to the thrust and to protect the two 55-mile-long flanks of the salient which had its apex north of Nijmegen. From both sides the Germans attacked to cut off the British and American divisions but were thrown back. Montgomery’s spearhead was close to the Rhine. To cross it and advance into Germany remained his primary objective.
On 26 September, when John Crocker’s 1st Corps was made responsible for operations in the Antwerp area, the 2nd Canadian and 49th (West Riding) Divisions were fighting along the Turnhout Canal. Their right joined the 53rd Division of Second Army east of Turnhout. Ten miles further to the east, that division’s front turned to the north at the base of the Nijmegen Salient.
Opposite them von Zangen’s 15th Army which had escaped across the Scheldt, faced the Canadians and British from Antwerp to Nijmegen. Many of its units had been nearly destroyed but its brain and nervous system — commanders, staffs and communications — were largely intact. With desperate efficiency, they strove to counter the threat to the Rhine, whilst holding grimly to their fortress of the Scheldt.
By now no one in First Canadian Army was under any illusions about the enemy’s capacity to fight. Though short of equipment, under strength and often with untrained boys in their ranks, many German units showed a determination and willingness to press home a counterattack which could be disconcerting. The War Diary of the 5th Brigade, speaking of the battle for the Albert Canal, noted ‘This was the first time our troops had met the enemy using bayonets.’
The first result of the new command arrangements in the Antwerp area came when Crocker ordered the 2nd Division to stop its attacks near Lochtenberg and cross the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal through the bridgehead established by the 49th. Swinging westward, the Black Watch took St Leonard on 28 September but attempts to advance further through the sandy heathland were met by accurate shell and mortar fire and by well-concealed machine guns. When Le Régiment de Maisonneuve and the Calgary Highlanders attacked in the direction of Brecht, they encountered 88mm fire, and, for the first time in recent weeks, a German tank.
But Canadian tanks too had appeared on the scene. The Fort Garry Horse, with whom the 5th Brigade had trained for years in England, moved into the bridgehead. They had worked together in Normandy but that close bocage country had precluded the intimate cooperation which they practiced so often on the Sussex Downs. The Germans were in for a shock.
Captain Sandy Pearson of the Calgaries described what happened:
The fighting strength of the Company was about thirty or forty. Every man carried an automatic weapon. They gave me a troop of tanks from the Fort Garry Horse and we did one of the first “ Infantry-cum-Tank” attacks. It worked so well that the combined force seemed unstoppable. We got a lot of prisoners with few casualties. We ended up at a deserted distillery near the Canal for the night.5
Directing the supporting artillery and mortars from the bowgunner’s seat of a tank was Captain Mark Tennant.
Ahead of us, a German was running away and I decided to let him go. I didn’t want to shoot the poor devil but then he turned back and picked something up. I thought that it must be pretty valuable and that if he was that serious about it, we probably needed it more than he did. I gave him the works and told the tank commander to stop. In the German’s hand was a tin can with a swastika on it, used to collect coins for the war effort. And that had cost him his life!
When I met Sandy in the distillery, we found tables set for the German officers’ dinner.6
But the battle was not over. In Brecht the Black Watch finally drove the enemy from the town on 1 October and the Maisonneuve held it for the next two days, while being constantly shelled and mortared and beating off several counterattacks.
The Poles and the 49th Division, which Crocker had ordered to break out of the bridgehead to the north-east, immediately ran into heavy opposition. Three kilometres west of Merxplas the attack of the 146th Brigade got off to a bad start. Its righthand battalion was late in crossing the start line for an attack on the Dépôt de Mendicité, enabling the enemy to concentrate his full fire on the troops attacking on the left. This was C Company of the Hallamshire Battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment who were protecting the left flank of the main assault.
Unaware of the strength of the enemy, the company was advancing with one platoon forward, it in turn being led by a section of six men commanded by Corporal John Harper.
The Depot was a natural defensive position being surrounded by an earth wall about 12 feet high backed by a wide road and a moat about 30 feet wide. Before it there was not a vestige of cover for more than 300 metres on the dead flat ground.
There was no sign of life from the enemy until the leading section came within 50 yards of the wall. Suddenly a hail of mortar bombs and small arms fire burst upon the advancing troops. Harper’s section rushed the enemy on the near side of the wall and there were pinned down by fire from both flanks and by grenades thrown from over the wall. His platoon commander, attempting to get forward, was badly wounded and Harper took charge of the platoon. Looking back, he could see the rest of his company pinned to the ground. The attack was on the point of failure. Looking up the steep slope of the wall, he could see spurts of dust where a machine gun was raking the top. A stick grenade flew across and exploded a few yards away. He could at least reply to that.
Angrily he pulled the pin from a 36 grenade, tossed it over the wall, then followed it with two more. By the time the third one had burst, he had scrambled up the wall and was firing at the enemy on the far side. Three of them dropped, four threw up their hands in surrender, while several ran and dived into the moat and began swimming to the far side. Harper dropped his rifle, picked up an enemy light machine gun and shot them as they swam.
He brought his prisoners over the wall, which was still under heavy fire, then returned across it to look for a way to cross the moat. Not finding one, in spite of bullets ricochetting from it, he crossed the wall again, gave orders to his section, climbed back on to the wall and covered them across with fire from a Bren gun, then occupied the abandoned enemy position.
Corporal Harper then left the comparative safety of a German weapon pit and once more walked alone along the moat for about 200 metres in full view of the enemy to find a crossing place. Eventually he made contact with the battalion attacking on his right and found that they had located a ford. Back he came across the open ground and on the way to report to his company commander he was hit by a rifle bullet and died on the bank of the moat.
Later it became obvious that the battalion on the right were only able to cross the ford with the help of fire from Harper’s platoon.
His citation for the Victoria Cross acknowledged that the success of his brigade’s attack on the Dépôt de Mendicité ‘can thus fairly be attributed to the outstanding bravery of Corporal Harper.’7
The Poles now spearheaded the 1st Corps advance up the railway line from Turnhout toward Tilburg with the West Riding Division supported by tanks of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers, keeping pace on both their flanks. Ahead of them, Typhoons and Spitfires of 84 Group RAF criss-crossed the axis of advance looking for targets.
On 3 October Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt received one of those reminders from above which field commanders find so irritating. The Chief of Operations at OKW, Col-General Jodl, wrote that if the early opening of the Scheldt, which was obviously vital to the Allies, was to be prevented, the line Antwerp-Tilburg-’s-Hertogenbosch must be held to the last. The British, Canadians and Poles could attest that Rundstedt had already reached that conclusion. That day he cancelled a projected attack by Battle Group Chill on the Nijmegen salient which he considered less important than holding Tilburg. Instead he ordered it to join the 67th Corps and drive back 1st Corps who had now taken Baarle Nassau. The battle group, formed around the nucleus of Chill’s depleted 85th Division, now contained remnants of the 8th and 89th Divisions, the Hermann Goering Replacement Regiment and the highly trained and well-equipped 6th Parachute Regiment.
Like other formations of First Canadian Army, the Poles were suffering the effects of the heavy casualties to their infantry earlier in the campaign. The few replacements which came forward were poorly trained. When, on the 6th, Chill’s battle group and the 719th Division made a concentric attack, the Poles gave no ground but they lost heavily in both tanks and men. Later, trying to advance against von der Heydte’s paratroops, their infantry and tanks seemed to have lost their earlier skill in working together. Without mutual support, Polish tanks were knocked out by German 88s at close range while their unsupported infantry were cut down by Spandau fire.
On 7 October 1st Corps was halted for a reorganization of the front. The 2nd Canadian Division returned to 2nd Corps, whilst Crocker gained the British 7th Armoured and 51st Highland Divisions, together with a considerable extension to his overlong 15-mile front.
The early hours of 2 October saw the beginning of the end to the fighting in Antwerp. At 3 a.m. two companies of the Royal Regiment of Canada crossed the Albert Canal into Merxem where they were joined later in the morning by the Essex Scottish attacking from the west. Further north-east, beyond the city, the South Saskatchewan Regiment led the 6th Brigade’s advance south-west along the Canal. By the afternoon, they had taken Lochtenberg. Next day, with the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders from Winnipeg, they took Brasschaet on the Breda road north of Antwerp. Continuing their sweep westward, they reached Appeln on the 4th, the 4th Brigade were north of Eeckeren, and Antwerp and its suburbs were free of the enemy.
The 4th Brigade now had the bit in its teeth. On the 5th, the Essex Scottish, despite fairly heavy casualties, drove the enemy from the village of Putte on the Belgian-Dutch border. Passing through them, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Royal Regiment swept forward another eight kilometres to within four and a half kilometres of Woensdrecht. The 2nd Division’s first main objective was almost within their grasp.