EAST OF THE CALCAR RIDGE, across an open valley 1,000 metres wide, rises another eight kilometres long, crescent-shaped and surmounted by two state forests. In the gap between the northernmost, the Hochwald, and the Balberger Wald, runs the Goch-Xanten railway whose capture was vital to 2nd Corps’ advance to the east. For the Germans it was the last defensive barrier before the Rhine bridges at Wesel and they were prepared to defend it to the death. Along it the remnants of four parachute divisions, amply supported by anti-tank weapons, waited in prepared defences.
In the cold hours before dawn on 27 February, battalions of the 2nd Infantry and 4th Armoured Divisions prepared to advance down the slopes of the high ground captured the day before, toward the Schlieffen defences at the edge of the Hochwald. On the left the Calgary Highlanders were to break into the wood half-way along its face while the Algonquin Regiment, supported by tanks of the South Albertas, seized Point 73, nicknamed ‘Albatross,’ a round-topped hill which blocked the entrance to the Hochwald Gap.
There had been no opportunity for ground observation of the Hochwald position before the Highlanders began their advance well before first light. In the lead was C Company commanded by Capt Bill Lyster, one of the two officers of the Regiment who had won the Sword of Honour at Sandhurst, leading his first company attack.
It was a gorgeous moonlight night. I decided on the old formation we had learned at Hillhurst Park in Calgary in 1939, arrowhead — one platoon up, two back with company headquarters in the centre, well spread out. We went down the slope across open ground for quite a distance then spotted some farm buildings on the edge of what we determined was the Hochwald. As we got close to them, all hell broke loose. Our company went to ground but bounced up and the lead platoon rushed the farmhouse. The others came in on the flanks in a pincer. An MG42 had company HQ pinned down, firing from the loft of the barn but was soon silenced — the Gerries had been killed or had fled, all but two who hid on the property and made their escape after killing a sentry who was exhausted and not on his toes.
I contacted Battalion HQ and, it now being daylight, was ordered to move into the forest covered by smoke from our tanks.
Later Ross Ellis with his artillery battery commander, Major Nixon, came up to where we were being shelled and mortared near some buildings inside the forest. The three of us were standing in the doorway of a battered old house planning a push up a trail which we had found, when a shell burst outside the open door. I grabbed my face because a piece of shrapnel had hit me in the nose and when my vision cleared, I saw a blue hole in Major Nixon’s forehead. He was dead of course and Ross and I had concussion.
I was ordered back to the RAP where the MO put me to sleep with a shot of Morphine. The next day I went back to C Company which by now had a firm grip on the edge of the Hochwald.1
Not since Normandy had the Highlanders met such heavy German mortar and artillery fire but by making the most of the accuracy of their own supporting guns, all their companies had broken through the network of fortified houses and concealed machine gun positions of the main Schlieffen position and were established in the Hochwald before 9 o’clock. Their casualties had been heavy, particularly in officers. Major Sherwin Robinson, wounded, was carried on to B Company’s objective by his sergeant-major where he controlled its reorganization before agreeing to be evacuated. All of C Company’s officers were knocked out and, not for the first time, its command passed to CSM ‘Swede’ Larson who commanded it with such skill and gallantry that he was awarded a Military Cross, a rare decoration for a warrant officer. By the end of the afternoon the Calgaries were dug in on all their objectives and, despite incessant pounding by enemy mortars and artillery, were not about to be shifted by the counterattacks of the German paratroops.2
Their success was not simply the result of guts and determination. Like the 4th Brigade on the Goch-Calcar road and the 6th on the Calcar Ridge, they had become battlewise veterans more than able to compete with the soldiers of the Wehrmacht on their home ground.
It is a rule of war that, even in the most professional of armies, something always goes wrong in a battle. On the right, when the Algonquins and B Squadron of the South Alberta Regiment were due to begin their advance, one rifle company and half of another were missing because the tanks carrying them had bogged down. At 5:15, less than an hour before dawn, Lt-Colonel R.A. Bradburn knew that he could wait no longer for his missing troops. To cross the open ground in front of the German defences in daylight would be suicidal for tanks. As the artillery began to place red marker shells on to the objectives and Bofors guns fired tracers to mark the way, he gave the order to advance.
So unpromising was the approach across the boggy farmland that the German defenders, sheltering from the artillery, never suspected that the Canadians would attack with tanks at night. Before the sun appeared over the dark wall of the forest, the two leading Algonquin companies had crossed the enemy’s antitank ditch and the minefield and low wire entanglements behind it and were clearing his first line of trenches. A third company passed through them and, before 10 a.m., sized the final entrenchments at the base of ‘Albatross.’ They had broken through the last German prepared positions before the Rhine but there they were stopped. The fourth company which might have leapfrogged through had not arrived.
The German reaction to what they recognized as a most serious threat to their bridgehead was immediate and violent. From every quarter guns and mortars poured a stream of shells and bombs on to the Algonquins’ positions and laid a curtain of fire behind them to prevent help getting through. From north of the Rhine the shells of the enemy’s heaviest guns raised enormous eruptions while machine guns swept the approaches to ‘Albatross.’
With the help of B Squadron’s tanks and their own very effective artillery, the Algonquins beat off a succession of counterattacks. Their numbers dwindled and it was virtually impossible to remove casualties through the storm of fire which blocked the way to the rear.
The options open to Brigadier J.C. Jefferson of the 10th Brigade to counter the deadly threat to the Algonquins and to exploit their successes were limited — partly as the result of a disaster suffered by his supporting armoured regiment.
Before the attack it appeared likely that B Squadron of the South Albertas might bog down in the sodden fields which lay in front of the German defences. To secure tank support on the objective, Jefferson ordered the Regiment to send its A Squadron with the Algonquins’ carrier platoon around the right flank, south of the railway. The Regiment protested that the route lay through enemy-held territory. The order was confirmed. As they moved through a cutting south of the tracks, the little force was trapped in an ambush by 88s and infantry Panzerfaust teams. Every tank and all but one of the carriers was destroyed. Not only was this a serious loss of fighting power, their destruction left the Algonquins’ right flank wide open.
Late in the afternoon of the 27th Jefferson ordered the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada to move forward through the Algonquins, across the summit of ‘Albatross’ to the far side of the ‘Gap.’ From the moment their advance began they were met by heavy shellfire which so increased in intensity that they were forced to dig in 500 metres short of the gap.
A mile to the north the Calgary Highlanders had been joined by Le Régiment de Maisonneuve in the western fringe of the Hochwald, but the enemy shelling was so heavy that an attempt by the Canadian Black Watch to advance south-eastward toward the gap had to be postponed until morning. No help could be expected yet from the 3rd Division who were still engaged in Üdem.3
The 10th Brigade’s attempt to burst through the gap had failed. It was obvious both to Jefferson and to Major-General Chris Vokes, commanding the 4th Division, that a much greater effort would be needed to clear the enemy from it and from the adjacent fringes of the woods — just how much greater they did not then realize.
Ahead, about 1,500 metres east of the western edge of the Hochwald, a north-south lateral road divided the forest in two. Another lay along its eastern edge. Beyond that, by about the same distance, was an isolated wood which was given the codename ‘Weston.’ The western end of the gap itself was constricted by a spur of the Balberger forest, known as the Tuschen Wald.
Vokes ordered the 10th Brigade to clear the Tuschen Wald, open the gap as far as the first lateral road and secure the railway from Üdem into the forest. The 4th Armoured Brigade would then send a battle group through to seize ‘Weston.’
It was obvious that the Germans now had brought an unprecedented weight of artillery into the battle (later found to amount to 717 mortars, 1,054 guns and an unknown number of self-propelled guns).4 Montgomery commented that ‘the volume of fire from enemy weapons was the heaviest which had been met so far by British troops in the campaign.’ To reinforce the defenders of the gap on the 27th Luttwitz brought in a fresh parachute battalion and more tanks of the 116th Panzer Division.
About midnight an uneasy stillness settled over the Hochwald, broken only by the occasional nervous stutter of a Bren or a tearing burst of Spandau fire. Waiting to advance once more up the slopes of ‘Albatross,’ otherwise known as ‘Point 73,’ at the entrance to the gap, the depleted Argylls checked their ammunition and equipment and cursed the mud and the cold.
Three hours before dawn the first shells of a heavy artillery barrage screamed overhead and the leading companies climbed from their slits and moved up the slope. Before the first glow of morning began to show on the eastern horizon, ‘Albatross’ was theirs, 70 prisoners were on the way to the rear and they were digging in on the first lateral road. Counterattacks by tanks and infantry began almost immediately, while the enemy artillery pounded the whole of the battalion area. To the already deafening noise of the battle were added the explosions of Canadian heavy-calibre shells seeking out German panzers and the tearing bursts and ear-splitting cracks of the Brownings and 75mm guns of the South Alberta’s Shermans. All day the battle went on. One of the Argyll’s companies was reduced to 15 men. Tanks carried ammunition and supplies to the hard-pressed companies and evacuated their casualties.
Near the entrance to the gap, German artillery observers spotted the Lincoln and Welland Regiment moving up for their attack on the railway and the Tüschen Wald. Mortar, artillery and rocket fire bursting in the tree tops caused so many casualties that the attack had to be abandoned until the unit could be reorganized.
All morning tanks of the Canadian Grenadier Guards with the Lake Superior Regiment had been working forward to attack through the Argylls toward ‘Weston.’ Of their normal strength of 63 tanks, the Guards had only 31 left after the fighting on the Calcar-Udem ridge. Their C.O. had been severely wounded and Major Ned Amy was promoted to replace him. Forty-five minutes before the assault was to begin Amy too was wounded by shellfire and turned over command of the attack to Major George Hale while he had his wound dressed.5
The start line was the first lateral road held by the Argylls. Only 10 tanks of the two leading squadrons reached it — the rest had bogged down in heavy mud and on slopes so steep that even with new ‘extended-end-connectors’ fitted to their tracks, the Shermans could not make the grade. Of the 10, three were put out of action by anti-tank guns firing from high ground south of the railway. The remainder manoeuvred along the left side of the gap and succeeded in advancing another 600 metres. There, four more were lost to the guns on their right while two of the enemy guns were knocked out by one of the surviving tanks.
Next morning the Grenadiers had 21 tanks available for action. Major Hale had been wounded and command passed to Major Curt Greenleaf.
Until the enemy anti-tank guns could be cleared from the high ground to the south and the fringes of the woods were secure, it was highly unlikely that armour could pass through the gap. Simonds directed the 2nd Division to clear the Hochwald and relieve the tired battalions in the gap while the 3rd captured the woods to the south. In the meantime the 4th Armoured Brigade was to continue attempts to break through.
On the right of the Corps the 11th British Armoured Division had passed south of Udem, stormed the high Gochfortz Berg on the 27th, then ploughed their way through forest and bog to the Schlieffen defences south of the Balberger Wald. Beyond them, to the south, 30 Corps were advancing on a broad front and were beginning to make faster progress. The 3rd British Division, which relieved the 15th, had crossed the Udem-Weeze road and was closing on Kervenheim. The 53rd Welsh were in the final stages of their hard battle for the fortified town of Weeze while the 52nd were picking up speed in their advance to the south-east down the Maas.
Further to the south, after six days of building up its forces and some hard fighting in taking the towns east of the Roer, the U.S. Ninth Army’s armoured divisions were beginning to roll northwards toward the Canadian front.
With every day Schlemm’s position was becoming more hopeless. To stem the American advance, he now was forced to bring down forces from the north, but not from the front of 2nd Canadian Corps where a breakthrough would threaten the existence of his army. In the first two days of March he reinforced the Hochwald front with two independent parachute units, the strongest left in his reserve, one of which was the Parachute Army Assault Battalion.
On 1 March Major-General Bruce Matthews of the 2nd Division sent his 4th Brigade into the Hochwald on the left of the 5th Brigade with orders to clear the northern half of the forest. Leading the assault were the Essex Scottish, supported by artillery and a troop of tanks of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers. In a particularly vicious battle, the Essex fought their way into the edge of the forest and seized a foothold for a further advance. On the left C Company lost three-quarters of its strength and its commander, Major Fred Tilston, was twice wounded leading the assault. Before they could consolidate, the Germans counterattacked. Through a hail of fire, Tilston moved from platoon to platoon, organizing the defence. Soon ammunition began to run low; the only source was the adjoining company. Six times he crossed the open bullet-swept ground which separated them to fetch bandoliers and grenades. Eventually he was hit again, so badly that he could not move, but before agreeing to take a morphine injection he insisted on giving orders for the defence of his position to another officer and made sure that the need to hold it was clearly understood. For his gallantry in securing a base for the further advance of his brigade, he was awarded the Victoria Cross but the action cost him the loss of both his legs.6
The road to Cleve, the Army’s main supply route, 13 February, 1945. (Photo by C.C. McDougall/Public Archives Canada/PA 143946)
Cleve: ‘A pathetic heap of rubble, roofs and radiators…sagging, crazy skeletons of homes.’ (Imperial War Museum)
Churchill AVREs with fascines and a bridgelayer in the Reichswald. (Imperial War Museum)
Bren carrier, scout car and Sherman tank of the 43rd Wessex Division moving through Bedburg toward Goch. (Imperial War Museum)
‘Land Mattress’ of 1st Canadian Rocket Battery being re-loaded. (Imperial War Museum)
Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada opening a parcel from home in the Hochwald. (Photo by K. Bell/Public Archives Canada/PA 137458)
Major-General Chris Vokes (4th Canadian Armoured Division) General Crerar, Field-Marshal Montgomery, Lt-General Brian Horrocks (30th British Corps) Lt-General Guy Simmonds (2nd Canadian Corps) Major-General Dan Spry (3rd Canadian Division) in the Rhineland. (Imperial War Museum)
In sight of the enemy, a British soldier forces two Dutch children to take cover. (Imperial War Museum)
Montgomery with Brigadier John Rockingham of the 9th Brigade near Cleve, 16 Feburary, 1945. (Imperial War Museum)
Company Sergeant-Major ‘Swede’ Larson, MC, Calgary Highlanders, searching German prisoners near Doetinchem, 1 April, 1945. (Photo by Lt. M.M. Dean/Public Archives Canada/PA 131699)
North Shore Regiment crossing canal near Zutphen under fire, April, 1945. (Photo by Lt. D.I. Grant/Public Archives Canada/PA 130059)
A platoon of the South Saskatchewan Regiment meets opposition at the Oranje Canal, 12 April, 1945. (Photo by D. Guravich/Public Archives Canada PA 138284)
Veterans of Scily and Italy prepare for first action in Holland. A rifle platoon of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry boarding a Buffalo before attacking across the River Ijssel.
Lt-General Charles Foulkes of 1st Canadian Corps orders the German forces in the Netherlands to lay down their arms, 5 May, 1945. Lt.-General Paul Reichelt (2nd left) Brigadier George Kitching, Foulkes, staff officer, Prince Bernhard. (Photo by Alex Stirton/Public Archives Canada/PA 133321)
The German platoon which confronted Brigadier Jim Roberts on 4 May, 1945, marching into barracks at Aurich next day to surrender. (Photo by D.I. Grant/Public Archives Canada/PA 143950)
Next morning the fury of the battle erupted anew when the RHLI pushed north-eastwards through the Essex in the direction of Marienbaum. Further to the right, the 6th Brigade was attempting to clear the southern half of the Hochwald and, on the fringe of the gap, worked forward to within 500 metres of the eastern face of the forest. To the south, the Chaudières who had been stopped by overwhelming fire on the 1st, succeeded in reaching the eastern end of the Tuschen Wald. Passing through them, the remainder of the 8th Brigade began clearing the Balberger Wood.
In the gap itself, Brigadier Robert Moncel’s 4th Armoured Brigade made another attempt to break through to ‘Weston,’ the wood a mile to the east of the exit. Three companies of the Lake Superior Regiment, mounted in Kangaroos instead of their usual half-tracks, with a composite squadron of 10 tanks of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, were to advance from the first lateral road which crosses the gap to capture a group of buildings on the second lateral by the east face of the Hochwald. A company of the Algonquins carried on tanks of the Governor-General’s Foot Guards would then drive beyond them to the edge of ‘Weston.’ Moncel believed that the enemy’s resistance was almost finished and that a determined thrust would crack his will. Unfortunately his own units were sadly depleted — the strongest Lake Superior company had only 44 men — and they were very tired.
To avoid the deadly enemy anti-tank fire which had proved so costly, the attack was to begin at 2 a.m. but the Kangaroos were late, held up in the morass near the entrance to the gap. Dawn was nearly breaking when the attacking force started down the slope and reached their first objective, a group of buildings halfway to the second lateral. From all sides the Germans poured machine-gun and anti-tank fire at the Canadian tanks and personnel carriers advancing through a storm of bursting artillery shells. Six of the Grenadier’s tanks bogged down in mud during the advance; the remainder were knocked out by Tiger tanks and 88s from south of the railway. With no armour left to support them, C Company of the Lake Superiors fought their way to their final objective on the road where they were pinned down in the buildings of a farm which were rapidly disintegrating under incessant shelling.
In the growing light of dawn, the remains of two platoons of the Algonquin Regiment now arrived and pushed forward toward ‘Weston.’ Five of the eight tanks of the Foot Guards on which they had been riding had been knocked out. Three hundred metres beyond the road the heavy enemy fire forced them to dig in, their objective plainly in view. Two Shermans stopped in flames and a counterattack by five Tigers was repulsed by artillery and the fire of the tanks mired in the gap.
Desperately, two companies of the Algonquins tried to get forward through the intense fire to reach their beleaguered comrades, but without success. Then late in the afternoon, a survivor brought the news that their two platoons had been surrounded by tanks and overrun. Of the leading company of the Lake Superiors only eight men came back. They brought tales of great gallantry, of panzers knocked out by PIATs, of counterattacks against enemy inside their position and of Sergeant C.H. Byce who took command when all his officers were down, had extricated the survivors and had then killed seven Germans and wounded 11 more as they attempted to follow. Nothing more could be done that night.7
Early next morning the Canadian Black Watch relieved the weary battalions on the first lateral road and the 5th Brigade prepared to renew the attack. During the day the 4th and 6th Brigades advanced further into the Hochwald until by nightfall they controlled much of the forest.
At 3 a.m. on 4 March the Watch and the Maisonneuve advanced east to the second lateral road without meeting resistance. As morning broke reports came in from across the front that the enemy was pulling back. By nightfall 2nd Canadian Corps reported the Hochwald and the Balberger Wald cleared of enemy, the 43rd Division on the left were within two miles of Xanten, while the 11th Armoured were on the outskirts of Sonsbeck.
