They hate our freedoms.
—George W. Bush, 2001
Much, indeed most, of the Stupid we’ve encountered so far has been traceable through a long lineage in Western thought. The Stupid we’re about to examine reflects many of the urges and causes of historical Stupid, but is of a considerably more recent development: primarily since 9/11, but with its roots in the national security state that has developed since the Second World War.
When it comes to modern examples of extreme Stupid, it doesn’t get bigger, vaster, more historic, more epochal, than the Iraq War.
First, there was the cost.
The United States is estimated to have spent $1.7 trillion on the Iraq War so far, with much more expenditure to come in the decades ahead via healthcare and veterans’ costs. The final total could be in the order of $4 trillion. The cost to the UK of its participation was a fractional, but still substantial, US$14 billion in 2010; the cost to Australian taxpayers of Australia’s trivial support role in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ had, by 2011, reached $2.4 billion. Nearly 4500 US troops died, along with 179 UK servicemen and women, with many thousands more injured and crippled. US Iraq veterans continue to have a frightening rate of suicide.
Then there were the results.
The most significant direct achievement of the war was the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis—estimates vary between 100,000 and 600,000. Whatever the number, so many Iraqis died during the ensuing allied occupation and civil war that, according to the World Bank, life expectancy in Iraq fell by two years between 2002 and 2007; in 2010 it had still not recovered to pre-war levels. Iraq itself has now fallen apart in another sectarian civil war, with the country now divided into a relatively effective Kurdish state, a nightmarishly brutal and aggressive Sunni terrorist state, and what’s left of southern Iraq, likely to become a client state of Iran. Meantime, the West is once again ramping up its rhetoric and deploying its military to address what is deemed to be the ‘apocalyptic’ threat of the Islamic State.
Then there were the consequences.
Putting aside that the justification for the war—Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction—didn’t exist, the attack had other effects as well. In 2006, a US intelligence report concluded that ‘the Iraq war has made the overall terrorism problem worse’. That conclusion was echoed by a UK government report that year into the 2005 London bombings and confirmed by the head of British intelligence service MI5 in 2010 in evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry in the UK. The then head of the Australian Federal Police had also reached that conclusion in 2004, and was attacked by the conservative Howard government when he expressed that view publicly, just as the Blair government had initially rejected any link between Iraq and the increasing risk of terrorism. And the Islamic State that has emerged from the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars is regarded as so dangerous that a new round of military intervention is underway.
This is a type of Stupid so vast that people seem unable to fully comprehend it: the governments of the United States, Britain, Australia and the other countries that participated in the attack on Iraq together spent trillions of dollars and caused the death of hundreds of thousands of people only to make their countries, by the admission of their own intelligence and law enforcement agencies, less safe from the threat of terrorism.
But when it comes to the War on Terror, everything is big. Big costs. Big body counts. Big infringements of liberty. Big Stupid. The post-9/11 era has been characterised, indeed defined, by Stupid. We are surrounded by it, but we’ve become inured to it, our ability to use perspective and logic dulled, our capacity for astonishment pushed ever higher, so that we find nothing noteworthy in things we would have found ludicrous or outrageous twenty years ago. It was Voltaire who first claimed that those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities, but in his eagerness to coin the ultimate anti-clerical bon mot, he framed it too restrictively: those who claim to prevent atrocities also want you to believe absurdities.
This is just a short list of some of the recent moments of vintage Stupid provided by the War on Terror:
• In February 2013, the US Secretary of Defense announced a new medal for drone operators to honour their service in remote-controlled killing. In recent years, drones have killed, according to conservative estimates, several hundred civilians, including dozens of children, in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. After an outcry from veterans who had actually faced real combat, the Pentagon plan was abandoned.
• The Central Intelligence Agency’s torture program produced no useful intelligence, a report by the US Senate Intelligence committee, which oversees the CIA and other intelligence agencies, found. Instead, the CIA took intelligence gained by the FBI using traditional methods and claimed it had obtained it via torture, lied to Congress and the US government about the benefits of torture, and kept secret some of its more barbaric methods. In order to try to stop the report, the CIA spied on the committee itself and then launched a public attack on its chair.
• One of the most vociferous Congressional critics of whistle-blower Edward Snowden and the journalists who have reported his revelations, Peter King—Republican chairman of the House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism—has for thirty years been a strong supporter of the IRA and refused to condemn its atrocities.
• In the United States, if you’re within 100 kilometres of a border—which amounts to two-thirds of the US population—you can have your laptop or mobile device searched by law enforcement agencies without cause under a ‘border exemption’ from normal due process. You can also be prosecuted if you refuse to tell authorities your password.
• The UK government made The Guardian go through an elaborate piece of theatre in destroying hard disks containing information on NSA and GCHQ spying provided by Edward Snowden, despite all parties knowing the same information was held on offshore servers and was just a click away.
• In 2011, the US Transportation Security Administration said that it ‘stood by’ its airport security officers after they insisted on patting down a wheelchair-bound ninety-five-year-old woman with cancer and compelled her to remove her adult nappy while going through security at a Florida airport.
• It took two years for the conviction of British man Paul Chambers for joking on Twitter about blowing up a Yorkshire airport to be overturned by British courts.
• The White House counterterrorism adviser Lisa Monaco used a speech to the Harvard Kennedy School to warn parents that ‘confrontational children’ could in fact be terrorists.
• After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, documents recovered from his security agency showed that the CIA and MI6 had repeatedly abducted Libyan dissidents in other countries and delivered them to Gaddafi to interrogate and torture. ‘I congratulate you on the safe arrival of Abu Abd Allah Sadiq,’ a senior MI6 official wrote to Gaddafi henchman Moussa Koussa about one of their victims. ‘This was the least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have built over the years. I am so glad.’
• The US government’s own files, and former Bush Administration officials, acknowledge that over 150 inmates of its Guantanamo Bay facility (for ‘the worst of the worst’ in lingua Dubya), including boys and old men, were entirely innocent; many were held for years anyway, including an Al Jazeera cameraman held for six years so he could be interrogated about that media company.
• In September 2013, several Iraqi torture victims were ordered by a US court to pay the legal costs of the company whose employees tortured them in Abu Ghraib during the Iraq War, after a court ruled the company could not be sued in the US for its actions in Iraq.
• Among the ‘trigger words’ that the NSA uses to filter internet communications for evidence of terrorism are ‘import’, ‘Elvis’, ‘illuminati’, ‘dictionary’ and, as if to prove that terrorists aren’t real men, ‘quiche’.
• Under the Obama Administration’s ‘Insider Threat Program’, developed in response to Edward Snowden, the Pentagon advised its staff to consider reporting anyone seen reading satirical news site The Onion or progressive online news site Salon as potential security threats.*
These absurdities aren’t merely disturbing, laughable or undignified, they come with a prodigious cost, even if we put aside as a one-off mistake the fact that the Iraq War has been a multi-trillion-dollar exercise in reducing Iraqi life expectancy.
So, forget everything you’ve been told about the War on Terror, and let’s go back to basics, in order to de-Stupidise it.
Between 9/11 and 2011, the United States spent an additional US$700 billion on homeland security, separate from its military spending—spending on bigger budgets for security, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, spending on a new Department of Homeland Security, spending on irradiating airline customers with X-ray body scanners, spending on security furniture and scanners at every government building across the country, and people to staff them. It also incurred an estimated $400 billion in losses derived from additional security measures.
Was this $1.1 trillion cost justified? There have been no mass-casualty attacks in the US since 9/11, and few terrorist incidents of any kind (more of which later). Did this additional spending—remember, the US, like every other government in the world, was already spending a lot of money on security, law enforcement and intelligence before 9/11—stop attacks? It’s impossible to tell, isn’t it? To determine what might have been without that additional $1+ trillion in spending and extra costs?
Well, yes, it is indeed impossible to tell, but it turns out there is actually a way to determine if the spending was justified—a different question, but one with a much easier answer. Two academics, John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, have tackled the question in their 2011 book, Terror, Security and Money: Balancing the risks, benefits, and costs of homeland security—the seminal text on understanding the mind-numbing stupidity of security spending. To grossly simplify their approach, they answer the question by working backwards—take how much additional money has been spent to prevent terrorist attacks, work out the cost of terrorist attacks, estimate the reduction in risk achieved by the extra spending and calculate how many terrorist attacks would need to have been thwarted to justify the extra spending. Yes, true, such an approach doesn’t account for the devastating emotional toll of a mass-casualty attack, the trauma for survivors, for families and friends of those killed and the wide-scale shock for a whole society, but it can put additional spending into an economic perspective.
Based on Mueller and Stewart’s conservative estimates, including very generous assumptions about how much additional spending has reduced the risk of terrorist attacks, the additional expenditure on homeland security by the US would have only been remotely economically justified if the additional spending by itself—apart from pre-existing security spending—had prevented more than one 9/11-level attack each and every year, or prevented 1700 smaller but economically significant attacks every year. And bear in mind, while the US was spending a lazy trillion on homeland security under the pretence of making itself safer, it was spending as much again on its Iraq occupation, which by common agreement made it less safe.
But even if you dispute Mueller and Stewart’s numbers or assumptions, their analysis points to one of the central absurdities of national security spending: terrorism is a negligible cause of mortality and economic cost in Western countries.
This is where Stupid starts to mount up. For example, in the US, among the things that are more fatal to people than terrorism are not just obvious threats like gun violence or car accidents,* but threats as varied as malnutrition, falls, swimming accidents and work accidents, each of which kill more Americans annually than the death toll from 9/11, let alone the ongoing annual death toll from terrorism, which is negligible—in fact, so small it ranks below bathtub accidents and shootings by toddlers as a cause of death. In terms of demonstrated threat, terrorism is on par with exotic diseases, skydiving accidents and choking in restaurants.
Indeed, Americans need more protection from their own police forces than from terrorists. On average, American police shoot, taser or beat to death around 400 of their fellow citizens a year, often for the most spurious of reasons, with the mentally ill and African Americans featuring prominently as innocent victims. In 2014, a North Carolina police officer called by the parents of a mentally ill teenager shot him dead even after two other officers had restrained him, declaring, ‘I don’t have time for this.’ Oklahoma police beat a man to death in front of his family after he had tried to intervene in a dispute between his wife and daughter. In 2013, Iowa police shot dead an unarmed teen whose father had called them because his son had taken his truck to buy cigarettes. Georgia police shot dead a diabetic man after his girlfriend rang 911 for medical assistance. Washington DC police shot dead an unarmed mentally ill female driver with a toddler in the back of her car. In 2012, Houston police shot dead a mentally ill double amputee in a wheelchair. These are only some of the more high-profile recent victims of America’s hyper-aggressive and heavily armed police.
In Australia, there has only been one terrorism-related death since 2001, when a Christian fundamentalist killed an abortion clinic security guard, though authorities insist they have thwarted four mass-casualty attacks during that period. Approximately 100 Australians have also died because of terrorism overseas since 2001, mostly in Indonesia. Even accepting at face value the claims of security agencies about the planned mass-casualty attacks, the possible death tolls from such attacks would have been small compared to nearly 19,000 Australians who have died in road accidents in the same period. As it stands, about three times more Australians have died falling out of bed since 2001 than have died at the hands of terrorists. But in the decade after 9/11, Australia spent nearly $17 billion on additional security, increased funding for intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, to which we committed as a dutiful ally of the US. That expenditure is in addition to other national security-related costs inflicted on Australian industry (the aviation industry in particular) that also run into the billions.
National security has sucked up huge amounts of money that, based on the policy objective of saving lives, obviously should have been spent elsewhere. Directing vast amounts of additional resources into national security beyond those that were already being directed to it before 9/11 means fewer resources to direct at the long list of preventable and treatable health threats we face. Those resources could be used for improving roads and road safety, or ensuring people have enough to eat, or providing better mental health services, or lifting economic growth potential through spending on infrastructure and education, or paying off government debt, the future interest on which will reduce our capacity for such expenditures. Or it could just be used to cut taxes: a US university study suggests a billion dollars in defence spending produces around 20 per cent fewer jobs than a billion dollars in tax cuts.
But it gets more Stupid. If the War on Terror costs money, health, lives and opportunities, it also comes with a heavy cost to basic freedoms. Our response to an enemy that purportedly ‘hates our freedoms’ has been to curb those very freedoms through anti-terrorism laws. For some reason, Australia has some of the most voluminous anti-terrorism legislation in the West, far bigger than legislation passed by US Congress or in other Anglophone countries. And under Australian laws, basic legal principles have gone by the board: people not charged with any crime can be detained by secret court order, without legal representation; people not charged with any crime can be subjected to strict controls on their freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of association; the crime of ‘sedition’ even made a sinister comeback; simply writing a book urging violence has seen an Islamic extremist in Australia jailed for over a decade—despite no harm coming from it, despite the book being cut-and-pasted rubbish.
Better yet, if you’re lucky enough to have been targeted for ‘rendition’ by the US, you’ll be sent to a third country and tortured, with an ASIO agent in attendance, while the Australian government denies knowing where you are.
Moreover, the legal framework of anti-terrorism in the United States has been used by governments as the justification for expanding their powers well beyond even the generous remit provided by policymakers in areas such as torture, extra-judicial killing (including of Americans) and, above all, mass surveillance. Since 9/11, the United States, with the assistance of the intelligence agencies of the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, has established a global surveillance system aimed at tracking and collating information on every internet and telephone user on the planet.
And as elsewhere, such laws, far from being temporary in nature as they were claimed to be when introduced, have remained in place and, worse, expanded into other areas of law, with Australian states applying anti-terror-style laws to motorcycle gangs and trade unions. And the very definition of terrorism expands to fill the space available to it. Protests by pacifists and people complaining about water quality have been labelled ‘terrorism’ in the United States, and groups targeted by the Department of Homeland Security’s intelligence ‘fusion centres’—whatever they are—include Ron Paul supporters, the Occupy movement, the ACLU, pro- and anti-abortion activists and gun ownership advocates. In the UK, in attempting to justify the detention of journalist Glenn Greenwald’s partner David Miranda, the UK government argued in court that simply publishing documents that might influence a government was ‘terrorism’, and that the motives of the publisher didn’t matter. ‘Terrorism is terrorism,’ the British government’s lawyers averred, meaning one could be a terrorist without even knowing it (the most dangerous kind of terrorist, presumably?). What they really meant was not that ‘terrorism is terrorism’, but that anything they wish to deem ‘terrorism’ is ‘terrorism’.
Anti-terrorism laws are thus like untreated cancers: they grow relentlessly and metastasise, infecting unconnected areas of law, undermining basic rights wherever they can find purchase. Aviation is a particular cluster point. Airports are now the legal null zones of the Western world: step into an airport, indeed even drive up to one, and your rights start vanishing. Security personnel can scan you, interrogate you, strip you of your possessions, detain you, use an (admittedly adorable) dog to sniff you and explore your belongings. If you choose to fly, your basic rights become dependent on the good temper and goodwill of bureaucrats and security guards.
But despite the ferocious and ever-expanding nature of these laws, their benefit is negligible. How so? Because (just as Mueller and Stewart show with security spending) they are in addition to already comprehensive criminal and anti-terrorism laws that enabled law enforcement and intelligence agencies to infiltrate, prevent and investigate the activities of terrorists, and thus provide only a marginal risk reduction.
This is another key aspect of War on Terror Stupid that people fail to grasp: there was no low-hanging regulatory fruit when it came to terrorism before 9/11, no gaping holes in criminal law and intelligence-gathering regulation that allowed terrorists free rein, or prevented agencies from doing their jobs properly. Rather, 9/11 was the result of agencies like the CIA, the NSA and the FBI failing to use the powers they already had, despite possessing detailed information about the attack and the attackers, and the failure of existing airport security measures which may have stopped the attacks.
Nor has this lesson been learned since. The review panel Barack Obama was forced to establish in the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations reported that it couldn’t find any evidence that the extraordinarily expensive, and intensely invasive and damaging, mass surveillance conducted by the NSA in recent years had thwarted a single terrorist attack. Indeed, terrorist attacks like those of the Neo-Nazi Miller couple in Las Vegas in 2014, clearly signposted on Facebook days in advance, aren’t even regarded as terrorist acts.*
Why does such palpable and expensive Stupid flourish in absurd national security policies costing trillions and damaging the fabric of Western countries while going virtually unnoticed?
Western societies managed to get through the Cold War without much of the rampant Stupid of the War on Terror, despite our foe in that conflict being a sophisticated, modern dictatorship with the capacity to completely destroy us. Western governments spent more on defence then than now—the US was spending well over 5 per cent of GDP on defence in the 1980s compared to around 4.5 per cent until recently—but spent far less on ‘homeland security’ and intelligence (Cold War intelligence agencies were, in any event, notoriously riddled with double agents and profoundly incompetent). They had no need for mass surveillance of the kind East Germany established, now replicated in electronic form by the NSA, GCHQ and other Anglophone agencies. Nor did they need laws that dramatically curtailed basic rights: indeed, it was the very economic, political and social freedoms of Western liberal democracies, in contrast to the oppressive conditions of the Soviet Union, that played a key role in undermining the latter.
One reason for the difference is a toxic mixture of risk aversion on the part of politicians and risk incomprehension on the part of voters and journalists. As any number of economists, psychologists, neuroscientists and statisticians have demonstrated, humans are wired to make rapid, rather than accurate, risk assessments, given early humans needed the former more than the latter. We thus tend to overstate the risk to ourselves of things that are unusual, that we can see affecting us personally, that are beyond our control, that aren’t associated with anything positive and which are unfamiliar. Contrarily, we underestimate the risks from things we are familiar with, over which we have a degree of control or which are a by-product of positive things. The prospect of dying in a car accident—which in Australia is around ten thousand times more likely than dying as a result of terrorism—is apparently far less worrying to people than perishing at the hands of violent religious fanatics; ditto the chance of being murdered, which is about forty times greater than dying at the hands of a terrorist. Our different reactions to the Cold War and the War on Terror are thus partly a difference between a world in which the chief threat, the Soviet Union, was a familiar part of our mental furniture, while Islamic terrorists are a sinister and unfathomable Other.*
That your average citizen doesn’t understand risk, or how additional security laws or spending only provide marginal reductions in already negligible levels of risk, isn’t surprising. But, political leaders, if dim-witted, still have access to high-quality advice on those subjects and many others, and thus have no such excuse. But their probability calculus is a political one: the remote chance of a major terrorist attack (in contrast to the much higher chance of ordinary low-casualty events like road accidents) must be treated seriously because of the political ramifications if one occurred.
During the early stages of the War on Terror, politicians and security officials around the world repeatedly referred to terrorism as an ‘existential’ threat. Its repetition suggested the word was in danger of coming free from its actual definition and drifting off, like ‘decimate’ and ‘genocide’, into a far vaguer meaning—in this case, ‘really bad’. Terrorism is by definition not an existential threat, but limited in impact even compared to conventional war. The Cold War was an existential threat, given all of humanity could have been obliterated through one small error, as nearly happened in 1963 and 1983. But terrorism is an existential threat for politicians, since any major attack would inflict, beyond the death toll or economic impact, serious political damage on those in power at the time.
Skilful politicians, however, also see opportunity in threat (the Chinese word for ‘crisis’ also means ‘opportunity’).* The War on Terror has thus been ruthlessly exploited by politicians both to extend government powers and for electoral gain, most famously when the Bush Administration pressured Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge to elevate the terror threat level just before the 2004 presidential election in order to boost Dubya’s chances in a tight race.
The Stupid produced by the War on Terror is thus a repulsive combination of voter ignorance of the basic rules of probability and politicians’ awareness of self-interest. That’s why anti-terror policies so strongly emphasise security theatre—elaborate and often very expensive measures, like airport body scanners, that create an impression of greater security without adding significantly to it. The primary effect of the airport X-ray body scanners used until recently in the US (they’ve now been replaced with millimetre wave machines) seems to have been irradiating people, given the evidence of cancer clusters among TSA staff, and the invasion of privacy—a former Transportation Security Administration official admitted that TSA staff racially profiled passengers and routinely gathered to mock passengers’ body images on scanners. However, politicians are evidently convinced the public rates scanners highly: during the swine flu hysteria of 2009, the Australian government installed thermal scanners at airports, insisting they would detect people with elevated body temperature.* Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in the United States and Australia installing body scanners at airports, without a cost–benefit analysis ever having been done, money that would have been better spent separating traffic at well-known highway blackspots, or providing better health services in regional communities, if the intention was to save lives rather than create the illusion of greater security.
Stupid isn’t a rare exception when it comes to the War on Terror: the primary institutional tools of national security are automatically predisposed towards absurdity. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies in Western countries are subjected to far less oversight than other government agencies, meaning corruption, incompetence and unauthorised or illegal activity are far less likely to be exposed than elsewhere in bureaucracies. (Contrary to the traditional conservative view that government bodies must be subjected to the most forensic scrutiny in the way they spend public money and regulate industry, it is usually the left that pushes for security and intelligence agencies, and the companies they keep in business, to be subjected to public and political scrutiny.) Instead, they operate with minimal scrutiny except via rubber-stamp secret courts or parliamentary oversight committees that work behind closed doors, meaning the evidence and arguments about the activities of intelligence and security agencies can never be publicly scrutinised.
As a consequence, intelligence and security agencies are particularly prone to misjudgements that result from a lack of concern about how internal decisions and policies may be viewed externally. It might be small things, like Australia’s foreign intelligence service using an aid program as cover for bugging the Cabinet of East Timor for the commercial advantage of Australian companies.* It might be serious blunders, like the FBI’s cross-border gunrunning operations, only exposed after a law enforcement official was killed as a result. Or it might be something profoundly wrong, like the CIA spending millions of dollars trying to develop mind-control drugs via monstrously unethical experiments—frequently on unwitting subjects—that resulted in a number of deaths over nearly two decades. Lack of scrutiny creates fertile ground for Stupid.
It also leads to abuse and mission creep. In the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations, the NSA admitted that a number of its staff had confessed to using its vast surveillance apparatus to stalk women—though it only knew of those who had admitted doing it. Snowden also revealed that intimate photos picked up by NSA internet surveillance were often shared among staff. This comes on top of previous revelations that NSA staff had listened in to the intimate conversations of US defence personnel and journalists for titillation a decade ago, and that NSA staff broke US laws thousands of times in the operation of the Obama Administration’s mass-surveillance programs. Edward Snowden’s revelations have also demonstrated how the NSA and other Anglophone intelligence agencies, despite the ‘War on Terror’ hyping of their role, in fact devote vast resources to economic espionage against even close allies.
Abuse of the intelligence-gathering powers that have been dramatically expanded in the War on Terror are thus not the problem of ‘a few rotten apples’ but an inevitable outcome of a culture of secrecy, which fosters abuse and incompetence. When there is no fear of oversight and accountability of the kind that lurks in the minds of most bureaucrats, incompetence, corruption and abuse follow more readily. It also leads to misjudgements and a tendency to use power merely because it is available to be used, not because its use is the most sensible means to achieve an organisation’s goals: NSA spying on the leaders of most of the US’s allies, and the efforts of Australia’s intelligence agencies to listen in to the phone calls of the Indonesian president, have inflicted significant damage on the national interest of both countries, for no clear gain. In a direct parallel with the Iraq War outcome, the NSA’s deliberate strategy of degrading internet encryption standards has actually made us less secure, by helping the cybercriminals who are supposed to be one of its targets, while the revelations of its surveillance have inflicted major economic damage on US IT companies, which have demanded that its activities be curtailed so that they can restore trust in the eyes of their customers.
Lack of, and resistance to, accountability is also a reason why humour is regarded with such malice in national security operations. Humour is, at least in part, realising the incongruity between what should be and what is—that is, it is a basic form of human scrutiny that identifies what doesn’t feel right in others’ behaviour, or that exploits the difference between what others say and what they do or what actually exists. As the identification of The Onion as possible evidence of treasonous intent, and the prosecution and conviction of people for joking about bombs at airports (sometimes not even when they’re at an airport) suggest, national security isn’t merely not humorous, it is anti-humour, a kind of humour black hole sucking everything around it into a singularity of zealotry. To joke at the expense of national security is to immediately signal your unwillingness to accept at face value the claims of those who purport to be providing it, and thereby to immediately place yourself under suspicion. National security officials reflexively resent scepticism and treat it as a direct threat.
Like politicians, security and intelligence agencies have seized the opportunity of the War on Terror to increase both their budgets and their powers. The budget of Australia’s domestic intelligence agency increased 600 per cent during the War on Terror, and it also received a glittering new headquarters on the shores of Lake Burley Griffin in Canberra that cost $700 million and was, aptly, 25 per cent over budget; the Australian Federal Police budget increased 160 per cent and that of Australia’s foreign intelligence agency by over 200 per cent. The powers of such bodies, and especially ASIO, have undergone a similar rapid inflation, with almost annual extensions of its legal powers, which often receive minimal parliamentary scrutiny.
But another group has similarly benefited from the War on Terror without even the risks faced by security and law enforcement agencies, which are at least exposed if a terrorist attack occurs: corporate America. Stupid is big—very big—business. Defence contractors obviously benefit from US military action (the share prices of several major US defence contractors surged in mid-2013 in anticipation of US military action in Syria and surged again when the Obama Administration announced air strikes aimed at Islamic State militants), but more than a third of Australia’s $70 billion-odd defence acquisitions budget over the last decade has flowed to foreign defence contractors, nearly all of it to US defence companies like Lockheed Martin and Boeing Defence. Even more has gone to those companies indirectly via local subsidiaries.
However, defence contractors aren’t the only, or perhaps even the biggest, corporate beneficiaries of the War on Terror. Ten US firms earned $72 billion between them from the Iraq War, with more than half of that obtained not by a defence contractor, but Dick Cheney’s former firm KBR, which secured nearly $40 billion worth of US government service contracts in Iraq. The really big bucks in the War on Terror aren’t so much in weapons as in cleaning, and catering, and construction, and administration and transport to service the military and intelligence machines. Oil companies earned billions from supplying the armed forces of the US, the UK and vassal states like Australia in Iraq and Afghanistan; healthcare companies that manage veterans’ services for the US military have tripled their profits as a result of over a decade of war. Homeland security spending, which in the US is still over $40 billion a year, also provides a strong revenue stream for both defence contractors and IT companies like IBM.
The corporate beneficiaries of the War on Terror, which stretch across IT to defence to services to health care, form a potent public and private lobby for continued expenditure on national security. Military personnel, politicians and national security bureaucrats often take board or executive positions at firms that work in national security industries after leaving their former profession, and sometimes go back to their old careers after a stint in the corporate sector. Northrop Grumman, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are fixtures in the list of top-twenty lobbyists in the United States; former and current defence contractor executives played a significant role in institutionalised lobbying efforts like the US Committee on NATO, which lobbied for the expansion of NATO in the 1990s, and the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, which aggressively pushed for an attack on Saddam Hussein in the lead-up to the Iraq War.*
In such an environment, governments and highly influential industries have at best little incentive in ending the War on Terror and some agencies and companies may even seek to perpetuate it. Defence industries, in particular, must be concerned about repeating the disaster of the West accidentally winning the Cold War, which precipitated a big drop in military spending—over 20 per cent in the US alone between 1990 and 1997. Military spending in the West has already reduced because of fiscal pressure in the wake of the global financial crisis; victory in the War on Terror would be a bitter blow indeed for arms manufacturers and companies providing services for military and intelligence operations, and a fate to be avoided at all costs. Thank goodness the Islamic State came along when it did.
Besides the Iraq War encouraging terrorism against Western targets, the conduct of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have created other positive feedback loops for terrorism. The destabilising effect of the Iraq War and massive expenditure on oil by Western armies in their campaigns helped drive oil prices to record highs: one oil analyst suggested the Iraq War was responsible for oil prices trebling. This has been a boon for Saudi Arabia and other repressive Middle Eastern autocracies, which promote fundamentalist forms of Islam that provide fertile soil for Islamist alienation and resort to violence.
The more significant feedback loop is the direct radicalising effect of the United States’ extra-judicial killing program involving drones, which have killed at the very least hundreds of civilians, and many children, in Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan, as well as an Australian, a New Zealander and several US citizens, including Anwar al-Awlaki and his son, Abdulrahman.* Drone strikes that kill civilians enrage target communities and directly create the conditions for radicalisation and anti-Western anger. This isn’t just the view that Malala Yousafzai, the brave Pakistani schoolgirl who was shot by the Taliban, put to Barack Obama in her White House meeting with him, but also that of the former US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, who explained that drone strikes ‘are hated on a visceral level, even by people who’ve never seen one or seen the effects of one’ and that they threaten the achievement of broader goals. As it turns out, the direct manner in which the attack on Iraq increased the terrorist threat to Western citizens is being continually replicated via drone warfare.
However, it’s the FBI that seems most committed to perpetuating the War on Terror, and if there are no terrorists, the FBI will invent them. The great majority of people prosecuted for terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11 have been caught in FBI stings, usually involving plots initiated or advanced by the FBI or its informers themselves, not those prosecuted. In one case, an FBI informant convinced a homeless man to sell two old stereo speakers (sic) to an undercover FBI agent for grenades to use in a plan, suggested by the informant, to attack a shopping mall. The homeless man is now serving seventeen years for terrorism. In another case, that of the ‘Newburgh Four’, four drug users living in poverty, including a mentally ill man, were recruited by an FBI informant and promised holidays, cars, businesses and huge amounts of cash—up to a quarter of a million dollars—to carry out a plot; one of them was told he would be killed if he backed out. All four are serving twenty-five years for terrorism.
The FBI isn’t alone in this type of behaviour. British police, in league with the UK’s febrile tabloids, entirely invented an Islamic extremist plot to blow up Manchester United’s Old Trafford ground in 2004—there was no plot, no explosives and no extremists. Another Islamic extremist plot, said to involve the biotoxin ricin, turned out to have no ricin, and four of the five people charged were acquitted.
Three of the key features of the War on Terror thus demonstrate how it can be a vast, self-perpetuating cycle of Stupid: the Iraq War actually made us less secure by radicalising civilians in target countries and increasing the incomes of fundamentalist Middle Eastern regimes; drone strikes continue to enrage and radicalise target communities; and undermining encryption as part of mass surveillance degrades internet security. And if terrorist plots don’t exist, they are invented by police agencies.
And while we have incorporated the low-level Stupid of the War on Terror into our daily lives—enduring the security theatre of the airport scan, assuming our governments are spying on us, tolerating the waste of billions of dollars on pointless conflicts—we’re oblivious to the greater absurdity: that the fixation with national security comes with a body count, not merely of foreign lives lost in distant wars, but in the consequences of infrastructure not built, health services not provided, prevention programs not funded, social services cut back, all in the name of strategies that in fact make us less safe. The desperate and draconian effort to make Westerners more secure is killing them too, not just the nameless victims of violence in places like Iraq. And this form of Stupid will continue as long as governments, intelligence and law enforcement agencies and large corporations benefit from it.
BK
* Speaking of The Onion, the West doesn’t have a monopoly on absurdity: in 2011, al-Qaeda criticised Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for peddling 9/11 conspiracy theories. ‘Why would Iran ascribe to such a ridiculous belief that stands in the face of all logic and evidence?’ al-Qaeda lamented, in a complaint that echoed an Onion parody video in which an al-Qaeda representative argues with a 9/11 truther.
* One researcher estimates nearly 1600 more Americans died on US roads after 9/11 than would have otherwise been the case, because they opted not to fly.
* Mass shootings are, strangely, not considered terrorism events despite usually being carried out by, for example, Neo-Nazi white males.
* But see, for example, Michael Herr’s Dispatches (1977) for how the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army did many of the allegedly unprecedented terrorist acts of Islamic extremists.
* In fact it doesn’t, that’s a Western myth, but whatever.
* An elegant example of Stupid in which a strain of flu not demonstrably worse than normal seasonal strains, and possibly less dangerous, sparked billions of dollars in spending by worried politicians to erect ‘protective’ measures like thermal scanners and rush into production vaccines that were never needed. The UK alone wasted £150 million on unnecessary swine flu vaccine.
* The whistleblower who revealed the bugging was then raided by Australia’s domestic intelligence agency and had his passport revoked to prevent him leaving the country to give evidence about the bugging to an international tribunal.
* A particularly unsubtle example of military-industrial-complex lobbying is former Republican State Department official and Iran-Contra survivor Richard Armitage, who has attacked Australia’s allegedly low level of defence spending without divulging that his firm, Armitage International, is a Washington lobbyist for US defence contractors.
* The drone strike that incinerated the sixteen-year-old Denver-born Abdulrahman, who was eating at a cafe with friends while looking for his (by then dead) father in Yemen, killed no militants. The man who ordered the strike, Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan, was rewarded by Barack Obama with promotion to head of the CIA. The killing of this boy has never been investigated by any authorities, and was dismissed by one source close to the Obama Administration as a case of ‘wrong place, wrong time’.