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Just War in Classical Judaism

Jacob Neusner
Bard College

The modern conviction that war is wrong except in cases of self-defense contrasts with the acceptance of war as right by nearly all just war theorists up until the 20th century.

Roger Berkowitz

The canon of classical Judaism does not support the view that war is wrong except in cases of self-defense. War falls into two classifications, votive and obligatory, and in the official writings neither of these classifications concerns itself to begin with primarily with self-defense. Let us review the relevant sources. Emerging some time prior to the advent of Islam in the seventh century C.E., the authoritative books of Rabbinic Judaism took over Scripture and systematized it. In addition to Scripture, that canon was comprised by

[1] the Mishnah, a law code that reached closure in ca. 200 C.E.,

[2] the Tosefta, a vast supplement to the laws of the Mishnah, ca. 300 C.E.,

[3-4] two Talmuds, one composed in the Land of Israel and the other in Babylonia, both of them still more extensive complements and commentaries to the Mishnah, completed in ca, 400 and 600 C. E., respectively, and

[5] a set of massive commentaries to books of Scripture called Midrash-compilations, spread over the same four centuries that produced the Mishnah and its commentaries.

The very contentious character of ancient Israelite Scripture invited the late antique authorities to take up the work of systematization. One could find in Scripture everything and its opposite. The contradictions yielded by Scripture transcended petty problems of picayune detail. Differing positions on basic doctrines could be documented. These yielded massive flaws in the divine writings.

Take for instance the issue before us, the view of war and peace that Scripture set forth in diverse passages. The very nature of God was embodied in the issue: is God a man of war as the Song to the Sea of Exodus 15 alleges, or does God promise the very cessation of war, as Isaiah 2:4 maintains? Scripture yields conflicting pictures of the legitimacy of war in self-defense, maintaining in some passages that war is legitimate only in self-defense (if there) and in others that war is legitimate in cases of aggression alone. I leave to Professor Baruch A. Levine elsewhere in this volume the exposition of Scripture’s several positions on just war. I address not Scripture but the post-biblical Rabbinic canon. We turn to the doctrine of just war in the view of the Rabbinic authorities of the oral tradition of the Mishnah, Talmuds and Midrash-collections.

That program promises what the canon cannot deliver, for the Rabbinic documents do not contain language that justifies the claim of a Rabbinic doctrine of just war. We find no answer to the question, when in the view of the Hebrew Scriptures of ancient Israel is it just to go to war? But we do find ample attention to the rules governing the conduct of armies and these may contain implicit answers to practical questions on the right conduct of armies. We shall have to depend on the rabbis’ reading of those passages to uncover responses to the question before us.

What rules dictate the conduct of armies? The biblical book of Deuteronomy, which represents itself as the review by Moses of the revelation of Sinai, contains instructions on who is subject to the draft for war and who is exempt. Reviewing the exposition Deuteronomy 20 by the religious and political authorities, we identify the definition of the legitimate conduct of war, the closest Scripture and Judaism come to the definition of a just war. As I said, Scripture contains conflicting opinions of the legitimacy of war, The most extreme, negative view of war is that of Isaiah 2:4, which holds war will cease in the eschatological future, “…they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.” The most extreme positive view is at Exodus 15:3, “The Lord is a man of war; the Lord is his name:”

MEKHILTA ATTRIBUTED TO R. ISHMAEL XXIX:I.

1. A.	“The Lord is a man of war; the Lord is his name:” (Exodus 15:3 ):
B.	R. Judah says, “Lo, this verse of Scripture is rich in numerous passages [that serve to amplify the picture].
C.	“It indicates that he appeared to them with every sort of armament.
D.	“He appeared to them like a mighty hero, girded with sword: ‘Gird your sword upon your thigh, O mighty one’ (Ps. 45:4).
E.	“He appeared to them like a horseman: ‘And he rode on a cherub and flew’ (Ps. 18:11).
F.	“He appeared to them coated in mail and garbed in a helmet: ‘And he put on righteousness as a coat of mail and a helmet of salvation on his head’ (Is. 59:17).
G.	“He appeared to them carrying a spear: ‘At the shining of your glittering spear’ (Hab. 3:11); ‘Draw out also the spear and battle-axe’ (Ps. 35:3).
H.	“He appeared to them bearing bow and arrow: ‘Your bow is made bare’ (Hab. 23:9); ‘And he sent out arrows and scattered them’ (2 Sam. 22:15).
I.	“He appeared to them with shield and buckler: “His truth is a shield and a buckler’ (Ps. 91:4); ‘Take hold of shield and buckler’ (Ps. 35:2).
J.	“Shall I then infer that he needs any of these measures?
K.	“Scripture says, ‘The Lord is a man of war, the Lord is his name,’
L.	“meaning, it is with his name that he does battle, and he does not need any of these means of making war.
M.	“If that is the case, then how come Scripture articulates each one of these measures by itself?
N.	“If the Israelites are in need, the Omnipresent makes war for them.
O.	“And woe for the nations of the world for what their ears are going to hear, for lo, the One who spoke and brought the world into being is going to make war on them.”
2. A.	Why is this stated?
B.	Since when he appeared at the sea, it was in the form of a mighty soldier making war, as it is said, “The Lord is a man of war,”
C.	and when he appeared to them at Sinai, it was as an elder, full of mercy, as it is said, “And they saw the God of Israel” (Ex. 24:10,
D.	and when they were redeemed, what does Scripture say? “And the like of the very heaven for clearness” (Ex. 24:10); “I beheld until thrones were placed and one that was ancient of days sat” (Dan. 7:9); “A fiery stream issued” (Dan. 7:10) —
E.	[so God took on many forms.] It was, therefore, not to provide the nations of the world with an occasion to claim that there are two dominions in heaven
F.	that Scripture says, “The Lord is a man of war, the Lord is his name.”
G.	[This then bears the message:] The one in Egypt is the one at the sea, the one in the past is the one in the age to come, the one in this age is the one in the world to come: “See now that I, even I, am he” (Dt. 32:39); “Who has wrought and done it? He who called the generations from the beginning. I the Lord who am the first and with the last I am the same” (Is. 41:4).

The man of war in the Scriptural account commands Israel to fight wars of aggression in the conquest of the Land of Israel, a.k.a. the land of Canaan. How do the rabbis harmonize these conflicting views, the eschatological vision of universal peace and the conviction that God is a man of war, so if the Israelite aspires to be like God, he must obey the divine command to conquer the land? The answer in the Rabbinic classics is found in the distinction fundamental to the Rabbinic doctrine of war between the war that is votive or optional — milhemet reshut — and the war that is obligatory or subject to a commandments — milhemet misvah. An optional war is carried out on the volition of the Israelite government, an obligatory war is required by God.

The distinction between the two classes of war seems to depend on intention, If the war is an act of aggression, so that the act of war expresses the Israelite’s attitude toward the fighting then it is a war of volition. If the war involves God’s purpose and not man’s, it is a war of obligation. The war fought to conquer the Land under Joshua’s leadership is a first class case of a war of obligation or commandment. That is why the siege of Jericho overrode the restrictions of the Sabbath.

We have a concrete example of the motivation for a votive war in the following narrative:

MISHNAH SANHEDRIN 1:5

B.	They bring forth [the army to wage a war fought by choice only on the instructions of a court of seventy-one.
XXIV.1B.	What is the scriptural source for this rule?
C.	Said R. Abbahu, “Scripture says, ‘And he shall stand before Eleazar the priest, [who shall inquire for him by the judgment of the Urim before the Lord. At his word shall they go out and at his word they shall come in, both he and all the children of Israel with him, even all the congregation]’ (Num. 27:21-22).
D.	“‘He’ speaks of the king.
E.	“‘And all the children of Israel with him’ refers to the priest anointed for war.
F.	“‘And even all the congregation’ refers to the sanhedrin.”
G.	But perhaps it is the sanhedrin that is instructed by the All-Merciful to inquire of the Urim and Thummim?
H.	Rather, the proof derives from what R. Aha bar Bizna said R. Simeon the Pious said, “There was a harp suspended over David’s bed. At midnight a north wind would blow through it, and it would play on its own. David would get up right away and take up Torah-study until dawn. At dawn the sages of Israel would come in to him. They said to him, ‘Our lord, king, your people Israel need sustenance.’
I.	“He said to them, ‘Make a living off one another.’
J.	“They said to him, ‘A handful of meal is not enough for a lion, and a pit cannot be filled up by its own dirt.’
K.	“He said to them, ‘Go and organize marauders.’
L.	“Forthwith they took counsel with Ahitophel and ask advice of the sanhedrin and address questions to the Urim and Thummim.”

The key to the details comes from the main purpose, which is the hierarchization of wars. A votive war is fought to gain booty. The procedure for the government to take action is specified, A command of God designates a conflict as an obligatory war. What difference does it make? The answer is set forth explicitly. All the regulations of war making specified at Deuteronomy 20 apply only to a votive war. The draft does not apply to specified classes of persons, and various other regulations mitigate the harsh rules of war. All these remissions of the draft and other leniencies are suspended, and everybody goes to battle, explicitly including women as well as men.

The following illustrate the difference in the status of votive and obligatory wars:

YERUSHALMI ERUBIN 1:10

[II:2] [A]	A military camp which goes forth for an optional war may grab freshly cut wood but may not grab [19d] seasoned wood.
[B]	An army which goes forth for an obligatory war may grab both seasoned and freshly cut wood.

Here is an explicit distinction between the two classes of war. The army in an obligatory war grabs whatever booty it is able to take over, the votive warriors cannot seize what is valuable.

So too the siege of cities is governed by different rules when the siege is obligatory from when it is votive:

YERUSHALMI SHABBAT 1:8

[I:5] [M]	They do not besiege a gentile town less than three days before the Sabbath.
[N]	That which you have said applies to making an optional war.
[O]	But as to making an obligatory war, even on the Sabbath [it is permitted to do so].
[P]	for so we find that Jericho was conquered only on the Sabbath.
[Q]	For it is written, “You shall march around the city, all the men of war going around the city once. Thus shall you do for six days” (Josh. 6:3). [Since on each day they rested in their camp, it does not count as starting a siege.]
[R]	And it is written, “And on the seventh day you shall march around the city seven (4b) times” (Josh. 6:4). [Here the actual siege started.]
[S]	And it is written, “Until it falls” (Deut. 20:20), even on the Sabbath. [Cf. T. Erub. 3:4]

The law is formulated from the perspective of the attacker and the rules explicitly address the conduct of a siege conducted by an Israelite force. The obligatory war is brought about in fulfillment of God’s commandment, for example to conquer the Land, and overrides the restrictions of the Sabbath day, a point made explicit for the siege of Jericho. Hence the obligatory war overrides the Sabbath, and that exemplifies the stater of the law for obligatory wars overall.

The two classes of war differ in how they are expounded. The votive war precipitates the exposition of an extensively detailed body of law, while the obligatory war is covered by a few basic rules. These come down to the contrast between the two classes of war. The exposition of the rules of the war of volition occupies the bulk of the legal treatment of the laws of war. There is little to say about the rules of the obligatory war, they come down to a blanket permission to the Israelites — “do whatever you find favorable to your cause.” The obligatory war is not subject to the rules of war.

That is not the case for the war of volition, which is subject to restrictive prohibitions. A sizable and complex body of law governs the conduct of the votive battle, glossing the regulations of Deuteronomy 20:5ff. The nature of the two types of war accounts for the difference between the two sets of rules. We briefly review the main points as set forth in the Mishnah with a brief selection from other documents.

MISHNAH SOTAH 8:2-4

• “And the officers shall speak to the people, saying ‘What man is there who has built a new house and has not dedicated it? Let him go and return to his house’ (Deut. 20:5).”
• All the same are the ones who build a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, and a house for storage.
• All the same are the ones who build it, who purchase it, who inherit it, and to whom it is given as a gift.
• “And who is the man who has planted a vineyard and has not used the fruit thereof” (Deut. 20:6) —
• All the same are the ones who plant a vineyard and who plant five fruit-trees,
• and even if they are of five different kinds.
• And all the same are the ones who plant such a tree, who sink them into the ground, and who graft them.
• And all the same are the ones who buy a vineyard, and who inherit it, and to whom it is given as a gift.
• “And who is the man who has betrothed a wife” (ibid.) —
• All the same are the ones who betroth a virgin and who betroth a widow —
• and even a deceased childless brother’s widow who awaits the Levir.
• And even if one heard during the battle that his brother had died,
• he returns and comes along home.
• All these listen to the words of the priest concerning the arrangements of battle and go home.
• And they provide water and food and keep the roads in good repair.

  M. Sotah 8:2

• And these are the ones who do not return home:
• He who builds a gate-house, a portico, or a porch;
• he who plants only four fruit-trees or five barren trees;
• he who remarries a woman whom he has divorced,
• or [he who marries] a widow in the case of a high priest, a divorcee or a woman who has undergone the rite of removing the shoe (halisah) in the case of an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a Netinah in the case of an Israelite, or an Israelite girl in the case of a mamzer or a Netin —
• such a one did not go home.
• R. Judah says, “Also: He who builds his house on its original foundation did not go home.”
• R. Eliezer says, “Also: He who builds a house of bricks in the Sharon does not go home.”

  M. Sotah 8:3

• And these are the ones who [to begin with] do not move from their place:
• He who had [just now] built a house and dedicated it, who had planted a vineyard and used its fruits, who had married the girl whom he had betrothed, or who had consummated the marriage of his deceased childless brother’s widow,
• since it is said, “He shall be free for his house one year” (Deut. 24:5) —
• “For his house” — this is his house.
• “Will be” — this refers to his vineyard.
• “And shall cheer his wife” — this applies to his own wife.
• “Whom he has acquired” — to include even his deceased childless brother’s widow.
• These do not [even] have to provide water and food and see to the repair of the road.

  M. Sotah 8:4

The rule governing all aspects and phases of the obligatory war is expressed as follows:

SIFRE TO DEUTERONOMY CXCVIII:I

1. A.	“When the officials have finished [addressing the troops, army commanders shall assume command of the troops]”:
B.	At the front and rear of the people they set up guards, with iron axes in hand. Whoever wants to retreat – [the guard] has the right to hit him on the thighs,
C.	for the beginning of a defeat is flight,
D.	as it is said, “Israel has fled before the Philistines, and there has been a great slaughter among the people also” (1 Sam. 4:17).
2. A.	Under what circumstances [does this rule apply]?
B.	In an optional war.
C.	But in an obligatory war, everyone has to go out to battle, even a groom from his chamber and a bride from her bridal bower.

What of the obligatory war and the exemptions specified for the votive war? Here we find a much less complicated situation. No emotions apply, all obligations are enforced for all classes of Israelites, Hence the law is simple: everyone goes.

MISHNAH SOTAH 8:7

• Under what circumstances [do the foregoing rules apply]?
• In the case of an optional war.
• But in the case of a war subject to religious requirement, everyone goes forth to battle —
• even a bridegroom from his chamber, and a bride from her marriage canopy
• Said R. Judah, “Under what circumstances? In the case of a war subject to religious requirement.
• “But in the case of an obligatory war, everyone goes forth to battle—
• “even a bridegroom from his chamber, and a bride from her marriage canopy.”

  Mishnah Sotah 8:7

Every Israelite is obligated to go to the obligatory war, and there are no qualifications of that rule. The Tosefta systematizes the rules for both classes of wars:

TOSEFTA SOTAH 7:23

• There are those who go forth and return home, go forth and do not return home, and there are those who do not go forth at all [M. Sot. 8 :4A].
• All those of whom they have said that they go forth and return home pay their share of the taxes of the town and provide water and food for the battle.
• And they repair the roads [M. Sot. 8:2/0].D. And all the rest of them do not go home at all.

TOSEFTA SOTAH 7:24

• All those concerning whom they have said, “They do not go forth at all,” for example, he who builds a house and dedicated it but has not lived in it for twelve months, planted a vineyard and eaten the fruit but not made use of it for twelve months, betrothed a wife and taken her in marriage and has not remained with her twelve months [M. Sot. 8:4B] —
• these do not pay their share of the taxes of the town, and do not provide water and food for the battle.
• And they do not repair the roads.
• R. Judah did call a war fought by choice, a war imposed by religious duty.
• But in the case of a war imposed by obligation, everyone goes forth,
• even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy [M. Sot. 8:7f-G].

The besieged Israelite army carries on an active defense even on the Sabbath day:

TOSEFTA ERUBIN 3:5

• Gentiles who came against Israelite towns [cf. M. Erub. 4:1A] — they go forth to do battle against them carrying weapons,
• and they violate the prohibitions of the Sabbath on their account.
• Under what circumstances?
• When they came for blood.
• But if they did not come for blood,
• they do not go forth against them carrying weapons, and they do not violate the prohibitions of the Sabbath on their account.
• [If, however,] they came against towns located near the frontier, even to grab straw, even to grab a loaf of bread,
• they go forth against them carrying weapons, and they violate the prohibitions of the Sabbath on their account.

Here we find another characterization of the obligatory war, the intention of the enemy. If the besieging gentile army came for blood, then the Sabbath prohibitions are suspended, But if the besieging gentile army did not come for blood, then the rules of the votive war pertain. The definition of the two classifications of war depend on the intentionality of the Israelite forces. If the enemy comes for blood the Israelites suspend all exemptions. If the Israelite forces are fighting a defensive war, the exemptions hold.

SIFRE TO DEUTERONOMY CXCVIII:I

1. A.	“When the officials have finished [addressing the troops, army commanders shall assume command of the troops]”:
B.	At the front and rear of the people they set up guards, with iron axes in hand. Whoever wants to retreat – [the guard] has the right to hit him on the thighs,
C.	for the beginning of a defeat is flight,
D.	as it is said, “Israel has fled before the Philistines, and there has been a great slaughter among the people also” (1 Sam. 4:17).
2. A.	Under what circumstances [does this rule apply]?
B.	In an optional war.
C.	But in an obligatory war, everyone has to go out to battle, even a groom from his chamber and a bride from her bridal bower.

We end with an explicit claim that the exemptions apply only to the optional war.

SIFRE TO DEUTERONOMY CCXI:I

1. A.	[“When you take the field against your enemies, and the Lord your God delivers them into your power, and you take some of them captive, and you see among the captives a beautiful woman and you desire her and would take her to wife, you shall bring her into your house” (Dt. 21:10-14)].
B.	“When you take the field”:
C.	Scripture speaks of an optional war.
2. A.	“…against your enemies”:
B.	facing your enemies.
3.A.	“…and the Lord your God delivers them into your power”:
B.	If you carry out everything stated in this context, in the end the Lord your God will hand him over to you.

Once again we apply the provisions of the rule of war to the optional war, Presumably the obligatory war does not exhibit them. God’s intervention depends on Israel’s intention.

SIFRE TO DEUTERONOMY CXC:VIII

1. A.	“When you take the field against your enemies”:
B.	Scripture speaks of an optional campaign.
2. A.	“…against your enemies”:
B.	Against your enemies you make war [and not against the enemies of God, in which instance the war is obligatory and not optional].

SIFRE TO DEUTERONOMY CXC:IX

1. A.	“…and see horses and chariots”:
B.	Just as they go forth against you with horses and chariots, so you go forth against them with horses and chariots.
C.	“…large forces”:
D.	Just as they go forth against you with large forces, so you go forth against them with large forces.”

SIFRE TO DEUTERONOMY CXC:X

1. A.	“…have no fear of them, for the Lord your God, who brought you from the land of Egypt, is with you”:
B.	The one who brought you up from the land of Egypt is with you in time of trouble.

The role of God is affirmed throughout. That underscores the context in which the specific topic of the just war is expounded in the Rabbinic canon. The system of theology in which the just war is subsumed spells out the implications of Israel’s subordination to God, and in particular to God’s will. The just war is a holy war because the system of which it forms a part arbitrarily designates it as just for its own reasons having to do with God’s will, not man’s willfulness. The governing consideration is not because [1] traits or circumstances that apply to a war classified as just bear intrinsic traits of justice, e.g., the absence of aggression. and not because [2] the system exemplifies in the contrast between obligatory and votive wars the way in which a holy war may be classified in more than a single setting. It is we who have introduced the language and invoked the reasoning of the just war and imposed the principle that a just war is defined by the absence of aggression. There are other considerations entirely that impose the category of justice on war.

HOW DOES CLASSICAL JUDAISM RESPOND
TO THE PROGRAM OF OUR OWN TIMES?

If a war is obligatory, in the Rabbinic system we therefore suppose it is just. But that is not because the indicative traits of justice govern, It is, rather, deemed subject to justice in the Judaic theological setting because of the identity of the source of the obligation to go to war. In the Rabbinic system that is God. Because God possesses among other traits the attribute of justice, his commandments are congruent to his traits of justice and thus are just, therefore the obligatory war is classified as a just war. But the system resting on the Rabbinic conviction of obligation, therefore justice, does not assign priority to justice, rather to obedience. God is as concerned with what man eats for breakfast as with his motivation in going to war. The particular issue of war conforms to the systemic program that dictates what people will eat for breakfast and whether they should go to war — equally subject to the same principles of the law.

That fact does not prevent our consideration of issues that are addressed to all systems of social thought whether religious or secular and philosophical. So we present to the formative system of Rabbinic Judaism questions that engage the attention of all systems equally. The transformation of both war and peace in the 21st century raises the following questions drawn from Professor Berkowitz’s catalogue.

1)

Ought we to try to justify war? Does the effort to justify war endanger an important distinction between war and peace?

a)	Is there something valuable in war that we should fear to lose?
b)	Is there something valuable in peace as distinct from war that we are in danger of losing?

The story cited earlier that has the sages advise David to make war provides an answer to this question:

H.	They said to him, ‘Our lord, king, your people Israel need sustenance.’
I.	“He said to them, ‘Make a living off one another.’
J.	“They said to him, ‘A handful of meal is not enough for a lion, and a pit cannot be filled up by its own dirt.’
K.	“He said to them, ‘Go and organize marauders.’

The war David declares is one of aggression. There is no effort made to justify the war other than Israel’s need for supplies. This is not a just war and it is a votive one. Such a theory of war does not introduce a value judgment concerning war. War does not enhance morality or offer a distinct value and peace does not promise an increase in virtue. Professor Berkowitz deems rare a rationale for war that does not include the issues of self-defense vs. aggression. Here antiquity contributes a case in which aggression and self-aggrandizement do not play a primary role,

2)

Is war justifiable? Or is war evil and criminal? Or is war beautiful?

a)	Do modern technologies of mass destruction make war unjustifiable?
b)	What will the increasing use of automated drones and robots mean for just war theory?

The story about David denies that a votive war is justifiable. Scripture portrays in the battle at the sea a case of mass destruction of Pharaoh’s forces. The issue of finding reasons to justify war ignores the context established for all judgments of right and wrong, which is the will of God.

 

3)	Is just war theory a secular project? How does it relate to its origins in Christian and Roman thought?

The rabbis’ abstract reflection on the votive and obligatory classes of wars does not compare in perspicuity to Roman and Christian reflection on the same matter. We are able to derive some general rules from the detailed cases that the Torah sets forth in the Rabbinic exposition of Deuteronomy 20. But that does not bring us close to the sophistication of the Roman thought on the subject, its capacity to raise encompassing questions or penetrating distinctions. The distinction that differentiates one type of war from another in the Rabbinic canon does not derive from or relate to Christian or Roman thought. That is self-evident.

More to the point: we are unable to locate in Rabbinic Judaism a categorical theory of just war native to that Judaism. The distinction between obligatory and votive wars derives from the Rabbinic theology of the origin of knowledge of God’s will in the Torah. We did not locate in the rabbinic canon of late antiquity an articulated theory of just war. We read that theory and its detailed issues into the Rabbinic canon, we did not find it there. We drew the inference of the presence in the Rabbinic canon of a theory that placed a higher value on one type of war than another. The laws that placed a higher level of strictness in the laws governing one type of war than in laws governing another type of war do not announce a theoretical construct favoring one attitude over another, certainly not justice having to do with war.

The issue in the Rabbinic canon is always God’s purpose, and when it comes to war, God’s purpose is to provide the promised land to the people of Israel. That consideration does not introduce the issue of justice, although the Rabbinic canon does justify the conquest of the Land of Canaan by the Israelites.

4)

What contribution can religious thought make to the current discourse about just wars?

a)	Are some religions more peaceful or more militaristic than others?

The Rabbinic system contributes to the discussion of just wars the example of distinctions among types of wars that do not derive from issues of ethics — right or wrong — or morality — good or bad (evil) — but rather from the arbitrary will of God. The language of justice is not germane. Little space separates the details of the two types of war in the rabbinic hierarchization. The case before us eliminates claims that all religions bear in common a principle of just war deriving from self-defense. It is clear that some religions take on a bellicose character and others an irenic quality. But the paramount quality is the inclusion in the several religious systems of record sayings in practice of war and peace in equal doses.

 

5)

Ought we seek to suppress and criminalize all war?

a)	Would a life without war be a human life?
b)	Is peace really the goal of human life? Is Pacifism a meaningful philosophy today?

A life without war is not contemplated by the Rabbinic authorities. Scripture contains the praise of an eschatological suppression of war. But until the end of days life without war is unthinkable in the obvious sense, it cannot be contemplated, it lies beyond the categorical conceptions of the system. The Rabbinic writings do not discredit all war but legislate in acute detail the rules governing war.

The classical documents of the Rabbinic canon contain judgments on the importance of peace. These support the view that a life without war lies within the boundaries of human life:

MISHNAH ABOT 1:12

A.	Hillel and Shammai received [the Torah from them.
B.	Hillel says, (1) “Be disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving people and drawing them near to the Torah.”

MISHNAH ABOT 1:18

A.	Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “On three things does the world stand: (1) on justice, (2) on truth, (3) and on peace,
B.	“as it is said, ‘Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates’ (Zech. 8:16),”

What defines peace is not to be taken for granted. It is a social virtue along with justice. But we are given no clear picture of the political virtues that mark peace in contrast to war or that distinguish peace from truth or other abstractions from one another. The one significant trait is the proof text that links the high importance imputed to peace by Simeon to the prophet Zechariah. Then Simeon treats peace as definitive of the social order — without telling us what he means by peace or specifying the traits that order society in the pattern of peace.

What are we to make of this obscure statement? Peace is absence of conflict. In later passages we find an elaborate statement of cases that illustrate a single point: one restrains himself in order to avoid creating conflict between oneself and others. That forms the evidence of the character of peace and therefore the definition of war.

6)	Does Just War theory regulate and tame war and thus lead to there being more wars?

Just war appeals to reason to justify war and to validate the exercise of legitimate violence therein. Hence justice regulates war that is not aggressive and that conforms to the expectations of rational conduct. The Rabbinic definition of matters does not appeal to mere arguments and appeals to something ore weighty than superficial reason. It relies on the declaration of God and not on the reasoning of man: not on concession but on submission.

CONCLUSION: THE JUST WAR AND THE JUST GOD — AND WHERE DOES PEACE

FIT IN: The rabbinic canon invokes its own category–formations, not just war versus just peace but obligatory versus votive war. That category-formation derives from the Rabbinic system, with its emphasis on the unity of God. Why does that system not recognize unjust war, only obligatory or votive war — a different thing altogether? The reason is native to the Rabbinic system with its convictions about God’s revealing his will in the Torah and about God’s fundamental justice. The unity of God implies that God is consistent and just. The issue of the justice of war is subsumed under the issue of the justice of God.

We cannot address the issue of just war without asking about just peace. But peace is not a matter of justice, I to is attained through the concession of one’s claim to the other person and yields a convenient outcome, Here is a full statement of the theory of peace in the context of conflict:

MISHNAH GITTIN 5:8

A.	And these rules did they state in the interest of peace:
I B.	A priest reads first, and afterward a Levite, and afterward an Israelite, in the interests of peace.
II C.	They prepare an erub in the house where it was first placed, in the interests of peace.
III D.	A well nearest to the stream is filled first, in the interests of peace.
IV E.	Traps for wild beasts, fowl, and fish are subject to the rules against stealing, in the interests of peace.
F.	R. Yosé says, “It is stealing beyond any doubt.”
V G.	Something found by a deaf mute, an idiot, and a minor is subject to the rule against stealing, in the interests of peace.
H.	R. Yosé says, “It is stealing beyond any doubt.”
VII.	A poor man beating the top of an olive tree. what is under it [the tree] is subject to the rule against stealing, in the interests of peace.
K.	R. Yosé says, “It is stealing beyond any doubt.”
VII L.	They do not prevent poor gentiles from collecting produce under the laws of Gleanings, the Forgotten Sheaf, and the Corner of the Field, in the interests of peace.
5:9 VIII A.	A woman lends a sifter, sieve, handbill, or oven to her neighbor who is suspected of transgressing the law of the Seventh Year,
B.	but she should not winnow or grind wheat with her.
IX C.	The wife of a haber lends the wife of an am haares a sifter and sieve.
D.	She sifts, winnows, grinds, and sifts wheat with her
E.	But once she has poured water into the flour, she may not come near her,
F.	for they do not give assistance to transgressors.
G.	And all of these rules they stated only in the interests of peace.
X H.	They give assistance to gentiles in the Seventh Year but not Israelites.
I.	And they inquire after their welfare,
J.	in the interests of peace.

Peace is attained by giving up one’s claim and surrendering the advantage to the other. Then peace is the absence of conflict. It is not a political condition affecting a whole nation but a mode of conduct in a manner that encourages public tranquility. Peace is not attained through public policy, a condition that affects nations, so much as an effort to diminish social tension and even violence on the part of the isolated individual. What we have is an elaborate set of examples of the rule that the strict law is set aside in favor of lenient rulings for concrete cases and behaviors.

The important point is that if we invoke the matched opposites, war and peace, we produce gibberish — the contrastive match of war to peace does not exist here. The language “And these rules did they state in the interests of peace” does not sustain, “And if not, they declare war” (e.g., impose a heavy fine). There is no matched opposite, so war and peace do not form, or function as, counterpart categories.

A principle of hierarchical classification guides the exposition of votive and obligatory war and effects a neat classification. We are able to summarize the components of the category, action, in a few words. The rules of concrete action deal with the legitimacy of actions of all sorts in making war that is conducted for a given purpose under a given designation. We find ourselves at the foundations of the theology of Judaism: the unity of God. A religion of numerous gods finds many solutions to one problem, a religion of only one God presents one to many. Life is seldom fair. Rules rarely work. To explain the reason why, polytheisms adduce multiple causes of chaos, a god per anomaly. Diverse gods do various things, so, it stands to reason, ordinarily outcomes conflict. Monotheism by nature explains many things in a single way. One God rules. Life is meant to be fair, and just rules are supposed to describe what is ordinary, all in the name of that one and only God. Justice in the context of war forms a minor detail of the larger monotheist category-formation. So in monotheism a simple logic governs to limit ways of making sense of things. But that logic contains its own dialectics. If one true God has done everything, then, since he is God all-powerful and omniscient, all things are credited to, and blamed on, him. In that case he can be either good or bad, just or unjust — but not both.

Responding to the generative dialectics of monotheism, the Torah systematically reveals the justice of the one and only God of all creation. God is not only God but also good. Appealing to the facts of Scripture in the first six centuries of the Common Era constructed a coherent theology, a cogent structure and logical system, to expose the justice of God — even in the context of war.

The theology of the Rabbinic canon conveys the picture of world order based on God’s justice and equity. The working-system of the Torah finds its dynamic in the struggle between God’s plan for creation — to create a perfect world of justice — and man’s will. That dialectics embodies in a single paradigm the events contained in the sequences, rebellion, sin, punishment, repentance, and atonement; exile and return; or the disruption of world order and the restoration of world order. None of these categories and propositions is new; anyone familiar with the principal components of the faith and piety of Judaism will find them paramount. It is not in identifying but in forming them into a logos — a sustained, rigorous, coherent argument, that can be set forth in narrative-sequential form — that I make my contribution.