Just War in Religion and Politics

For many, the core identity of a soldier is that of “servant of the state”. This view is popular among many soldiers, political leaders, and citizens. While the identity of a soldier certainly includes servant of the state, we should not overlook the fact that soldiers are also moral agents who are responsible for their actions. While soldiers may be fulfilling their contract with the state when called upon to deploy and fight the state’s wars, their service to the state does not eliminate their moral responsibility to examine the moral justness of the wars they are being ordered to wage. If soldiers find the war to be unjust, they have a responsibility to not participate in it. Although the decision to become a selective conscientious objector is a difficult one for a professional soldier and carries consequences with it (possibly including punishment by the state and intense social and peer pressure), participation in an unjust war is morally wrong. While it may be easier for soldiers to claim invincible ignorance; a condition in which it is impossible to ascertain the truth or falsity of one’s beliefs, as an excuse for moral culpability, I argue that soldiers must employ moral diligence in an attempt to ascertain the truth in regards to the justness of the conflict. This moral diligence must be in keeping with both the importance of the issue and what a prudent and sensible person would do. As war and killing are vitally important issues, soldiers must necessarily employ a high degree of moral diligence to determine the justness of any conflict they are called upon to fight in.

In exploring the requirement for soldiers to employ moral diligence, I will argue that:

INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE, THE TRADITIONAL DIVISION OF
JUST WAR THEORY, AND RESPONSIBILITY

An excellent starting point for a discussion of both invincible ignorance and the need for soldiers to employ moral diligence can be found in Shakespeare’s Henry V. In Act 4, Scene 1, a disguised King Henry walks through his camp to judge his army’s morale prior to the battle of Agincourt. He declares to one group of soldiers that “Methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the King’s company, his cause being just and quarrel honorable.” One soldier responds with “That’s more than we know.” A second soldier adds “Ay, or more than we should seek after, for we know enough if we know we are the King’s subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime out of us.”¹

Henry’s conversation with the two common soldiers mirrors the traditional view of Just War Theory and its separation into two parts: jus ad bellum – the justice of the war and jus in bello – justice in the war. The first part concerns itself with the justifications for resorting to force as a means of achieving political objectives. Jus in bello concerns itself with the considerations on how a war is prosecuted. Traditionally, just war theory holds that while soldiers may be held responsible for their own misconduct in fighting the war (the jus in bello portion), they are not responsible for jus ad bellum considerations which are the responsibility of the state’s political leaders. Shifting momentarily from the moral realm to the legal realm, this means that soldiers are generally held responsible for only two of the three classes of war-related crimes formulated by the International Law Commission at the request of the UN General Assembly in 1950. The three crimes being:

The traditional view of JWT holds that soldiers are not responsible for crimes against peace because the decision to go to war is a political decision rather than a military decision. Since soldiers play no role in this decision they, in Paul Christopher’s words, “can never be responsible for the crime of war, qua soldiers.”³ This reasoning results in a very neat division of jus ad bellum and jus in bello responsibilities between soldiers and their political masters. Initially, the traditional view seems reasonable. In the age of mass armies and conscription, can we really assign guilt and responsibility for crimes against peace to the common soldier and professional officer corps? Practically speaking, this would mean that, assuming the unjust side lost, its soldiers would be viewed as guilty and presumably subject to some kind of punishment. In general, punishment has not occurred at the conclusion of wars in the 19^th, 20^th, and 21^st centuries. Wehrmacht soldiers after WWII and Iraqi soldiers after the Gulf War were not viewed as guilty for the crime of war nor punished for fighting for an unjust cause.

Attempts to establish a principle of prima facie guilt for individuals due to their membership in certain organizations (such as the armed forces of a state waging unjust war) breaks down in practice. This is even the case when the crimes committed fall into the category of war crimes or crimes against humanity. For example, during the Nuremberg trials, there was an attempt to assign prima facie guilt to all SS members (including the Waffen or combat soldiers of the SS) for their role in executing the “special tasks of a police nature” with which the organization had been charged.⁴ This attempt failed because it was recognized as unjust. Despite their membership, many members of the SS did not participate in any of the atrocities or crimes against humanity for which their organization remains infamous. Punishing individuals collectively seems unfair. It is also interesting to note that the attempt to assign prima facie guilt failed even though the SS was, until late in the war, almost entirely a voluntary organization.⁵ It is thus unsurprising that attempts to assign collective guilt and responsibility to mass, conscripted armies would be problematic.

If assigning collective guilt on a military organization for war crimes and crimes against humanity is problematic, it appears that it is even more so the case when it comes to crimes against peace. As we have already seen, Christopher argues that soldiers can never be responsible for the crime of war. He not only focuses on the political versus military decision distinction but also the beliefs and knowledge (or lack of it) that soldiers possess. Here he appeals to both Michael Walzer and Francisco Vitoria. He interprets Walzer to say that in regards to soldiers “theirs is never the crime of aggression because they always believe that their cause is just.”⁶ In other words, soldiers can’t be held guilty when the knowledge they have leads them to believe their actions are just.

In reference to Vitoria, Christopher appeals to the notion of invincible ignorance. Ignorance is “lack of knowledge about a thing in a being capable of knowing.”⁷ Ignorance categorized as invincible occurs “when a person is unable to rid himself of it”.⁸ Ignorance which is invincible thus provides a “valid excuse and excludes sin.”⁹ Christopher holds that soldiers are always infected with invincible ignorance when it concerns the justness of the war they are being called to fight in. Presumably, Christopher sees this as a desirable state. He even goes so far as to ask “Who could wish it otherwise?” However, his own answer to this is not couched in terms of knowledge or knowing but in terms of duty. He argues that:

“… soldiers are always infected with “invincible ignorance”—and who could wish it otherwise? Standing armies are recruited, trained, and maintained to defend the community in times of danger. And although defending one’s community or family may be the right of every citizen in primitive society, in civilized society that right has been taken away from the population at large and isolated in the office of soldier. It is, therefore, a duty for the soldiers to defend those constituents who have entered a pact with them to this end. It would be a traitorous abrogation of public trust to swear an oath of preparedness to perform certain duties on demand in return for “meals and support by the state,” and then, after accepting the benefits of the agreement, to refuse to fulfill the duties stipulated when called upon to do so. No citizen logically could wish it so.”¹⁰

While no citizen could logically wish a soldier to shirk his duties when called upon to fight a just war, it is not at all clear that a citizen would want a soldier to actively support an unjust war. A simple analogy shows this to be the case.

INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE RECONSIDERED

Consider the case of the bystander who sees a criminal rob a bank and begin to load sacks of money into the get-away car. Since the sacks of money are heavy and there are quite a few, the robber asks the bystander for help. The bystander willingly complies and assists in the loading of the get-away car. Upon finishing the loading, the criminal drives away.

In this case, it seems that our bystander is responsible and guilty of wrongdoing. Assuming the bystander realized that a criminal act was being committed, recognized a moral wrong, and then proceeded to assist in the act’s completion, it seems clear we would label this person as an accomplice to a crime and as someone who has acted morally wrong.

The same labeling holds true for soldiers who agree to fight in a war they know is unjust and thus morally wrong. While one might debate what is the best course of action for the bystander to pursue in bank robbery scenario (call the police, run for help, attempt to stop the bank robber), one should not expect or condone their actively aiding the robber. If this is true, there is no reason we should expect anything less from a soldier in similar circumstances. We may argue about what the appropriate actions for the soldier to take (refuse to fight, apply for conscientious objection status, or resign one’s commission) no one should expect or condone a soldier to actively support a war they know to be unjust and will involve unjustified killing.

In fact, Vitoria makes it quite clear that soldiers should not blindly march off to war. In Political Writings, Vitoria lays out the following four propositions:

Propositions 1, 2, and 4 are clear in that they require moral examinations of the causes of war by all of those concerned. Proposition 3 is somewhat problematic but still understandable within the overall framework of Vitoria. This proposition is of a practical nature. Vitoria discusses the impossibility and inexpediency of putting the arguments of “difficult public business before every member of the common people.” This proposition can also be seen to rely on proposition 2 in that the lesser subjects (the majority of soldiers) must rely on trusting their superiors who are duty bound to examine the cause of the war (we shall examine this in more detail in a later section). Propositions 1 and 4 also allow lesser subjects to opt out of the war if they have knowledge of its injustice.

What we see at work here is the role of “moral diligence.” Ignorance is said to be truly invincible only when a person is unable to rid himself of it notwithstanding an effect to do so. The requisite for this diligence “must be commensurate with the importance of the affair in hand, and with the capacity of the agent, in a word such as a really sensible and prudent person would use under the circumstances.”¹² With this in mind, and considering the importance of an affair such as war making or fighting, it is clear that soldiers must examine the justness of the war that they face and not simply throw up their hands and claim invincible ignorance.

CERTAINTY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE

While one may posit the existence of invincible ignorance on theoretical grounds, some might question the possibility of its existence in the information rich modern world. To answer this concern, we must return to our definition of ignorance as a lack of knowledge about a thing in a being capable of knowing. “Fundamentally speaking and with regard to a given object, ignorance is the outcome of the limitations of our intellect or of the obscurity of the matter itself.”¹³ Given that the vast majority of soldiers are intellectually capable of understanding and applying jus ad bellum criteria, our focus will be on the “obscurity of the matter” -in other words, the uncertainty that exists in determining if a war is just or unjust.

Hugo Grotius, a key figure in the development of modern JWT captures the idea of “obscurity” in the following passage:

What Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, I. i) wrote is perfectly true, that certainty is not to be found in moral questions in the same degree as in the mathematical sciences…. Thus it comes about that between what should be done and what it is wrong to do there is a mean, that which is permissible; and this is now closer to the former, now to the latter. Hence, there often comes a moment of doubt, just as when day passes into night, or when cold water slowly becomes warm. This is what Aristotle means when he says: ‘Oftentimes it is hard to decide what is to be preferred.’ Andronicus of Rhodes states the matter thus: ‘It is hard to distinguish what is truly just from that which appears to be.’…¹⁴

An example that illustrates the uncertainty concerning moral judgments in regards to the justness of wars is the discussion concerning the Iraq War. In the period leading up to the actual invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies, world opinion was split on what course of action was truly just. Even within America, there was a severe division over whether or not the war could be justified. Applying the same jus ad bellum principles led many to very different conclusions as summarized in the table below.¹⁵

THE IRAQ WAR; JUST OR UNJUST WAR?

4. The act of war should be in proportion with the offense of the nation being attacked.

6. The real reason for the war should show right intent and should be the stated reason.

7. The outcome of the war will lead to a more just result than if no war had occurred.

Faced with a situation of moral uncertainty such as the case just described, one must apply moral diligence to rid themselves of ignorance and try and obtain the necessary knowledge to make a right decision (for our purpose deciding whether or not to go to war). Again, the diligence required “must be commensurate with the importance of the affair in hand, and with the capacity of the agent, in a word such as a really sensible and prudent person would use under the circumstances.”¹⁶

Given that the decisions of whether a war is just and whether to support it or not are of great importance, the key word to focus on is the “capacity” of the agent. I believe there are two ways to understand “the capacity of the agent”. The first has already been mentioned. Certainly, capacity should be taken as meaning the individual’s mental ability or their faculty or potential for experiencing or appreciating a particular situation (which the vast majority of soldiers possess). Another way to understand capacity is as one’s duty, position or role. For the purposes of further discussion, it is this last understanding of capacity that is important.

KNOWLEDGE, ACTION, AND RESPONSIBILITY

Understanding capacity as duty, position, or role allows us to recognize not only the limits of moral prudence but also the distinction between those soldiers who truly possess invincible ignorance as compared to those whose ignorance is not only vincible and thus capable of being overcome, but who have made little or no effort to dispel it. Ignorance of this kind might be labeled crass or supine.¹⁷ Adding these distinctions to the category of those who possess knowledge, we thus come up with three categories of knowledge/ignorance and with them different moral responsibilities for participating in an unjust war. These categories are:

For the first category, consider the case of General A who sits in on his political master’s explanation for going to war. He learns that, despite appeals to jus ad bellum principles, the real reason for going to war is to jump start the economy and to divert the nation’s focus from the severe economic problems it is experiencing. It is clear to General A that his state is about to embark on a war of aggression. If he supports the war, he is no different than the bystander who recognizing the robber was committing a crime by stealing from the bank, nevertheless went on to assist him. Like the bystander, General A is an accomplice to a crime — specifically the crime of aggression (crimes against peace). General A is also morally responsible for knowingly participating in an unjust war.

In his opening statement in the case against those Germans being tried as war criminals, Robert H. Jackson made it clear that at certain times soldiers can and should be held responsible for the crime of war or crimes against peace. As Jackson put it:

“We recognize that to plan warfare is the business of professional soldiers in every country. But it is one thing to plan strategic moves in the event war comes, and it is another to plot and intrigue to bring that war on.”¹⁸ Jackson goes on to say that the leaders of the German High command were not on trial “because they lost the war but because they started it.”¹⁹

The Nuremberg Tribunal stated in regards to certain high ranking military leaders of the German high command that there was “much evidence as to the participation of these officers in planning and waging aggressive war … without their military guidance the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and sterile.”²⁰ Because of their knowledge that the war they were embarking upon was unjust and their subsequent efforts to plan and facilitate aggression, the Tribunal recommended those who were guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment.²¹

Since the conclusion of the Nuremberg trials, international law has expanded liability in regards to crimes against peace. Article 25 (3) (d) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) now provides that where a group of persons are acting with a common purpose, they incur liability if the offense is committed or attempted, where their contribution is intentional and is:

i)	made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime or
ii)	made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.²²

Clearly by this standard, soldiers who have knowledge of such activity can and should be held both morally and legally responsible. They have knowledge that the act they are planning or embarking upon is unjust.

While the case against those who have knowledge that their actions are unjust seems fairly clear, the case of those possessing vincible ignorance is not so straight forward. Consider a general officer (General B) who, while not possessing knowledge of the fact that the war is unjust, has the capability to determine if the war is just. Imagine he has access to certain intelligence files and the minutes of key meetings and briefings. With the employment of moral diligence, General B could find out the truth of the situation. He need only access the files in question. However, he does not do so. Perhaps General B is reluctant to discover the truth that the war is unjust because he would feel obligated to take some kind of action (end his career by resigning, buck the chain of command, refuse orders, etc.). Unlike the person who knowingly assisted a criminal act, General B is not strictly liable for the crime. However, he has certainly not exercised moral diligence. At a minimum we must consider him morally “irresponsible” in that he did not take the steps we would expect of a prudent and reasonable man. We must also question the character of a person such as General B and to some degree find it lacking.

Although both examples given have used high ranking officers, the possibility does exist that due to their duty assignment, both junior and mid-level officers as well as enlisted soldiers could end up in the same situation as our imaginary generals. The examples focused on senior leaders because much of the key intelligence considered vital in determining whether to go to war may be compartmentalized at the higher levels of command in which political decisions are discussed.

The third and arguably largest category of soldiers are those who are truly unable to rid themselves of ignorance despite their efforts at moral diligence.. For them, certainty is not to be found. They lack the capacity to determine if the war is just or unjust. This might occur due to the kind of regime or state they serve. One can easily imagine members of North Korea’s Armed Forces, having been subject to propagandized education and indoctrination for their entire life, as incapable of being able to determine if a war is just or unjust. Their lack of access to information makes such a determination very difficult if not impossible. On the other hand, one can just as easily imagine a soldier in an open democratic society facing the same problem of uncertainty for different reasons. Instead of too little information, there is too much. Various opinions and interpretations in regards to the war exist within society, the media, and the world community. The best efforts of moral diligence result only in continued uncertainty. A state of invincible ignorance exists.

I am certainly not saying that a state of invincible ignorance is inevitable for the vast majority of soldiers. At times, it might be the case that the war one’s state is about to embark on is clearly just or unjust. If it is unjust, soldiers are morally obligated to take action to avoid participating in the war. However in those cases where invincible ignorance does exist, what should soldiers do?

INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE AND THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHIC

There are various views within the just war tradition concerning what soldiers should do when they are truly in a state of invincible ignorance. For example, Grotius bases his view on the maxim “what you question, do not do.” He states that “ If in a weighty manner there is doubt on both sides, and one of the two must be chosen, that which is the safer ought to be adopted” because:

In many controversies it may happen that strong arguments are forthcoming in support of both sides, whether drawn from the facts in the case or supported by the authority of others. When this occurs, if the matters which are in question are of slight moment the choice may evidently be free from harm, no matter on which side it may fall. But if the question is one of great importance, such as the infliction of capital punishment, in that case, because of the great difference between the courses to be chosen, the safer is to be preferred….. Whence it follows that in case of doubt we must refrain from war.

Now war is of the utmost importance, seeing that in consequence of war most sufferings usually fall also upon innocent persons. Therefore in the midst of divergent opinions we must lean towards peace….²³

For Grotius, those possessing invincible ignorance and a degree of uncertainty, should “play it safe” and not participate in a war which may be unjust. The consequences of such a war are too serious to take chances on.

As we have already seen Vitoria disagrees with Grotius’ “play it safe” approach. He holds that soldiers in a state of invincible ignorance “may lawfully go to war trusting the judgment of their superiors.”²⁴ Of these two views, I believe it is Vitoria’s which best fits the military ethic, that in turn forms the core of the professional military culture. In fact, the very nature of the military seems to condition soldiers to go to war in those cases in which they are unable to ascertain the war’s actual “justness.” One of the imperatives of military organizations is that they must be sufficiently disciplined with a recognized hierarchy of authority to ensure that orders are carried out consistently and reliably.²⁵ As such, certain traits and virtues are taught and internalized among professional militaries. Samuel Huntington’s observation of the military profession makes this point clearly. He writes:

“To render the highest possible service the entire profession and the military force which it leads must be constituted as an effective instrument of state policy. Since political direction only comes from the top, this means that the profession has to be organized into a hierarchy of obedience. For the profession to perform its function, each level within it must be able to command the instantaneous and loyal obedience of subordinate levels. Without those relationships, military professionalism is impossible. Consequently, loyalty and obedience are the highest military virtues.”²⁶

An example of this focus on loyalty and obedience is particularly clear in the oath American soldiers take when enlisting:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.”

In addition to loyalty and obedience to the state, another important aspect of the professional Military Ethic is loyalty to one’s fellow soldiers. One sociologist describes the contemporary sense of loyalty for the American military in these terms:

“Loyalty is the quintessential military virtue: loyalty to the country, the Constitution, and the president as commander-in-chief … to the [military] itself and its standards and traditions; to the unit in which a soldier serves, and to peers, superiors, and subordinates. In theory the most important of these loyalties is to the United States Constitution; in practice the most important—to a soldier’s morale and to his or her willingness to obey orders and assume responsibility—is to comrades.²⁷

This duty and loyalty to fellow soldiers is a cornerstone of the Professional Military Ethic and its importance cannot be emphasized enough. The special relationship between military comrades with its emphasis on not letting fellow soldiers down is another decisive factor for going to war in cases in which the war’s justness cannot be determined (In fact, I believe many soldiers would find it the decisive factor for participating in an unjust war as well as one whose justice is undeterminable).

To be loyal to our country, the Constitution and our oath, and our comrades in the profession, it seems as if we cannot (in those cases where uncertainty regarding the justness of the war exists), simply “sit this one out. However, before moving on to a final point, I want to make it clear that I do not take the oath or loyalty as the ultimate “trump cards” requiring a soldier to fight in an unjust war. An oath, no matter how solemn, can’t require someone to carry out a moral wrong. My position is simply that given a state of invincible ignorance in which the justness of a particular war is unable to be determined, the soldiers’ adherence to a professional military ethic centered around obedience, loyalty, duty, and a sworn oath are decisive factors in favor of going to war on behalf of the state — as long as the state and its leaders has proved trustworthy in the past.

TRUST AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR LEADERS

In addition to the previously mentioned virtues of courage, loyalty, and obedience, another key component of the professional military ethic is trust between military professionals and within the chain of command. When told that the unit on their right will attack to support them and that another unit will conduct a diversionary attack to distract the enemy from their own attack, soldiers trust the chain of command to make those things happen. At a more personal level, soldiers trust their leaders to make wise decisions, act morally, and, given the nature of their profession, do their best to protect them from harm. This trust is as deeply ingrained as the virtues previously mentioned.

It is because of this trust as well as the other aspects of the professional military ethic that makes the role of senior leaders so important. In many cases, soldiers may not have the capability to access the knowledge necessary for them to determine if the war they are embarking on is just. In such a case, their professional military ethic will generally lead them to go off to fight. Obedience, loyalty, and trust point them in this direction. If senior leaders have knowledge that the cause is unjust based on the greater information they possess, they must take action. Whether this action takes the form of speaking out, resigning one’s commission, or refusing to participate in the war’s planning or execution, they are obligated to act. Not doing so is morally wrong in that it betrays the trust placed in them and will lead their subordinates to participate in an immoral activity.

On 5 February 2003, I was in a van traveling from Fort Hood, Texas to the Austin Airport. Along with other officers, we were headed to Kuwait to conduct final planning for our part in the invasion of Iraq. Several of the officers had expressed private concerns over the justness of the possible war. As we drove, we listened to Secretary of State (and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Powell’s radio speech to the United Nations. Powell made a clear case for the justness of our cause and the evidence for it. Based on his position, former service, and the respect and trust he was held in, Powell’s comments and support for the invasion served to convince us (and at least a portion of the American people) that what we were doing was right. While I have no reason to doubt Secretary of State Powell’s sincere belief that the information he was providing was correct, one can only imagine what the consequences of someone like Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or a Service Chief, who having information that the war was unjust, was to speak out publicly. Such an action might even avert an unjust war from occurring.

While the same professional military ethic applies to senior leaders, their possession of certain knowledge may provide them with clarity in regards to the justness of the war. If this is the case, they then have no excuse for planning or participating in an unjust war. Morally they are wrong. Legally they should be held responsible. By their actions or inactions, soldiers may unknowingly go off to kill and die in an unjust war.

CONCLUSION

It is not the case, as put forth by King Henry’s common soldier that “obedience to the King wipes the crime out of us.” Faced with a war that is clearly unjust, we would be morally wrong to aid or participate in it. Likewise, when soldiers enter the military, they are not issued a blanket of invincible ignorance to relieve them of the responsibility to seek the truth concerning the justness of a war they are called upon to fight. It is the responsibility of every soldier to exercise moral diligence to try and ascertain whether a war is just or not. Unfortunately, the justness of the war is often unclear. Propaganda, patriotism and conflicting views and opinions may leave us uncertain. Our best efforts at moral diligence fail. In such a case we may truly be in a state of invincible ignorance. While this alone might be considered a valid excuse for participating in the “uncertain” war, the professional military ethic further requires soldiers to fulfill their duties and obligations as long as our leaders have proved trustworthy in the past.

ENDNOTES

¹ Anthony E. Hartle, “Moral Principles and Moral Reasoning” in Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet Prayer, eds. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Sisters, Oregon: Jerico, LLC, 2007).

³ Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 96.

⁴ Tom Segev, Soldiers of Evil, trans. Haim Watzman, (New York: McGraw Hill Company, 1987), 97.

⁵ Jan Phillip Reemstsma, “On War Crimes” in Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century, eds. Omar Bartov, Atina Grossman and Mary Nolan, (New York: The New Press, 2002), 11.

¹¹ Francisco de Vitoria, “On the Law of War” in The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings, eds. Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 319.

¹⁴ Hugo Grotius, De ieure bell: ac pacis, bk. II, in The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings, eds. Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 413.

¹⁵ Rodney P. Carlisle, Iraq War, (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2007), 66-67.

¹⁸ Robert H. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War Criminals, (New York: Alfred A. Knopt, Inc., 1946), 85.

²⁶ Samuel, Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 73.

²⁷ Kim Hays, Practicing Virtues: Moral Traditions at Quaker and Military Boarding Schools, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 54.

1.	First, if the war seems patently unjust to the subject, he must not fight even if he is ordered to do so by the prince.
2.	Second …, all those who are admitted or called or of their own accord attend the public or royal council are in duty bound to examine the cause of just war.
3.	Lesser subjects who are not invited to be heard in the councils … are not required to examine the causes of war, but may lawfully go to war trusting the judgment of their superiors.
4.	There may nevertheless be arguments and proofs of the injustice of the war so powerful, that even citizens and subjects of the lower class may not use ignorance as an excuse for serving as soldiers.¹¹

	Opponents:	Only a new vote by the Security Council would grant proper authority.
	Proponents:	Iraq had disobeyed prior Security Council resolutions that threatened force if disobeyed, and Resolution #1441, passed in 2002, gave sufficient authority.

	Opponents:	There was no clear evidence of WMDs, according to chief UN inspector Hans Blix.
	Proponents:	There was no clear evidence that Iraq had eliminated its known WMDs, according to Blix.

	Opponents:	The casualty rate in a war might be so high that success would not be clear.
	Proponents:	The Iraqi regime was weaker than it had been in 1991, and few troops would be needed to defeat the Iraqis.

	Opponents:	Obstruction of inspections is not an act of war.
	Proponents:	The regime was dangerous, had WMDs, and was a threat to security unless removed.

	Opponents:	Inspections should continue before war is the only option.
	Proponents:	Saddam Hussein had used up his chances to cooperate.

	Opponents:	Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W. Bush really wanted access to Iraqi oil or had other motives.
	Proponents:	Removing WMDs from a ruthless, terror-sponsoring state was the real and sufficient reason.

	Opponents:	Thousands of civilian and military casualties could be avoided.
	Proponents:	If the war was conducted quickly and humanely, the result will be freedom for the Iraqi people and the elimination of a serious threat to the region.

13

The Duty of Moral Diligence: The Responsibility of Soldiers to Determine the Justness of War

INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE, THE TRADITIONAL DIVISION OF JUST WAR THEORY, AND RESPONSIBILITY