Chapter III

Training the Antiterrorist Operator

The antiterrorist operator will need a wide array of skills to allow him to carry out the diverse missions he may be assigned. Individuals selected for military antiterrorist units who are already serving in elite formations may have many skills that will merely need fine tuning to fit the hostage rescue/antiterrorist mission. Those selected from police units, however, may need to be trained in traditional military skills to allow them to carry out missions that fall outside of normal policing duties. Units such as the British SAS, which rotate operators through the antiterrorist squadron, will have far less difficulty in keeping operators sharp than will the Australian SASR’s TAG unit, which is permanently assigned antiterrorist work. Likewise, national police antiterrorist units such as GIGN or GIS that deal with an array of serious criminal operations can keep their skills honed. Nevertheless, at least some antiterrorist training in esoteric skills serves the dual purpose of giving operators “another tool in their tool box” should the need ever arise on an operation while also helping to keep the operator alert and interested and ready for action. Many antiterrorist units have been deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq where their skills can be used in hunting and apprehending real terrorists, but can also be employed to do something other than train, train, train.

This chapter contains an overview of the wide array of skills necessary for antiterrorist operators and some of the special training they receive.

Small Unit Tactics

As with many aspects of antiterrorist training, military special ops units with the antiterrorism mission will have received extensive small unit tactical training as part of their training for an array of special operations. Members of national police units, for the most part, will not have received such training. Small unit tactical training consists of the following:

PATROLLING

This is one of the most basic skills to be learned. Units must understand how to carry out patrols with point and rear security, without bunching up and making themselves an inviting target for an ambush. They must learn to move stealthily through divergent terrain, and how to tape up equipment and pack it so that it does not make noise as they move. Some units will also receive training in tracking and counter-tracking.

SETTING AND COUNTERING AMBUSHES

Operators should be trained in setting ambushes and in methods of countering an ambush by fighting through it. Immediate action drills that train operators to use fire and movement to cover each other as they escape a kill zone or attack directly through the flank of the ambush must be practiced extensively with live fire. The ability to set an ambush may prove invaluable if the mission is to snatch or eliminate a terrorist leader. Many rescues have been launched on terrorists transporting hostages through the jungle by operators lying in wait—in effect, using the techniques of ambush. An ambush set to carry out a rescue is really little different than an ambush set to snatch an enemy. Both require the operators to be aware of no-shoot targets.

MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain)

All antiterrorist units must know how to fight in the warrens that make up many of the cities in developing countries. Should they have to fight their way clear of a terrorist-controled neighborhood after a rescue, their skills at combat in urban areas will be severely tested. In such a situation, it can only be hoped that gun support from helicopters such as TF160’s “Little Birds” is close by.

CLEARING AND ENTRIES

Members of antiterrorist units must be especially skilled at clearing buildings, ships, trains, aircraft—anywhere that hostages might be held. As a result, they must practice extensively to carry out entries and room clearing. Groups are normally organized into four- or five-man teams, who are trained to get into position as stealthily as possible, then to dynamically enter the rooms they must clear. The minimum number of operators who enter a room is two, with four being more common. As soon as the room is secure, other operators will move through to the next room to be cleared. Generally, this type of entry is used when hostages are present and/or there is an active shooter so that rescue personnel can get to the hostages as fast as possible.

Operators will also learn to do entries through windows reached via rappeling, through ceilings or walls sometimes breached by an explosive charge, or even through sewers or holes blown in the floor (as during the 1996 rescue at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, Peru).

Clearing is another tactic that operators must learn. They have to practice clearing hallways with many rooms opening from them, clearing stairways, being aware of possible terrorists located on upper levels when clearing an atrium or other open areas. Trainers can keep operators busy indefinitely when training to deal with the myriad permutations of buildings. Many units work with construction companies that allow them to carry out exercises in buildings that are about to be demolished so that operators can actually break down doors, crash through windows, and otherwise carry out realistic entries. In terms of doors and windows, operators will learn to use specialized entry tools such as the “hooligan bar,” cutting torches, “Thor’s Hammer,” and window rakers (designed to break out a window and quickly rake away glass so operators can enter).

Building clearing tactics must also be practiced using variations that are likely to be required in an operational assault. Operators may, for example, be inserted by helicopters or infiltrated to the target from the sea. The assault may be initiated by a sniper eliminating a terrorist or by an explosion blowing out a wall. As their entry and rescue tactics are honed by hundreds of training exercises, operators will develop the ability to quickly adjust their tactics to fit the situation and when something goes wrong with their plan, as will usually happen, they learn to make adjustments. They also learn to adjust to members of their team, often anticipating what other members will do, based on the endless training they have done.

In some antiterrorist units operators learn to carry out entries accompanied by trained dogs. France’s GIGN and RAID, among other units, make great use of dogs that are trained to go in ahead of the rescue team and attack any terrorist holding a weapon. A bounding dog makes a small target and can normally reach a terrorist very quickly. (The dogs, by the way, wear ballistic vests just like their human comrades.)

Parachuting

Military personnel entering a military antiterrorist unit are quite likely to already be parachute-qualified; however, in many cases they will have basic static line parachute qualification. Static line parachuting is designed to insert a large number of airborne troops into an area quickly during a battalion- or brigade-sized drop. It is very unlikely to be used in cases where an antiterrorist unit is inserted clandestinely in small numbers to carry out a rescue or other operation. Many antiterrorist units chosen from national police forces will also receive basic parachute training, often as a confidence builder and as a symbol of being elite. Parachute wings on an operator’s chest will also give him more credibility when a police unit has to work with a military special ops unit on an operation or when doing exchange training. The mystique of being parachute-qualified still exists. A GIGN operator once talked a hostage taker, a former French para, into surrendering by appealing to the fact they were both members of the “airborne brotherhood.”

 

There are three main types of specialized parachute insertions and jumps:

HALO (High Altitude, Low Opening)

In some antiterrorist units every member will be HALO-qualified, while in others only a portion of the unit will receive HALO training. HALO jumps allow an operator to leave an aircraft at high altitude—up to 30,000 ft—and freefall to a much lower altitude—2,000 ft is fairly standard—before opening the chute. This insertion method allows the aircraft to fly above many surface-to-air missile systems and also allows an operator to quickly drop off radar coverage. For example, the SAS and SBS used to practice jumps in Norway in which they would wait to open their chutes until a fjord would block radar from detecting their descent. HALO jumpers are normally on oxygen, have their combat load well distributed for aerodynamics, wear warm clothing for the time they spend at altitude, have an altimeter attached to their wrist or reserve chute, and normally have a back-up system (AAD-Automatic Activation Device) that will automatically open the chute at a certain altitude should they pass out or become disoriented.

A member of the Czech URNA antiterrorist unit completes a HALO jump. (Czech Republic Ministry of the Interior)

HAHO (High Altitude, High Opening)

This variation of the HALO jump can prove invaluable, especially if the unit must carry out a clandestine operation in a country that is hostile or non-supportive. HAHO is designed to allow an operator to jump from up to 25,000–30,000 ft, then open a chute and glide up to 35 miles to his landing zone. This allows the aircraft to fly on the other side of a border yet still insert operators via parachute. HAHO jumps are normally carried out at night with the operator guiding himself in via a GPS system. Skilled HAHO jumpers can form up at high altitude then glide in together with a team leader acting as guide for the group. HAHO jumpers have steerable parachutes and may make course corrections along the way to use the best route to infiltrate to their target.

LALO (Low Altitude, Low Opening)

The LALO drop—yet another technique practiced by some antiterrorist units—is designed to insert a team very quickly close to the ground. In a LALO jump the aircraft will swoop in to an altitude of 1,000 ft or perhaps slightly less to insert the operators—in this case via a static line jump—who will only have a few seconds’ hang time before hitting the ground. This method can be effective against terrorists who do not have anti-air capability, as it inserts operators right onto a target quickly. Today, in many cases, instead of a LALO jump operators might fast rope from a helicopter instead (see Helicopter Operations, below).

Members of GSG9 train in engagement of vehicles from a helicopter; it appears the operator at left is using an HK G3 rifle with Trijicon ACOG optical sight. (BGS)

Operators who are assigned a MAT role will also be trained to carry out “wet jumps” directly into the sea. The U.S. DevGru practices HALO insertions into the sea, after which operators inflate rubber boats or don scuba gear to infiltrate their target.

Though the antiterrorist unit needs personnel with a wide array of parachuting skills, in reality, parachute insertion is used only rarely on antiterrorist operations.

Helicopter Operations

The helicopter has become the chariot that takes special operators into battle; hence the antiterrorist warrior must be highly skilled in helicopter operations. Training includes insertion via trooper ladders, rappel, or fast rope as well as direct jumps into the sea or snow. Operators also train in extraction procedures via ladder or various types of extraction rigs, some of which can extract a four-man team at once. (Interestingly, SBS operators apparently first developed fast roping to give them a method of descent as fast as a fireman’s pole.) Many helicopters used for special operations will be equipped with benches on the outside so that operators can be quickly inserted from the hovering chopper. Special ops helicopters may also be rigged with harnesses to allow operators to fire their weapons from the helicopter. Many units practice firing upon vehicles from helicopters: GSG-9 has a reputation for being very skilled at engagement from helicopters. Units also train snipers to engage from helicopters, especially for MAT operations. These tactics will be discussed in more detail in the section on sniper training.

Operators also practice parachute insertions from helicopters. MAT operators practice parachuting into the sea, then using inflatable boats to approach their target. In some cases jumps are made, then operators swim to the target. Operators in scuba gear practice jumping a few feet into the sea from hovering helicopters. Specialized helicopter units such as the U.S. 160th SOAR (Special Operations Aviation Regiment) practice many highly specialized techniques. For example, the 160th has practiced extracting SEALs by hovering just above the water with the helicopter’s ramp down into the water. SEAL operators can then run rubber boats directly into the helicopter for rapid extraction after an operation.

Having skilled helicopter pilots to practice with the operators is an absolute necessity since they have to be able to hold the helicopter steady when it is used as a sniping platform or for fast roping. For MAT operations, the pilots must be able to adjust their approach and hover to the motions of the ship. Among the helicopter pilots trained for MAT ops was Britain’s Prince Andrew, who worked closely with the SBS.

Combat Swimmer and Small Boat Training

Members of antiterrorist units who receive scuba and boat training normally fall into one of three groups, each trained to a different level of skills. The first group comprises operators who are in one of the naval or marine special operations units that has a MAT mission as well as other naval special warfare tasks. They will be trained to an extremely high level as specialists in all types of naval special ops. Units such as the U.S. Navy SEALs, the Royal Marines SBS, Russian “Delfin,” and Italy’s COMSUBIN fall into this category. Even within these units, however, there will be some operators who specialize in MAT. For the SEALs it is DevGru; for the SBS M Squadron; and for the “Delfin” those operators from Alpha and Vympel who receive naval Spetsnaz training.

The second group consists of operators within antiterrorist units who are trained in combat swimming and small boats and are assigned to specialized sub-units. For example, SAS Boat Troops or Combat Applications Group (Delta Force) Boat Troop operators could carry out a maritime antiterrorist operation if necessary, but would usually act as support for the SBS or DevGru.

The third group is composed of operators in national antiterrorist units who receive basic combat swimmer and small boat operations as part of their training for the unit. They will have the ability to carry out operations such as assaults on a hijacked ferry or underwater infiltration to a coastal site. At least some members of the unit will probably have received additional training to allow them to carry out more sophisticated maritime operations. GIGN offers a good example of a unit that does not primarily have the MAT mission, but trains operators as combat swimmers. In fact, GIGN has used some techniques especially well suited to their mission to train their swimmers. To get them used to waiting patiently beneath the water until an operation may be launched, operators have had to lie on the bottom of the Seine motionless for extended periods while giant barges pass over their heads just a few feet away. GIGN operators have also spent a great deal of time practicing having their weapons ready and engaging targets located at the rail of a ship or on a bridge as soon as the muzzle of the weapon breaks water.

Operators are trained in basic combat diver skills. These will include the physiology, physics, and theory of diving; specialized physical conditioning for diving, including long swims; use of open and closed-circuit scuba equipment; underwater navigation; diving equipment maintenance; and transport. Navigation over long distances under water, by day or night, using the compass is an integral part of the training. As the combat dives get more sophisticated, swimmers will have to change direction underwater and make turns to reach the objective. They will operate under time limits and must stay in contact with their team. Operators also learn to dive in tropical and Arctic conditions.

Underwater communication via radio or hand signals is another important aspect of training, and personnel are trained to use specialized underwater weapons (see Chapter V). Russian trainees have to carry out a lengthy swim under burning gasoline and with explosions nearby.

As diving skills improve, swimmers will learn to exit and reenter submerged submarines to allow clandestine insertion and extraction. Swimmers will also be trained to use underwater vehicles such as the U.S. SDV (Seal Delivery Vehicle) to allow them to cover longer distances while submerged. Operators will also learn to carry out “wet jumps” via parachute directly into the sea, often with rubber boats, which they will then use to reach their objective. Insertions directly into the sea of operators either in scuba gear or with rubber boats are also in the operator’s repertoire.

For silent approach to ships or coastlines, operators learn to use small canoes or rubber boats, while they will also probably have access to larger boats that are very fast and heavily armed for use in hit-and-run operations.

Operators who are part of a naval special warfare unit will be trained in underwater reconnaissance of enemy ships or installations, beach reconnaissance prior to a landing, and underwater demolition. All of these skills have some application to swimmers assigned to an antiterrorist unit as well. For example, their objective may be a ship carrying WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). If it is determined that an assault to take the ship is not feasible, then attaching explosive devices to the hull to sink it may prove the most viable option. If done well, the ship may appear to have sunk accidentally. The USA, Israel, and the Russians, among others, have, reportedly, carried out such operations. The ability to carry out a beach reconnaissance maybe useful, too, prior to a rescue operation against a coastal target if a portion of the rescue or support force will be coming in over the beach.

To give an idea of how such skills might be used, a U.S. MEUSOC (Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable) will have an element trained in hostage rescue. When deployed, such units will also have a small SEAL element attached to carry out beach reconnaissance. Should the necessity arise to rescue American citizens in an area where the MEUSOC personnel are the closest and only ones likely to be on site in time, the MEUSOC operators and SEALs can work together to put together a rescue over the beach or from helicopters.

Terrorist Psychology and Hostage Negotiation

Members of antiterrorist units study terrorist incidents and terrorist profiles to learn as much as possible about how terrorists operate. By studying the psychology of terrorists, they may be able to predict likely targets or predict actions the terrorists are likely to take once they have taken hostages. Many units will have a psychologist or psychiatrist as an advisor, or perhaps even assigned to the support element of the unit. An important part of psychologically profiling terrorists is determining when it may be necessary to launch an assault. Terrorist actions must be analyzed, as must the possible deteriorating state of the hostages. For example, during the Munich Olympic incident, the fact that the terrorists attempted to disguise their identity seemed to indicate that they did not plan to die and hence might be open to negotiation. But the negotiations were handled poorly and an inept rescue attempt was launched so the incident still ended badly. During the Beslan School incident, all the psychological indicators were that the terrorists intended to kill as many hostages as possible, especially children. As a result, the FSB operators from Alpha and Vympel had to be prepared to take Draconian action against them at the first opportunity.

Psychological profiling of hostages may be important as well. During the DePunt Train incident in Holland (May 1977), psychologists were able to indicate to the Dutch Marine/BBE operators which hostages would be most likely to panic during a rescue operation. When the assault on the train was launched, one of these hostages did indeed leap up into the line of fire. Another psychological prediction based on hostage-profiling was offered when the US Delta Force was preparing to rescue the hostages in Iran in 1979. Psychological advisors emphasized that photos of one hostage should be studied closely as he had a special operations background and was very likely to use the confusion of a rescue to disarm one of the terrorists; hence he might be mistaken for a “Tango.”

Some units even send operators into mental hospitals to observe patients with different psychological disorders so that they will be better able to determine how such individuals might react under stress. Operators also watch the interrogations of captured terrorists to gain an insight into their mindset.

The study of hostage incidents will give them indicators of the actions terrorists are likely to take. For example, in lengthy incidents, negotiators and rescue personnel hope that Stockholm Syndrome will start to work and that the terrorists will feel a kinship to the hostages, which will make it more difficult to execute them. In some cases, negotiators try to build this bond by forcing the terrorists to work with the hostages: by sending in food that needs to be prepared, for example. On the other hand, if terrorists separate one or two hostages from the rest and place them in a separate room or put hoods over their heads, this may indicate that they are distancing themselves from the hostages they have chosen to execute when the time comes to prove that they are serious in their demands.

One aspect of Stockholm Syndrome that operators must be particularly aware of is the likelihood of hostages beginning to identify with their captors to the extent of shielding them from rescuers or even picking up weapons to defend the terrorists. This is why most rescue teams will cuff hostages after evacuating them until they can determine that no terrorists are hiding among them, and that none have actively been supporting the terrorists.

Most antiterrorist units have personnel who are trained as hostage negotiators, though they may not carry out the negotiations in all incidents. In some countries, negotiators fall under the national police umbrella and only turn the incident over to the antiterrorist unit if it appears that negotiations will not succeed and that hostages will die. In other units, the negotiators are an integral part of the unit. In either case, operators should have a sound understanding of what hostage negotiators do and how they operate.

The best hostage negotiators provide a source of intelligence based on their conversations with the terrorists. They can also offer educated opinions on the state of mind of the terrorists and the likelihood of their starting to kill hostages. For example, prior to the assault on the Nord Ost Theater in Moscow, negotiators heard some of the women suicide bombers begin chanting prayers, which they felt was an indication that they were about to blow themselves up.

Good hostage negotiators can also prolong an incident to allow time for Stockholm Syndrome to work and to give rescue personnel time to prepare and rehearse for an assault. One technique negotiators use to good effect is wearing the terrorist leader/negotiator down with trivia. For example, if he asks for fruit juice, the negotiator will carry on lengthy discussions about which type he would like and in what type of containers. Not only do these negotiations buy time but they also develop a give and take between terrorist and negotiator. Very skilled negotiators may even be able to lead terrorists to take action that will increase the likelihood of a successful rescue. For example, if the terrorists and hostages are in a barricaded building where an assault will be very difficult, a skilled negotiator might be able to convince the terrorists that taking a bus to a waiting plane at the airport offers their best option. Once the terrorists exit the building with the hostages, they may be eliminated by snipers and an assault team. During the Iranian Embassy siege at Princes Gate, the negotiator even kept the terrorist leader on the phone as the SAS assaulted, thereby locating him so that the SAS could eliminate him while also making it more difficult for him to order his fellow terrorists to begin killing the hostages.

The negotiator should understand how an antiterrorist team works when doing an assault and should train with the team on practice exercises. If the negotiator is not an integral part of the team, then it is normally considered best that he or she not be located with the assault force. Note the terms “he or she.” In some instances a female negotiator might be better while in others a male negotiator might be preferable. If the negotiator is not actually an operator, then it is possible that some subtle bond will have developed between him or her and the terrorists that will lead him to give an unintended indicator that an assault is about to go in. As a result, even though the negotiator must be willing to say to the rescue team leader that he feels he will not be able to negotiate the incident out and that it is time for the assault option, he will still not know exactly when the assault is going in. Even when the negotiator is an integral part of the unit, he should be in a separate location while negotiating so there is no chance of the terrorists hearing rescue personnel practicing a rescue or discussing options.

Although antiterrorist units train rigorously to assault with maximum force when necessary, they also realize that if they can properly assess the terrorists’ psychological state, the incident might end without loss of life, or if the assault is necessary they may be able to more effectively eliminate the terrorists while saving the hostages. Unfortunately, the current brand of Islamic terrorism seems more intent on killing the maximum number of those perceived as “infidels” than upon negotiating for any set concession, but being aware of this mindset also helps prepare operators to deal with these terrorists.

Surveillance Techniques and Intelligence Gathering

Although the mission of antiterrorist units is to rescue those taken hostage by terrorists, their mission is also to prevent terrorist acts. This may mean that they will carry out surveillance on suspected terrorists before assisting in their arrest. Surveillance may also be designed to identify members of a terrorist cell prior to taking its members into custody. When operating in other countries where hostages may have been taken, operators must also be able to blend in when attempting to determine where hostages are being held.

As a result, members of antiterrorist units are frequently trained in sophisticated surveillance techniques. Among the skills they will develop are those necessary to shadow a suspected terrorist without being detected. Techniques may include the use of multiple vehicles, following a suspect on foot, using multiple operators to box a suspect by moving parallel to his route, choosing clothing that may be changed easily and rapidly to create a simple disguise, and using a multitude of techniques developed by units such as the British 14th Intelligence Company.

Sometimes surveillance will be over an extended period. Specially designed vehicles that look like service vehicles such as those used by phone companies, cable companies, and delivery companies, may be available, but these may also attract the attention of suspected terrorists. As a result, operators also learn to build hides in urban or rural areas in which they are trained to stay for days at a time observing potential targets. The SAS became very skilled at such surveillance in Northern Ireland.

Operators also learn to carry out surreptitious entries to gather intelligence or to place electronic surveillance devices including microphones, video cameras, computer mirroring devices, etc. As part of their training, they may well learn lock picking, how to photograph a room with a digital camera as a record so that anything disturbed is replaced properly, and methods of entering through windows, ventilation shafts, and so on.

As well as planting bugs on phones or computers with land lines, operators will learn how to intercept cell phone calls or text messages and how to hack into computers being used wirelessly. They will also learn to use devices that block electronic signals so that cell phones will not work if they want to isolate a terrorist from his comrades. In addition, operators will learn to track vehicles or persons via GPS or use devices to block GPS tracking should that be necessary. Thermal imagers can be used to track suspects within a building to locate them prior to a raid or a rescue operation, and operators must be trained to interpret the images. Some units will also even have the ability to track suspected terrorists using satellite imagery.

Another skill that is useful to operators carrying out surveillance as well as those planning a rescue is the use of computer drafting programs to quickly develop diagrams of a target building and mark locations of important physical features. In fact, all aspects of gathering intelligence at the scene of a hostage or barricade incident are very critical in carrying out a successful assault.

Members of the Australian SASR practice their rappeling skills from a helicopter. (Australian MOD)

The operators who actually carry out an assault may not be the ones who gather the intelligence, as they will be concerned with developing their options and practicing the assault. Often, antiterrorist units will have an intelligence cell that does the actual gathering of information from witnesses, first responders, relatives of hostages, freed hostages, others from the building involved, electronic surveillance, updates from snipers, building blueprints and myriad other sources of information that will allow them to constantly update the intelligence fed to negotiators and operators. So that they can use the intelligence and aid in gathering, operators will receive some training in gathering intelligence and analyzing the raw data.

Skilled debriefs of freed hostages are especially useful as they help operators assess the mood of the terrorists, their weaponry, presence of explosives, where they may have barricaded doors, and so on, whether they have separated any hostages, where hostages are being held, health problems among hostages or terrorists, and countless other details that may be useful in building the mosaic needed to develop a negotiation and rescue plan.

Members of antiterrorist units will have studied various aspects of building and architecture that will help in gathering pre-assault intelligence. Any team members with training as military engineers or with experience in the building trades will have helped other members of the unit learn about different types of doors, windows, and so on. Details such as whether doors at a target site open inward or outward, are reinforced, have heavy duty locks, or have bars must all be factored into any plan determining whether entry is feasible. The type of roof on a building, for example, may determine whether helicopter insertion is viable or whether access from another building’s roof is better. Knowing the thickness of concrete walls on buildings can help plan the strength of charge if an explosive entry through a wall is deemed necessary. Members of antiterrorist teams learn to work with local fire departments, which will often have blueprints of, and information about, buildings within their area.

Members of a unit charged with gathering and analyzing intelligence will try to obtain photos of hostages and terrorists to help brief members of a rescue team as to who are “shoots” and who are “no-shoots.” They will also work with psychologists to develop profiles of terrorists and hostages. If listening devices or video cameras have been planted, the intelligence team will attempt to determine the intent of the terrorists from their conversations. Likewise, intelligence analysts will receive information from the negotiator that may help determine the terrorists’ mindset and plans.

Members of the Republic of Korea’s 707th Special Mission Battalion prepare to practice an entry on a tire house. Note that instructors are above to evaluate the entry; note also the large “707” on their ballistic vests so they can immediately identify each other. Their weapons have EOTech sights; note the drop holsters for their pistols. (ROK Special Warfare Command)

One of the most important skills for the antiterrorist unit intelligence operator is the ability to give very concise briefings illustrated with diagrams or models so that he can keep the rescue team constantly updated and so that they can keep refining their rescue plan. An intelligence operator who has been trained to do entries, even if that is not his primary assignment, has a much better understanding of the type of information the operators need before going in.

The mission of intelligence operators does not end when the entry team goes in. They must be trained to debrief hostages to determine if there are remaining booby traps, terrorists unaccounted for, and numerous other bits of information. They must also be ready to interrogate any surviving terrorists. Operators who have done the entry are also trained to watch for computers, cell phones, documents—anything that may be used to gain intelligence about the terrorist group, future targets, or methods of operation.

Every member of an antiterrorist unit will normally receive some training in surveillance and intelligence gathering. Those who show a special aptitude or have special skills that lend themselves to intelligence gathering maybe assigned the intelligence portion of the unit full time.

NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Warfare

Although antiterrorist operators may not have the sophisticated training to actually deal with WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction), they quite possibly will end up going in first during an assault on an installation or ship containing WMDs. As a result, they must be trained in the basics of such weapons and to work in support of specialists. For example, after 9/11, combined teams of NEST (Nuclear Emergency Search Teams) and FBI HRT were deployed along the East Coast of the USA to search for and counter any attempt to bring nuclear weapons into the USA. At least some members of U.S. and Russian antiterrorist units drawn from special ops personnel may well have nuclear training, too, related to the backpack “nukes” they were trained to deploy during the Cold War.

In general, however, training in NBC warfare for antiterrorist operators consists of basic familiarity with the types of weapons they might encounter so that they can immediately call for specialists if suspicious items are encountered. Operators must also train wearing NBC suits so that they can move and engage targets while fully kitted up should they have to carry out an assault on a suspected WMD site. This training will include techniques for assaulting a nuclear power plant should there be an incident. Training will include briefings on sensitive areas of the plant where bullets could cause damage though generally nuclear power plants are built so sturdily that small arms fire is very unlikely to reach any critical areas. Operators are also trained that though their mission may be to rescue hostages, the integrity of the nuclear facility takes precedence based on the “good of the many over the good of the few” doctrine.

Operators will frequently be trained to use basic detection devices so they will be aware of radiation leaks or the presence of hazardous chemicals or bioweapons. Team medics will be trained to administer counter-agents to likely chemical or biological weapons and will normally take the antidotes or medications along during an assault.

Although there may be a tendency to think that such concerns affect only the antiterrorist units of major countries, it should be borne in mind that in April 2007, Slovak operators of UOU intercepted 37.4 lb of radioactive material being smuggled in a vehicle with Hungarian license plates.

Communications and Related Technology

All operators in an antiterrorist unit will learn the basics of communication using different types of radios and computer links, while at least some personnel will receive advanced training that enables them to set up and maintain communication equipment. Most units will have a wide array of radios available to fit different missions.

Since many units respond to incidents within their own country, they will have police radios available to monitor police calls and communicate with officers setting up a cordon around an incident scene. Units will also have a secure net that allows them to communicate with their headquarters throughout an incident or deployment. On an overseas deployment this net is likely to be established via a SatCom (Satellite Communication) link. For operations, each operator will have a radio that allows him to communicate with fellow team members during the operation. It is important that both the command link and the operator link be secure so that reporters or terrorists cannot listen in. Snipers will normally be on the same link as the command element and the entry team, though teams may have a separate channel for talk with the snipers. When multiple snipers are being used against multiple targets, establishing a secure and clear radio link that allows the “Shoot!” command to be given simultaneously is highly critical. In some operations, a ground-to-air radio link with supporting helicopters or flying fire support may need to be established.

Operators will learn to use simple radio codes that designate doors and windows of a target building or entry points on a railroad car, bus, or aircraft. They will also develop a radio code for different terrorists and hostages. The codes will normally be simple and easily remembered. For example, the four sides of a building may each be designated by a color, while terrorists could be “Tango One,” “Tango Two,” and so on. More complicated codes may be used when sending messages regarding an operation via SatCom.

For use on close protection details, operators will have small ear pieces and throat or wrist microphones. This same equipment can be used when doing clandestine surveillance. Specialized radio systems with microphones in the mouthpiece for underwater use are available for a unit’s combat divers.

Operators must also know how to use laptop computers with satellite links to either send photos shot with digital cameras or to receive intelligence such as satellite photos, blueprints, photos of hostages and terrorists, or other important data. Very durable computers—such as the ToughBook, which is used by U.S. personnel—are designed to stand up to the rigors of special ops usage. In conjunction with their computers, operators may employ GPS tracking to locate terrorists via their cell phones or devices planted on their vehicles. They may also obtain intelligence about an incident by gaining access to surveillance cameras in the area and playing the video on the computers. In large metropolitan centers such as London, there are very few areas that will not be covered by closed-circuit television (CCTV). In addition to tracking terrorist cell phones, operators also have the ability to blanket an area around an incident so that terrorists cannot call out or receive calls on their cell phones.

Because communications and information technology change at such a rapid pace, an antiterrorist unit’s communications specialists must constantly receive training updates, which they will then pass on to operators.

Target Designation

Although target designation normally falls within the missions of military special operations units, there are circumstances where the ability to guide in precision munitions could be useful for the antiterrorist unit. Currently, some units have a proactive mission against terrorists to prevent them from carrying out atrocities. In such a mission if a terrorist headquarters, bomb factory, bioweapons lab, or other facility is located, especially in another country, rather that face large loss of life attempting to assault the installation operators might “paint” it for a precision munition.

Antiterrorist units drawn from military special forces will probably have some operators who are already trained in the use of laser target designators. National police antiterrorist teams, on the other hand, will probably only train operators if they have an international mission that could take them to areas with terrorist strongholds or if such areas exist in their own countries.

Operators who will use laser target designators must be trained in selecting the best sites from which to laze a target, be aware of what types of surfaces lend themselves best to being “painted,” and know how to communicate with the aircraft that will be launching the munitions. (Note that naval missiles or guns as well as artillery pieces can also launch laser-guided munitions.) Many of the same skills used by snipers or surveillance teams to get into a hide will be required when getting into position to designate a target.

Although man-portable laser designators will vary, most use a pulsing laser that is compatible with munitions to be fired at the designated target. Designators may be used with night vision devices and usually have a magnification of 10x and a field of view of three to five degrees. Minimum range is normally around 300 meters with a maximum range out to 10,000 meters. Operators will be aware from their training with different types of munitions what constitutes “Danger Close” for the specific mission, which, along with available cover and terrorist patrols, will influence how close to the target they set up. In some cases, operators may also designate a target for a Specter gunship that is overhead.

Surgical strikes are the specialty of antiterrorist units. However, the “scalpel” used can vary. It might be a precision sniper shot to a terrorist’s head or it might be a precision JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) delivered on a terrorist haven.

Languages

Language facility is useful for antiterrorist operators in many ways. If deployed to another country for training or on a mission, the ability to communicate in the local tongue is invaluable. When listening to wire taps or other electronic surveillance product, language ability is also vital. The ability to read other languages not only allows operators to judge if captured documents are important, but also allows them to read open source material in newspapers, magazines, books, or on the internet that might give them insights into potential enemies. The ability to read foreign languages and understand them may also be invaluable in learning from materials written about other antiterrorist units or documentaries about them.

Many military special ops units have a language requirement for personnel, who must learn at least one foreign language. Some antiterrorist units also require that each operator speak his native tongue plus two others. There are also advantages for units from countries with diverse populations to recruit personnel who speak their ancestral tongue fluently. Operators from wide-ranging backgrounds may also be useful when it is necessary to infiltrate another country in order to gather intelligence or prior to an operation. For example, having operators who are black or Asian might have obvious advantages since “Anglos” would stand out in African or Asian countries. Israel makes excellent use of the fact that Jews have immigrated from so many countries and thus know the language and culture of their former homeland. Israel also has many operators who speak fluent Arabic and specialize in undercover missions into Gaza, the West Bank, and elsewhere.

When sending personnel for language training, it makes sense for an antiterrorist unit to try to get a wide array of language skills among operators. Although it is possible to predict which languages are most likely to be useful, alliances change and today’s foreign friend might be tomorrow’s foreign enemy. Also, terrorists may choose to take hostages at an embassy or other facility in any country. Just as an example, the SAS traditionally did not emphasize Spanish as a language skill for its operators. Then, in the Falklands War, it found itself very short of Spanish speakers. Within the U.S. Army Special Forces, each Special Forces Group is oriented toward a certain part of the world. The 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) focuses on Asia and has Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese, Korean, and other Asian speakers; the 3rd SFG (Abn) focuses on Africa and has Swahili and other African-dialect speakers; the 5th SFG (Abn) focuses on the Middle East and has Arabic, Farsi, and other language speakers, the 7th SFG (Abn) focuses on Latin America and has Spanish and Portuguese speakers, and the 10th SFG (Abn) focuses on Europe and has Russian, French, German, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, and various other European-language speakers.

In many cases, the ethnic makeup of a country will aid in recruiting personnel with certain language skills. In the U.S. armed forces, for example, Spanish speakers are relatively common and, therefore, it is rarely necessary to send operators for training in this language.

A substantial portion of antiterrorist units around the world require English as one of the languages for their operators as it is the most universal language today and will give them the best chance of communicating with other units and in other milieus. In at least some cases, operators will be given a crash course in a few basic phrases should they have to carry out a rescue of hostages most of whom do not speak the native language of the country in which they are held. Just knowing how to say “We’re here to rescue you!” or “Stay down!” may be invaluable.

Still another advantage of language training is that when a native speaker of a language is employed to train personnel, the instructor will often incorporate information about the country, people, and customs into the language instruction, which will help operators should they ever have to operate in that country.

Explosives and Booby Traps

Antiterrorist operators drawn from military special ops units will probably have already had basic demolitions training. It is possible that at least a few operators on national police teams will also have had some EOD (Explosives Ordinance Disposal) training. In some countries, especially where one military or police unit handles all special tasks including antiterrorism, the EOD mission may fall under the purview of the antiterrorist unit.

Explosives training that is specially tailored to the antiterrorist mission will stress explosive entry of buildings and possibly trains, buses, or other transport. Explosive entry to a barricaded facility where hostages are being held offers speed and shock to both get the rescuers to hostages as quickly as possible and disorientate the terrorists. In some cases, an explosive entry may be used so that booby traps between the entry point and the point where the hostages are being held will be detonated.

One of the most common types of charge used to gain entry is the cutting charge designed to cut doors. Many antiterrorist teams use a cardboard silhouette target to which they attach detonating card to create a door breaching or cutting device that may be quickly created if needed. In addition to learning how to create breaching charges, operators must learn how to quickly approach a target and how to place them. For breaching steel doors, operators will need to know how to create and place a linear cutting charge. However, the use of a linear cutting charge does cause fragments of metal to enter the room and so is not normally the optimum technique to gain entry directly to a room where hostages are being held.

In situations where a steel door will be breached directly into the area where hostages are held, teams will have been trained to use a water charge (a container containing detonating cord or other explosives and filled with water that is hung against the door). A water charge not only makes fragmentation far less of a danger, but also eliminates the fireball present with a standard linear cutting charge. Teams are trained to back away from doors that are being blown, then to rush through the breached door while terrorists remain stunned by the blast.

Window charges for use against non-armored windows are normally thrust through the window, then detonated, so that the glass is blown outward to protect any hostages inside the room.

Part of training, especially for demolition specialists within a unit, will cover various types of explosives, including C3/C4, PE3/PE4, Semtex, RDX, PETN, etc. By learning the characteristics of different explosives, specialized operators can select those that best fit a mission and properly calculate the amount needed for different types of target.

Operators will receive extensive training in creating charges and using prepackaged charges. Drills to learn to safely place charges and detonate them as well as how to carry out approaches prior to placing a charge are carried out extensively. Although many teams will send every operator through explosive entry training, there will usually be operators who are especially skilled with explosives who have received more extensive training. These operators will usually have responsibility for setting charges.

Antiterrorist operators also receive extensive training in booby traps and IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices). They need to be aware of the different types of ignition devices used on booby traps as an aid in avoiding them should they have to carry out a rescue in a building or vehicle which has been booby trapped. This knowledge of IEDs and booby traps will also be valuable if an operator is assigned to do security surveys or aid in dignitary protection operations. If it is necessary to carry out a rescue, then evacuate rescued hostages to a helicopter or boat pickup, operators may also set booby traps to discourage pursuit. Particularly in military antiterrorist units, operators will learn to make improvised explosives themselves. Although this skill is usually considered most valuable when carrying out sabotage missions or working with insurgents, it could conceivably be useful in antiterrorist ops.

Although they are used during tactical entry training, stun grenades and other distraction devices may also be covered as part of explosives training. If commercial stun grenades are not available, unit explosives experts will know how to use grenade simulators or other improvised distraction devices.

Weapons Training

Operators chosen for antiterrorist teams will normally have already displayed a high level of marksmanship to even be considered for entry. However, because of the precision necessary to surgically eliminate a terrorist hiding behind a hostage those skills will be honed even more. No matter what other training he maybe undertaking, the special operator constantly practices with his weapons to keep his skills sharp. Members of the U.S. Navy’s DevGru are known in the antiterrorist community for the large number of rounds they expend annually—reportedly 2,500 to 3,000 rounds per week—but other units shoot a great deal as well. Operators in France’s GIGN, for example, are known to fire 100 to 300 rounds per day. Members of India’s NSG (National Security Guards) fire about 2,000 rounds per year during normal practice and qualification. However, during the two months that operators serve on the alert team, they will do range time each day and fire around 14,000 rounds over this period.

As part of their specialized firearms training and as part of continuation training, operators learn, then hone various skills. For example, they learn to engage after rapidly drawing their weapon from its holster. They learn to fire from nonstandard firing positions—on their backs, while moving sideways, or toward or away from a target; to fire from within vehicles, from helicopters, while aboard boats or ships, while rappellng, while skiing, and as soon as they break water after a scuba approach to the target. They will also learn to shoot in situations where only a small portion of a terrorist’s body is visible, and particularly to take head shots into the eye/nose triangle (Note: the SAS/SBS teach to take the shot into the mouth) to eliminate a hostage taker before he can harm the hostage.

To add stress and realism, many units incorporate other factors into their firearms training. The SAS and other units will have operators exert themselves physically while wearing full equipment and a gas mask, then make them engage targets with precise shots. India’s NSG incorporate a 780-meter course with 26 different obstacles that must be overcome within 18 minutes. After completion of this course, operators must then engage targets and qualify. This exercise is part of selection but experienced operators still run it as well. Some get their time under 10 minutes and still shoot high scores.

The NSG stress rigorous exertion combined with shooting to duplicate the exhaustion a heavily equipped operator may have to overcome by the time he is in position to engage terrorists. NSG operators also practice on a 400-meter shooting course spread over 11 zones and incorporating 29 electronically controlled targets that are exposed for only two to three seconds Operators must move through the course engaging the “shoot” targets in 6 minutes 30 seconds or less. The score is based on a combination of quality of hits on the targets and speed of engagement, as well as speed moving through the course.

The operator will learn to deal with problems that arise during engagement and deal with them quickly so that he can keep fighting. He will learn malfunction drills so that if his weapon goes down he can quickly correct the problem and get it back into action. He will also learn transition drills so that he can instantly switch from his primary weapon to a secondary one should there be no time to clear the malfunction. So that they can keep fighting if injured, operators learn to operate a weapon with their “support hand” (i.e. left hand for a right-handed shooter). Some units will teach operators to fire a “double tap” (two quick shots as close to each other as possible) while other units now teach to shoot until the terrorist goes down. The operator will learn multiple engagement techniques to fit the tactical situation. For example, if he faces multiple terrorists, he might have to quickly fire one shot on each one, then scan to see if any of them need another hit.

Tactical training will be discussed in another section, but to allow operators to receive the best training possible, most units will have real or mock aircraft fuselages, train cars, buses, or other typical targets on which they may practice. Many will also have a “killing house” that is constructed to allow 360-degree live-fire shooting during entry training. The one used by the U.S. Navy DevGru is typical of the best of these killing houses. Built at a cost of $25 million, it incorporates walls that use a rubberized ballistic material to absorb bullets for 360-degree firing. Targets include movers, pop-ups, turners, and realistic humanoid dummies that will only go down if hit with a killing shot. Video cameras allow instructors to critique training operations upon completion. The SAS Killing House at Stirling Lines is very similar, as are those of other units. For some types of assault, operators will practice force-on-force training using weapons altered to fire Simunitions, a sophisticated paint marking cartridge that can be fired from standard weapons.

In addition to the Killing House, India’s NSG use a sophisticated Combat Shoot Room. Operators are required to enter the dark room and, using a white light or laser illuminator, engage their target in three seconds. The NSG also use a realistic force-on-force system that has two contiguous rooms, each equipped with video camera and screen. Each operator enters his room and engages the other operator on screen. This exercise builds reaction time and attunes the operator to the movements of a live opponent. (The SAS also use a version of this system.)

Many units also have operators act as “hostages” standing next to targets in the Killing House while other members engage the targets. This exercise forces the shooters to be precise in shot placement when a live “no shoot” is nearby and also helps those acting as hostages to develop coolness under fire.

Since operations will often take place at night and/or in an environment where gas has been inserted, operators will practice in the Killing House wearing their gas masks and NVGs (Night Vision Goggles). They will become skilled at using the illuminators mounted on their weapons, which may include flashlights, visible lasers, and infrared lasers.

The primary weapons used by most antiterrorist units are the handgun, SMG (submachinegun), and carbine, and operators will constantly practice with these weapons (see Chapter V for the use of specific weapons). Operators will also learn to use specialized versions of these weapons such as suppressed pistols and SMGs. Suppressed weapons will not only be used in stealth situations to silently eliminate an enemy but also in situations such as ship assaults when the sound in a steel passageway would be multiplied and also where the suppression of muzzle flash is important in case compartments are flooded with fuel or other fumes. The flame suppression is also valuable if raiding a terrorist bomb factory, a drug lab, or a source of suspected WMDs. Suppressed weapons are important, too, should a team have to infiltrate through the sewers where flammable gases could be ignited by muzzle flash.

Members of the Colombian Special Forces practice building clearing drills in a tire house that allows them to shoot in multiple directions. The tires are filled with packed earth and will stop bullets; however, steel-belted radial tires must not be used! (US DOD)

Operators will learn to use other weapons as well. The shotgun may be used in the antipersonnel role, but also to blow the hinges or locks on doors. The sniper rifle is another important part of the antiterrorist arsenal. Most units train specialized snipers, but all operators receive some training with the tactical rifle. Sniping rifles will be discussed in more detail in the sections on training snipers and weapons (see page 147).

Members of Czech MP SOG train for building entries on a mock doorway. (Amada Ceske Republiky)

Operators will be skilled in the use of support weapons such as the LMG (Light Machine Gun), which may be necessary to give covering fire when carrying out some rescues. They will also be proficient with the grenade launcher, which will often be mounted directly on their carbine or rifle. Although the grenade launcher may be used to insert CS or other gas, antiterrorist teams will also know how to use gas guns. Units carrying out MAT operations will also have access to specialized underwater weapons.

Generally, antiterrorist units will have an extensive arsenal of world weapons so that operators can become familiar with them. This familiarity training not only allows operators to use virtually any weapon that falls into their hands skillfully, but also allows them to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these same weapons in the hands of terrorists. For example, an operator who has practiced with the AK47 or AK74 realizes that if a terrorist has one with the safety on, it will take a moment to shift his hand to the proper position to release it. The operator will also know how to render various weapons inoperable during a struggle with a terrorist. If it is a pistol with a magazine safety, for example, he will know that pressing the magazine release and dumping the magazine will render the pistol inoperable. An additional advantage of having knowledge of a wide variety of weapons is that it allows an operator to render safe any weapons taken from terrorists during operations.

Sniping

Although all operators will receive at least the basics of precision tactical marksmanship, some will be especially trained as snipers who can often end a hostage incident with one well-placed shot. Generally, operators who have already shown outstanding long-range marksmanship will be selected, but those with a background in hunting and stalking will also have an advantage.

Part of sniper training—such as learning the ballistics of different cartridges so that allowances can be made when using them for distance and wind drift—is technical. The sniper trainee will also learn the advantages of different types of cartridges, such as expanding, AP (Armor Piercing) and APT (Armor Piercing Tracer), so that he can choose the one best suited for the mission. For example, if he has to takeout a terrorist through hard cover he may choose an AP round. Today, sophisticated minicomputers are available to aid in calculation, but snipers must still know how to figure their elevation or windage should the computer go down. Sniper trainees will also learn to estimate distance based on use of the Mil Dot or other reticle with a range-finding capability. Once again, laser range finders will be used today, but the operator must know how to calculate as well. Snipers will also develop their observation skills since they will often be in a hide for days waiting for a shot and sometimes gathering intelligence.

An operator from the Czech SOG unit practices handgun engagement drills; note the extended magazine. Because of the position of his carbine, it is quite possible he is carrying out a transition drill from carbine to handgun. (Amada Ceske Republiky)

Improving marksmanship is, of course, critical, as is learning to shoot a variety of weapons that may be in the unit’s arsenal. Many units, for example, will have a combination of 7.62 NATO, .300 WInchester Magnum, .338 Lapua, and .50 BMG rifles so that the one best suited to the mission may be chosen. Skilled snipers using a precision .50 rifle can now make hits at a mile or more. Snipers must also learn to maintain the rifles and their optics and learn about the different optics available. In addition to day scopes, some of which will have illuminated reticles for low light usage, the sniper must learn how to use night vision optical sights.

Snipers must be able to infiltrate to their shooting position and build a hide, so a good portion of sniper training is spent on camouflage, stalking, and the ability to remain very still once in a hide. Many of the same skills needed to gather intelligence by manning an observation post are also invaluable for the sniper.

Antiterrorist snipers may have to support their comrades while hovering in a helicopter or lying prone on the deck of a ship. As a result, operators must practice with the special ops helicopter pilots to develop the teamwork needed to shoot from a helicopter. Snipers must also learn how to rig a shooting position aboard a helicopter. The sniper who will operate in the MAT role must learn to adjust for the motion of the ship from which he is shooting and the motion of the target ship. Often, for heliborne or shipborne sniping, the operator will have a special rifle that is self-loading and employs a scope with lower magnification and a wider field of view.

It is important, too, that the sniper practices his skills in conjunction with the rest of his team since he will often initiate an assault by taking out a terrorist leader or sentry. He must also practice feeding intelligence to operators doing the entry since he will usually be on the high ground and have a spotting scope with his observer and the scope on his rifle. After the incident at Beslan School, where so many children died trying to escape, snipers must also train to give rapid covering fire by eliminating any terrorist shooter who shows himself at a window. In large incidents such as Beslan, it is advantageous if snipers have a self-loading rifle with detachable magazines and a substantial number of spare magazines available. On some teams, the observer is armed with a self-loading optically sighted rifle to support the sniper.

The antiterrorist sniper must be prepared to remain hidden for many hours so that he may possibly end the incident with one precise shot, but he must also be ready to constantly update his team on what he sees from his vantage point.

A sniper and observer team from Slovenia’s Specialna Enota antiterrorist unit. (Slovenian National Police)

Unarmed Combat

First, it should be noted that although this section is titled “unarmed combat” in reality most units include training with knives, clubs, and other weapons as part of their hand-to-hand/unarmed/martial arts training.“Without firearms” would probably be a better designation. Although many antiterrorist units put great emphasis on martial arts on the assumption that situations may arise at close quarters—an aircraft takedown, for example—where the use of martial arts maybe preferable to firearms, the training is still far different from that offered in most martial arts schools. That doesn’t mean that many operators aren’t skilled martial artists who have competed at national or international levels. When Italy’s NOCS was formed, the initial intake of personnel was chosen from among the top martial artists in the Polizia di Stato sports club.

Antiterrorist units need martial arts training that is mission-specific and is based on the assumption that any time the operator must rely on his martial arts training it will be a life and death situation. The martial arts training should therefore give the operator the confidence to go against any terrorist at close quarters without apprehension. Martial arts training should give the operator not just a physical edge but also a psychological one. The antiterrorist operator will resort to his martial arts skills either because of the extreme close quarters at which he must engage a terrorist, or because he has lost his weapon or it has become inoperable. To prevent loss of the weapon to a terrorist at close quarters, therefore, weapons retention skills should be included in the martial arts training. Firearms training will also cover transitioning to a secondary weapon should the primary one go down.

Members of Croatia’s ATJ Lucko Antiterrorist Unit practice martial arts. (Croatian Police)

For the operator, martial arts techniques should be ones that can be learned relatively quickly, retained with a modicum of practice, and employed quickly and devastatingly, even when wearing body armor, gas mask, and gear. Techniques relying on set stances and reactions that must be practiced assiduously are less desirable than those that train the operator to counter an attack from any position with natural movements. Versatile techniques that train the operator to react to typical motions (i.e. an overhead strike, whether with the hands, a knife, or a club) can be used against various types of attack. Usable techniques for striking and blocking with the bare hands, grappling and fighting on the ground, techniques using blades, clubs, and improvised weapons as well as techniques to counter these weapons and firearms are all important.

Incorporating regular martial arts training into the physical training program is the best way to keep the skills sharp. Russian Spetsnaz troops incorporate techniques for using the blade and martial arts strikes and parries into their calisthenics program, which keeps their reactions quick and instinctive.

The U.S. Special Forces Combatives Course incorporates an array of techniques that give the operator a chance against virtually any type of attack. The first component is rigorous physical fitness training to give the operator the endurance and flexibility to overcome an enemy.

Sentry elimination teaches operators techniques for stalking and quickly neutralizing an enemy who stands in the way of completing a mission. An antiterrorist team making a stealth approach prior to a takedown might well have to resort to such techniques using bare hands,a knife, garrote, or club. Filipino martial arts are favored, as they combine bare-handed close combat with knives and clubs to prepare the operator quickly for a wide array of combat situations. Kicking techniques are designed on the assumption that the operator will be wearing boots and will not have had time to practice flying snap kicks or other such moves. During training, kicks that are quick and devastating to the enemy are taught. Kneeing and stomping are considered basic skills, while punches, slaps, and elbow strikes in conjunction with blocks and kicks are once again designed to eliminate the opponent quickly. Grappling techniques include throws, arm bars, chokes, joint manipulations, and other techniques to control and eliminate an opponent. Knife techniques emphasize the constant movement of the blade as well as the use of stabs, snap cuts, slashes, and other knife techniques including blocks against an opponent armed with a knife.

Using various types of pads and protective gear, operators practice their techniques using full contact as much as possible so that they are used to aggressively delivering kicks, throws, blows and other moves against an opponent who is fighting back. The Special Forces Combatives Course is designed to not just give the operator the physical techniques needed to overcome an enemy at close quarters, but also the mental toughness and aggressiveness to fight to win in life and death encounters.

Among martial arts training that has proved especially well-suited to special operators is Israeli Krav Maga. Like other martial arts systems that are useful for antiterrorist operators, Krav Maga is strongly oriented toward practical, combat usage in no quarter situations. Krav Maga gives the practitioner the ability to inflict maximum pain and damage to an opponent, and then to escape quickly. The basic principles of Krav Maga include: Neutralize a threat quickly, Avoid personal injury, Go from the defense to the attack as soon as possible, Employ the body’s natural reflexes, Attack any vulnerable point, Use any improvised weapon available. To enhance its practicality, Krav Maga teaches the practitioner to fight against several opponents, while protecting someone else, with a leg or arm injured, against armed opponents, and in other situations where the advantage seems to lie with the enemy. Training scenarios may incorporate flashing lights, loud noises, or other disorienting factors to help the Krav Maga practitioner remain focused. Students also learn strong situational awareness so that they can spot potential attacks before they are launched. In addition to Israeli antiterrorist units, other world units including France’s GIGN train in Krav Maga.

Russia’s FSB Alpha and Vympel as well as other units with an antiterrorist mission such as SOBR train in Systema, another martial art designed for real world application. Systema was developed from traditional Cossack close-combat styles. As with the other martial arts that have the best application for special operations, Systema does not train based on set fighting stances and movements; instead, high-speed elliptical strikes are used along with kicks and ground fighting techniques. Systema incorporates a lot of training in countering and using weapons. It also stresses fighting in situations that many martial arts do not address—while sitting in a chair or a vehicle, for example. An interesting aspect of Systema is that students are trained to not adopt an aggressive expression nor to use loud yells when fighting on the assumption that the practitioner will move directly into an attack from a neutral physical appearance, thus granting him surprise.

Spetsnaz martial arts training emphasizes combat against multiple opponents on the assumption that teams will operate in small numbers, generally clandestinely and at night. Techniques against multiple opponents stress putting each one out of the fight as rapidly as possible with deadly or incapacitating strikes. Another aspect of this training is disarming opponents and turning their weapons against them and their comrades. This ability to fight multiple opponents is considered so important that an endurance bout against multiple opponents is incorporated into the brutal Spetsnaz selection procedure.

As part of their martial arts training, Russian special ops units put great stress on the use of the blade. One assumption is that the Spetsnaz operator will have more than one blade available, including an AK74 bayonet, a fixed blade combat knife, a survival knife, a folding utility knife, a hideout knife, and one or more throwing knives. Spetsnaz have also used a ballistic knife that fires the blade at the enemy through a strong spring action. As with other good knife-fighting training, Spetsnaz training emphasizes continuous movement so that an enemy cannot anticipate where an attack will take place. Movements should transform quickly and flawlessly into others and lead to advances, feints, withdrawals, turns, lunges, and slashes so that the enemy will leave himself vulnerable to attack. Spetsnaz are also highly trained to use their sharpened entrenching tool as both a striking and throwing weapon.

Russian naval Spetsnaz and some other units with a MAT mission also train specifically in underwater martial arts to be used against enemy combat swimmers. Russian “Delphin” (naval Spetsnaz) not only spar under water but also practice knife combat underwater not just against humans but against sharks and dolphins, the latter because the U.S. uses dolphins to guard ships and installations. Reportedly, Spetsnaz swimmers have killed enemy swimmers with the blade, including some South African swimmers who may have been attempting to sabotage a Russian/Soviet ship delivering weapons to Africa.

The Republic of Korea’s 707th Special Mission Battalion, which is that country’s antiterrorist unit, draws on a long and rich martial arts tradition in Korea. TaeKwanDo and Hwarang Do are two disciplines that have been taught to Korean special operations personnel. However, a special martial arts system was developed for the most elite Korean special operators. Known as Tukong Moosul, this system was developed in the late 1970s by a group of martial arts masters, but, unlike other Eastern martial arts, which have a strong sport orientation, it is designed as a combat system applicable to the battlefield. As with other military-oriented martial arts, it stresses quick elimination of an enemy as a threat using techniques an operator wearing combat gear can perform readily.

This has been a quick overview of martial arts training designed for antiterrorist operators. Many other systems may be taught or practiced by individual operators, especially those who act as instructors within the units who are constantly looking for techniques which fit their special needs. In addition to knives and clubs, operators may also learn to use crossbows, tomahawks, blowguns, or other silent killing weapons. Whatever the system taught, however, the goal remains the same: to eliminate a threat quickly using techniques readily employed by the operator. no matter what the situation.

Driving

Training is designed to give the operator multiple skills. On the most basic level, he learns to drive an automobile at high speed safely whether in pursuit or escape and evasion. However, high-speed driving training also hones the operator’s reflexes and develops his nerve and judgment. As part of their driving training, operators will learn how to drive both defensively and offensively. When driving offensively, the operator learns techniques for ramming another vehicle, for forcing a vehicle off of the road, and for driving through roadblocks. Part of the ability to drive through roadblocks or to ram is knowing exactly where to hit different types of vehicles to spin them out of control or out of the way. For example, a vehicle with the engine in the front will normally be rammed in the rear, which is lighter and easier to shove away. Operators will also learn to drive on roads that are wet or otherwise slick and how to counter skids. In some cases, they will use controled skids to turn the vehicle. They will learn to perform J-Turns, Bootlegger Turns, and other specialized driving maneuvers.

Once these skills are mastered, the operator must learn how to apply them to tactical situations. For example, he will learn to incorporate his training into VIP driving. He will learn, when operating a vehicle as part of a VIP escort team, to use the vehicle to block traffic for the VIP car as it turns, and to otherwise position the vehicle to protect the VIP car. He will also learn the various vehicle escort techniques and how to operate vehicles when embussing or debussing a close protection team.

As part of his training, which can apply to VIP Protection or other tactical situations, he will learn vehicle anti-ambush drills, including the pick-up of personnel from a disabled vehicle under fire and immediate action drills when in a disabled vehicle.

Many antiterrorist units have specialized vehicles designed with ladders on the roof or in the bed of a truck. Operators will learn to drive these vehicles directly up to a building an aircraft or other venue to deliver operators during an assault.

Operators may also have to know how to operate a wide array of other vehicles, such as motorcycles, trucks, buses, even tanks. Trucks or buses may be used to infiltrate operators close to the site of an assault, or an operator might be inserted into a hostage situation posing as a bus driver. To prepare for dealing with an aircraft hijacking, operators may learn to drive the people movers and service trucks that are used at airports. The SAS used to even put operators through the simulators for large aircraft so that they could board the plane posing as a pilot and at least know the preflight drills.

Though it can only loosely be called driving, some operators learn to ride horses and operate horse-drawn vehicles in case they are deployed to a country where animal power is still widely used. Or, they may learn to use trail bicycles or street racing bikes, which will let them approach an incident site quietly yet quickly or when posing as a cyclist.

Some units will have their own facilities for driving training, but many will use closed airfields that offer long runways for acceleration. Some have access to more sophisticated facilities—France’s GIGN, for example, has done driving training at LeMans. Others use the driving test tracks at car manufacturers.

Many units will send operators through mechanics training on a wide array of vehicles on the assumption that it might give them some useful knowledge in a hostage incident. Many buses, for example, are designed so that mechanics working on them can shut them down or start them in a location other than the driver’s compartment. An operator may want to have the knowledge to rig a remote ignition cutoff for a vehicle supplied to a hostage taker. Knowledge of the mechanics of various vehicles is useful when doing explosive ordnance recces of a VIP car or other vehicle.

Operators may also spend some time at a facility where they harden vehicles used for heads of state or other VIPs, learning how they are designed and built so that they have the knowledge to advise on them while also having the knowledge to deal with a situation should a leader be carjacked in his hardened vehicle.

Teams send operators on a wide array of driving courses so that they are prepared for diverse situations, but also to help keep the operators sharp and motivated. High-speed driving classes, for example, give the operators valid skills but also offer an interesting and exciting change from the normal training regimen for the adrenaline junkies who are members of many antiterrorist units.

Close Protection

Many antiterrorist units will be assigned to close protection details as part of their duties. Most countries already have some type of law enforcement agency that has the mission of protecting government officials. Antiterrorist operators are generally brought in to augment these law enforcement assets in special circumstances. For example, should a country face an increased threat of terrorist assassinations, then antiterrorist operators may augment protective teams. Frequently, if a leader visits areas where threat assessment indicates that he or she is facing particular danger, then anti-terorist operators may be included as part of the security forces. The British SAS, for example, has accompanied members of the Royal Family on some overseas visits. Leaders of countries taking part in the War on Terror who choose to visit their troops in the war zone are very likely to be accompanied by antiterrorist personnel. When the antiterrorist unit is drawn from the armed forces of a nation, they may also be assigned to protect senior military leaders in combat areas.

Members of a nation’s antiterrorist unit may be called upon to provide specialized skills in conjunction with regular protective details. For example, in some countries, the antiterrorist unit is trained to function much as the U.S. Secret Service CAT (Counter Assault Team) to provide heavier firepower should an attack be launched. Skilled snipers from the antiterrorist unit may also function in the countersniper role when world leaders visit their country. In some cases, members of the antiterrorist unit will be brought in to carry out security surveys of venues that will be used during high-level VIP visits.

A similar mission carried out by members of antiterrorist units is assignment to embassies to assess security measures and to augment the regular security force. Not only does this give the embassy additional highly trained security personnel, but it also means operators will be familiar with a country’s overseas embassies should they ever have to carry out a rescue of diplomats held hostage there.

As part of their training of special operations and antiterrorist units of friendly countries, personnel will often provide close protection training. Not only does this training help the client country develop more effective close protection for leaders who are presumably friendly to the country supplying the antiterrorist trainers, but it allows its operators to work more effectively with other units on VIP junkets. Many of the skills needed to perform effectively in the close protection mission will be gained as part of the training of antiterrorist operators. They will already possess excellent close combat skills with firearms and without. They will have received high speed offensive and defensive driving training that will allow them to perform as a VIP driver or train VIP drivers. Their experience with explosives and booby traps will allow them to carry out explosive recces for IEDs. Antiterrorist units receive training in terrorist psychology, which will have a carry over to providing a threat assessment when doing close protection work.

Operators will need to be trained in vehicle and foot escort formations and techniques as well as specific AOP (Assault on Principal) drills that apply in the close protection mission. They will already know how to assess a building for its security, but they will learn to apply these skills specifically to determining whether it offers a secure residence, office, or venue for a principal. Antiterrorist operators will have to learn to adjust to working with a principal and his staff, which should be made somewhat easier due to the fact that they are likely to be only called in when there is a heightened threat. Antiterrorist operators may have to do some adjustment of their rules of engagement when operating in the close protection role, but they normally train for scenarios where terrorists are “shoot” and hostages are “no shoot;” therefore, they should have little trouble operating in the politically charged environment of close protection.

Mountaineering and Skiing

Countries that have mountainous and snowy areas within their boundaries obviously need an antiterrorist unit with the capabilities of operating within them. Just as an example, Austria’s EKO Cobra and the Jagdkommando both train extensively for Alpine operations. Countries without mountainous areas may not need such a capability, yet having at least a few members of the unit who have received mountain warfare training could conceivably prove useful if a rescue were necessary in another country. Some countries, on the surface, might not seem to need a high-altitude capability, yet even the Israeli Army needs ski troops since there is a ski resort on Mt. Hermon.

Some units such as the SAS utilize their Mountain Troops for extreme warfare. As a result, when an SAS Squadron is on its antiterrorist rotation, it will have one troop trained for mountain warfare and probably a few members of other troops who have been through mountain and Arctic training. At least some members of the SBS will also have received cold weather training should an assault in Arctic waters or onto beaches in the Far North be necessary. The Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare training ranks among the most rigorous in the world and prepares graduates to fight in the most extreme conditions.

Mountain training will include free climbing, rope work, rappeling, movement across glaciers, and numerous other mountaineering techniques. Along with learning the techniques operators will have to learn how to survive at altitude and avoid altitude sickness, conserve energy, and protect themselves from frost bite. In fact, survival is an integral part of extreme warfare training. This includes learning to build shelters in Arctic conditions.

Although operators may learn downhill skiing, especially if they are from countries such as Switzerland, Austria, or others where this is a long-held tradition, cross country skiing, which will help an operator move across the snow quickly, will be more useful. Operators may also learn to use dog sleds or snowmobiles.

Operators will learn to survive and move in extreme conditions, but they must also learn to fight in adverse conditions. They will learn to camouflage themselves to blend with the terrain. Another very important skill is learning to shoot using crossed skis as a rest or using other specialized techniques. Operators must learn to keep their weapons operating in extreme conditions as well. Choosing lubricants that won’t freeze and avoiding condensation on the parts that can freeze a weapon making it inoperable are just two important skills that need to be learned.

Should a rescue under extreme conditions be necessary, operators may have to be inserted into mountains or snowy areas via helicopter or parachute. In fjords or other areas that are reachable from the sea, operators must also know how to operate small boats in extreme conditions or carry out underwater approaches from a submarine. Because such insertions are dangerous, they require substantial training if operators are to be adequately prepared.

Since operations in extreme conditions require careful planning, teamwork, attention to detail, and physical fitness, mountain and ski training not only gives the operator skills that may prove invaluable on an actual operation, but also help in his overall development as a highly professional antiterrorist warrior.

Urban Ascent and Descent

Although antiterrorist operators learn various climbing techniques during mountaineering training, they must also learn specialized techniques for ascending or descending buildings that will apply to rescue in urban settings. In addition to standard rappel techniques from roofs, they will also learn techniques such as the Australian repel, in which they descend head down. This technique is useful for reaching a point just above a window, then peeking in with the face just barely over the top sill. Operators also learn to shoot from this position.

Shooting during a rappel is an important aspect of operator training. Not only will operators learn to stop during a rappel and brace their feet against the building for a shot with a handgun, but they may also learn to shoot while swinging past a window. France’s GIGN practices a technique based upon the large number of windows that open inward in Paris and other large French cities. They position themselves, then swing out and kick open the window with their feet. Once in the room they practice quickly engaging any terrorists they see.

Although operators may reach the roof of a building through helicopter insertion or via another roof top, they may also have to ascend on their own. As a result, they have an array of grappling hooks, some of which may be fired onto a roof or other anchor point. Once the climbing rope is secure, they can then ascend the building. Operators practice free-climbing the faces of buildings and often become extremely skilled. GSG-9 operators are known within the anti-terorrist community for being especially good at this. As a trick, they will often direct visitors to climb the stairs in their headquarters to an upstairs room, while they will beat the visitors by free-climbing the side of the building and entering through a window.

Other ascent and descent techniques are practiced, including the use of ladders—often attached to a truck—ramps, poles, and via the shoulders or a stack or other operators. Learning a variety of techniques of this nature not only gives the operators useful skills that may be applied in a rescue, but also helps keep them extremely fit. Most units will have specialized towers built at their training facility that will allow them to practice techniques including shooting from the rappel. Various types of ascents or descents will also be incorporated into training exercises to keep operators sharp.

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE)

As with other aspects of operator training for antiterrorism, the extent to which SERE training is incorporated will depend upon whether units maybe deployed to carry out a rescue in areas where there is a danger of being captured. Units operating only within their own country might not receive SERE training, but, on the other hand, if they are deployed against insurgents who control portions of the country, they might still need these skills. By the very nature of their behind-the-lines missions, military special forces operators will generally have received extensive survival, escape and evasion, as well as, counterinterrogation, training. Just as an example of the potential need for SERE training when carrying out the antiterrorist mission, the aborted Delta Force rescue mission into Iran still managed to get all operators out of the country; however, a scenario in which some had been left behind could certainly have arisen. In that case, operators would have had to attempt to reach Turkey or a sea coast on their own or have instituted an E&E (Escape and Evasion Plan) on which they had been briefed in advance.

SURVIVAL

Operators are first trained to survive should they find themselves in a hostile environment. Such a situation can arise if their helicopter goes down or they become separated during a fire fight from their comrades. It is not inconceivable that, even after a successful rescue in an enemy/terrorist-controled area, operators might have to evacuate hostages to an alternate extraction point or even to a nearby border.

Survival training covers an array of skills that prepare an operator to survive in the water, the desert, the jungle, mountains, even urban areas controled by an enemy. Trainee operators learn to find water; live off of the land by fishing, trapping animals, and recognizing edible plants; provide shelter for themselves, avoid dangerous plants and animals (unless they plan to eat the latter!); and perform first aid to deal with injuries sustained in the field. They also learn to build fires (or not to if a fire could compromise their position), to build rafts for crossing rivers or streams, and to generally make a hostile environment less hostile.

Experienced operators will usually carry a small E&E kit containing basic survival tools—-including a knife, fish line for fishing and making snares, waterproof matches and/or a firestarter, a signal mirror, water purification tablets, and possibly tubing and plastic sheeting to make a solar still. Experienced operators may well tailor the kit to the AO (Area of Operations). For example, in mountain or cold areas, compact solar blankets may be added, while for the desert collapsible bladders to carry additional water may be included.

EVASION

Whether it is necessary for the operator to exfiltrate an area alone or with hostages, he must be trained in techniques of counter-tracking, misleading tracking dogs, setting booby traps along trails to slow pursuers, using streams or other terrain to make himself harder to track, and communication procedures for contacting search and rescue or other units sent to retrieve him. Land navigation, with and without GPS or other aids, will be an important skill, as will camouflage. Training will have taught the operator just how far he can push himself before he must stop and rest. If accompanied by hostages, operators will have to take into consideration their physical condition which may not be good, thus slowing attempted movement. Some operators may lag behind to slow pursuers with ambushes or sniping, particularly when hostages are being exfiltrated.

In some cases operators may have to be extracted via trooper ladder, STABO/SPIES rig, or other devices lowered from a hovering helicopter. Operators must be familiar with a variety of small boats and their engines in case they can steal a boat to exfiltrate via a river, lake, or ocean. They should also know how to start a vehicle without the keys in case they get a chance to steal one to speed their movement.

Perhaps the best known examples of evasion by special operations personnel are the stories of British ex-SAS members Andy McNab and Chris Ryan during the First Gulf War. McNab was captured and some of his fellow soldiers killed, but Ryan made it to the border.

RESISTANCE

This portion of SERE training prepares the operator for the eventuality of being captured. He will learn what the code of conduct is when captured and normally how long he must hold out so that other operators will have a chance to leave the AO or complete the rescue. As part of their counterinterrogation training, operators will be subjected to various physical and psychological techniques that are likely to be used against them. One of the ironies of the angst expressed in some parts of the media over using water boarding during interrogation of captured terrorists is that all members of U.S. special operations forces have been subjected to water boarding as part of their counterinterrogation training.

Members of an antiterrorist unit sent to rescue hostages will be viewed as very high-value captives and hence must be prepared for harsh interrogation. Should they be forced to appear on television as captives, operators are often trained to provide intelligence via subtle eye or finger movements or other techniques.

ESCAPE

The best time to escape is right after capture. As a result, operators must be ready to use their martial arts training or hidden weapons to eliminate any guards and escape before they can be transported to a secure facility. Even in a highly secure lockup, operators may be able to apply some of their skills (i.e. lock picking, wall scaling, and so on) to escape. In the UK, SAS members used to be called upon to test new maximum security prisons and often escaped in a matter of minutes.

Medical Training

Normally, every operator will receive basic first aid and CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) training, which will be updated at set intervals. However, a number of operators will also receive more advanced combat medic training. Those military units that draw from special operations units will have operators who have been through the advanced military medical training, while units drawn from national police units may have to send personnel through combat medic training.

The most advanced combat medical training can take up to a year and include immediate care to stabilize traumatic injuries, triage of injured operators and hostages to determine the care that will be needed upon evacuation, cardiac life support, administration of fluids and drugs, and treatment of common team injuries during training and operations. The special ops medic assigned to antiterrorist duties will also be in charge of preventative care for members of his team. This may include knowing the basic steps necessary to remain healthy in the desert or Arctic, or anywhere in between, and making sure they are followed. The medic will know about infectious deceases common to areas of operations and how to prevent and treat them. He will also know the symptoms of special health issues affecting operators from mountaineering, carrying out HALO/HAHO jumps, or doing combat diving. Medics must be aware of the likely problems that can arise from eating indigenous food and be able to treat stomach disorders. Myriad other duties may fall to the medic with a deployed unit, from making sure fresh, potable water is available to checking that latrines are dug downstream. Since the operators with whom the medic works will be highly motivated and well trained, not to mention quite intelligent, many of these issues will be handled as a matter of routine by experienced personnel.

Good combat medics will also look at uniforms, equipment, and supplies to determine if their design is such that harnesses will chafe, edges will cause cuts, or that there are no other design features that can impact on a unit’s health and safety.

Operators train hard so parachuting or diving injuries are to be expected despite precautions. Doing high-speed entries and rappeling can also lead to injuries. One reason that operators now wear elbow and knee pads is the large number of injuries they can sustain to joints by banging against doorways or leaping into and out of vehicles. By immediately dealing with relatively minor injuries, the team medic can keep them from becoming serious and, should bones be broken or major traumas sustained during training, the medic can stabilize them until the operator gets to a medical facility. Since operators work with explosives, cutting torches, stun grenades, and other such devices, the team medic must also be trained to deal with burns and have available in his kit materials needed to treat them.

Speaking of kit, combat medics learn to organize their medical kit very carefully so that they can immediately put their hands on needed equipment. Some antiterrorist teams actually carry out exercises requiring the medic to determine simulated injuries in complete darkness by feel, then locate the necessary medical supplies in his bag and treat the injuries in total darkness. Flashing lights and sounds of gunfire in surrounding areas may be included to simulate an actual rescue operation.

Special ops medical personnel must be very aware of how helicopter medical evacuation works and how to communicate with the medical evacuation crew, and possibly the doctors at the facility to which the patient will be evacuated. The medic has to know what steps are necessary to prepare the operator or other injured party for medical evacuation and also what diagnostic information they need to send with the patient.

The best trained combat medics will have done a rotation at a big inner-city emergency room, where they will see more gun shot and knife wound victims in a couple of months than they would anywhere other than intense combat. In case it is necessary to save their comrades or rescued hostages, some of these highly trained medics will know how to perform basic surgical procedures such as opening an airway or tying off an artery. At least a few antiterrorist units actually have doctors who are trained operators assigned to the unit. Many former U.S. Special Forces medics go to medical school on leaving the armed forces and at least a few return to serve with special operations units.

It is important that combat medics assigned to antiterrorist units should also be trained as operators. The general SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) during a rescue operation is that once the operators “go in” they do not stop to deal with injured comrades or hostages. Their job is to get to the terrorists as rapidly as possible to prevent them from killing or injuring anyone. The combat medics will usually be with a group of operators that follows the initial entry team and takes control of captured terrorists, secures hostages until their identities are verified, and deals with operators who are down or injured hostages. The combat medic must be able to operate as part of these follow-on teams and, should additional terrorists be encountered, engage them with his weapons effectively. He may be there to save lives, but that might still involve taking the life of a terrorist who suddenly leaps from hiding with plans to kill him or his patients.

Antiterrorist medics also have a responsibility to prepare their teammates for the possibility of injury and brief them on what will happen should they go down. GSG-9 used to actually insert a catheter into the arm of each operator taking part in an assault and tape it off to save time in getting him fluids should he take a hit. As part of their training, antiterrorist teams will incorporate scenarios that simulate a member of the unit being shot or otherwise injured so that other team members learn to move in and assume his duties and the medic learns to stabilize and evacuate him.

Exchange Training

Some of the most valuable training antiterrorist operators get is from other teams with which they carry out exchange programs. Many teams will have developed their own approach to a typical problem faced in anti-terrrorist operations and other teams can learn from that approach. Exchange training may be carried out in a variety of ways. Most of the major antiterrorist teams will have one or two members from allied units on long-term assignment—up to a year or more. Likewise, they will have a few operators on assignment to other teams. The U.S., Australia, Great Britain, and Poland have teams that work together so often that they can virtually interchange members for operations. Other exchanges may only cover a couple of weeks when a substantial number of operators from one unit will visit another to carry out training exercises.

Certain units have developed a reputation for special expertise in certain areas. The British SBS, Australian OAT, and DevGru, for example, have practiced oil rig takedowns extensively and hence can offer a great deal of expertise to members of other units. The Israelis have more experience with suicide bombers than anyone else; so other units can learn from them. Austria’s EKO Cobra and Jagdkommandos are particularly skilled at Alpine operations so those on exchange can learn from them. Other units have specialized skills. Because there are so many good combat shooting schools in the USA, many teams will send exchange trainees to the Combat Applications Group or DevGru so that they can attend courses at Blackwater (now known as Xe) or other facilities. Operators training in the USA may also get a chance to observe big city U.S. SWAT teams who often do more high-risk warrant entries in a month than many antiterrorist units have carried out in their entire history.

Another reason to visit friendly units is to try out their hardware. Operators learn to use a variety of weapons and equipment and sometimes come back to their units and say, “We have to get...!” For example, the SAS adopted the HK MP5 after seeing it in use by GSG-9, And other units who saw the SAS use stun grenades quickly added them to their arsenal. The U.S. Trijicon ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight) became widely used among antiterrorist units when they encountered it with U.S. units. A more low-tech example is the use of elbow and knee pads by operators. Once operators saw other teams using them and realized how many injuries they prevented when doing entries, rappeling, and other things, they became de rigeur for teams all over the world. Reportedly, in fact, since only Spetsnaz wear knee and elbow pads, in Chechnya, terrorists have been known to abort ambushes when they see troops wearing them!

Major SWAT competitions around the world are another way that operators can interact with members of other teams and pick up techniques and gossip. They also get a chance to see new equipment on display with vendors who attend. Likewise, there are a few large trade shows of equipment for antiterrorism/special operations that offer a chance to exchange ideas and view equipment. The one in Jordan each year has an especially good reputation. It helps when the king is a former special operator!